A Flawed Compass: A Human Rights Analysis of the Roadmap to Strengthening Public Safety by Jackson, Michael & Stewart, Graham
The Peter A. Allard School of Law 
Allard Research Commons 
Faculty Publications (Emeriti) Allard Faculty Publications 
2009 
A Flawed Compass: A Human Rights Analysis of the Roadmap to 
Strengthening Public Safety 
Michael Jackson 
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, jackson@allard.ubc.ca 
Graham Stewart 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/emeritus_pubs 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons 
Citation Details 
Michael Jackson & Graham Stewart, "A Flawed Compass: A Human Rights Analysis of the Roadmap to 
Strengthening Public Safety" (2009). 
This Research Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Allard Faculty Publications at Allard 
Research Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications (Emeriti) by an authorized 
administrator of Allard Research Commons. 
 
 
A Flawed Compass: A Human Rights Analysis of 

















MICHAEL JACKSON  





Note to the on-line version 
The on-line version of this report varies from the print version in that minor errors have been 
corrected. 




About the Authors 
Michael Jackson, Q.C. (LL.B (London); LL.M (Yale) has been involved in the 
teaching and advocacy of human rights for over 35 years, specializing in the 
areas of prisoners' rights and aboriginal rights. As a professor at the Univer-
sity of British Columbia's Faculty of Law, he introduced the first courses on 
these subjects in a Canadian law school; as a lawyer he has represented 
prisoners and First Nations in leading cases before the Supreme Court of 
Canada; as a representative of the Canadian Bar Association he has pre-
sented submissions on reforms to the criminal justice system to committees of both the Cana-
dian House of Commons and the Senate. In 1993, he was awarded the Bora Laskin National Fel-
lowship in Human Rights Research. In 1999 he was appointed Queen's Counsel by the Attorney 
General of British Columbia. In 2009 he was the first recipient of the Ed McIsaac Human Rights 
in Corrections Award. His publications include Prisoners of Isolation: Solitary Confinement in 
Canada (1983) and Justice behind the Walls: Human Rights in Canadian Prisons (2002) both of 
which are accessible online at www.justicebehindthewalls.net. 
 
Graham Stewart, MSW retired from his position as the Executive Director of 
the John Howard Society of Canada in June 2007 after 38 years with the Soci-
ety. JHS Canada is the national office for a network of 60 charities across 
Canada concerned with addressing the problems of crime and the rehabilita-
tion of those in prisons and after release. His career began with the John 
Howard Society in 1969 followed by positions in Waterloo Region, Kingston 
and at the John Howard Society of Ontario where he was the Director of Re-
form Programs and in 1990 the Executive Director where he remained until being appointed to 
JHS as Executive Director in 1996. He has extensive experience as a counsellor, administrator 
and policy analyst for the Society. During the last 20 years of his career Graham was responsible 
for the analysis of criminal justice issues, policies and trends, prepared briefs and position pa-
pers on behalf of the Society and acted as the primary spokesperson on policy and reform mat-
ters. Topics he has addressed include issues in corrections, parole and gradual release, sentenc-
ing and sentencing alternatives, young offenders, community corrections and the voluntary sec-
tor. He has represented the JHS at hearings of Parliamentary and Senate committees, various 
commissions and filled other consultative roles. He has also taught courses in criminal justice at 
St. Lawrence College in Kingston and at the University of Ottawa. 
  
A Flawed Compass     Preface: The Roadmap as Public Policy  
i 
 
Table of Contents 
About the Authors ........................................................................................................................... i 
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................. i 
Preface: The Roadmap as Public Policy .......................................................................................... iv 
Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................... viii 
1 Context for the Review:  Problems and Pitfalls ...................................................................... 1 
1.1 Introduction...................................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 A Question of Credibility .................................................................................................. 4 
1.2.1 Reasons for the Review ............................................................................................ 4 
1.2.2 Mandate .................................................................................................................... 5 
1.2.3 Panel Members ......................................................................................................... 6 
1.2.4 Research .................................................................................................................... 8 
1.2.5 Consultations ............................................................................................................ 9 
1.2.6 Managing Strengths and Weaknesses ...................................................................... 9 
1.2.7 Historical Perspective ............................................................................................. 12 
2 Human Rights and Corrections ............................................................................................. 14 
2.1 Dignity’s Child ................................................................................................................. 18 
3 Faulty Premises ..................................................................................................................... 22 
3.1 Crime in Canada ............................................................................................................. 22 
3.2 The Changing Offender Profile ....................................................................................... 26 
4 Constitutional and Legislative Framework of Corrections ................................................... 36 
4.1 Refocusing the CCRA ...................................................................................................... 38 
4.2 Proposed Amendments to s. 4 ....................................................................................... 39 
4.3 Retained Rights and the Least Restrictive Principles ..................................................... 41 
4.4 The Legal and Constitutional Context of the CCRA ........................................................ 43 
4.5 Least Restrictive vs. Appropriate Measures ................................................................... 46 
4.6 The Nature of Prisoners’ Rights – The Citizen Lawbreaker ............................................ 48 
4.7 Removing Prisoners’ Rights – A Suspect Enterprise ...................................................... 51 
5 Conditions of Confinement ................................................................................................... 56 
5.1 Context ........................................................................................................................... 56 
A Flawed Compass     Preface: The Roadmap as Public Policy  
ii 
 
5.2 The Correctional Plan ..................................................................................................... 57 
5.3 Segregation: The Litmus Test of Legitimacy................................................................... 63 
5.4 Gangs .............................................................................................................................. 69 
6 Drugs in Prison ...................................................................................................................... 73 
6.1 The Panel’s Approach ..................................................................................................... 73 
6.2 The Importance of a Humane Visiting Regime .............................................................. 77 
6.3 Reconciling Humane Visiting with Safe Penitentiaries .................................................. 80 
6.4 Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 92 
7 Adequacy of the Inmate Disciplinary Process ....................................................................... 94 
8 Earned Parole ...................................................................................................................... 101 
8.1 The Promise and Purpose of Statutory Release ........................................................... 102 
8.2 Discrediting Statutory Release ..................................................................................... 105 
8.3 Parole as an Alternative to Statutory Release ............................................................. 108 
8.4 Employment as a Condition for Conditional Release................................................... 111 
8.5 The Promise and Implications of an “Accountability Contract” .................................. 112 
8.6 Implications for the Overrepresentation of Aboriginal Prisoners ............................... 114 
8.7 The Unspecified Cost of Abolishing Statutory Release ................................................ 114 
8.8 Abolition of Accelerated Parole Review ....................................................................... 115 
8.9 An Implied Alternative ................................................................................................. 116 
8.10 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 117 
9 Education, Employment and Human Rights ....................................................................... 118 
9.1 Introduction.................................................................................................................. 118 
9.2 Employment and Employability ................................................................................... 121 
9.2.1 Scope ..................................................................................................................... 124 
9.2.2 Feasibility .............................................................................................................. 129 
9.2.3 Logistics ................................................................................................................. 129 
9.2.4 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 130 
9.3 Education ...................................................................................................................... 131 
9.3.1 Education and Recidivism ..................................................................................... 133 
9.3.2 Logistics ................................................................................................................. 140 
9.3.3 Costs and Benefits ................................................................................................. 141 
9.3.4 Computers ............................................................................................................. 142 
A Flawed Compass     Preface: The Roadmap as Public Policy  
iii 
 
9.3.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 146 
10 Aboriginal Offenders ........................................................................................................... 148 
10.1 The Nature of the Problem - Aboriginal Overrepresentation .................................. 149 
10.2 The Appropriate Remedial Response ....................................................................... 154 
10.3 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 160 
11 Physical Infrastructure and Regional Complexes ............................................................... 161 
11.1 To Build New or Replace Existing Structures ............................................................ 162 
11.2 Regional Complexes .................................................................................................. 164 
11.3 Cost ........................................................................................................................... 169 
11.4 An Alternative Planning Approach ........................................................................... 169 
11.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 171 
12 Rhetoric and Reality ............................................................................................................ 172 
12.1 Context ..................................................................................................................... 172 
12.2 Ashley Smith and the Implications for Human Rights .............................................. 180 
12.2.1 What Happened .................................................................................................... 180 
12.2.2 Mental Health Issues ............................................................................................ 181 
12.2.3 Transfer Issues ...................................................................................................... 183 
12.2.4 Segregation Issues ................................................................................................ 183 
12.2.5 Use of Force .......................................................................................................... 184 
12.3 Effects of Segregation ............................................................................................... 185 
12.3.1 The Panel’s Consideration of Segregation ............................................................ 188 
12.4 Grievances ................................................................................................................ 189 
12.4.1 The Panel’s Consideration of Grievances ............................................................. 192 
12.5 Direct Accountability to the Deputy Commissioner for Women ............................. 192 
12.5.1 The Panel’s Response to Direct Accountability for Women ................................. 193 
12.6 Deaths in Custody ..................................................................................................... 194 
12.7 Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 196 
13 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 198 
 
A Flawed Compass     Preface: The Roadmap as Public Policy  
iv 
 
Preface: The Roadmap as Public Policy 
This report is a critical review of the policy paper on the Correctional Service of Canada released 
publicly in December 2007 by a panel appointed by then Minister of Public Safety, the Honour-
able Stockwell Day.  Headlined A Roadmap to Strengthening Public Safety, the report has been 
embraced by the Government and the Correctional Service of Canada as the script for a “trans-
formation” agenda for Canadian federal corrections. Neither the report nor the transformation 
agenda has been subject to any serious public policy analysis or debate, yet corrections is now 
being made over in its image. Makeovers – of faces, bodies and houses - may provide accept-
able scripts for popular reality television shows, but this makeover of federal corrections affects 
not just the external façade of prisons but would undermine the  fundamental human rights of 
the men and women confined behind their walls and fences. Yet the Roadmap makes no refer-
ence to and indeed seems oblivious to the long struggle in the history of Canadian imprison-
ment to entrench a culture of respect for human rights. There are many recommendations of 
the Roadmap which reflect ideological and populist views that being   “tough on crime” is a suf-
ficient and defensible basis for public policy.  Not only will implementation of many of the key 
recommendations undermine respect for human rights but they will also do nothing to enhance 
public safety. They are deeply flawed and we believe it is necessary that the Government and 
CSC be held accountable before the “transformation” makes a mockery of Canada’s commit-
ment to the defence of human rights. 
 There would have been no need to prepare this response had the Roadmap been the result of 
an informed and objective panel whose credibility was not seriously undermined by obvious 
politically partisan influences and ideology. It might not have been necessary if the Panel had 
been aided by expert independent policy and research staff, or if its recommendations had en-
joyed significant public review. It would not have been necessary had there been time for the 
Panel to prepare a carefully constructed analysis that clearly justified its recommendations in 
terms of effectiveness and cost. Neither would it have been necessary had the recommenda-
tions been built upon our well documented correctional history, human rights considerations 
and an understanding of the relevant law. But none of these essential components for respon-
sible, principled and effective public policy making were present. 
What is special about corrections? 
The expectation for the responsible, principled and effective development of public policy ap-
plies to any area of government activity, but it has some particular significance in the area of 
federal corrections. There are three characteristics of the correctional environment that mark it 
out for special vigilance.  
Power 
No other system of government activity entails as much power over individual citizens’ free-
dom. At the federal level the correctional authorities control every element of the lives of those 
sentenced between 2 years and natural life from the basics of food and shelter, clothing, medi-
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cal care, access to family and friends, recreation, education, and religious observance. Privacy is 
a rare commodity even for the most intimate moments and the fundamental values of indi-
viduality and autonomy are subordinated to the exigencies of power and control. 
 Accountability 
We are accustomed and expect that responsibility and accountability of government increases 
proportionately with the power that the system is authorized to exercise. The sweeping power 
and, therefore, the responsibility of the correctional system are unparalleled in free society. 
The exercise of this power in the form of imprisonment occurs behind walls that are intended 
to keep prisoners inside but they also keep the community outside. The walls are a forbidding 
barrier that few Canadians have peered behind either directly or even through the media. The 
barriers are not just concrete and stone walls or razor-wire fences; they involve security prac-
tices that control both behaviour and information. The physical separation and security focus 
makes prison management largely invisible to the public – in contrast with other powerful sys-
tems like the courts that operate in a publicly accessible forum. The accuracy of the information 
that is disseminated is often difficult to confirm though sources other than the correctional sys-
tem’s own communications. 
Indifference and fear  
Finally, prisons hold people who have little claim over the attention or compassion of the gen-
eral community. They have broken the legal code that society depends on for order and safety. 
Some have committed horrible crimes that generate strong feelings of revulsion and fear. Ex-
cept in the aftermath of sensational events in prison, the issue of whether prisoners are treated 
properly is low on the citizenry’s list of priorities. In our current recessionary times where the 
lives of those who live within the rules of society are increasingly challenged, the issue of prison 
conditions is not an obvious vote getter.  
What we have then is a system of great power operating in a forum that is inaccessible by the 
public and media, with only as much public accountability as it takes on itself, characterized by 
a cycle of neglect and abuse leading to horrible events, followed by “reform” with new meas-
ures and standards put in place to redress the problem. Almost inevitably the measures prove 
inadequate or the commitment to them decays over time and a new round of abuse begins. 
Commissions of inquiry, royal commissions and explosive media stories have documented those 
failures beginning with the Brown Commission that castigated the cruel administration of King-
ston Penitentiary in the 1840s and most recently – almost 150 years later -  the Arbour Com-
mission that condemned  the strip searching of women prisoners by male guards at the Prison 
for Women. The “reforms” that the Roadmap advocates are likely to lead to another chapter in 
this history of abuse of human rights, a chapter another commission of inquiry will be called 
upon to document. Our response to the Roadmap is our best effort to raise public awareness to 
forestall that happening.  
Why view correctional policy and through a human rights lens? 
The necessary counterbalance to this cycle to ensure the continued improvement of the condi-
tions of confinement and to guard against the failures and abuse is a complex web of laws, poli-
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cies and practices underpinned by a culture that at its core is intended to address the funda-
mental need of us all, both individually and collectively, to have our human dignity respected. 
Our attempts to institutionalise respect for human dignity in society take many forms but to-
gether they are referred to as “human rights.” Human rights are those rights to human treat-
ment that come solely from the fact that we are human beings. They are not privileges, not 
“earned” or deserved” because of what we have or have not done; they are inherent in nature 
by reason of our common humanity and cannot be cast aside in the name of populist “tough on 
crime” ideology.  
It is easier to implement respect for human dignity and respect of human rights with those we 
respect, love or feel safe with, but to be sure that they are predictably and consistently avail-
able, they must also be the birthright of those we fear and dislike. Prison is the acid test of our 
commitment to human rights. If we can maintain our commitment in our prisons we can do it 
anywhere. If not, then respect for our human dignity becomes conditional and, in the case of 
prisons, based on the decisions of faceless officials operating with the broadest authority in the 
darkest places of society. Ultimately the preservation of rights for all citizens depends on our 
preservation of the rights of those in our prisons. For this reason, important policy develop-
ments in corrections in the past almost inevitably have begun with the careful articulation of 
human rights as reflected in fundamental rules of law and humane practices.  
But in the Roadmap’s latest rendition of public policy there is no reference to human rights. Nor 
do we find any reference to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms or to the common law and 
Charter jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada which together give Canadian legal con-
tent to the international human rights standards set out in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and other international covenants to which Canada is a signatory. The Roadmap’s only 
references to legal rights are presented in the context of diminishing them. That alone is a very 
serious development. In this case, what makes the policy proposals so alarming has been the 
fact that the Ministry responsible for overseeing the correctional system, rather than encourag-
ing the broadest public consultation on recommendations that would undermine much of the 
human rights work  of the last 30 years, has completely endorsed them after only a few weeks 
of closed internal review. Packaged as the “transformation agenda” CSC officials and employees 
(including those who privately have grave reservations about the agenda) along with many in 
the community sector have felt obliged to accept the proposed changes uncritically. With no 
public review or consultation, the plethora of recommendations – some good, some trivial but 
many with draconian implications for the protection of human rights, public safety and the pub-
lic purse, are being presented as the future of federal corrections in Canada. 
Legal and human rights principles have been fundamental to correctional policy in Canada for 
about three decades and while compliance with those principles is always a challenge, they are 
the keystone that holds corrections policy together in a coherent whole.  The absence of such 
principles in the Roadmap requires that our response be sufficiently detailed so that the knowl-
edge and evidence deficiencies in the Roadmap and their deviance from Canada’s long-standing 
principles for corrections can be documented and understood. It is through that lens that we 
have analysed the Roadmap report and assessed the potential success or failure of the correc-
tional measures it proposes.  
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The title of our response and the design of the cover page is informed by the 1990 Green Paper 
published by the Minister of Justice and the Solicitor General of Canada “Directions for Reform: 
A Framework for Sentencing, Corrections and Conditional Release”, which laid the foundations 
for the 1992 Corrections and Conditional Release Act. It, too, had on its cover a symbolic com-
pass pointing to a contemporary model of corrections that reflected the values and principles 
embodied in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. In sharp contrast, the Roadmap is a flawed 
moral and legal compass. It points in the wrong direction without reference to the fundamental 
values and principles of human rights.  
The research and writing of this report was supported by a grant from the Law Foundation of 








Context for the Review  
On April 20th, 2007, The Honourable Stockwell Day, Minister of Public Safety announced the 
appointment of a Panel charged with the task of reviewing the operations of the Correctional 
Service of Canada (CSC).  The Correctional Service of Canada Review Panel (the Panel) was 
composed of Rob Sampson, the former Minister of Corrections for the Ontario Government, 
and four other individuals experienced in the fields of public policy and public safety. The man-
date of the Review Panel was to provide the Minister of Public Safety with advice on a broad 
range of complex topics that have been problematic for CSC over many years. 
Six months after its appointment the Review Panel presented its final report to the Honourable 
Stockwell Day on October 31, 2007. The 170 page report (excluding appendices) entitled “A 
Roadmap to Strengthening Public Safety”,1 contains 109 recommendations organized around 
strengthening five key areas that the Panel considered would enable CSC “to offer greater pub-
lic safety results to Canadians.” The five areas and the Panel’s major recommendations are:  
1. Offender Accountability  
Rehabilitation is a responsibility shared by CSC and the offender.  
The principles of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA) have to be strengthened 
to further emphasize offender responsibility and accountability.  
2. Eliminating Drugs from Prison  
The presence of drugs means that the institutions are not safe and secure environments 
where offenders can focus on rehabilitation. The Panel recommended that CSC strengthen its 
interdiction initiatives on all fronts. 
3. Employability/Employment  
There is a need to enhance both the quantity and quality of work opportunities available in 
penitentiaries leading to opportunities in the community.  
The Panel recommended that CSC implement a more structured workday to allow for the 
proper balance among work, education and correctional programs.  
4. Physical Infrastructure  
The Panel recommended that CSC explore building regional “complexes”; complexes rein-
force an overall correctional management model that stresses the accountabilities of of-
fenders to follow their correctional plans and provide integrated opportunities to improve 
correctional results.  
5. Eliminating Statutory Release; Moving to Earned Parole  
                                                     
1  Report of the Correctional Service of Canada Review Panel: A Roadmap to Strengthening Public Safety ( Minis-
ter of Public Works and Government Services Canada 2007) iii ( hereafter “Roadmap”) online at 
http://www.ps-sp.gc.ca/csc-scc/report-rapport/table_of_contents-eng.aspx 
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The Panel recommended that offenders be required to earn their way back to their home 
communities: they should demonstrate to the National Parole Board that they have changed 
and are capable of living as law-abiding citizens.  
The Government officially responded to the Report in Budget 2008, investing $478.8 million 
over five years to initiate the implementation of a new vision and set the foundation to 
strengthen the federal correctional system and enable CSC to respond comprehensively to the 
Panel’s recommendations. The then CSC Commissioner Keith Coulter established a Transforma-
tion Team to lead CSC’s response to the Report recommendations, led by Senior Deputy Com-
missioner Don Head. On June 27 2008, Mr. Head succeeded Mr. Coulter as the Commissioner. 
In his introduction to the June 2008 edition of Let’s Talk, CSC’s in-house publication, Don Head 
described the nature and trajectory of the envisioned transformation:  
CSC is once again starting a new chapter — this time in response to the CSC Review Panel Report. 
The Panel’s 109 recommendations touch on every aspect of our business, ranging from institu-
tional services to community corrections. Responding to these recommendations will position us 
well for the future to help ensure we achieve excellent public safety results in an integrated and 
consistent manner.   
With remarkable speed unprecedented in the history of Canadian Corrections - a little over a 
year - a blueprint for “transformation” of Canada’s federal correctional system has been identi-
fied by the Panel and has been endorsed and adopted by CSC as the correctional equivalent of 
the holy grail for “how CSC delivers services and …the manner in which we perform our busi-
ness.” Given that we are talking “transformation” rather than incremental change, there has 
been remarkably little discussion or critical commentary,  either in the public domain or among 
the criminal justice NGO community, about  the contours of the Roadmap, analysing its 
strengths, limitations and implications. Is it indeed the pathway to the correctional grail or an-
other step in a long history of well intentioned but flawed attempts to pave over the fault lines 
in the correctional landscape? Is the proposed  transformation really one that will  strengthen 
public safety or an agenda that will threaten  the vital balance between security  and justice, 
and in the process derogate from the development of a culture of respect for human rights and 
undermine Canada’s commitment to live up to  its domestic and international human rights ob-
ligations. 
Our purpose in writing this report is to subject the Roadmap’s recommendations and CSC's 
transformation agenda to the kind of scrutiny that such far-reaching changes in the Canadian 
federal correctional system demands and the Canadian public deserves. Our report is intended 
to present a counterpoint to the Roadmap, one marked by a review of correctional and legal 
history, a consideration of the relevant reports of  royal commissions, task forces and academic 
research and an analysis of the human rights standards and jurisprudence applicable to correc-
tions,  all of which is entirely absent from the Roadmap. On the basis of what we consider a 
stronger historical and legal foundation, one anchored in an unwavering commitment to human 
rights in prison, we will discuss the merits, limitations and the true costs for both public safety 
and human dignity of implementation of the Panel’s recommendations for correctional pro-
grams and services. We will show that the Panel's analysis reveals such fundamental misunder-
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standings and misinterpretation of the Canadian correctional context that both its observations 
and recommendations are indelibly flawed. 
One of the hard lessons the authors have learned from our collective 75 years of being involved 
in Canadian corrections is that there is often a huge gap between the rhetoric and reality of 
change. We have both repeatedly experienced events in Canadian penitentiaries, often in con-
tradiction to the law, policy and stated values of the prison system,  that have been huge disap-
pointments in our quest for the humane  treatment of prisoners.  While prison is one of the 
most difficult environments to respect human dignity, that means we must be ever more vigi-
lant to ensure that the values that we depend on for our quality of life are extended to those in 
prison. We both continue to profess and advocate that a humane prison is a substantially real-
izable and necessary goal. The fact that many important steps have been taken during our 
working lives speaks to the fact that our goal is shared by many dedicated administrators and 
staff within the Correctional Service of Canada. But while the achievements are important and a 
matter for celebration, we must never lose sight of the gaps between the rhetoric and reality. 
The goal of living in a humane society cannot be surrendered - particularly in our prisons.  
Faulty Premises 
Any government-sponsored body charged with the task of making recommendations about the 
future of corrections in Canada should have the hallmark of credibility if it is to engender the 
necessary confidence of Canadians that the recommendations do form a blueprint that is in the 
public interest. Credibility turns on factors such as the reasons for the study, expertise of the 
review Panel in the field under study, objectivity of the chairperson, appropriate resources for 
research, adequacy of the time frame, and the opportunity for public consultation regarding 
the recommendations. In all of these respects the CSC Review Panel reveals serious shortcom-
ings, creating the grave concern that the Panel’s conception, mandate and recommendations 
were unduly influenced by a political and ideological agenda that undermined its correctional 
integrity. 
We analyze how the Panel carefully selected crime statistics that give a distorted view of crime 
trends that are then bootstrapped to justify the “strengthening public safety” agenda. Similarly 
we examine in detail the innuendo and questionable conclusions that the Panel draws from the 
“changing offender profile”. The crime and offender profile data the Panel draws upon to justify 
its agenda is for anyone with a basic knowledge of such matters transparently misused to 
create faulty premises.  
The report paints a picture of crime that purports to show serious violent crime as being on the 
increase by focussing on the 2006 figures without any historical perspective of the cycle of 
crime statistics that show that overall violent crime has been on the decrease. To imply that a 
one-year change constitutes a trend that should influence, let alone justify, far-reaching 
changes to the framework of Canadian corrections is a fundamental error. 
Notwithstanding the public misconception of rising and rampant violent crime, the rate of vio-
lent crime in Canada has not gone up over the past decade. The Panel’s report, far from cor-
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recting this misconception, contributes to its perpetuation. In July 2009 Statistics Canada re-
ported the fifth consecutive annual decline in police-reported crime.  
The Panel’s uncritical acceptance of the “changing offender profile” and misinformed analysis 
of violent crime trends seems to set the stage for many of their most dubious recommenda-
tions. Buying in to the seductive rationale of a more difficult prisoner population sets the stage 
to adopt simplistic sanction-based responses to a whole range of complex problems. Human 
rights, in that context, become an expendable hindrance. The recommendations to change the 
CCRA –to separate “basic” from other rights,  abandon the least restrictive measures standard, 
tighten up on “offender accountability”, link rights and privileges to compliance with  the cor-
rectional plan, reduce access to conditional release, use work as a discipline dressed up as 
treatment, and the placement of drug interdiction before anything else – including justice, flow 
naturally from their view of prisons and crime encapsulated in their attachment to these faulty 
premises. 
 While the Roadmap purports to chart a transformative pathway for Canadian corrections, it 
fails to acknowledge or give due consideration to the relevant historical context in which many 
of its recommendations must be situated.   Remarkably, of the 170 years of available “historical 
perspective” since the opening of Kingston penitentiary in 1835, the Panel's analysis provides 
just two short paragraphs. The history is limited to post 1992.  Did the Panel really believe that 
nothing before 1992 and the adoption of the CCRA - the legislative framework for federal cor-
rections - was of relevance to its recommendations? Yet Canadian corrections has a deep his-
tory that is well documented through a succession of royal commissions, commissions of in-
quiry, government task forces and academic literature. It is also a history that includes discus-
sion of many of the key areas and some of the same recommendation identified by the Panel.   
The Panel patently misconceives the historical context of the CCRA. The Panel seems to believe 
that the legislative purpose of the CCRA was to serve the needs of CSC.  The report treats the 
CCRA as if it were simply a piece of legislation designed to facilitate a narrow set of correctional 
goals that are subject to change depending upon changes in the prison population and opera-
tional requirements. As we document, one of the primary purposes of the CCRA was to bring 
correctional legislation into conformity with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to ensure that 
Canadian correctional authority was exercised within a Charter culture of respect for rights and 
not according to the dictates of administrative convenience. The CCRA was not simply a re-
sponse to the challenges of operational requirements and the offender profile of the federal 
prison population in the 1980s but a far-reaching legislative response to the requirements of 
Canada's Constitution that enshrine Canadian values. It was also intended to reflect in legisla-
tive language the values and principles of CSC’s Mission Statement, a statement that every So-
licitor General and Minister of Public Safety since 1989 has signed and held up to be the key 
principles on which CSC’s operation is to be judged. We believe that the problematic and con-
troversial nature of many of the Panel’s recommendations flow from their lack of consideration 
of the historical and constitutional foundations of the CCRA. 
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Human Rights and Corrections 
We are not the first to make the point that it takes vigilance and courage, both individual and 
collective, to ensure that human rights are protected at those points where they become most 
vulnerable. Within Canada, that vulnerability is nowhere more evident than inside penitentia-
ries. It is because we believe that respect for human rights is fundamental to any transforma-
tion of Canadian corrections that we begin our commentary with the international and domes-
tic human rights framework.  
In our response we argue that human rights is not something that needs to be “balanced” 
against prison discipline and control. Rather, it is something through which prison discipline and 
control is exercised in a professional manner. Discipline and control that is not consistent with 
inherent human dignity, and the rights that give legal meaning to that dignity, is simply the na-
ked exercise of power and as such is inevitably abusive. Legitimate discipline and control is nec-
essary but can only be effective in promoting positive change in the individual, and avoid being 
self-defeating, if it is inherently moral and justifiable. Promoting and respecting human rights is 
not about being soft, it is about being decent. Respect for human rights is a necessary condition 
for the exercise of correctional authority.2 It is also the most effective way of doing corrections.  
In the past several years the commitment to human rights at the upper levels of CSC has con-
siderably wavered. There are those who now think that human rights talk is  out of fashion, as if 
such discourse was a fad  or fetish of liberal-minded people and had no place in a “get tough on 
crime and criminals” world. Little wonder then that a human rights strategy remains a hard sell 
to many staff and the general public. 
In light of the unfinished business of entrenching a culture of respect for human rights within 
Canadian penitentiaries and the wavering commitment within CSC to such an agenda, any re-
port on the future of corrections must include a clarion call to reinvigorate that commitment 
and identify measures and initiatives well calculated to implement it. No such call is to be found 
in the Roadmap.  Instead of a clarion call for greater vigilance in protecting human rights we 
find a virtual open invitation to CSC to dismantle the existing legal and administrative frame-
work and redefine the definition of rights by introducing an ill-conceived hierarchy of rights and 
conditions of confinement dependent upon how well prisoners participate in their correctional 
plan. The Roadmap undermines the fundamental nature of Canada's human rights commit-
ments and puts Canada on a path out of step with the relevant international and domestic hu-
man rights norms. 
In our Response we have repeatedly invoked the concept of human dignity and the principles 
that pour content into its implementation in Canadian corrections to provide the necessary 
framework for understanding the dangers and perils for both public safety and human rights 
                                                     
2
 Michael Ignatieff in A Just Measure of Pain has documented the deep historical links between justice and 
moral legitimacy. John Howard, whose 1777 seminal work The State of the Prisons in England and Wales in-
spired the idea of the modern penitentiary as a humane response to crime, in his proposals for reform of the 
prisons, was insistent that punishment, in order to be effective, must maintain its moral legitimacy in the eyes 
of both the public and the offender. For Howard the most painful punishments and those that aroused the 
greatest guilt were those that observed the strictest standards of justice and morality.   
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that lie along the Panel’s Roadmap and CSC’s transformation agenda.  As we will demonstrate, 
the failure of the Panel to understand that the CCRA was designed to incorporate a Charter cul-
ture of rights into correctional operations undermines their principal recommendations for 
amending the Act. It is to these recommendations that we first turn.  
The Panel’s proposed Amendments to the CCRA 
In justifying what is described as “refocusing the CCRA” the Panel accepts “the key rehabilita-
tive principle and CSC’s responsibility …to provide the offender with ample opportunity to learn 
the skills required to correct behaviour”. At the same time, the Panel “does not view the reha-
bilitation mandate of CSC as a one-way commitment.” We are told that “the foundation of the 
Panel’s philosophy is the belief that if rehabilitation is to occur and truly be sustained, it must 
be shared between CSC and the offender.” Offenders “must seize those opportunities, pick up 
the tools of rehabilitation and use them.” The Panel, therefore,  recommends legislative change 
“to support an increased emphasis on offender accountability” and because the CCRA “is highly 
prescriptive in how CSC should operate, and what it can and cannot do ” proposes changing the 
principle of ‘least restrictive measures’ with the principle of ‘appropriate measures’ to support 
correctional plan implementation”.  
The Panel’s most significant and far reaching proposed amendments to the CCRA are to ss. 4(d) 
and 4(e). In furtherance of its goal to more firmly establish the principle of offender responsibil-
ity in the Act, the Panel suggested several changes to the wording of these sections.  Instead of 
assuming that prisoners are to be imprisoned according to “the least restrictive measures” and 
that prisoners “retain all the rights and privileges that adhere to members of society except for 
those necessarily removed as a result of their imprisonment”, prisoners would be expected to 
earn their rights and privileges.  The only rights that prisoners would retain will be “basic 
rights”.  
Some indication of the Panel’s correctional philosophy can be gained from the articulation of 
the same “basic rights” correctional philosophy that was advanced by members of the former 
Canadian Alliance Party in its dissenting report to the Parliamentary Sub-committee’s Five Year 
review of the CCRA:  
Putting the protection of a law-abiding society first means that it is necessary to accept to some 
degree that the rights and privileges of those who obey the laws of this country are fundamen-
tally different from the rights of those who do not. The system does not do this. 
Section 4 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA) states "that offenders retain the 
rights and privileges of all members of society, except those rights and privileges that are neces-
sarily removed or restricted as a consequence of the sentence." The Canadian Alliance believes 
that any person who has been convicted in a Canadian court should temporarily lose some of 
their rights and privileges as a Canadian. Primary exceptions to this are basic Charter rights such 
as right to an attorney and the right to humane and healthful treatment. We define this as the 
right to be incarcerated in accommodations with reasonable environmental control, to be pro-
vided with basic personal care supplies, to be fed according to the Canadian nutrition guide, and 
to be provided with access to basic medical treatment. Beyond this, prisoners should have the 
ability to earn other rights and privileges such as more freedom within the prison, transfers to 
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more desirable facilities, training programs, sports programs, visitor privileges, payment for 
work performance, canteen privileges, temporary absences and parole. Each of these rights and 
privileges must be earned by appropriate behaviour which in turn means that they can also be 
taken away for inappropriate behaviour.3 
So what is so wrong with requiring prisoners to earn the right to have anything more than their 
basic rights? The fundamental flaw in this and the Panel’s vision of correctional principles is 
fivefold:  
(1) it is inconsistent with the evolving common law and Charter jurisprudence on the human 
rights of prisoners, specifically the judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada in Solosky 
v. The Queen [1980] and Sauvé v. Canada [2003]; 
(2) it disregards the extensive legislative history and context of the CCRA (specifically the 
work of the Correctional Law Review); 
(3) it is out of step with international human rights standards;  
(4) it would compromise respect for the rule of law and human rights in Canadian prisons 
and  
(5) it would undermine rather than promote prisoner reintegration 
This is the Panel’s rationale for the change to the least restrictive measures principle:  
The Panel believes that this principle has been emphasized too much by the staff and manage-
ment of CSC, and even by the courts in everyday decision-making about offenders. As a result an 
imbalance has been created that places the onus on CSC to justify why the least restrictive 
measures shouldn’t be used, rather than on offenders to justify why they should have access to 
privileges based upon their performance under their correctional plans. The Panel believes that 
this imbalance is detrimental to offender responsibility and accountability.4  
The Panel clearly has no appreciation that the principle has been appropriately and necessarily 
emphasised by staff and management and applied ‘even by the courts” because it is in keeping 
with a Charter derived constitutional test to justify reasonable limits on Charter rights and that 
under that test the only justifiable limitations are those that are necessary to achieve a legiti-
mate correctional goal, and that are the least restrictive possible. The onus on the correctional 
authorities to justify that the exercise of their legal authority is in accordance with the least re-
strictive measure is consistent with and indeed mandated by  the "retained rights" principle 
endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada which means that it is not giving rights to inmates 
which requires justification, but rather, restricting them, which does.  
The Panel’s amendment would substitute “appropriate” for “least restrictive measures”. This 
change would substitute for a constitutionally derived standard of restraint on the exercise of 
state power, a policy and operationally derived standard that leaves it entirely up to correc-
                                                     
3  Canadian Alliance  Official Opposition Minority Report on the Corrections and Conditional Release Act ,Jim 
Gouk M.P. included in A Work in Progress:  The Corrections and Conditional Release Act [Ottawa: Public Works 
and Government Services, 2000]  
4  Roadmap, p. 16. 
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tional authorities to determine what are the appropriate measures, so long as they are de-
signed to ensure the protection of the public, staff members and offenders and that are consis-
tent with the management of the offender’s correctional plan. 
The questions never posed and therefore never answered by the Panel are what legitimate cor-
rectional initiatives or interventions are presently precluded by requiring CSC to ensure that it 
respects the least restrictive measures consistent with the protection of the public, staff mem-
bers and offenders and on what conceivable basis  should the federal correctional system, the 
deep end of the criminal justice system, be excepted from the constitutional standards that 
govern all other exercises of state coercive power?   
The Nature of Prisoners’ Rights  
The second major amendment proposed by the Panel is to s. 4(e). The current wording of 4(e) is 
a legislative codification of the Supreme Court of Canada’s pre-Charter decision in Solosky. Sub-
sequent decisions of the Court interpreting the Charter have greatly reinforced this concept of 
retained rights and a careful review of the most important of these cases - Sauvé v. Canada - 
the prisoners voting case - demonstrates that the Panel’s proposed changes are not only incon-
sistent with the Supreme Court’s approach to human rights but would undermine decades of 
important work in Canada and internationally to establish a culture of respect for human rights 
behind prison walls. 
According to the Panel, apart from a basic level of rights, prisoners do not have the right to 
have rights.  The assumption seems to be that human rights properly belong to those who are 
law-abiding members of society. For those who have crossed the threshold to become law-
breakers and have been sentenced to prison the right to bear all but the most “basic” rights is 
forfeited.  Any further rights must then be earned back by the law-breakers who must show 
they have taken responsibility for their criminal actions and are actively engaging in rehabilitat-
ing themselves.  
In Sauvé, the Supreme Court of Canada takes a very different approach to how prisoners’ rights 
are to be understood.  First, and most importantly, Chief Justice McLachlin uses the evocative 
phrase “citizen-lawbreakers”5 to describe prisoners and their relationship to Charter rights.  The 
crucial point is that even after conviction and imprisonment, an offender remains a rights-
bearing individual: the connection between the individual and their common law and Charter 
rights is not severed by a finding of criminal guilt and a sentence of imprisonment. Conse-
quently, prisoners’ rights include the majority of the most robust rights listed in the Charter, 
including freedom of conscience and religion, freedom of thought, equality rights, the right to 
life, liberty and security of the person, language rights, and a considerable list of legal rights. 
The Panel, in proposing that prisoners be allowed  “basic rights” and that any additional rights 
must be earned, views rights as being contingent, in that they can be taken away for ‘bad’ be-
haviour and restored for ‘good ‘behaviour.  This view, however, misconceives at a fundamental 
level the very nature of human rights, as rights that are inherent in the human person, based 
                                                     
5  Sauvé at para. 40. 
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upon a sense of common humanity and dignity. The inherent nature of the rights contained 
within the Charter has been recognized and affirmed by the Supreme Court in Sauvé in their 
statement that “Charter rights are not a matter of privilege or merit, but a function of mem-
bership in the Canadian polity that cannot lightly be cast aside”.  
The Panel’s view of human rights is rendered without reference to the constitutional frame-
work established by Canadian courts. The role of Charter rights in a democracy is to protect the 
integrity of the individual from the coercive power of the state. This function is especially im-
portant in the criminal law context, not only because of the potential for unfair and arbitrary 
action on the part of the state, but also because it is in the criminal context where the individ-
ual has the most to lose – the right to liberty.  Courts have taken their role as protectors of 
these rights seriously and there is a strong jurisprudential history of defending the rights of an 
accused in the criminal law context. However, it must never be forgotten that the correctional 
system is an extension of the criminal justice system.  An individual, while incarcerated, is even 
more vulnerable to rights-infringing action by the state, as he or she is dependent on the state 
for access to all the necessities of life. It is the state that provides their shelter, their food, en-
sures their safety and allows them access to their families through visits, phone calls and mail.  
As Justice Louise Arbour has stated:  
A guilty verdict followed by a custodial sentence is not a grant of authority for the State to disre-
gard the very values that the law, particularly criminal law, seeks to uphold and to vindicate, 
such as honesty, respect for the physical safety of others, respect for privacy and for human dig-
nity. The administration of criminal justice does not end with the verdict and the imposition of a 
sentence. Corrections officials are held to the same standards of integrity and decency as their 
partners in the administration of criminal law.6 
There is another important dimension to understanding the implications of a roadmap that 
would direct Canadian corrections on a journey featuring regimes that limit rights. A consistent 
theme in the history of corrections, not just in Canada but throughout the world, has been the 
struggle to achieve a balance between potentially competing goals, whether expressed as jus-
tice and security/public safety, punishment and rehabilitation, or restraint and reintegration. A 
prominent feature of this history has been that the invocation of imprisonment and the prac-
tices that accompany its execution have been punctuated over the course of two centuries by a 
succession of crises. These crises have led to commissions of inquiry and reports cataloguing 
both the abuses of power taking place within prison walls and the prison's pervasive tendency 
to make prisoners more dangerous and more anti-social. In the last part of the twentieth cen-
tury and into this century it has been increasingly recognized that an indispensable component 
in reconciling the goals of public safety and justice has been promoting a culture of respect for 
the rule of law and human rights and holding correctional authorities accountable for abuses of 
power.  
The most recent of these inquiries in Canada to address this component is that of Justice Louise 
Arbour in 1996 arising from the strip searching and segregation of a group of women at the 
                                                     
6
 Louise Arbour, Commission of Inquiry into Certain Events at the Prison for Women in Kingston, (Ottawa: Public 
Works and Government Services Canada, 1996) at xi 
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Prison for Women. The Arbour report is a seminal document in the history of Canadian correc-
tions, yet the Panel’s report gives no consideration to the recommendations of the Arbour re-
port to entrench respect for the rule of law and human rights in Canada’s penitentiaries. Justice 
Arbour went on to become Chief Prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunals for the 
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, a justice of the Supreme Court of Canada and the United Na-
tions High Commissioner for Human Rights, yet the analysis by one of Canada’s most distin-
guished jurists regarding the importance of and CSC’s historical lack of respect for human rights 
is nowhere acknowledged by the Roadmap.  
The Panel’s recommendations reflect a profound lack of understanding of the constitutional 
and correctional basis for the recognition of and legitimate limitations on the human rights of 
offenders. Implementation of its recommendations, far from being “transformative”, would be 
a deeply regressive development in Canada’s human rights history. 
Conditions of Confinement 
The Panel's recommendations to CSC on how the Service should restructure the conditions of 
confinement in Canadian penitentiaries reveal the same fundamental flaws as its recommenda-
tions regarding amendments to the CCRA. The Panel places great weight on and indeed unques-
tioning belief in the prescriptive excellence of the correctional plan and regard an offender’s 
willingness to engage with it as the pre-requisite to certain rights and privileges and conditions 
of confinement and propose that it be entrenched as an “accountability contract” on which pa-
role release would be contingent. There is more than a little correctional hubris in the assump-
tion that CSC assessors can, in the first few months of a long sentence, definitively diagnose and 
prescribe the exact programs that will address the prisoner’s problems, now and in the future. 
Here, as with so much of corrections, the distance between the rhetoric and the reality is vast.  
The correctional plan typically will identify which of the CSC "menu" of cognitive-based pro-
grams are necessary to address the prisoner's criminogenic needs, risk factors, and reintegra-
tion potential, and any educational upgrading or job training that may be appropriate and 
available. According to policy the development of an offender`s correctional plan is handmade 
and carefully tailored to the offender`s needs, risks and motivation. In practice it more resem-
bles an assembly line mass produced product made from standardised parts. 
While we do not dispute the necessity for a correctional plan, we also reject the notion that as 
presently structured it is all that is required to manage future risk and prepare the person for 
successful release. Effective corrections cannot consist of simply participating in a pre-ordered 
set of programs taken from a very limited menu. The road of personal development is rarely a 
straight one. The route and goals change as we discover new options or barriers. So long as 
choice is involved, the correctional plan must be flexible – to reflect changes in the person and 
his or her goals. Similarly, all the elements must tie together to make sense and build towards a 
process of change. The Roadmap recognizes the need for continuity, but seems to be overly 
and unrealistically confident that this can be accomplished by the professional staff under the 
current framework of the correctional plan. 
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The Panel recommendations are particularly addressed to the unmotivated prisoner who does 
not participate in their correctional plan. It is this offender who the Panel wishes to motivate to 
better cooperate with the correctional authorities by encouraging CSC to identify and prescribe 
conditions of confinement that are tougher for such offenders  than those available to their 
more compliant peers. However, this “they get less” model of motivation is not likely to lead to 
reintegration of offenders, but rather to a harder, tougher cohort of individuals who, in large 
measure, are already quite used to privation. It is also clear from years of experience that if of-
fenders ‘participate’ or attend programs for the sole purpose of avoiding a negative conse-
quence, or to meet expectations of a decision-making authority, they are less likely to internal-
ize the benefits and therefore, ultimately, defeats the purpose of the correctional plan in the 
end. 
The Panel would have CSC undergo a re-examination of rights and privileges and develop re-
gimes based on an offender’s performance under his or her correctional plan and differentiat-
ing access to ‘rights and privileges’ both by security level and such performance.  Less than a 
decade ago when this regimes concept was first advanced, CSC, after consultation with the Na-
tional Associations Active in Criminal Justice (NAACJ) and the Canadian Bar Association, cor-
rectly concluded that trying to develop correctional regimes with differing rights and privileges 
was not a productive discourse. Yet it is now proposed by the Panel as a new idea with no ap-
preciation of its implications or of the road previously travelled by CSC. 
Segregation 
That the Panel’s recommendations would both compromise principles of human dignity and fair 
and just decision-making and undermine the already difficult task of developing within the fed-
eral correctional system a culture of respect for rights is manifested in the Panel’s observations 
and recommendations regarding administrative segregation. Because the time in administrative 
segregation can extend to months, even years, it represents the most powerful form of carceral 
authority. Because the conditions of confinement are the closest thing to solitary confinement, 
it is also the most intensive form of imprisonment. Segregation is perhaps the best documented 
example in Canada of the abuse of correctional power yet the Panel devoted little space to this 
issue. It did however make recommendations to tighten the conditions in voluntary segrega-
tion. The clear implication of the Panel’s analysis is that the conditions of confinement for those 
prisoners in “voluntary” segregation are too soft and need to be toughened up to discourage 
prisoners from checking into or remaining in voluntary segregation. 
 In 1977 the Supreme Court rightly characterized segregation as “a prison within a prison”.  
Administrative segregation was the subject of CSC’s 1975 Vantour report, the 1996 Arbour 
Commission of Inquiry and CSC’s 1997 Report of the Task Force on Segregation, a task force 
convened specifically in response to the damning criticism of Justice Arbour.  It is also the sub-
ject of a large body of scholarly work. Yet the Panel makes no mention of any of this, even 
though the Task Force devoted considerable attention to the issue of voluntary segregation and 
the challenges it presented for CSC.  Every other report that has looked at segregation has ad-
dressed the human rights implications of the conditions of confinement as central to its delib-
erations, as well as addressing the importance of due process in making decisions about placing 
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prisoners in segregation and reviewing these cases to minimize the duration of segregation.  
According to the Panel, the only pressing agenda facing CSC regarding administrative segrega-
tion worthy of inclusion in the transformation agenda is to make the conditions of such segre-
gation less comfortable- presumably by taking away any aspect of confinement - such as a sin-
gle cell - that seems to confer an advantage over those existing in general population. The Panel 
virtually invites CSC to reverse its policy, adopted in response to the recommendations of the 
Task Force on Segregation and after repeated criticism from the Correctional Investigator, that 
prisoners in segregation shall not be double bunked.  Elsewhere in the Panel's report there is 
reference to the Parliamentary Committee’s report on the five-year review of the CCRA, “A 
Work in Progress”. That Committee specifically addressed the issue of administrative segrega-
tion and one of its recommendations was that CSC should appoint independent chairpersons 
for administrative segregation similar to the regime for the disciplinary process. The system of 
independent adjudication of disciplinary cases in which a prisoner can be sentenced to a maxi-
mum of 30 days in segregation (which can be increased to 45 days for multiple convictions) was 
introduced in 1980 following the recommendations of the 1977 report of the Parliamentary 
Subcommittee on the Penitentiary System in Canada.  Since then there have been a succession 
of recommendations from other inquiries, committees and experts for the introduction of in-
dependent adjudication into the process of placement of prisoners in indefinite administrative 
segregation. It has been argued that independent adjudication of segregation decisions is nec-
essary to ensure a fair and unbiased hearing, compliance with the statutory framework, protec-
tion of prisoners’ rights and privileges while segregated, and the implementation of re-
integration plans to ensure that the correctional authorities, in administering the sentence, use 
the least restrictive measures. The recommendation for independent adjudication has been ad-
vanced by Justice Arbour, CSC’s Task Force on Segregation, the Yalden Working Group on Hu-
man Rights, the Parliamentary Sub-Committee on the CCRA, the Canadian Human Rights Com-
mission and the Correctional Investigator. This consensus would seem to all but guarantee that 
CSC would recognize that it merited space in the correctional legal landscape yet CSC has stead-
fastly resisted implementation of these recommendations.7  The Panel makes no mention of 
this outstanding and pressing issue of independent adjudication despite its identification by an 
increasing chorus of commentators, academic, judicial and parliamentary, as an essential part 
of the roadmap for a fair and effective correctional regime.   
Gangs 
The Panel seems to be particularly concerned with those offenders who are doing relatively 
short sentences, who have gang affiliations and who continue to maintain criminal values. Yet 
here again, the research literature that the Panel seems  not to have read strongly suggests that 
a strategy based on greater privation by toughening of the conditions of confinement is unlikely 
to make a positive impression on those who have already experienced a life of alienation and 
privation that  led to their gang involvement. Ironically, as the Panel deliberated CSC received a 
report that provided a comprehensive analysis of the origins of Aboriginal gangs and the social 
                                                     
7  For a detailed history of the issue see Michael Jackson, The Litmus Test of Legitimacy: Independent Adjudica-
tion and Administrative Segregation,  48 Canadian Journal of Criminology and Criminal Justice, 157 (2006) 
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and economic conditions that lead to the formation and recruitment of members. Its major 
findings provide powerful evidence for rejecting the Panel’s “they get less” strategy to motivate 
the non-compliant gang member. What the report demonstrates clearly is that the issue of re-
sponding in the correctional context to young, unmotivated gang members is complex, rooted 
as it is in larger societal conditions and that the avenues for advancing CSC’s  mission and man-
date must be nuanced  and must above all else  be based on “treating inmates like human be-
ings.” Instead what we get from the Panel is a blunt recommendation to sanction the non-
compliant by developing a hierarchy of rights and privileges with more privation and more on-
erous conditions of confinement for the unmotivated prisoner.  
Drugs in Prison 
The Panel makes far-reaching recommendations which it believes will enable the Correctional 
Service of Canada to better wage the war on drugs inside the walls. The Panel’s approach to 
drug use is one dimensional focusing exclusively on greater enforcement with no sensitivity or 
consideration to the implications of the measures proposed on the human rights of prisoners 
and their families to visit and associate.  
There can be no argument that the trafficking of illegal drugs within penitentiaries is a serious 
problem that contributes to violence, the spread of disease and undermines prisoner rehabilita-
tion. There can be no argument that because of these reasons, “illicit drugs are unacceptable in 
a federal penitentiary”. There is also no argument that the proliferation of drugs within Cana-
dian society and the enormous profits to be made from the distribution of illegal drugs has led 
to the growth of international, national and local criminal networks to manufacture and distrib-
ute these commodities. That the drug trade would be a major problem in Canadian penitentia-
ries is neither a revelation nor surprising. A significant part of the federal prison population is 
made up of offenders who come to prison (1) because of illegal drug use - those who are ad-
dicted to illegal drugs and commit offenses such as robberies, to feed their habits or commit 
offences while under the influence of drugs and (2) because of their involvement in the net-
works of drug trafficking. Within the prison walls, therefore, are replicated and concentrated  
the market conditions for a profitable drug trade that exist outside the walls – a demand side of 
users eager to acquire drugs and a supply side of  offenders connected to networks to fill that 
demand. In 1990 a British Columbia Court of Appeal judge commented during a sentencing ap-
peal that “Drugs of all sorts are readily available in our prisons and penitentiaries. Only the 
price varies, in kind and amount, from that which is exacted on the street”.  This comment re-
mains as true today as then.  
It is clear from the list of the Panel recommendations that enhanced security measures, in-
creased use of drug dogs and drug-sensing technology, greater limitations on contact visits, 
more intense surveillance and strengthening of intelligence information and more punitive 
sanctions are the exclusive focus of the Panel’s approach to reform.   Completely absent from 
the Panel’s analysis is any recognition that under the existing law, correctional authorities al-
ready have and use significantly greater powers to conduct searches within federal penitentia-
ries than Canadian society would ever tolerate by the police on the street. Even with these 
greater powers, drugs continue to flow into prisons.   While it might seem reasonable to believe 
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that implementing the Panel’s recommendation of “more stringent control measures (i.e. 
elimination of contact visits)” and requiring that all visits be behind glass might have some im-
pact on reducing the flow of drugs, there is no research evidence to support this. In fact CSC’s 
own internal audit of drug interdiction reveals that over the period 2001-6 drug seizures in the 
visits areas accounted for less than 20% of drug seizures in penitentiaries. We also need to con-
sider that even if the flow could be successfully reduced, this increased scarcity would signifi-
cantly increase the value of drugs and competition for them with the result that the drug trade 
in prison could become more lucrative, desperate and, therefore, more violent. 
Restricting visits beyond the current practice of selective restrictions for those who present se-
curity risks would also have a crippling effect on prisoners and their families. Permitting a hu-
mane visiting regime while ensuring a drug-free penitentiary is impossible if either the visits or 
the drug interdiction must be absolute. Both outcomes are desirable as they reflect recognition 
of the competing interests at stake, recognition entirely absent from the Panel’s analysis. With-
out recognizing these competing interests, the Panel is unable to consider strategies other than 
simply allowing one to exclude the other.  
The Panel makes the mistake of not recognizing that most prisoners and most visitors are not 
involved in the drug trade at all. Depriving them of the opportunity to maintain crucial relation-
ships in the faint hope of  seriously interfering with drug trafficking in prison is arbitrary and 
comes at a cost that is substantial while offering no evidence that drugs will not come in 
through other, potentially more problematic channels. The CCRA recognizes the Charter rights 
of prisoners and visitors, articulates in legislative form the correctional objectives that provide 
the substantial and compelling grounds for placing limitations on those rights and requires that 
any such limitation be the least restrictive measure. These criteria appropriately reflect princi-
ples articulated by the Supreme Court in its Charter jurisprudence and cannot be easily modi-
fied without raising serious questions of constitutionality. The significance of this carefully cali-
brated constitutional order in framing recommendations for reform is completely ignored by 
the Panel. 
Two of the Panel’s recommendations call for greater use of ionscan equipment and drug dogs 
without any cost-benefit analysis or review of CSC’s experience with these anti-drug initiatives.  
In fact, CSC has never been able to produce evidence of studies conducted by them or anyone 
else that establish the reliability of the technology in the field. There is no doubt that the tech-
nology is highly sensitive to certain substances and can identify extremely small amounts. How-
ever, what is in dispute is the degree to which the technology can reliably differentiate between 
substances associated with illegal drugs and many other perfectly legal substances.   
Despite its widespread use in a variety of settings there is a dearth of independent research on 
the reliability of the technology in drug testing in field situations, such as the front gate of a 
prison. In 1998, at the order of Her Majesty’s Prison Service in the United Kingdom, the Police 
Scientific Development Branch conducted a study of six electronic trace drug detection devices, 
under both field and laboratory conditions. Included in these machines were machines utilized 
by CSC, the Barringer Ionscan and the Ion Track Itemiser. The detailed results of the experi-
ments could not be released due to “commercial confidentiality”, but a general conclusion re-
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vealed that the only illegal drug that the machines detected reliably was cocaine, and that for 
other drugs, the machines were “not…currently reliable.”  
 
In 2006, as a result of the concerns by offenders and their visitors about the proper use of Ion 
scan devices an audit was conducted by CSC’s Internal Audit Branch This Audit found that the 
Ion scan policies and procedures were not being followed and provides powerful confirmatory 
evidence that the abuse of ionscanning described in the accounts of visitors are not aberrations 
but part of a systemic failure by CSC staff to comply with law and policy.   
 
The Panel does not seem to have been aware of the existence of this Audit yet confidently rec-
ommends that CSC place more resources in the deployment of this technology without insisting 
on reliability studies conducted in the field and without requiring that CSC demonstrate its 
compliance with law and policy. It is hard to understand, therefore, the Panel’s unquestioning 
endorsement of this and other unnamed “new technologies” except in terms of an unremitting 
and unquestioning faith in intensifying the war on drugs, irrespective of the costs to justice and 
effective corrections.   
We have seen no evidence to support the case that “a more rigorous approach to drug interdic-
tion” would have any more success within prisons than the array of increased enforcement and 
tougher sentencing has had on stemming the flow of drugs coming into Canadian cities and 
communities. In prison, as on the street, prevention and treatment are more hopeful and pro-
ductive strategies to address the intractable problems of drug use. Harm reduction strategies 
offer the best hope to modify the deadly transfer of HIV and Hep C within the prisons and, after 
release, in the community. 
 
CSC’s current Drug Strategy rightly emphasises the elements of prevention and treatment along 
with enforcement. Shifting resources by addressing only “more stringent measures”, as advo-
cated by the Panel, carries unconsidered heavy costs for both a crucial element necessary for a 
humane environment and for an effective drug strategy. Unfairly inhibiting the rights and ability  
of prisoners, their families and their support networks to maintain the bonds of family and 
community necessary for their reintegration into society, has no legitimate place  in a roadmap 
to a just, peaceful and safe society. 
Earned Parole  
The Panel proposes that Statutory Release and Accelerated Day Parole be abolished and re-
placed with a system they call “earned parole” where an offender’s release prior to the warrant 
expiry date would only be possible through a parole decision by the National Parole Board. In 
our response we consider the historical record and the research evidence relevant to the 
Panel’s recommendations and discuss why we think they are ill-conceived and inimical to public 
safety.  
In 1969 the Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections (the Ouimet report) reviewed 
Canada’s experience after the first decade of the Parole Act. The Committee noted that while 
the lowest risk offenders were being released through parole under community based supervi-
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sion, those who had not been granted parole were being released directly to the street with 
neither supervision nor assistance. In other words, those for whom the transition to the com-
munity was likely to be the most difficult were being ignored and left to their own devices. To 
address this shortcoming the Committee proposed that a system be developed “under which 
almost everyone would be released under some form of supervision.” Recognizing that “there 
will be many who will not qualify for parole” they proposed “making the period of statutory 
remission a period of supervision in the community subject to the same procedures that apply 
to parole.” By recommending that community supervision occur during the remitted portion of 
the sentence, the Committee ensured that the community supervision period would be added, 
not subtracted, to the time that would otherwise be served in prison. The Committee’s recom-
mendations were implemented in 1970 through amendments to the Parole Act. 
 It is important to understand the consequences for corrections of the introduction of what 
from 1970 until 1992 was called “mandatory supervision”.  Prior to 1970 a prisoner who was 
not granted parole and who had not lost remission through bad behaviour would be entitled to 
be released at the end of two-thirds of their sentence. At that point the prisoner became a free 
person, subject to no further restraint by the state. As a result of the implementation of the 
recommendations of the Ouimet Committee in 1970, those prisoners not granted parole re-
mained entitled to be released at the two thirds point in their sentence, but instead of being 
free they were now subject to mandatory supervision by a parole officer- in effect a compulsory 
form of parole. During this period of supervision they could be returned to prison to serve the 
rest of their sentence for breach of the conditions of their supervision even though they com-
mitted no new crime. Quite clearly the changes in 1970 amounted to a substantial tightening of 
the correctional screws. The period of time under sentence was increased by fifty percent 
through the addition of the period under mandatory supervision. This change was justified by 
the correctional theory that it would help those who were considered too high risk for parole to 
safely reintegrate into the community. With the passage of the CCRA in 1992 this form of com-
pulsory supervision was renamed “statutory release”. 
The Panel views statutory release as being an unsuccessful program. That conclusion appears to 
be driven primarily by the Panel’s recitation of a few statistics. 
 “Of all statutory release supervision periods in 2005–06, 6 in 10 were completed without revoca-
tion; however, statutory release cases accounted for 79% of violent reoffending in the commu-
nity, while representing 35% of the conditionally released population.  
For another and fairer perspective on the risks of violent offences committed in the community 
by those on statutory release, consideration should be given to the overall contribution of this 
group to violent crime in Canada. In 2006-07 117  violent offences (all types and severity) com-
mitted by statutory release cases constituted 0.035% of the 306,559 (35 per 100,000) violent 
crimes reported by Statistics Canada for that year. No violent crime is acceptable, but before 
we abolish statutory release as an unsafe program it must be understood that with this meas-
ure only a tiny fraction of violent crime would be addressed.  Further, given that release at war-
rant expiry would follow anyway in less than 7 months on average, the likelihood that the of-
fences would only be delayed slightly would mean no noticeable or real difference in the vio-
lent crime we experience in the community. 
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In 2006-07, 58.1% of those on statutory release completed their supervision period success-
fully, while 30.7% who failed to live by the rules were returned to prison for “technical” viola-
tions and 9 % returned with a non-violent crime. That leaves just 2.2% who returned for com-
mitting a violent crime. In fact, the overall rates of both violent and non-violent reoffending by 
those on statutory release have been dropping steadily from an already low rate for many 
years.  
The Panel presents data in such a way as to build a case for their proposition that a violent fail-
ure rate of just 2.2% amongst those identified as being both the highest need and highest risk 
offenders is a failed program that should be abolished.  However the most concerning omission 
in the Panel’s analysis is that they make no attempt to address the single factor that would jus-
tify the abolition of statutory release: whether the same people, if released free and clear at 
the end of their sentence would, during a similar period, commit violent offences at a rate 
lower than the 2.2% rate of statutory release cases. Without this information the Panel is un-
able to provide any valid evidence that abolishing gradual supervised release for these higher-
risk prisoners is not a reasonable balancing of risk against the competing risk of direct unsuper-
vised release to the community. 
The fact that the statutory release cases do relatively worse than the parole group is hardly a 
revelation. As noted already, this outcome was predicted by the Ouimet Committee in recogni-
tion of the fact that statutory release was intended to be used for those who had been refused 
or did not apply for parole.  
The Panel would have us confidently believe that with the abolition of statutory release the 
goal of community reintegration and public safety will be furthered because, through the im-
plementation by CSC of all the Panel’s other recommendations, offenders who would now 
leave prison on statutory release, will be better motivated and prepared to gain their release 
under the reformed “earned” parole model advanced by the Panel. In this way the National Pa-
role Board’s grant rate would increase obviating the need for statutory release. It is our judg-
ment that such confidence is not only misplaced but, based upon any objective analysis, de-
monstrably misconceived. 
The Panel “believes” that many individuals who are either denied or who do not apply for pa-
role would approach their correctional plan with new-found enthusiasm should statutory re-
lease be abolished. In fact, the circumstances of the offense, the inability to produce coherent 
release plans, addictions and mental illness, learning disabilities, illiteracy and many other dis-
advantages constitute weigh heavily against a successful parole application. They are not fac-
tors that most prisoners can easily compensate for or change. Others will have already failed on 
parole and, regardless of the effort they put into their correctional plan while in prison, have no 
reasonable chance of being released on parole again. Additionally, it needs to be recognized 
that family and community support, crucial factors for success, are not available for many pris-
oners and cannot be addressed through a correctional plan.   
The continuous focus of the Panel on “motivation” as a primary factor that determines release 
on parole overlooks the enormous barriers to parole faced by so many prisoners and ignores or 
minimizes what would be required to overcome them.  Clearly, it is difficult to be “motivated” 
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to address factors that are perceived to be beyond a person’s capacity to control.  No incentive 
or punishment can address this perception. The suggestion that large numbers of those cur-
rently being released on statutory release might be released under parole if they tried harder is 
insensitive to systemic and personal disadvantage.  
In surely what is the ultimate case of correctional irony, the CSC Review Panel, 40 years after 
the Ouimet report was tabled, recommends the abolition of statutory release citing “public 
safety” as the reason: the very rationale used by Ouimet to recommend it in the first place and 
relied upon ever since by CSC and successive governments to justify its continuance. The Panel 
does so in apparent ignorance of the history of statutory release and the reasons for its imple-
mentation. The Panel’s lack of historical context for its recommendation is a major public policy 
shortfall.  Had the Panel reviewed that history and the underlying justification for the introduc-
tion of statutory release it might have recognized that its recommendation for its abolition con-
flicts with its own observation “that public safety is best served through a period of supervised 
and supported release for offenders prior to the end of the sentence”. 
Militating against the Panel’s confidence that its transformation agenda will adequately com-
pensate for abolition of statutory release are the Panel’s own recommendations that would 
make it more difficult to “earn” parole. Two of these additional elements of earned parole that 
relate to adherence to the correctional plan and the prospect of community employment raise 
serious issues of implementation and accountability that undermine the Panel’s confidence that 
earned parole is an effective substitute for statutory release. While everyone would agree that 
employment after release is often important, the proposal to make employment an important 
factor for granting parole could have serious and unintended consequences. It is very difficult 
to arrange employment for prisoners or for prisoners to find their own employment while in-
carcerated. Even amongst those few employers who might consider employing a person 
straight out of prison, even fewer would be willing to promise a job without the opportunity to 
interview the individual, being able to assess his qualifications or character and not knowing 
when or if the person would become available. While having a job is an important advantage, 
requiring that a person have a job “or strong likelihood of a job placement” would be an insur-
mountable barrier to parole for the great majority.  
We are left in no doubt that the abolition of statutory release will have a huge impact on the 
federal prison population. The release mechanism that is used in two-thirds of all releases will 
be abolished,  leaving those so affected to serve 50% more time in prison than is the case now. 
To compensate for their statutory release recommendations every prisoner would need to be 
released on earned parole before the two-thirds point in their sentence, the Parole Board 
would need to have a grant rate of almost 100%. We challenge any experienced correctional or 
parole administrator/decision maker to seriously argue that this is a realistic scenario.  
 One very disturbing consequence of the Panel’s proposal to abolish statutory release is the im-
pact it will have on Aboriginal offenders. The overrepresentation of Aboriginal offenders in Ca-
nadian prisons has been condemned by the Supreme Court of Canada as a “national crisis” and 
“a staggering injustice”. As the CSC Research Branch and the Correctional Investigator have 
documented, the grant rates at full parole for Aboriginal offenders fall below the rates for non-
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Aboriginal offenders leading to Aboriginal offenders being released and supervised on statutory 
release at a significantly higher rate. The Panel’s proposed abolition of statutory release would 
see a greater representation of Aboriginal offenders serving their complete sentences in prison, 
further increasing their over representation in federal custody, and thereby deepening the na-
tional crisis and intensifying the injustice. Yet nowhere in its Roadmap does the Panel give this 
implication any consideration. In light of our analysis a strong case can be made that the aggra-
vating impact of the abolition of statutory release on the systemic discrimination facing Abo-
riginal offenders should in and of itself be sufficient reason to reject the Panel’s proposal. 
The Panel makes no effort to quantify the financial costs of its proposed abolition of statutory 
release. However, the Canadian Criminal Justice Association and the John Howard Society of 
Ontario reviewed the likely cost implications of abolition showing that the price for this change 
could approach one billion dollars. While costs should not outweigh community safety, propos-
ing huge expenditures of this nature without any evidence of increased community safety is 
irresponsible public policy especially in the context of the lost opportunities that spending in 
this way represents. With just a fraction of this amount we could better address the issues of 
mental illness in prison and the community and make real progress in reversing the many im-
pediments to Aboriginal reintegration. 
Employment and Employability 
The terms of reference for the Panel include the expectation that they would consider “The 
availability and effectiveness of work programs, including impact on recidivism.” Although only 
one of a number of areas identified in the Terms of Reference, work readiness, training and 
placement both in prison and the community clearly became a substantial focus and priority of 
the Roadmap. If implemented as described by the Panel, the recommendations relating to 
work, training and placement are likely to have enormous cost implications – rivalled only by 
the proposal to abolish statutory release. The recommendations also have very substantial im-
plications for prison administration, program management, community supervision and deci-
sions to grant parole. 
The history of corrections is filled with work or work-training initiatives that in their day were 
thought would reduce recidivism based on the common-sense idea that to be successful after 
release one needed a source of livelihood and a productive place in society. It is difficult to see 
how ex-prisoners can stay free of crime indefinitely without a way to sustain themselves and 
this view is reflected from the start of the report when the Panel states that “without the 
means to earn a living upon release, an offender’s rehabilitation is jeopardized.”  However, as 
the Panel notes, “employment has been eclipsed as a priority over the past decade by programs 
that address other core needs (e.g., substance abuse and violence).” 
The Panel makes no attempt to trace the reasons for the drift from an historically popular focus 
on employment skills to those relating to cognitive skills, mental health, addictions, anger man-
agement, literacy, education and other programs developed over the last few decades. Are we 
to understand from the Panel that these changes were not made on the basis of evidence of 
better results? It would appear that the Panel is simply not familiar with the reasons for this 
very clear and deliberate shift– reflected repeatedly in the “what works” literature that CSC has 
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embraced. Not only does the literature establish clear criteria for effective programming and 
the focus of that programming, it cautions that misdirected initiates can actually make matters 
worse. 
One might expect that the Panel would be aware of the problems that arose from simple as-
sumptions in the past about effective programming and be sensitive to the fact that ideas that 
seem to make sense intuitively often do not work as expected in the unusual world of the 
prison. Further it would be reasonable to expect that the work of the Panel would be strongly 
influenced by the research in recent decades – much of it by the Department of Public Safety 
and CSC that builds an increasingly stronger case for effective program design that works to re-
duce recidivism. For that reason it is essential that the Panel, to the degree that it takes a dif-
ferent course, would marshal evidence that supports the notion that pre-release preparation 
for work, prison-based employment and job placement on release for the majority of prisoners 
is technically possible, financially and operationally feasible and effective in reducing recidivism.  
Unfortunately, here as with so many of their other recommendations, they do not make an evi-
dence-based case and seem oblivious to the implications of the direction they set. 
The Panel seems to think that the CSC Research Branch has placed relatively modest amounts 
of their resources into employment and training research simply as an oversight rather than a 
deliberate strategy to focus research in those areas that their existing research, and that of 
other jurisdictions, see as being most promising.  So certain it is of its conclusions, the Panel ac-
tually proposes that the researchers go out and prove what the Panel is convinced must be 
there - somewhere.  
It is remarkable that the Panel would propose far-reaching changes first and then ask the CSC 
Research Branch to find the evidence to justify those changes. Surely this completely distorts 
the very notion of evidence-based policy into something that could only be described as policy-
based evidence. Further, CSC has already conducted some research on their employment initia-
tives as well as reviews of research in other jurisdictions that appears to have been ignored by 
the Panel. Being one of the most expensive programs, the potential for serious cost-benefit 
misjudgements in relation to employment initiatives is substantial. 
Throughout the report the Panel emphasises the “changing offender profile” and in so doing 
paints the picture of a population with large numbers of violent persons with serious mental 
health, addiction, social deficits, and a plethora of other barriers – all needing to be treated by 
CSC under shorter and shorter time frames. They paint a picture of recalcitrant and unmoti-
vated prisoners who often seek out segregation to avoid addressing their correctional plan that 
the Panel thinks is already undemanding. Having proffered this description of the prison popu-
lation as a foundation for their review, the Panel then claim to have seen examples “that dem-
onstrate that basic education and specific skills can guarantee immediate employment and can 
offer a solid base that an employer can use to build increasing expertise through on-the-job ex-
perience and training.”  
Based on their discovery of these unidentified magical programs, the Panel then places great 
expectations on CSC to make employment during and after release a priority - apparently un-
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fazed by the fact that their recommendations are breathtaking in their scope, complexity and 
cost. 
While some or even most of the initiatives proposed by the Panel could be beneficial, together 
they would require a massive influx of new money to implement. Even with unlimited funds, 
some would be logistically near impossible to achieve. The Panel does not address the financial 
or logistical implications to any serious degree – a flaw that seems even more glaring when the 
current economic downturn and the new economic reality of continuing and increasing gov-
ernment deficit are considered. Nor is the employment of ex-prisoners likely to become a prior-
ity for government spending or the private sector in the face of increasing unemployment gen-
erally. 
A significant increase in the size of prison populations would make it extremely difficult for CSC 
to retain the current programs as they exist, let alone engage in massive expansion.  The lack of 
space in programs, already a barrier to achieving prisoners’ correctional plans, can only become 
much worse. In fact, the Panel does not take into account the anticipated prison population in-
crease to be created by new legislation that introduces long mandatory minimum sentences for 
a whole range of offences and barely considers its own recommendations to abolish statutory 
release and accelerated parole review. The proposals of the Panel reflect the complete oppo-
site of what one might expect of an evidence-based approach to prison rehabilitation. We 
should expect that the evidence for effectiveness for their employment focus would be clearly 
identified first, followed by a feasible strategy for implementation. That strategy would include 
cost implications.  Instead, the Panel first recommends “transformative” changes for CSC with 
employment as a keystone element, and then proposes that CSC develop hitherto unavailable 
“evidence” that will demonstrates the effectiveness of their proposals to reduce recidivism for 
large numbers of offenders. Only then do they suggest that CSC begin to estimate the costs and 
impact of their proposals as they proceed with the implementation of the recommendations.  
Without any of the evidence, implementation strategy or costs addressed, and in the face of 
contrary considerations, CSC announced that it is fully committed to the implementation of the 
Panel’s recommendations. We should all be concerned however that the new focus on em-
ployment will take resources from other areas that have greater potential to reduce recidivism 
and that the Panel’s initiatives will mark another chapter in the history of costly if well inten-
tioned correctional failures. 
Education 
The Panel views education as being a substantial component of their employment and employ-
ability focus when it states “Education has an undisputed role in the personal development and 
professional or vocational success of an individual in Canadian society”. What is surprising is 
that given the importance of education to recidivism and its crucial relationship to the Panel’s 
emphasis on employment, education is the subject of so few recommendations and those that 
are presented are so general.  
On closer examination the Roadmap’s support for education is qualified by other recommenda-
tions and statements that make it clear that the Panel is only supportive of basic education 
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where it is directly tied to employment. The concept of education being justifiable only as an 
avenue to work is contradicted by the evidence and speaks, again, to the ideological focus of 
the Panel. The solution to recidivism is not just about finding work, although that is obviously 
important, it is also about addressing the myriad of problems that stand in the way of finding 
work or other means to sustain oneself as a law-abiding citizen. These factors interact in itera-
tive and complex ways. Addictions might preclude the positive opportunities of education or 
work if left uncontrolled. Education might improve the person’s susceptibility to treatment and 
allow them to progress more quickly. Employment might well be the outcome of successful re-
habilitation as much as a contributor to successful rehabilitation. 
The lack of context and nuance in the Roadmap’s consideration of education has the effect of 
forcing people into an ideologically-determined set of programs rather than create an environ-
ment of personal development through which prisoners are encouraged and supported to find 
their way to a law abiding life after prison.  
As we document in our response, the Panel would have CSC embark on a set of work related 
initiatives that are costly, unresearched and likely unrealizable. Yet the Panel not only would 
subordinate existing education  initiatives to its flawed work strategy but pays scant regard to  
an education strategy that is cost effective,  reflects community standards, is realistic, well re-
searched and consistent with the core values of human rights.   
Aboriginal Offenders 
Whereas in other parts of our response we have criticized the Panel for misunderstanding the 
issues and the nature of the problems facing CSC and for recommending far-reaching, ill-
conceived and unprincipled changes, our critique of their discussion of Aboriginal offenders is 
different. Our issue is not with the Panel’s recommendations but rather that they have not 
been given the necessary profile and priority. This illustrates one of the problems when a 
roadmap is developed with a one-dimensional focus on public safety without sufficient atten-
tion to the justice goals of the criminal justice system. A “transformation” agenda that does not 
address, as the first priority, the staggering injustice that has been and continues to be inflicted 
on Aboriginal peoples is not one that a just society should endorse. 
The problem of Aboriginal overrepresentation in Canadian prisons is well documented and has 
received the attention of a large number of commissions and inquiries and more recently that 
of the Supreme Court of Canada. Yet one looks in vain for any reference to this in the Roadmap. 
It does not even rate a footnote in the changing offender profile section. This is especially trou-
bling since the problem is getting worse. In 1999 the Supreme Court of Canada in the Gladue 
case, referring to the 1997 figures that showed that “Aboriginal peoples constituted close to 3 
percent of the population of Canada and amounted to 12 percent of all federal inmates issued 
this call to action: "These findings cry out for recognition of the magnitude and gravity of the 
problem and for responses to alleviate it. The figures are stark and reflect what may fairly be 
termed a crisis in the Canadian criminal justice system".  Later in its judgment the Court re-
ferred to the “staggering injustice” these figures represented. 
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The Correctional Investigator, in his June 2007 presentation to the Panel, advised the Panel that 
the number of Aboriginal offenders was still increasing and now represents 19.6% of the federal 
incarcerated population and the gaps in correctional outcomes between Aboriginal and other 
offenders are still widening. He warned, “Should the current trends continue unchecked, ex-
perts project the Aboriginal population in Canada's correctional institutions could reach the 
25% mark in less than 10 years”. In his latest 2007-8 Annual Report he writes, “using the latest 
census data, we estimate the overall incarceration rate of Aboriginal Canadians to be 983 per 
100,000, or almost nine times higher than the rate for non-Aboriginal people”. Regrettably the 
Panel’s summary of the nature of the problem demonstrates no appreciation of national ur-
gency or the need for extraordinary efforts to redress the problems that are within the Service’s 
mandate. 
 
While CSC has developed a strategic plan regarding Aboriginal offenders, one endorsed by the 
Panel, there is the substantial disconnect between strategic planning and its implementation. It 
is this disconnect that gives rise to the realities described by the Correctional Investigator in his 
2005-6 Annual Report and submission to the Panel; the over representation of Aboriginal of-
fenders, particularly Aboriginal women, in maximum security, which means prisoners often 
serve their sentences far away from their family and the valuable support of other community 
members, friends and supports such as Elders; the absence of Aboriginal programming in 
maximum-security institutions limiting their ability to be transferred to lower security institu-
tions; the underrepresentation of Aboriginal offenders in minimum-security institutions that 
contributes to their being released later in their sentences than other prisoners; longer periods 
of incarceration and more statutory releases for Aboriginal offenders contribute to less time in 
the community for programming and supportive intervention than for non-Aboriginal offend-
ers; the proportion of Aboriginal offenders under community supervision is  significantly smaller 
than the proportion of non-Aboriginal offenders serving their sentences on conditional release; 
Aboriginal offenders continue to be over-represented as a proportion of offenders referred for 
detention and ultimately detained compared to the other offender groups; parole is more likely 
to be revoked for Aboriginal offenders than non-Aboriginal offenders and Aboriginal offenders 
are re-admitted to federal custody more frequently than non-Aboriginal offenders, repeating  
the cycle of inequitable treatment.   
It is here that the Panel’s failure to properly review the evidence of overrepresentation be-
comes so important. Had the Panel done so how could it in all good conscience have concluded 
that “The Panel recommends that employment be the first priority in supporting Aboriginal of-
fenders in returning to the community”.  That employment would be the Panel's first priority is 
explained not by a careful consideration of the evidence of injustice but by the Panel’s faith 
that employment, coupled with restricting prisoners to basic rights and toughening up prison 
regimes, is the correctional wave of the future. 
Nor could the Panel in good conscience have contented itself with simply recommending that 
“CSC make resources available to respond to the specific needs of Aboriginal offender popula-
tions, such as further investment in correctional programming tailored specifically to their 
needs.” This is hardly the clarion call necessary to respond to a national crisis. In the absence of 
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anything more, the recommendation has to compete with the many other recommendations 
that also call for further resources that may and indeed been given much higher priority. Had 
the Panel taken seriously the importance of restorative justice principles to the reintegration of 
Aboriginal offenders, how could it give the green light to CSC to ramp up security measures and 
place further burdens and injustice on community visitors in ways quite antithetical to the heal-
ing journey. Had the Panel given the necessary restitutional attention to overrepresentation 
and that Aboriginal prisoners are released later in their sentences than other prisoners, how in 
good conscience could it recommend the elimination of statutory release without any concern 
that it would almost certainly mean that Aboriginal offenders will serve even more time? It is 
not too harsh a judgment to conclude that the Panel’s recommendations in the context of the 
systemic causes of Aboriginal overrepresentation and in conjunction for the other criminal jus-
tice initiatives of the Government (including restricting the availability of conditional sentences 
and the expansion of mandatory minimum sentences) provide an unintended roadmap for in-
carcerating even more Aboriginal offenders for even longer periods of time.  
Physical Infrastructure and Regional Complexes 
The Panel appears to have been persuaded by the UCCO submissions that substantial redevel-
opment of the prison infrastructure is needed in order to impose the control and disciplinary 
regimes that the union wants to see implemented. 
Neither author of this response to the Roadmap pretends to be qualified to address matters of 
infrastructure “rust-out” or prison design except in terms of some general principles where the 
location and design of prisons have a bearing on human rights. We have, therefore, focussed 
our response largely on the human rights considerations. That said, we recognize that no struc-
ture can last forever – or should. This is particularly true of prisons that have gone through im-
portant transformations from the days of the Cherry Hill and Auburn Penitentiaries. While 
change is inevitable, and buildings become obsolete, few structures have the lasting power of 
the prison. We need to realize that any prisons built today will be with us for a very long time 
and it is, therefore, essential that if we are to avoid costly and long-lasting mistakes our plans 
must be based on clear correctional objectives, respect for human rights principles and solid 
evidence as to how design supports those objectives and principles. 
If human rights are to be relevant to corrections, then the design and location of prisons must 
give very careful consideration to them so as to avoid creating conditions where attempts to 
respect those rights are undermined by the environment. The constitutional standard reflected 
in the CCRA that CSC  use and justify the least restrictive measures demands that the structures 
that give force to the restrictive nature of the prison be developed to ensure that very careful 
accounting of how “least restrictive measure” has been recognized. Nowhere in the Act does it 
say that administrative convenience, efficiencies or even costs trump rights.  
Good management and good design must complement each other in order to achieve the de-
sired outcome. Neither can be considered in isolation of the other and if the Roadmap is to set 
in motion a process that is intended to make major changes in the “philosophy” of prison de-
sign - to be embodied in concrete and steel - they should articulate the key elements of that 
philosophy and demonstrate how it accommodates the fundamental principles relating to hu-
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man dignity and law of human rights. In fact, other than some tenuous claims to increased effi-
ciencies, we are left to wonder what the plans they articulate tells us about their vision of cor-
rections in the 21st century. 
Before considering new construction or the repair of old prisons, the bigger question that needs 
to be answered is: what prison capacity is needed in Canada in the foreseeable future? The 
comparison between Canada and the US shows that while crime and general growth in the 
population has an impact on imprisonment levels, public policy choices have, by far, the great-
est influence. The fact that over the last two years our current federal government has adopted 
what is generally described as “harsh US style sentencing policies” that rely heavily on manda-
tory sentences for many offences should be of considerable concern for those planning future 
prison accommodations. The Panel, however, makes no attempt to factor these changes in sen-
tencing policies into their proposals. Not only did they ignore the likely impact of the shift to-
wards greater reliance on longer terms of imprisonment through the sentencing process, they 
did not even assess the impact on levels of imprisonment arising from their own recommenda-
tions relation to parole, statutory release and accelerated parole review. The Panel’s recom-
mendations cannot help but generate sharp increases in our federal prison population. The 
abolition of statutory release alone will remove the release mechanism that is used in two-
thirds of all releases and the Panel’s suggestion that their other reforms will result in a dramatic 
increase in the number of prisoners who will earn parole is unrealistic.  
It is quite likely that with both the sentencing and releasing policies changing, the federal gov-
ernment would be hard pressed to build enough prison capacity to keep up with the growing 
population.  Plans to replace the existing prisons for new ones will become increasingly difficult 
to achieve. For these reasons, the discussion of addressing “rust-out” through new construction 
seems like a denial of reality. The Panel’s invitation to consider design justified by the need for 
replacement while ignoring expansion pressures presents both a limited and misleading pic-
ture. 
The new prisons envisaged by the Panel would be distinguishable from existing prisons primar-
ily by a number of characteristics. The size and capacity of the new complexes would be much 
larger than any existing federal penitentiaries. By building physically separate housing units 
within the complex while using common central services such as kitchens, case management, 
administration, and possibly work programs and visiting facilities, distinct populations would be 
housed, at least at nighttimes, in separate units. 
The Panel identifies what they consider to be the problems of discrete facilities and sets out the 
presumed advantages of regional complexes including offering “a continuum of care that is not 
possible now when a transfer between prisons occurs” and economies of scale that “are lost by 
replicating identical management, administrative and operational structures” without any evi-
dence that such advantages might actually be realized or any analysis of the assumptions upon 
which they are based. The Panel provides no discussion of possible disadvantages and fails to 
identify a whole range of other issues that are crucial in redesigning the physical organization of 
imprisonment.  
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Our response identifies a series of questions that relate directly to the ways in which prison de-
sign has a dramatic bearing on how prisoners are treated and the protection of their human 
rights. Administrative convenience has always been a major counterpoint to human rights and a 
massively large institution justified almost entirely on the bases of administrative convenience 
and efficiencies could well shift the pressure even more against the human rights perspective. 
It is interesting to note that the only significant expenditure of the Panel to obtain objective 
third-party “evidence” occurred in relation to their proposal for regional complexes where the 
Panel contracted with Deloitte & Touche to independently estimate the costs of constructing 
and operating a new regional complex facility versus the status quo. While we applaud the 
Panel for seeking something more tangible than their beliefs to ground their recommendations 
in this case, there are two important observations that need to be made about the Deloitte & 
Touche report: 
1. the mandate was extremely limited – with a singular focus on cost while ignoring virtu-
ally all other correctional and human rights considerations, and  
2. the report’s conclusions about costs are cautious and equivocal.   
Based on the lack of clarity or conviction reflected in the Deloitte & Touche report itself, we 
cannot understand either the unbridled enthusiasm of the Panel for this proposal or the appar-
ently uncritical endorsement of their recommendations by the Minister and CSC. The Panel’s 
selective profiling of the regional complex model resembles more a sales pitch more than a se-
rious and thoughtful planning document. It seems ill-advised, and the antithesis of responsible 
correctional governance, to build an infrastructure of prisons – buildings that typically last for 
over a hundred years - on such a weak foundation. Any plan, especially one as massive and 
permanent as regional complexes, must be seriously challenged in the planning stages if we are 
to avoid having many future generations saddled with expensive, obsolete structures. Sadly, 
once again, there is no recognition of the relevance, importance, or even the existence, of hu-
man rights and their implications for their proposed design 
Rhetoric and Reality 
At the very same time the Panel was minimising the conditions within segregation and propos-
ing changes to toughen up the “accountability” of prisoners, Ashley Smith strangled herself to 
death after more than a year of continuous segregation in our federal prisons. Based on our re-
view of the report of the Correctional Investigator we conclude that the agonizing death of this 
nineteen year old in federal custody illustrates powerfully the fatal flaw of the Panel’s vision for 
corrections, by pointing to larger issues that can only be redressed by a roadmap that places 
human rights protection at the centre, not the periphery, of institutional transformation.  
The Panel is not responsible for Ashley Smith's death. But the Panel has adopted writ large the 
same policies adopted by the staff at Grand Valley who subjugated the rights of Ashley Smith to 
the perceived needs of security and control. In our view the Panel was too easily captured by 
those who promote deprivation as a means to achieve compliance in a system where compli-
ance often trumps all other considerations such as the desperate circumstance or mental 
health of the individual. The importance of vigilant and principled leadership in maintaining 
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conditions that respect the rights of individuals confined by the power of the state was missed 
entirely.  
Conclusion  
All of this speaks to the dangers of creating major “transformative” policy virtually overnight by 
a largely unqualified group under a heavy cloud of political expediency. Surely these factors 
alone warrant that the report be set aside as a failed experiment in public policy. That it was 
accepted in its entirety without any apparent internal critical review or public consultation as 
the future for CSC is alarming. Surely in this case the emperor has no clothes. 
The Roadmap seeks to move the Correctional Service of Canada away from an unequivocal 
commitment to respect and protect the human rights of prisoners as the centerpiece of its op-
erations. It is a flawed moral and legal compass. It points in the wrong direction; a direction 
that, tragically and inevitably, will bring yet more chapters in an already overburdened history 
of abuse and mismanagement of correctional authority through disregard of human dignity.  
The Roadmap and Bill C-43 
In June 2009, in the final days of the session the Honourable Peter Van Loan, Minister of Public 
Safety, introduced in Parliament a package of legislative amendments to the CCRA identified as 
Bill C-43.   The direct link between the Roadmap and the proposed amendments is made clear 
in the Minister’s statements “It sets the foundation to strengthen the federal correctional sys-
tem as we are proposing with the tabling of this bill”.8  
We carefully considered adding as a final chapter to this response our commentary on Bill C- 
43. We have decided however that it is better to distribute this commentary as a separate al-
beit companion document. The Roadmap is being held up by CSC as the foundation for correc-
tional transformation displacing and eclipsing every other vision of corrections. The implications 
for the policies, practices and values contained in the Roadmap go far beyond that which re-
quires legislative change and so we did not want readers to assume that Bill-43 is the complete 
response of the Government to the report. Indeed Bill C-43 it is likely to be only the first of sev-
eral Bills, including one to abolish statutory release.  As a matter of historical record we have an 
obligation to make it as clear as we can that this is a vision that offers a false promise of public 
safety obscuring its great detrimental impact on the protection of human rights and effective 
corrections. We also have an obligation to make it clear to those who will be deliberating upon 
the merits of Bill C. 43 that its amendments are not the “modernization” of the correctional sys-
tem as the government would have but a deeply regressive move. 
 
                                                     
8  Backgrounder Bill C-43, June 16, 2009 
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1 Context for the Review:  Problems and Pitfalls 
1.1 Introduction 
On April 20th, 2007, The Honourable Stockwell Day, Minister of Public Safety announced the 
appointment of a Panel charged with the task of reviewing the operations of the Correctional 
Service of Canada (CSC).  The Correctional Service of Canada Review Panel (the Panel) was 
composed of Rob Sampson, the former Minister of Corrections for the Ontario Government, 
and four other individuals experienced in the fields of public policy and public safety. The man-
date of the Review Panel was to provide the Minister of Public Safety with advice on: 
 The availability and effectiveness of rehabilitation programming and support mecha-
nisms in institutions and in the community post release, including the impact on recidi-
vism and any legal framework issues; 
 The availability and effectiveness of programs and services for Aboriginal offenders; 
 Review the recommendations made in the report Moving Forward with Women’s Correc-
tions; 
 The availability and effectiveness of mental health programs and services in institutions 
and in communities; 
 The availability and effectiveness of work programs, including impact on recidivism; 
 The initial placement of offenders convicted of first and second degree murder; 
 CSC’s approach to the location of its Community Correctional Centres and Parole Offices 
in urban areas; 
 CSC’s ability to deal with parole violations, and with frivolous and vexatious grievances 
by offenders; 
 CSC’s plans to enhance services for and support to victims; 
 CSC’s efficiency in delivering on its public safety mandate—identifying barriers and op-
portunities for savings including through physical plant re-alignment and infrastructure 
renewal; 
 CSC’s operational priorities, strategies and plans as defined in its business plan; 
 Current challenges with respect to safety and security in institutions, including those re-
lated to reducing illicit drugs and combating violence, and requirements for the future; 
and 
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 CSC’s capacity to deliver, including its capacity to address infrastructure rust out, main-
tain basic safety and security in institutions and communities, meet its basic policy and 
legal obligations; and adapt to the changing offender profile.9 
In the months that followed the appointment of the Review Panel, the group visited penitentia-
ries, parole offices and halfway houses and met with CSC staff and managers, union representa-
tives and CSC executives. They also met with non-governmental organizations involved in the 
correctional process in Canada, such as the St. Leonard’s Society of Canada and the Elizabeth 
Fry Society.  The Review Panel solicited and received written submissions from key stakeholders 
and interested Canadians and met with many in person to discuss the challenges and possible 
solutions facing corrections. Six months after its appointment the Review Panel presented its 
final report to the Honourable Stockwell Day on October 31, 2007. 
The 170 page report (excluding appendices) entitled “A Roadmap to Strengthening Public 
Safety”, contains 109 recommendations organized around strengthening five key areas that the 
Panel considered would enable CSC “to offer greater public safety results to Canadians.” The 
five areas and the Panel’s major recommendations are:  
1.Offender Accountability  
Rehabilitation is a responsibility shared by CSC and the offender.  
The principles of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA) have to be strengthened 
to further emphasize offender responsibility and accountability.  
2. Eliminating Drugs from Prison  
The presence of drugs means that the institutions are not safe and secure environments 
where offenders can focus on rehabilitation. The Panel recommended that CSC strengthen its 
interdiction initiatives on all fronts. 
3. Employability/Employment  
There is a need to enhance both the quantity and quality of work opportunities available in 
penitentiaries leading to opportunities in the community.  
The Panel recommended that CSC implement a more structured workday to allow for the 
proper balance among work, education and correctional programs.  
4. Physical Infrastructure  
The Panel recommended that CSC explore building regional “complexes”; complexes rein-
force an overall correctional management model that stresses the accountabilities of of-
fenders to follow their correctional plans and provide integrated opportunities to improve 
correctional results.  
5. Eliminating Statutory Release; Moving to Earned Parole  
The Panel recommended that offenders be required to earn their way back to their home 
communities: they should demonstrate to the National Parole Board that they have changed 
and are capable of living as law-abiding citizens.10  
                                                     
9  Report of the Correctional Service of Canada Review Panel: A Roadmap to Strengthening Public Safety ( Minis-
ter of Public Works and Government Services Canada 2007) iii ( hereafter “Roadmap”) online at 
http://www.ps-sp.gc.ca/csc-scc/report-rapport/table_of_contents-eng.aspx  
10  Roadmap, at vii 
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The Government officially responded to the Report in Budget 2008, investing $478.8 million 
over five years to initiate the implementation of a new vision and set the foundation to 
strengthen the federal correctional system and enable CSC to respond comprehensively to the 
Panel’s recommendations. The then CSC Commissioner Keith Coulter established a Transforma-
tion Team to lead CSC’s response to the Report recommendations, led by Senior Deputy Com-
missioner Don Head. On June 27 2008, Mr. Head succeeded Mr. Coulter as the Commissioner. 
In his introduction to the June 2008 edition of Let’s Talk, CSC’s in-house publication, Don Head 
described the nature and trajectory of the envisioned transformation:  
Over the last 30 years, CSC has undergone a number of significant changes that have directly re-
shaped the way that correctional services have been delivered in Canada. For example, the 
McGuigan Report of 1977 contained recommendations for improving the correctional system fol-
lowing a series of violent incidents and hostage takings in 1975 and 1976. In the late 1980s, the 
unit management system introduced an integrated approach to the overall management of of-
fenders in the federal system. Finally, the coming into force of the Corrections and Conditional 
Release Act in 1992 facilitated the modernization of federal corrections by replacing the Peniten-
tiary Act and the Parole Act. Each of these milestones has re-oriented and advanced our ap-
proach to corrections and how we contribute to public safety for Canadians. 
CSC is once again starting a new chapter — this time in response to the CSC Review Panel Report. 
The Panel’s 109 recommendations touch on every aspect of our business, ranging from institu-
tional services to community corrections. Responding to these recommendations will position us 
well for the future to help ensure we achieve excellent public safety results in an integrated and 
consistent manner.11   
With remarkable speed unprecedented in the history of Canadian Corrections - a little over a 
year - a blueprint for “transformation” of Canada’s federal correctional system has been identi-
fied by the Panel and has been endorsed and adopted by CSC as the correctional equivalent of 
the holy grail for “how CSC delivers services and …the manner in which we perform our busi-
ness.” Given that we are talking “transformation” rather than incremental change, there has 
been remarkably little discussion or critical commentary,  either in the public domain or among 
the criminal justice NGO community, about  the contours of the Roadmap, analysing its 
strengths, limitations and implications. Is it indeed the pathway to the correctional grail or an-
other step in a long history of well intentioned but flawed attempts to pave over the fault lines 
in the correctional landscape? Is the proposed  transformation really one that that  will  
strengthen public safety or, as some fear, an agenda that will threaten  the vital balance be-
tween security  and justice and in the process derogate from the development of a culture of 
respect for human rights  and undermine Canada’s commitment to live up to  its domestic and 
international human rights obligations. 
Our purpose in writing this report is to subject the Roadmap’s recommendations and CSC's 
transformation agenda to the kind of scrutiny that such far-reaching changes in the Canadian 
federal correctional system demands and the Canadian public deserves. Our report is intended 
to present a counterpoint to the Roadmap, one marked by a review of correctional and legal 
history, a consideration of the relevant reports of  royal commissions, task forces and academic 
                                                     
11  Let’s Talk Vol 33 No 1 June 2008 online at http://www.ps-sp.gc.ca/csc-scc/report-eng.aspx  
A Flawed Compass         Context for the Review: Problems and Pitfalls  
4 
 
research and an analysis of the human rights standards and jurisprudence applicable to correc-
tions,  all of which is entirely absent from the Roadmap. On the basis of what we consider a 
stronger historical and legal foundation, one anchored in an unwavering commitment to human 
rights in prison, we will discuss the merits, limitations and the true costs for both public safety 
and human dignity of implementation of the Panel’s recommendations for correctional pro-
grams and services. We will show that the Panel's analysis reveals such fundamental misunder-
standings and misinterpretation of the Canadian correctional context that both its observations 
and recommendations are indelibly flawed. 
1.2 A Question of Credibility 
Any government-sponsored body charged with the task of making recommendations about the 
future of corrections in Canada should have the hallmark of credibility if it is to engender the 
necessary confidence of Canadians that the recommendations are in the public interest. Credi-
bility turns on factors such as the reasons for the study, expertise of the review panel in the 
field under study, objectivity of the chairperson, appropriate resources for research, adequacy 
of the time frame, followed by an opportunity for public consultation on the recommendations. 
In all of these respects the CSC Review Panel reveals seriously shortcomings creating the grave 
concern that the Panel’s conception, mandate and recommendations were unduly influenced 
by a political and ideological agenda that undermined its correctional integrity.  
1.2.1 Reasons for the Review 
Prior to the 2006 federal election the Conservative party, at the urging of police, victim and 
prison guard associations made promises to examine the operation of the Correctional Service 
of Canada. Much of the pressure came through the “Club Fed” campaign that presented to the 
public the distorted notion that life for those in our federal prison system was equivalent to a 
holiday resort. 
In a speech to the Canadian Professional Police Association one year before the CSC Review was 
announced then Minister of Justice Vic Toews acknowledged and agreed with the “Club Fed” 
rhetoric when he said: 
I believe that it is time to get tough when it comes to incarcerating violent offenders, and I ap-
plaud the efforts that have been made to put an end to what has been referred to as “Club Fed.12 
In their 2006 election platform the Conservative party made three promises that were directly 
related to recommendations that were later contained in the Roadmap report. They were:  
 Review the operations of Correctional Service Canada with a view to enhancing public 
safety.  
 Ensure federal corrections officers have the tools and training they require to do their job 
as peace officers. 
                                                     
12  Speech for the Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, Vic Toews, Q.C.  Canadian Professional 
Police Association, 3 April 2006, Ottawa, Ontario http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/news-nouv/spe-
disc/2006/doc_31774.html  
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 Replace statutory release (the law entitling a prisoner to parole after serving two-thirds 
of his sentence) with earned parole.
13
 
After the election the government made no effort to hide their intention to make the operation 
of our justice system much tougher. The Prime Minister also articulated his disdain of academ-
ics and others who use “statistics” and lawmakers who recognize that prisoners do not forfeit 
their human rights when he said: 
Some try to pacify Canadians with statistics. 
Your personal experiences and impressions are wrong, they say; crime is really not a problem. 
These apologists remind me of the scene from the Wizard of Oz when the wizard says, "Pay no 
attention to that man behind the curtain. 
But Canadians can see behind the curtain. They know there's a problem. 
And they know it was caused by a generation of lawmakers who embraced the bizarre notion 
that the rights of criminals outweigh the rights of law-abiding citizens.14 
There is little in this statement to encourage Canadians to think that the Conservative’s ap-
proach to crime policy in Canada would be respectful of the rights of all Canadians or based on 
objective evidence. As we will show, it is the Panel that improperly utilizes crime statistics to 
inflame public fear and it is the Panel that demonstrates a cavalier disregard for the last half 
century of developments in human rights law and policy.  
At the press conference announcing the establishment of the Review Panel in April 2007, Minis-
ter Stockwell Day was flanked only by victim and police advocates sending out the clear mes-
sage that the review would address primarily their concerns. During the press conference he 
spoke of only correctional officers and their contribution to corrections.15 Despite the laudable 
efforts of CSC over the past decades to encourage partnerships with non- governmental sector 
organizations such as John Howard, Elizabeth Fry, St Leonards and the many other groups ac-
tive in criminal justice and CSC’s recognition of their integral role in the reintegration of offend-
ers, these organizations had no role in the conception or announcement of the review panel 
nor were they invited to shape its mandate. 
1.2.2 Mandate 
The mandate of the Panel was extensive, yet, to ensure the degree of public and expert consul-
tation, participation and reflection on such major issues, the Panel was given what most ob-
servers believed to be an unreasonably short  50 day window (later extended to six months) 
within which to report to the Minister. Many of the areas of review such as the effectiveness of 
treatment and the role of statutory release are highly complex matters that have each been 
subject to years of detailed research. Yet, the Panel was expected to make recommendations 
                                                     
13 Conservative Party of Canada, Federal Election Platform 2006, http://www.box.net/shared/g4ol2jo0tz    
14 National Post, An address by Stephen Harper, the Prime Minister of Canada. Delivered Friday, January 25, 
2008  
15 Remarks by Honourable Minister Stockwell Day on Correctional Service of Canada, April 20, 2007, Ottawa, 
http://www.ps-sp.gc.ca/media/sp/2007/sp20070420-en.asp  
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on these issues in some definitive way in a few months. Not unreasonably, informed observers 
raised serious concerns about the entire process and the degree to which the Panel was in-
tended to give expert advice or just confirm the Government’s already announced intentions. 
Although extensive, the terms of reference had obvious gaps. Of particular significance they did 
not explicitly include CSC’s performance in and accountability for maintaining respect for the 
rule of law and human rights as an integral part of its mandate. The terms of reference make no 
mention of the principles for corrections that are expressed in CSC’s own Mission Statement or 
the relevance to correctional operations of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.   
The fundamental importance of justice behind the walls is a theme that animated the work of 
the 1977 Parliamentary Subcommittee on the Penitentiary System in Canada, and is one that 
has been addressed in every annual report of the Correctional Investigator. In one of the writ-
ten submissions of the Panel, the hope was expressed that “the absence of specific reference to 
the maintenance of the rule of law and respect for human rights in your terms of reference will 
not mean that the issues of safety and security overshadow your recommendations”.16  Unfor-
tunately the report in its discussion under the key area of offender accountability and its rec-
ommendations for changes in the CCRA shows a lamentable and unacceptable ignorance 
and/or misunderstanding of the legal history of Canada's correctional legislation, the pivotal 
role of the Charter of Rights and the recommendations of these other commissions of inquiry 
and task forces that call for greater commitment from CSC to promoting a culture of respect for 
human rights within Canadian prisons. The Roadmap makes no mention of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms, CSC’s Mission Statement, no reference to leading Supreme Court of Canada 
judgments dealing with prisoners’ rights, nor the recommendations of the Arbour commission 
(the most recent major commission addressing human rights in Canadian prisons). Nowhere is 
there any mention of CSC’s own 1997 report of the Working Group on Human Rights, chaired 
by Max Yalden, former Chief Commissioner of the Canadian Human Rights Commission, and 
that report’s major recommendation that CSC must adopt a human rights strategy as the cen-
trepiece of its strategic planning.   
1.2.3  Panel Members 
One might reasonably think that if principled and research-based new directions in corrections 
were to be expected on so many difficult subjects within a few months, the members of the 
Panel would bring to the task a broad base of expertise and experience in correctional law, pol-
icy and practice. In this case however none had academic training related to criminology, of-
fender treatment or correctional law. Of course academic training is not the only qualification 
for membership on such a panel. Professional policy and field experience may also provide a 
sound basis for mature and balanced correctional judgment. In that light we reviewed the ex-
pertise of the panel members as presented by the Minister. 
 Serge Gascon, retired as the Deputy Chief after a 30-year career with the Police Service of the 
City of Montreal. During his career with the Police Service, he created and introduced a systems 
evaluation program, a career planning model for the Service, and managed major operational 
                                                     
16  Submission of West Coast Prison Justice Society, June 4, 2007 
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initiatives dealing with high-risk events in the city. He has been President of the Regional Com-
mittee of the Criminal Information Service of Quebec, and has served on a variety of committees 
contributing to criminal justice (police, correctional services, justice and parole).  
 Sharon Rosenfeldt began her career as an alcohol and drug abuse counsellor at the Pound-
maker’s Lodge Treatment Centre in Edmonton, Alberta. In 1981, following the abduction and 
murder of her 16-year-old son, she helped co-found Victims of Violence, a national organization 
dedicated to improving the situation of crime victims in Canada. She has also, as part of a career 
as a victims’ advocate, served as the Vice President of the Canadian Police Association’s Re-
source Centre for Victims of Crime.  
 Ian Glen, Q.C. was the Chair of the National Parole Board of Canada from May 2001 to May 
2006. Previously, from 1975 to 2001 he held several senior positions in the federal government, 
including those of assistant deputy and deputy minister.  
 Chief Clarence Louie is a highly respected Aboriginal leader who has been Chief of the Osoyoos 
Indian Band since 1985. He has consistently emphasized economic development as a means to 
improve the standard of living for Aboriginal people. Chief Louie was appointed chairperson of 
the National Aboriginal Economic Development in April 2007 and has received numerous 
awards including the Aboriginal Business Leader Award from All Nations Trust and Development 
Corporation.  
It cannot be disputed that these four panel members are distinguished Canadians and could 
bring to bear their professional experiences, in the areas of policing, the perspectives of crime 
victims, the practise of parole and the particular economic challenges facing Aboriginal offend-
ers reintegrating into their communities. But even collectively one would be hard pressed to 
suggest that they had the range of expertise and experience of the law, policy and practice of 
imprisonment to address the range of subjects in their mandate. Under these circumstance the 
chairperson of the Panel has a heavy responsibility to provide the leadership and expertise that 
is necessary for an adequately broad and comprehensive perspective.   
According to the Minister, the Chairperson of the Panel, Robert Sampson, was from 1995 to 
2003 a member of the Legislative Assembly of Ontario and a member of the Government of On-
tario Cabinet, holding a variety of positions including Minister of Correctional Services from 
June 1999 to April 2002. In 1996, as Parliamentary Assistant to the Ontario Minister of Finance, 
Sampson spearheaded the Ontario Government’s review of legislation and regulations govern-
ing auto insurance coverage in the Province of Ontario. At the time of his appointment as panel 
chairperson he was President of White Label Mortgages Limited, specializing in commercial 
mortgage brokerage services to Canadian corporations and groups. He is also Vice President, 
Corpfinance International Limited, providing debt and equity placements and financial advisory 
assignments for small and medium-sized corporations and all levels of government. While this 
sort of expertise might be welcome in a review of the recent subprime mortgage and liquidity 
crises It would seem that Mr. Sampson’s single obvious qualification for the review of correc-
tions in Canada was the fact that for two years in the mid-ninety’s he was the Minister of Cor-
rectional Service for the Province of Ontario under a Conservative government with strong ties 
to the current federal conservatives.  
If serving as a minister of corrections for two years a decade before at the provincial level was 
sufficient expertise to address the correctional issues put to this Panel, one might then ask why 
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the federal minister, Stockwell Day, with more than two years of federal experience himself, 
needed the Panel at all.  It is disturbing that the important role of being the chair was entrusted 
to Mr. Sampson when he had neither the credibility of an expert on the broad range of subject 
matters under neither review nor the political distance that one would expect for the chairman 
of an ostensibly objective and “independent” review. 17 
For the panel to have broad credibility, it would be essential that the chair be a person with re-
cord of objectivity and intellectual rigour that was broadly recognized. Often, for obvious rea-
sons, retired or active judges are commissioned to lead such panels. They are trained in reason-
ing and inquiry, objective and not publically  nor politically aligned. In fields with serious legal 
implications, they also have obvious strengths in jurisprudence. Finally, judges well understand 
the need to maintain respect for the Rule of Law in a democracy and the potential of powerful 
institutions to abuse those who are under their control. Justices Archambault, Fauteaux, and 
Arbour are all examples of such people having public credibility in addressing complex correc-
tional problems. Similar appointments are used routinely in many other areas of public policy. 
The perspectives of the other Panel members needed to be complemented by  members whose 
expertise included constitutional and correctional law; criminological research in prison admini-
stration, the treatment of offenders  and the experience of imprisonment, including the distinct 
issues facing women and Aboriginal prisoners; an understanding of the mental health issues 
facing corrections; the challenges of prison management and operational needs at a senior 
level within CSC  and the role of citizen based organizations committed to the assistance and 
reintegration of offenders. We are not suggesting that a double digit panel is a sine qua non of 
credibility. Some members could be expected to have expertise in more than one area. But 
given the breadth, complexity and time line of its mandate, a panel with a much greater range 
of expertise was necessary to ensure well-founded recommendations.  
1.2.4 Research 
The creation of a research team is an essential part of any important public policy review.  
Given the scope of the Panel’s mandate it was essential that the services of expert independent 
researchers were available to address the subjects adequately, including the need to compile 
and synthesize the mass of research studies and scholarly literature and review the reports of 
previous inquiries and commissions. This need was particularly great in this case given the lim-
ited range of expertise of the panel members. Putting in place an independent research team 
takes time and resources but neither were available to the Panel. Except for a few dedicated 
CSC managers and staff, the Panel members were left alone to address a mandate larger than 
that given many royal commissions.  
                                                     
17  Following the release of the Roadmap and the Government’s endorsement of its recommendations  Mr. 
Sampson was appointed by the Minister of Public Safety as one of two “external advisors” to assist CSC in 
completing its Strategic Review. Not surprisingly  Mr. Sampson, having chaired the Roadmap Panel, had little 
difficulty in July 2008, in his role as external advisor, to “ attest to the probity” of CSC’s Strategic Review based 
on the key recommendations he had authored and in concluding that the  strategic review was “extremely 
well planned, well led and well executed”.  
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1.2.5 Consultations  
The time constraints under which the Panel laboured severely limited the ability of NGOs and 
others interested in the future of corrections to fully participate and contribute to the review 
Panel’s work. Unlike previous major reviews into the penitentiary system, no consultation 
documentation containing questions or proposals was prepared that would guide those inter-
ested in making a submission.  Hearings were quickly arranged, and those wishing to make writ-
ten submissions were given short lead times and limits of 20 pages within which to make 
them.18 Most importantly, no opportunities were made available for consultation on the actual 
recommendations coming from the Panel - many of which are far reaching, unanticipated, and 
have major implications that appear not to have been considered by the Panel.  
Instead of broad and deep consultation on the Panel’s recommendations, almost immediately 
the Minister and the Correctional Service of Canada indicated that they had adopted a new 
“Transformation” agenda based on the Panel recommendations. Within months the Govern-
ment announced that $122M dollars had been allocated to fast track the changes. In fact, ac-
cording to the most recent Government figures, the total investment over five years amounts 
to $478.8.19 
1.2.6 Managing Strengths and Weaknesses 
When a panel is asked to assess a complex and important issue in a short period of time, the 
potential for problems becomes immediately obvious. That potential was magnified in the case 
of the CSC Review Panel because it was assigned multiple complex issues. Under these circum-
stances, there are a number of strategies that the Panel might take. One option is to defer to 
the staff of the system being investigated. They often have the technical and professional 
knowledge as well as a thorough understanding of the logistical problems and circumstances of 
their system and often have a background of research and policy development. These strengths 
can easily overwhelm a review panel. The problem with this deferential approach is that critical 
observations are likely to be missed, and little is learned. The confirmation of the status quo by 
the review panel creates a stone wall around the operations and policies rather than a window 
that allows others to see inside. Where serious problems exist, this type of response by a re-
view panel simply makes things worse.  
On the other hand, the review panel might strikes out boldly on its own believing that   they 
might be able to use this critical independence to identify important fresh perspectives that can 
serve to create a “roadmap” to a better future. The risk with this approach is that the review 
                                                     
18   While all other participants were instructed to limit their submissions to 20 pages the Panel  accepted a sub-
mission of 53 pages from the Union of Correctional Officers (U.C.C.O.) contributing to a perception that in 
their consultations and in their report the Panel gave greater time and consideration to the  opinions and per-
spectives of correctional officers yet virtually no time or consideration to the opinions of prisoners and their 
advocates. 
19  Correctional Service of Canada, Transforming Corrections, http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/organi/trnsform-
eng.shtml; http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/media/nr/2009/nr20090616-eng.aspx?rss=true  
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panel might simply not comprehend the complexity of the problems and will thrust onto an al-
ready overburdened or weak system a costly and unhealthy new agenda thereby further crip-
pling the system and creating costs that might create new and long-lasting burdens. 
The degree to which being absorbed by the system is a problem or not is dependent on two 
factors: 1) the capabilities of the reviewers as reflected in their experience, knowledge, objec-
tivity, independence and their access to expert resources directly and through consultations, all 
within an adequate time frame and, 2) how well the system being reviewed has evaluated their 
problems already, consulted widely and generated over time principled and evidence–based 
policy proposals and strategies. Where both the Panel’s capabilities and the existing policies are 
strong, the outcomes are most likely to be beneficial. If either is weak, the quality of the out-
comes is likely to be compromised at best. If both factors are weak the review process is very 
unlikely to generate a sound foundation for transformative change. 
Even a panel with limited expertise in particular areas should be able to assess the planning 
worthiness of the organization being examined by applying certain relevant criteria in their 
analysis. Are the existing policies coherent, evidence based, lawful, and with resources that are 
adequate and proportional to the resources allocated to other priorities? Can they all be tied to 
the purpose of corrections as set out in the CCRA? Are the policies reflective of the dignity of 
the individual and the need to protect their human rights? Has short-term political expediencies 
unduly influenced the policies that are currently in place? Our examination of the Roadmap has 
led us to conclude that too often the Panel made poor and unprincipled recommendations by 
amplifying already weak correctional policy. The Panel’s uncritical acceptance of the “changing 
offender profile” and distorted analysis of violent crime trends seems to set the stage for many 
of their most dubious recommendations. Buying in to the seductive rationale of a more difficult 
prisoner population leads to simplistic sanction-based responses to a whole range of complex 
problems. Human rights, in that context, become an expendable hindrance. The recommenda-
tions to change the CCRA to separate “basic” from other rights,  abandon the least restrictive 
measures standard, tighten up on “offender accountability”, link rights and privileges to com-
pliance with  the correctional plan, reduce access to conditional release, use work as a disci-
pline dressed up as treatment, and the placement of drug interdiction before anything else – 
including justice, flow naturally from their view of prisons and crime encapsulated in their at-
tachment to these faulty premises.  
The Panel charted its own course outside of any existing policy envelope in its proposals on 
employment and employability, prison complexes and the abolition of statutory release - pro-
posals that have huge implications for the deprivation of liberty while generating equally seri-
ous new financial costs with no descernable gains to public safety. 
Lest it be thought that we are naysayers, we readily acknowledge that there are important 
parts of the Panel’s report that are built upon CSC’s policy strengths and were able to amplify 
the direction of existing good policy as well as placing some urgency on implementation. The 
recommendations on mental health are the best example of this.  The mental health strategy 
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developed by CSC in 200420 as well as the strategy developed prior to that specifically relating 
to the mental health issues of women prisoners,21 formed a solid, evidence-based and princi-
pled platform from which initiatives to address this complex and crucial problem could be ad-
dressed. This strategic work was strengthened with the development of plans to enhance ser-
vices to the mentally ill after release into the community. Most commentators – professionals 
in the field of mental health, community groups, the Office of the Correctional Investigator22 
and now the Panel23 - have been supportive of these strategies. CSC has made the development 
of services for the mentally ill one of its top 5 priorities.24 The government has even put some 
funding in place – albeit temporary and modest.25 
This broad degree of support occurred in large measure because the strategy was approached 
in an honest, at times almost brutal, assessment that did not protect sacred cows or avoid 
bruising egos. It was, therefore, able to embrace evidence in its design and human rights as its 
motivation. The strategy was probably emboldened by the fact that the Senate of Canada had 
conducted an exhaustive, evidence-based and principled review of the state of mental health 
and addictions in Canada26 that set an environment where critical analysis was expected. Fi-
nally, unlike the correctional environment where deprivation and punishment are still seen by 
many as legitimate means of intervention, few today see any role for punishment and depriva-
tion as helpful strategies to address mental illness. As a result there is greater alignment be-
tween political, public and professional voices leading to informed consensus.  
It is hard to conceive of a less helpful environment for a person facing serious mental illness 
than a federal prison. At its best, it is a place that engenders fear, defensiveness, denial, stigma-
tization and isolation. At its worst it becomes a segregation cell that can put relatively healthy 
people into psychotic states. Compounding the problems are the additional factors that many 
seriously mentally ill are without family support while in prison and outside community re-
sources are often not available. 
 Human rights are our legal formulation to address a basic notion of preserving our individual 
and collective human dignity. It preserves the individual’s human dignity by protecting the per-
son from unfairness and abuse, and it preserves our collective dignity by giving us one means of 
acting in a civilized and respectful manner together. Few areas reflect the need for a human 
rights-based analysis than the care of the mentally ill in our prisons. Unfortunately the Panel did 
                                                     
20   Correctional Service of Canada, Quick Facts: Mental Health Strategy for Corrections, at http://www.csc-
scc.gc.ca/text/pblct/qf/11-eng.shtml  
21  Laishes, Jane. The 2002 Mental Health Strategy For Women Offenders, Correctional Service of Canada at 
http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/prgrm/fsw/mhealth/toc-eng.shtml  
22  Office of the Correctional Investigator, Annual Report 2007-2008, p. 35 at http://www.oci-
bec.gc.ca/rpt/pdf/annrpt/annrpt20072008-eng.pdf  
23  Roadmap, p. 104 
24  Correctional Service Canada, Our Priorities, at http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/organi/prio-eng.shtml 
25  Coulter, Keith. “Improving Capacities to Address Mental Health Needs of Offenders" 31st Canadian Congress 
on Criminal Justice, 2007 at http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/media/spchscommis/2007/07-11-01-eng.shtml  
26  Kirby, M. (Chair) and Keon, W.J.(Co-Chair), Out of the Shadows at Last: Final Report of the Standing Senate 
Committee on Social Affairs, Science and Technology on Mental Health, Mental Illness and Addiction - High-
lights and Recommendations.    Senate of Canada, 2006 
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(a) Historical Perspective 
All Canadians have the right to live in safe 
communities. Threats to that right should be 
addressed swiftly and effectively by the criminal 
justice system. The federal correctional system 
is a critical component of that response. 
Much has changed in Canada’s criminal justice 
system since 1992, when the Corrections and 
Conditional Release Act (CCRA), the statute that 
governs The Correctional Service of Canada 
(CSC), received Royal Assent. In the intervening 
15 years, the nature and size of the federal of-
fender population has steadily changed. The 
CCRA and CSC’s mandate were designed to 
meet the challenges that the criminal justice 
system faced in the late 1980s. The Panel has 
concluded that the principles of the CCRA do not 
address the current and future challenges facing 
CSC.  
Roadmap p. 1 
 
 
not address this issue from a rights-based perspective and so their response lacks principled 
analysis or moral urgency.  However, because the underlying mental health strategy was prem-
ised on such an analysis, the recommendations are strong and sensible.  The Panel, perhaps in 
part influenced by the breadth of support and in part by the professionalism of the planning 
and strategic direction, also endorsed the strategy. Indeed most of the Panel’s recommenda-
tions are already in the plan. 
1.2.7    Historical Perspective 
While the Roadmap purports to chart a transformative pathway for Canadian corrections, it 
fails to acknowledge or give due consideration to the relevant historical context in which many 
of its recommendations must be situated.  Remarkably, of the 170 years of available “historical 
perspective” since the opening of Kingston 
penitentiary in 1835, the Panel's analysis on 
page 1 (shown in text box) provides just two 
short paragraphs. The history is limited to 
post 1992.  Did the Panel really believe that 
nothing before 1992 and the adoption of 
the CCRA was of relevance to its recom-
mendations? Canadian corrections has a 
deep history that is well documented 
through a succession of royal commissions, 
commissions of inquiry, government task 
forces and academic literature that deserves 
careful consideration. It is also a history that 
includes discussion of many of the key areas 
and some of the same recommendations 
identified by the Panel.  What confidence 
can the public have that the transformation 
agenda will improve public safety when no 
consideration has been given to why some 
of the same recommendations made by the 
Panel that have been made by previous re-
ports have not been successful in achieving their goals? 
The absence of any understanding of correctional history condemns the Panel to repeat the 
mistakes of the past. The Panel’s Roadmap for the 21st century harkens back to the earliest and 
simplest concepts of the early 19th century penitentiaries.27 Removal of rights, which increases 
                                                     
27  The first penitentiaries in North America, the Auburn Prison in New York and the “Cherry Hill” Eastern Penn-
sylvania Penitentiary in Philadelphia introduced the innovative idea that prisons could be used for both pun-
ishment (as an alternative to torture or death) and for reformation by making the prisoner change his way. 
Each adopted a distinct theory about how the reformation of the prisoner could be achieved. As described by 
the 1969 Ouimet Commission:  
 These two prisons were built between 1820 and 1830. They appear to have influenced, until about a dec-
ade ago [1955] the design and program for carceral institutions in the Western world. 
A Flawed Compass         Context for the Review: Problems and Pitfalls  
13 
 
isolation, is presented as the solution for “unmotivated” prisoners. Excessive reliance on work 
to bring about individual reform, combined with dramatic proposals to abandon reintegration 
strategies for the majority of prisoners through the abolition of Statutory Release, are pre-
sented as the new foundation for a modern correctional system, oblivious to the fact that we 
have already been there. 
Even in their short two-paragraph historical review, the Panel patently misconceives the his-
torical context of the CCRA. They seem to believe that the legislative purpose of the CCRA was 
to serve the needs of CSC.  The report treats the CCRA as if it were simply a piece of legislation 
designed to facilitate a narrow set of correctional goals that are subject to change depending 
upon changes in the prison population and operational requirements. As we will detail later, 
the legislative context of the CCRA is previewed in the Correctional Law Review working papers 
and, as they make clear, one of the primary purposes of the CCRA was to bring correctional leg-
islation into conformity with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms to ensure that Canadian cor-
rectional authority was exercised within a Charter culture of respect for rights and not accord-
ing to the dictates of administrative convenience. The CCRA was not, therefore, simply a re-
sponse to the challenges of operational requirements and the offender profile of the federal 
prison population in the 1980s but a far-reaching legislative response to the requirements of 
Canada's Constitution that enshrined Canadian values.  It was also intended to reflect in legisla-
tive language the values and principles of CSC’s Mission Statement, a statement that every So-
licitor General and Minister of Public Safety since 1989 has signed and held up to be the key 
principles on which CSC’s operation is to be judged. We believe that the problematic and con-
troversial nature of many of the Panel’s recommendations flow from their lack of consideration 
of the historical and constitutional foundations of the CCRA.  
The need for historical context is vital for another reason that directly impacts public safety. 
The circumstances that gave rise to the recognition of the legal obligations of CSC to respect 
human rights were ones following violent events. Inquiries and court interventions disclosed 
abuses of power and inhumane conditions of imprisonment. To relax the vigilance of CSC from 
even its current fragile “commitment” to human rights simply invites a repetition of those tragic 
and costly events.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                           
 In the Eastern Pennsylvania Penitentiary, a man was put into a cell alone with his Bible and his thoughts 
(the theory being that he would repent and reform); whereas in the Auburn Prison inmates were let out 
of their cells by day to work together in shops while being forbidden to speak and required to march in 
lockstep with a downcast gaze. The latter system rested on the theory that hard work, not solitary pen-
ance, would both punish and reform. However, the efficacy of such methods has not been demonstrated. 
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2 Human Rights and Corrections 
We are not the first to make the point that it takes vigilance and courage, both individual and 
collective, to ensure that human rights are protected at those points where they become most 
vulnerable. Within Canada, that vulnerability is nowhere more evident than inside penitentia-
ries. It is because we believe that respect for human rights is fundamental to any “transforma-
tion” of Canadian corrections that we begin our commentary with the international and domes-
tic human rights framework.  
In the material that follows we will try to demonstrate that human rights is not something that 
needs to be “balanced” against prison discipline and control. Rather, it is something through 
which prison discipline and control is exercised in a professional manner. Discipline and control 
that is not consistent with the inherent human dignity, and the rights that give legal meaning to 
that dignity, is simply the naked exercise of power and as such is inevitably abusive. Legitimate 
discipline and control is necessary but can only be effective in promoting positive change in the 
individual and avoid being self-defeating, if it is inherently moral and justifiable.28 Promoting 
and respecting human rights is not about being soft, it is about being decent. Respect for hu-
man rights is a necessary condition for the exercise of correctional authority. 
On December 10, 2008 Canada joined other nations in marking the 60th anniversary of the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights.  We did so with the knowledge that, as much as any coun-
try, we have endeavoured to live up to the ideals and standards set by this statement of fun-
damental human rights, and with added pride that a Canadian, John Humphrey, played a lead-
ing role in drafting and guiding the Declaration through the United Nations in 1948. Article 1 of 
the Universal Declaration affirms that "All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and 
rights."29 As Max Yalden, former Chief Commissioner of the Canadian Human Rights Commis-
sion and a commissioner with the United Nations Human Rights Commission, stated on the oc-
casion of the 50th anniversary of the Declaration, this "fundamental statement of humanity's 
goals and aspirations for a fairer and more humane future, is nowhere more applicable than in 
the world of corrections."30 Mr. Yalden went on to assert that "no moment in history could be 
more appropriate" for the Correctional Service of Canada to re-commit itself to respecting the 
provisions of the Declaration.  
                                                     
28   John Howard, whose 1777 seminal work The State of the Prisons in England and Wales inspired the idea of the 
modern penitentiary as a humane response to crime, in his proposals for reform of the prisons, was insistent 
that punishment, in order to be effective, must maintain its moral legitimacy in the eyes of both the public and 
the offender. For Howard the most painful punishments and those that aroused the greatest guilt were those 
that observed the strictest standards of justice and morality.  See   
http://justicebehindthewalls.net/book.asp?cid=765&pid=816; Michael Ignatieff, A Just Measure of  Pain; The 
Penitentiary in the Industrial revolution 1705-1850 (1978) p.72 
29   G.A. res.217A III, U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948), reprinted in [1948] U.N.B. 465 
30   Maxwell Yalden, "Canada, the CSC and Human Rights," [November 1998] Let's Talk  Vol. 23, no. 4, at 13 
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The significance of the Universal Declaration and the international instruments it has inspired is 
clearly set out in the 1997 Report of the Working Group on Human Rights, Human Rights and 
Corrections: A Strategic Model. The working group was commissioned by CSC and chaired by 
Mr. Yalden. The report explains the international sources of the human rights guarantees and 
protections of the Canadian Charter and the CCRA:  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted by the United Nations General Assem-
bly on December 10, 1948. Although it does not have the status of a binding international cove-
nant, it is widely regarded as determining conventional international law and as the primary in-
strument for protecting the "inalienable," "inherent" and "fundamental" dignity of the human 
person. It underlies the many subsequent UN covenants and conventions that have shaped inter-
national human rights law, to which Canada is a party, in particular the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention Against Torture. These, among other things, pro-
vide that:  
"All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the in-
herent dignity of the human person" (art. 10, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
[ICCPR]);  
"No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment" (art. 7, ICCPR);  
"The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall 
be their reformation and social rehabilitation" (art. 10(3), ICCPR)31  
The Universal Declaration and the International Covenant have been influential in shaping Ca-
nadian domestic law, and many of their provisions are the source of the constitutional protec-
tions entrenched in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As we will see, the Correc-
tions and Conditional Release Act was drafted to ensure that the correctional legal regime was 
consistent with the Charter, and thus it is possible to trace a lineage through the four docu-
ments. As the Working Group concluded:  
. . . One must acknowledge what the CCRA does do to lay out a correctional regime that will be 
respectful of Canada's obligations in human rights matters . . . Over and above the general right 
to safe and humane custody, sections 3 and 4 of the Act specifically identify: the right to be dealt 
with in the least restrictive way; the residual rights which are those of any member of society, 
except those necessarily restricted or removed by virtue of incarceration; the right to forthright 
and fair decision-making, and to an effective grievance procedure; the right to have sexual, cul-
tural, linguistic and other differences and needs respected; and the right to participate in pro-
grams designed to promote rehabilitation and reintegration. These broad principles can be read-
ily traced back to their international and constitutional roots.32   
Andrew Coyle, a former governor in the Scottish prison system and the Director of the Interna-
tional Center for Prison Studies at King’s College, London, has summarized the implications for 
the treatment of prisoners of the international instruments that require States to respect the 
                                                     
31   Human Rights and Corrections: A Strategic Model December 1997 Online at http://www.csc-
scc.gc.ca/text/pblct/rights/human/im4630-02-eng.shtml ( hereafter “The Yalden Report”) 
32  Yalden Report, p.24 
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inherent dignity of the human person. In A Human Rights Approach to Prison Management”, he 
writes: 
People who are detained or imprisoned do not cease to be human beings, no matter how serious 
the crime of which they have been accused or convicted. The court of law or other judicial agency 
that dealt with their case decreed that they should be deprived of their liberty, not that they 
should forfeit their humanity… 
Their humanity extends far beyond the fact that they are prisoners. Equally, prison staff are hu-
man beings. The extent to which these two groups recognize and observe their common human-
ity is the most important measurement of a decent and humane prison. Where such recognition 
is lacking there will be a real danger that human rights will be abused.33  
In Canada we have taken much pride in committing this nation to the advancement of human 
rights. The 1982 Charter of Rights and Freedoms is the legal lodestar in the entrenchment of 
international human rights protection in our own Constitution.34 The overarching human right 
to dignity does not stop at the prison door and, as the Supreme Court has made clear, the Char-
ter applies with full force to the imprisoned. Entrenching human rights in the Constitution is 
one thing: translating the right to human dignity in the everyday life of a prison is quite an-
other. The prison environment, more so than any other within the boundaries of the State, with 
its authoritarian structure, its surveillance and supervision of every aspect of a person's life, its  
daily rituals of count and search, is at constant odds with the attributes of dignity, individuality 
and liberty that most of us experience. The potential for abuse of human rights is ever present. 
This has been well expressed by Ivan Zinger, formerly a human rights officer for CSC and now 
Executive Director of the Office of the Correctional Investigator: 
In a correctional context, every aspect of the prisoner’s life is heavily regulated by correctional 
authorities. Correctional authorities make thousands of decisions every day that affect prisoners’ 
fundamental rights (e.g., use of force, segregation, searches, transfers, visiting). Routine daily 
activities, such as whether prisoners can contact family and friends, whether and how they can 
practice their religion or access medical services, and when they can eat and sleep, are all regu-
lated by correctional authorities. Without recognition that the business of corrections is all about 
                                                     
33   Andrew Coyle, A Human Rights Approach for Prison Management: Handbook for Prison Staff (London: King’s 
College, International Center for Prison Studies, 2002), at p. 31-33. Dr. Andrew Coyle is one of the most re-
spected international experts on prison management and has extensive international experience on prison 
matters, having visited prison systems in many countries as an expert consultant for bodies such as the United 
Nations and the Council of Europe. 
34   See the statement of   Chief Justice Brian Dickson In Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Al-
berta), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 313 : “Since the close of the Second World War, the protection of the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of groups and individuals has become a matter of international concern. A body of trea-
ties (or conventions) and customary norms now constitutes an international law of human rights under which 
the nations of the world have undertaken to adhere to the standards and principles necessary for ensuring 
freedom, dignity and social justice for their citizens. The Charter conforms to the spirit of this contemporary 
international human rights movement, and it incorporates many of the policies and prescriptions of the vari-
ous international documents pertaining to human rights.” (at p.348) 
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promoting and monitoring respect for human rights, preventing human rights violations, and de-
tecting and remedying human rights violations, systemic abuses of power are inevitable.35  
In 1996 Justice Louise Arbour, in her report on abuses of human rights at the Prison for 
Women, concluded that the enactment of the CCRA, the existence of internal grievance 
mechanisms, and the existing forms of judicial review had not been successful in developing a 
culture of rights within the Correctional Service of Canada. Her report led to the new Commis-
sioner of Corrections, Ole Ingstrup, setting up of the Working Group on Human Rights. In his 
1997 Report Mr. Yalden alerted the Service to the importance and challenges of implementing 
a human rights agenda within Canadian penitentiaries: 
It is particularly important to recognize the fundamental nature of Canada's commitments in 
light of the fact that some members of Canadian society, including some CSC employees, do not 
necessarily share the values underlying the Service's human rights framework. In that context, it 
is essential to make it clear that the principles and provisions incorporated in the CCRA derive 
from universal human rights standards supported by all the advanced democracies with which 
Canada compares itself, that the Service holds itself accountable to those standards, and that it 
is actively committed to making them work in federal correctional institutions.36  
In identifying a strategy for improving the CSC's communication of its mandate regarding hu-
man rights to the general public, the Yalden Report acknowledged that the Service was "caught 
in a cross-fire between those who perceive the correctional system as soft on criminals and 
those who worry that incarceration further degrades them, or fails to assist them in becoming 
more positive members of society".37 Based on the results of a 1996 CSC staff survey, the Re-
port also observed that a substantial proportion of staff either do not accept the rationale for 
their professional conduct or question its effectiveness. The Report concluded:  
If staff are to see themselves as part of a lawful and socially constructive enterprise, they not 
only need a firm grasp of clear and practical professional guidelines, they must also have some 
personal understanding of why such rules are lawful and the social purpose that they serve.38   
The Report offered what it saw as the best argument for observing human rights in a correc-
tional context:  
[It] is not merely that [these rules] are required by international convention or domestic law, or 
even that they are intrinsically more civilizing, but that they actually work better than any known 
alternatives -- for inmates, for staff and for society at large. By preserving such fundamental so-
cial rules within the institutional setting, so the argument goes, one improves the odds of even-
tually releasing a more responsible person. 39   
                                                     
35   I. Zinger, “Human Rights Compliance and the Role of External Prison Oversight” (2006) 42 , Can. J Crim. & Crim. 
Jus. 127 at 128. 
36   Yalden Report, p. 8  
37   Yalden report, p.36 
38   Yalden Report, p.37 
39   Yalden Report, p.40 
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It cannot be overemphasised that respecting human rights is not a weak-kneed “soft on crimi-
nals” line but the most principled and most effective form of corrections. As expressed by An-
drew Coyle in A Human Rights Approach to Prison Management:  
Staff behavior and the humane and dignified treatment of prisoners should underpin every op-
erational activity in a prison. This is not merely a question of human rights principles. In opera-
tional terms is also the most effective and efficient way in which to manage a prison.40   
The Yalden Report proposed a broad platform of reforms, all premised on a "rights-related 
strategy." These included improvements in the quantity, quality, and accessibility of rights-
related training, particularly for front-line staff, and the establishment of a Human Rights Unit, 
headed by an individual with appropriate seniority, to monitor compliance with human rights 
standards.  
The Yalden Report was well received by the then  Commissioner of Corrections, Ole Ingstrup, 
(himself a former warden in the Danish prison system)  and one of the first recommendations 
to be implemented was the establishment of a Human Rights Unit at National Headquarters. 
However, far from being given the profile and resources suggested by the Yalden Report, the 
CSC's Human Rights Unit has a smaller staff than any other at National Headquarters. In the 
past several years the commitment to human rights at the upper levels of the Service has con-
siderably wavered. There are those who now think that human rights talk is  out of fashion, as if 
such discourse was a fad  or fetish of liberal-minded people and had no place in a “get tough on 
crime and criminals” world. Little wonder then that, as Mr. Yalden predicted, a human rights 
strategy remains a hard sell to many staff. 
In light of the unfinished business of entrenching a culture of respect for human rights within 
Canadian penitentiaries and the wavering commitment within CSC to such an agenda, any re-
port on the future of corrections must include a clarion call to reinvigorate that commitment 
and identify measures and initiatives well calculated to implement it. No such call is to be found 
in the Panel’s report.  To  its great discredit the Panel  makes no mention of Canada’s interna-
tional human rights obligations or of the application of the Charter to Canadian prisons, and has 
no regard for or apparent awareness of the well-documented record of how difficult it has been 
to entrench a culture of respect for rights within CSC. Instead of a clarion call for greater vigi-
lance in protecting human rights we find a virtual open invitation to CSC to dismantle the exist-
ing legal and administrative framework and redefine the definition of rights by introducing an 
ill-conceived hierarchy of rights and conditions of confinement dependent upon how well pris-
oners participate in their correctional plan. The Roadmap undermines the fundamental nature 
of Canada's human rights commitments and puts Canada on a path out of step with the rele-
vant international and domestic human rights norms.  
2.1 Dignity’s Child 
 One of the large gaps in the Panel’s analysis is the lack of any consideration to the views and 
perspectives of the prisoners themselves who would be affected by the Panel's recommenda-
                                                     
40   A Human Rights Approach to Prison Management p.33      
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tion. In preparing this response the authors did not have the financial resources available to the 
Panel but we determined that it was not only appropriate but necessary to provide a forum for 
some prisoners to voice their concerns.  With the cooperation of the Warden of Matsqui Insti-
tution we held a “community hearing” at the institution on November 29, 2008. In advance of 
the meeting prisoners were invited to prepare and present either written or oral submissions 
addressing the recommendations contained in the Roadmap.41 The proceedings were recorded. 
The submissions covered many areas but not surprisingly the issues of human dignity and 
equality, the core concepts underpinning human rights law, emerged as a common theme. 
Several prisoners addressed the Panel’s recommendation that the CCRA be amended to provide 
that prisoners only retain “basic rights”. Nathan Myles characterized the underlying theme in 
the terrible events in the last century where in different parts of the world certain classes of 
citizens were stripped of their rights: 
In general it's where a ruling group denigrates another group's dignity, pride and human rights. 
[The Roadmap] would be taking away our rights and making us lower class to no-class citizens. 
To treat us as social outcasts… This report is not a roadmap to public safety but plain and simply 
an attempt to destroy the rights of prisoners and to downgrade us in class to subhuman –sub-
Canadians.42 
Another prisoner, Greg Hanson, in critiquing the Panel’s recommendation that human rights 
can be attenuated because a prisoner has not shown ‘sufficient progress’  in addressing their 
correctional plan, invoked his own personal journey and offered this account of the importance 
of human dignity in anchoring any correctional system: 
 In the spring of 1982 I was 15 years old, living in a small city in B.C. Like many teenagers, I was 
preoccupied with motorcycles, girls, rock music, and dressing to impress my peers. Mostly I was 
unaware of something happening that spring that would have considerable influence on my fu-
ture life. On April 17th Queen Elizabeth II and the Prime Minister of Canada signed a document 
that included the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, or “The Charter”. Though it meant 
little to me at the time, the Charter is a Canadian legal document that would have a greater ef-
fect on my life than any other. Two short years later, I would enter British Columbia’s infamous 
Oakalla prison. From then until today, I am ashamed to concede that I have spent over 22 years 
inside of prisons just like this one (Matsqui). In that time, I have learned more about human in-
dignity than many would think possible for an educated person living in one of the most “civi-
lized” nations on earth. Though I could not know it at the time, my entrance into Oakalla began a 
long search for human dignity.  
My dictionary defines dignity as, ‘the quality or state of being worthy, honored, or esteemed.’ By 
that definition, human dignity involves the way I view myself, the way others deal with me, and 
the way I view and treat others. While it is true that many things can affect the way I feel about 
myself, it is equally true that the way others treat me plays a large role in my everyday sense of 
personal value. I have been thinking a lot about that lately. Especially have I been thinking about 
it in light of the Charter. More than any other Canadian legal document, the Charter gives voice 
                                                     
41 Invited observers included representatives from CSC’s NHQ Rights, Redress and Resolution Branch and the 
Director General, Corrections & Criminal Justice, Public Safety Canada. 
42    Submission of Nathan Myles, November 29, 2008 Matsqui Institution 
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not only to how Canadians must treat each other, but more importantly, how we should view, or 
feel about each other. 
It would be unrealistically biased of me to be so critical of the “Roadmap” report and not present 
an alternative. Yet, I freely admit that any alternative I could present would only be one more 
theory in a long line of theories presented by those seeking a utopian society. The truth is, crime 
is ugly. In every form, it is an assault on the human dignity of another. I know of which I speak.  
In 1983, I began my all out assault on dignity. It began with a breach of financial trust, and 
ended 12 years later with the ultimate indignity - when I deprived another human being of his 
right to life. Yet, as implausible as it may sound, I now know that during that time I was desper-
ately seeking “worth, honor, and esteem.” You will recall that this is how the dictionary defined 
“dignity”. How did a person searching so desperately for dignity become so undignified? 
I have thought about that question for many years now. The conclusion I’ve reached is that even 
though we are born with dignity, the world we are born into is full of indignity. How else can we 
explain the global epidemic of sexual slavery, child molestation, family violence, drug addiction 
and alcoholism, war, violent crime, starvation and poverty, environmental destruction and gross 
economic injustice? We may be born innocent, but it doesn’t remain that way for long. If dignity 
is a human birthright, then the world we are born into is a thief relentlessly seeking to steal it 
away. When dignity is first taken from us, we feel “indignant”. Without correction, our base re-
sponse is to take dignity from others in an attempt to retrieve our own. Logically, this “tit-for-
tat” model of conflict resolution is the wrong response. It only creates a firestorm of people rob-
bing dignity from others. Yet it is the model we continue to follow into adulthood – often without 
second thought. What it creates is a life cycle of indignity as the pendulum swings between los-
ing and taking dignity. 
Lawmakers know this well. In April of 1945, in an endorsement of the Charter of the newly 
formed United Nations Organization, U.S. President Harry Truman publicly stated: “We must 
build a new world—a far better world—one in which the eternal dignity of man is respected.” It 
is this attempt to validate “eternal dignity” for all that drives lawmakers to draft codes such as 
the Charter. … 
As stated earlier, I am in prison because of committing one of the greatest indignities known to 
man. I forcibly took away another person’s dignity. His right to “worth, honor, and esteem”. His 
right to life. In doing so, I likewise gave up my own human dignity. Notice, I did not say I gave up 
my right to dignity. .. Rather, in my case, I threw away my own dignity. At that time, Canadian 
society was forced to decide how to respond. Was revenge the right model? By killing me, they 
could enact upon me the same indignity I had enacted on my victim. Though I wouldn’t learn 
anything from the experience, perhaps it would teach the rest of society that taking away the 
dignity of another would be met with a forcible and severe removal of their dignity. Or, perhaps, 
as is the case in some societies, it would be better to publicly torture and maim me. That way re-
venge could be satisfied as my dignity is taken away on a repeated and daily basis. In the end, 
Canadian society chose the moral high road. Perhaps this course was chosen on the perception 
that a person born into a world with so much indignity is not solely responsible for treating oth-
ers with indignity. So, it was decided that in my case – and the cases of thousands of other Cana-
dian citizens – Canadian society would attempt to teach us how to treat others with dignity….But 
how could this best be accomplished on such a large scale? In 1986, it was decided to create a 
new body of law that would – amongst other things – “promote the dignity and fair treatment of 
inmates”.  
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This new body of law would take 6 years to create, span the mandate of two separate govern-
ments, and involve the labours of hundreds of lawmakers, social workers, International partners, 
university professors, CSC staff, lawyers, and community liaisons. The working papers alone for 
this project cover 2 years and 481 pages of summary reports. I know, I’ve read all of them. The 
final result was the CCRA – The Corrections and Conditional Release Act and the accompanying 
Regulations. 
The rationale behind this legislation is easily understood. Stripping a person of dignity is often 
more brutal than inflicting physical blows. It is devastating to the human spirit. A devastated, 
dehumanized human spirit is a dangerous thing. When humans become dehumanized, they tend 
to act inhumanely. This was the lesson learned painfully through the events in B.C. Pen, Mill-
haven, Archambault, and Kingston Penitentiary in the 1970’s and early 80’s. Some in the CSC to-
day choose to irresponsibly forget that those lessons were paid for with the blood of both prison-
ers and Correctional Officers. A more pleasant lesson CSC has both learned and preached since 
that time is that when accorded greater dignity, human inclination is to conduct oneself, and 
treat others more humanely. In the 20 years since the creation of CSC’s Mission and the subse-
quent inception of the CCRA, incidents of prison violence in general, violent recidivism by parol-
ees, and violent crime committed by successful beneficiaries of CSC correctional programming 
have reduced dramatically.43 
It is more than ironic that Canadian prisoners can demonstrate a far greater understanding and 
respect for the significance of human rights than an ‘expert’ panel purporting to chart a road-
map for the future of Canadian corrections. Perhaps we should expect that those who have felt 
the indignity of harsh justice – both given and taken – would be most sensitive to legal amend-
ments that would deform the laws that were shaped to reflect our commitment as a society to 
human dignity. In our response we have repeatedly invoked the concept of human dignity and 
the principles that pour content into its implementation in Canadian corrections to provide the 
framework for understanding the dangers and perils for both public safety and human rights 
that lie along the Roadmap and CSC’s transformation agenda.   
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3 Faulty Premises 
The Panel gives considerable space at the beginning of the report setting that stage for their analy-
sis and recommendations by providing some data on crime trends and changes to the profile of 
prison populations. Because of the seriousness of the conclusions they reach and the implications 
of their recommendations, it is essential that we examine the data presented. We were struck by 
the negative attitudes towards prisoners generally that this part of the report reflects which may 
explain why the Panel gave no consideration for human rights in the chapters that followed and felt 
no apparent compunction introducing proposals that would diminish those that currently exist. 
3.1 Crime in Canada 
 The Panel provides a short overview of crime trends in Canada and their likely impact on federal 
corrections. Their analysis leads the reader to conclude that the major decreases in crime occurring 
over many years are driven by non-violent crime that has little impact on federal corrections while 
violent crime is on an alarming increase. The analysis contains a series of errors, and selective use 
of statistics that reveals a weak understanding of crime rates and trends. Given the importance 
that the report appears to place on these data for the future of federal corrections, the errors must 
be addressed in detail.  
The report paints a picture of crime that purports to show serious violent crime as being on the in-
crease by focussing on the 2006 figures without any historical perspective of the cycle of crime sta-
tistics that show that overall violent crime has been on the decrease. To imply that a one-year 
change constitute a trend that should influence, let alone justify, far-reaching changes to the 
framework of Canadian corrections is a fundamental error.   
The Panel’s use of carefully selected statistics using a single year as a reference – something any 
first year criminology student is warned about – and exposure of the misconceived impression cre-
ated by the Panel of increased serious violent crime along with the implication of an increasingly 
violent federal prison population, becomes clear by looking at the Juristat 2007 figures and the 
trend over the decade from 1998 - 2007.  




 http://www.statcan.ca/Daily/English/080717/d080717b.htm   
To better understand the significance of the 2007 figures, Statistics Canada reports the percentage 
increase /decrease over the previous year (2006) and the comparison figure over the previous dec-
ade.  
Using this table we can revisit the Panel’s inference of a violent crime epidemic. Using their bullets 
of relevant information that “positions” their observations and recommendations, we then sup-
plement that information with the 2007 figures and more importantly the 10- year period changes. 
 murders increased for the second consecutive year to 852, 30 more than the previous year; 
The Panel has misread the figures. The 852 figure refers to attempted murder, not murder.  As to 
the figure for murder, the 2007 Juristat figures do not separately report murders but aggregate all 
homicides to include murders and manslaughter offences. The 2007 Juristat shows that police re-
ported 605 homicides in 2006, 58 fewer than in 2005. This resulted in a rate of 1.85 homicides per 
100,000 population, 10% lower than in 2005. As noted by Juristat “The homicide rate has been 
generally declining since the mid-1970s.” 44  
For attempted murder the increase in 2006 was followed by a 2.5 decline in 2007. “Although the 
rate of attempted murder has remained consistently higher than that of homicide since 1978, it has 
generally parallelled the gradual decline seen in homicide.”45   
The data show that the 10 year change for homicides declined by 2.6%; for attempted murder the 
ten year change shows a 1.6% decline.  
 aggravated assaults, the most serious form of assault, were up 5%, also the second consecu-
tive increase;  
The data show that for 2007 these offences remained virtually unchanged with an increase of 0.5%. 
The 10 year change shows an 18.6% increase.  
                                                     
44  Juristat, (2007) p. 4 
45  Juristat, (2007) p. 5 
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 assault with a weapon or assault causing bodily harm increased for the seventh consecutive 
year, up 4%; this was the highest rate since the offence was introduced into the Criminal 
Code in 1983;  
Statistics Canada reports that “... aggravated assault, assault with a weapon and forcible confine-
ment remained stable. The stable rate of assault with a weapon follows seven years of previous 
increases.” 46 The data show 32.3% increase over the previous 10-year period; 
 robberies increased for the second year in a row, up 6%;  
The 2007 data for robberies show a decline of 4.7%. The 10 year period shows a 6.5% decline. 
 robberies involving firearms rose 4% and accounted for approximately 1 in 8 robberies;  
Statistics Canada reports that “Most robberies in 2007 were committed without the use of a 
weapon (60%). The rate of robberies involving firearms, which accounted for about 11% of all rob-
bery incidents, fell in all provinces except Manitoba and British Columbia. As a result, the national 
firearm-related robbery rate was at its lowest point since this information became available in 
1977.” 47  
 kidnapping/forcible confinement continued to increase; over the past 20 years, the number 
of incidents reported to police has increased sevenfold, from about 500 in the mid-1980s to 
over 4,000 in 2006.  
For 2007 kidnapping/forcible confinement remained virtually unchanged with an increase of 0.9% 
but abduction declined 8.3%. The 10 year cycle shows a 121.5% increase in kidnapping/forcible 
confinement and a 47.2 decline in abduction. 
 youth crime increased by 3%, the first increase since 2003; the rate of youths accused of 
homicide was the highest since 1961;  
In fact, “The rate of youth accused (the youth crime rate) decreased by 2% in 2007, following a 3% 
increase in 2006. Following substantial declines after peaking in 1991, the youth crime rate has re-
mained relatively stable over the past decade.”48 Further, according to Juristat,  
“Following a record high in the youth homicide rate in 2006, the number of youth accused of homi-
cide in 2007 decreased from 85 to 74, representing a 13% drop in the rate. Despite this decrease the 
2007 youth homicide rate was the second highest since 1961. The rates in Manitoba and Saskatche-
wan, reached record highs. It is important to note that youth homicide rates can vary considerably 
from year-to-year due to the relatively small number of youth who commit this offence.” 49 
To illustrate the above mentioned volatility of youth homicide rates; “There were 40 youth (12 to 
17 years) accused of homicide in 2004, 17 fewer than the previous year. The rate of youth accused 
was at its second lowest point in more than 30 years.” 50 
                                                     
46  Juristat, (2007) p. 4 
47  Juristat, (2007) p. 5 
48  Juristat, (2007) p. 8 
49  Juristat, (2007) p. 8 
50  Juristat, Homicide in Canada 2004,   Statistics Canada – Catalogue no. 85-002-XPE, Vol. 25, no. 6 p 13.  
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 drug crimes increased 2%; cannabis offences, which continued to account for approximately 
60% of all drug offences, were down 4%, but cocaine offences were up 13% and offences re-
lated to other drugs, including crystal methadone, rose 8%.  
In 2007 the rate of drug offences rose 4%, driven by an increase in cannabis possession offences, 
which accounted for about half of all drug offences. 
The data also show that sexual assaults declined in 2007 by 4.5%. The 10 year period shows a 
23.2% decline. Other sexual offences remained virtually unchanged in 2007 with a decline of  0.1%. 
The 10 year period shows a 26.1 decline. 
The overall violent crime rate decreased 2.5% in 2007 and the 10 year period shows a 5.3% decline. 
In April 2009 Statistics Canada introduced a new tool - the Crime Severity Index. The index was de-
veloped in response to a request by the police community to create a measure of crime that re-
flects the relative seriousness of different offences. Each type of offence is assigned a weight de-
rived from actual sentences handed down by courts in all provinces and territories. More serious 
crimes are assigned higher weights, less serious offences lower weights. As a result, when all crimes 
are included, more serious offences have a greater impact on changes in the index. Using the new 
index Statistics Canada reported as follows: 
Crime severity is expressed as an index for which 2006 is the base year at 100. In 2007, the index for 
overall crime was 94.6, down from 119.1 in 1998. This means that crime severity fell by about 20% 
during the decade. The 10-year decline was driven by a 40% drop in break-ins. 
The seriousness of police-reported crime fell in every year during the decade, except for 2003. In that 
year, the index rose as a result of increases in robberies and break-ins. 
In contrast to the downward trend in the seriousness of police-reported crime as a whole, the index 
for just violent crime stayed relatively stable during the decade. This suggests that the situation 
with respect to serious crimes against the person was about the same as 10 years ago. 
In 1998, the Violent Crime Severity Index value was 98.0 and in 2007, it was 96.5, a drop of 
about 2%. The traditional violent crime rate was also at about the same level in 2007 as in 1998.51 
So what conclusions should be drawn from these figures? Notwithstanding the public misconcep-
tion of rising and rampant violent crime, the rate of violent crime in Canada has not gone up over 
the past decade. The Panel’s report, far from correcting this misconception, contributes to its per-
petuation. There are, not surprisingly, a few offence categories that seem to be inconsistent with 
the overall trend and thus require further research to understand. In particular, we note the rise in 
the more serious types of assaults, but also the significant decline in sexual assaults. The huge in-
crease in kidnapping /unlawful confinement offences is anomalous and in part likely reflects 
changes in police/crown charging practices because it is accompanied by a large decline in abduc-
tion charges. But clearly placed in their proper context these figures reveal no crisis in public safety 
that calls for a transformation of the correctional system.   
It is interesting to contrast the Panel’s analysis with that of the Ouimet Commission of 1969 which 
surely set the standard for prudence in cautioning against the dangers of being too easily per-
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suaded that crime was escalating. They began their chapter entitled “The Incidence of Crime in 
Canada” with these words:  
Whether serious crime has been increasing in Canada in recent decades is a question that must be 
examined before changes in the administration of justice can be discussed dispassionately. The belief 
that violent crime is rampant tends to engender extreme reactions and thus interferes with the con-
sideration of proposals on their merits. 52      
They conclude this chapter by cautioning of the danger of describing short term crime statistics 
changes as trends: 
These findings underline the danger of attaching much significance to reports of annual fluctuations 
in unfamiliar statistics... 53  
It is all too clear that the Panel fell head first into the trap that Ouimet warned of forty years ago. 
Their errors violate a fundamental expectation for any review or opinion purporting to be “expert” 
and seriously undermine a key premise for their recommendations. 
3.2  The Changing Offender Profile 
The Panel provides this description of developments that have led to changes in the offender pro-
file of those admitted to federal institutions and the implications for CSC:  
To understand crime in Canada, it is important to understand the series of developments in the last 
15 years that have gradually transformed the federal offender population profile. These include: 
o the amendments to the Criminal Code that provide options to the courts for first-time, 
non-violent offenders; 
o the introduction of conditional sentences for certain types of offences; 
o the strengthening of laws to combat organized crime and gangs; 
o the toughening of laws for child sex offenders; 
o the closure of provincial mental health facilities; 
o the Supreme Court decision (R v. Wust (2000) 1 S.C.R. 455) that reduced sentences for 
time served while on remand status54  
                                                     
52  Ouimet,R (Chairman) 1969)  Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections-Towards Unity: Criminal Justice and 
Corrections, p.21 
53  Ouimet, p30 
54  The Panel misunderstands the very limited impact of Wust on federal prison populations. Giving credit for time 
served on remand had been a common practice well before Wust. In R v. Rezale (1996) 31 O.R. (3d) 713 Justice 
Laskin of the Ontario Court of Appeal said: 
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While these factors have contributed to a 12% decrease in the men offender population since 1997, 
they have also created many new challenges for CSC in implementing its mandate. 
In a speech to the International Corrections and Prisons Association (ICPA) on October 23, 2006, CSC 
Commissioner Keith Coulter articulated the nature and gravity of these new challenges: 
Our offenders have more and more extensive histories of involvement with the court system—
roughly 9 out of 10 now have previous criminal convictions. 
Our offenders also have more extensive histories of violence and violent offences in their criminal 
history, and far more are assessed as violence prone, hostile, impulsive and aggressive. 
There has been an increase of more than 100% in the proportion of offenders who are classified 
as maximum security on admission—13% are now classified at this level on admission. 
An increase of 33% has occurred in the proportion of offenders with gang and/or organized 
crime affiliations—one in six male, and one in ten female offenders now have known affiliations. 
The proportion of offenders serving sentences for homicide has increased by 14%—it now stands 
at more than one in four male offenders. 
The percentage of male offenders has increased by 71%, with an increase of 67% in female of-
fenders identified at admission as having very serious mental health problems—12% of the male 
and 26% of the female offender populations have this designation. 
About four out of five offenders now arrive at a federal institution with a serious substance 
abuse problem, with one out of two having committed their crime under the influence of drugs, 
alcohol or other intoxicants. 
There is a trend to shorter sentences here in Canada. This has meant an increase of 62% in the 
proportion of male offender admissions serving a sentence of less than three years. (“Canadian 
Corrections: Current Complexities” 55 
This description and analysis is overly simplistic and again suffers from a lack of historical perspec-
tive. It is true that there have been changes in the federal offender profile but the Panel overstates 
both the nature of the changes and their implications. Here are just some examples.  
 The Panel reports, citing the former Commissioner, that:  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
      Although this section is discretionary, not mandatory, in my view a sentencing judge should ordinarily give credit 
for pre-trial custody.  At least a judge should not deny credit without good reason.  To do so offends one’s sense of 
fairness.  Incarceration at any stage of the criminal process is a denial of an accused’s liberty.  Moreover, in two re-
spects, pre-trial custody is even more onerous than post-sentencing custody.  First, other than for a sentence of 
life imprisonment, legislative provisions for parole eligibility and statutory release do not take into account time 
spent in custody before trial (or before sentencing).  Second, local detention centres ordinarily do not provide edu-
cational, retraining or rehabilitation programs to an accused in custody waiting trial.  For these reasons, pre-trial 
custody is commonly referred to as “dead time”, and trial judges, in deciding on an appropriate sentence, fre-
quently give credit for double the time an accused has served. (at 721) 
      The Supreme Court in Wust held only that “the well-established practice of sentencing judges to give credit for 
time served when computing a sentence remains available  [to offences that prescribe a mandatory minimum sen-
tence+, even if it appears to reduce a sentence below the minimum provided by law.”   
55  CSC Commissioner Keith Coulter, International Corrections and Prisons Association Conference, October 23, 2006, 
Vancouver, BC,  http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/media/spchscommis/2006/icpa_2006-eng.shtml   
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Our offenders also have more extensive histories of violence and violent offences in their criminal 
history, and far more are assessed as violence prone, hostile, impulsive and aggressive”.  
Yet according to the most recent Juristat report we read this quite different statement of the 
changes over the last decade: 
 Among adults admitted to federal custody, the mix of offences has changed since 1997/1998, 
the longest time period for which data are available. While offenders convicted of violent of-
fences continue to represent the largest proportion of offenders admitted to federal custody, this 
proportion decreased from 58% in 1997/1998 to 49% in 2006/2007. 
This change occurred because the number of adults admitted for property crimes and 'other 
Criminal Code' offences grew, while the number of adults admitted for violent crimes remained 
relatively unchanged 56 
 The statement that “there has been an increase of more than 100% in the proportion of of-
fenders who are classified as maximum security on admission—13% are now classified at this 
level on admission”, fails to acknowledge that this increase is partly attributable to a change in 
CSC’s own policy, introduced in 2001, that all prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment for first 
and second murder are to be classified during the first 2 years of their sentence as maximum 
security. Prior to 2001 many of these offenders were rated medium security on admission. This 
policy, which has been heavily criticized by the Correctional Investigator as both unjustified as 
sound correctional policy and contrary to the security classification criteria set out in the CCRA, 
has nothing to do with the escape risk, dangerousness or unmanageability of these prisoners 
but was introduced to placate victims and the police.57 
 
 The Panel states that “the percentage of male offenders has increased by 71%, with an increase 
of 67% in female offenders identified at admission as having very serious mental health prob-
lems—12% of the male and 26% of the female offender populations have this designation.” 
There is no doubt that the deinstitutionalization of the provincial mental  health systems has 
led to many more mentally ill offenders being processed through the criminal justice system  
and that some of  the most chronic of these offenders end up in federal institutions. While this 
population does, as the Panel correctly concluded, give rise to special challenges and a need for 
carefully tailored interventions, to imply, as the Panel does, that a larger proportion of mentally 
ill offenders contribute to a more violent offender profile, is not supported by the evidence. The 
assumed relationship between mental illness and violent crime, while a common popular mis-
conception, and one seemingly shared by the Panel, has been the subject of much recent re-
search. That research demonstrates that a causal interpretation of the statistical association be-
tween mental illness and violence is problematic because any relationship is influenced by 
                                                     
56  Avani Babooram, The Changing Profile of Adults in Custody, 2006/2007 Juristat, December 2008 Vol. 28, no. 10 
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2008010/article/10732-eng.htm#a3  
57  See Justice Behind the Walls p. 477-482 online at http://justicebehindthewalls.net/book.asp?cid=196 
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other variables including substance abuse, victimization and community disorganization. Im-
prisonment far from alleviating may compound these problems.58 
 
 While “the proportion of offenders serving sentences for homicide has increased by 14%—it 
now stands at more than one in four male offenders” the Panel fails to note that this part of the 
prison population historically has been the least disruptive and troublesome for prison man-
agement. The increase in the number of offenders serving life sentences certainly has impor-
tant implications for correctional programming but it does not contribute to a prison popula-
tion more likely to use violence within the prison. A common public fallacy, shared and rein-
forced by the Panel is that those serving life sentences are difficult to manage prisoners.   Pre-
vious CSC Task Forces have addressed the special nature of and challenges facing this lifer 
population, reports that the Panel seems not to have considered in their recommendations.59 
 
The average time served before parole for someone convicted of capital murder before 1977, 
whose sentence was commuted, was 13.3 years. Since the abolition of capital punishment that 
year and the introduction of the mandatory minimum 25 year sentences for first degree mur-
der, even taking into account those who successfully apply for a reduction of eligibility through 
the Judicial Review that can occur after 15 years, the average time served before parole for 
these offenders has significantly lengthened resulting in the pooling of “lifers” in the prisons. 
Estimates of median time that will be served before parole for those subject to the 25 year pe-
riod of parole ineligibility has been estimated to be 28.4 years with more than half of the total 
group expected to serve more than 30.6 years.60 This was an entirely intended outcome – one 
that reflects deliberate changes to justice policy in Canada. The drivers for this change were en-
                                                     
58   Frank Sirotich, Correlates of Crime and Violence among Persons with Mental Disorder: An Evidence- Based Review, 
Brief Treatment and Crisis Intervention 8:171–194 (2008); Frank J. Porporino and Laurence L. Motiuk, The Prison 
Careers of Mentally Disordered Offenders:18  International Journal of Law and Psychiatry, pp. 29-44, 1995,  a Ca-
nadian study reporting no significant differences in the mean number of prior convictions, either in total or specifi-
cally for prior violent convictions between non-disordered and the disordered federal prisoners, nor in involve-
ment in significant prison incidents  e.g., assaults, escape, possession of contraband or general behavioral disrup-
tion. Online on CSC’s website athttp://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/rsrch/reports/r33/r33e-eng.shtml#DISCUSSION;N. 
Patrick Gosden, Peter Kramp, Gorm Gabrielsen, Tavs Folmer Andersen, Dorte Sestoft,  Mental Disorders and 
Charges of Violent Offences, Journal of Law and Psychiatry 29 (2006) 186–194. This study of male adolescent re-
mand prisoners in Denmark  revealed no statistically significant association between the occurrence of a violent 
charge and mental disorders in general; Virginia Aldige Hiday,  Putting community risk in perspective: A look at 
Correlations, Causes and Controls, International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 29 (2006) 316–331, which con-
cluded “Future studies are likely to find statistical associations between severe mental illness and violence which 
will be spurious. Policy makers not recognizing the spuriousness of the studies' correlations will be mislead in ef-
forts to reduce community risk. More broadly, such correlations will act to support the stereotype of the violent 
mentally ill person and to sustain the stigma of mental illness”. p.327 
59  Implementing The Life Line Concept: Report Of The Task Force On Long Term Offenders February, 1998 
60  Corrections Directorate, Ministry of the Solicitor General, “Life Sentences for First Degree Murder (Canada) and 
International Equivalents: Eligibility for Release and Average Time Served, 1999. 
A Flawed Compass               Faulty Premises 
30 
 
tirely political compromises made to gain acceptance for the abolition of the death penalty and 
did not reflect changes in the nature or profile of the average lifer. 61 
 
 “There is a trend to shorter sentences here in Canada. This has meant an increase of 62% in the 
proportion of male offender admissions serving a sentence of less than three years”. While this 
represents a distinct programming challenge from that of long term offenders it is hardly a 
“dramatic change” given that going back to the late 19th century the average penitentiary sen-
tence in Canada has been less than 4 years and that under the pre-1970 remission schemes al-
most all federal prisoners, who had not already been paroled, were released from prison after 
serving two-thirds of the original sentence.62  
 
 The Panel does recognize that “since 1997 there has been a 12% decrease in the male offender 
population” but does not link this to the fact that there has been in that same period a 14.4% 
decline in the overall Criminal Code offence rate (excluding traffic offences) and a 5.3% decline 
in violent crime.  
The Panel makes no mention in its summary of the changing offender profile of what the Supreme 
Court of Canada has described as “a crisis in the criminal justice system” and “a staggering injus-
tice” – the overrepresentation of Aboriginal offenders. As we will describe in a later chapter this 
overrepresentation has almost doubled in the last 20 years and may be fairly regarded as the most 
disturbing trend in Canadian corrections.  
The Panel offers this analysis of the implications of the changing offender profile: 
This dramatic change in the profile of the average federal offender means that CSC now has an of-
fender population that is more violent and requires either more interventions or different types of in-
terventions, which must be provided in an even shorter timeframe. 
Furthermore, many offenders need to learn how to live as law-abiding citizens for the first time, as 
they have failed to learn the skills required to be productive members of society. The reasons for this 
vary. Many have failed throughout their lives, beginning in elementary school, and have subse-
quently moved through the juvenile justice system, the provincial adult correctional system, and in 
many cases, the mental health system. The reality is that many offenders entering a federal peniten-
tiary are addressing their behaviours for the first time ever. While core programs in the past could 
focus on criminogenic needs, today’s offender has to learn basic living and employability skills, and 
also address addiction and criminogenic needs. 
As a foundation for transformative corrections this analysis is notable only for its banality. The na-
ture and types of correctional interventions has been the perennial and ubiquitous subject of cor-
rectional history dating back to Canada’s first Penitentiary Act enacted in 1835. Borrowing from the 
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preamble of the English Penitentiary Act of 1779, it set out the intentions behind Kingston Peniten-
tiary: 
  If many offenders convicted of crimes were ordered to solitary imprisonment, accompanied by well-
regulated labour and religious instruction, it might be the means under providence, not only of deter-
ring others from the commission of like crimes, but also of reforming the  individuals, and inuring 
them to habits of industry63 
When Kingston Penitentiary opened, the prevailing theory, as described by historian J. M. Beattie, 
was that crime was a social disease characteristic of the poor, the origins of which lay in indolence 
and a lack of moral sense.  
Since crime was thought to be the product of a criminal class that lived in destitution and ignorance, 
that lived without the restraints of morality and religion, . . . crime could only be prevented and soci-
ety protected if the habits and behaviour of the lower orders of the population were changed . . . In-
ternal discipline and good work habits would succeed in protecting property from the envy of the low 
orders where the horrors of the gallows had failed.64  
 The expectation of those who designed the regime at Kingston Penitentiary was that with a basic 
diet of hard work and religious instruction, outlaws would become law-abiding. As the peniten-
tiary's official historians have noted, "At least this was the hope at a time when criminal behaviour 
was equated with sinfulness. It later would be called a sickness, and still later a disorder of the so-
cial environment, but the penitentiary would prove equal to all the theories." 65  
The latest reiteration of Canadian correctional interventions dates to the 1990s when, as part of its 
organizational renewal, CSC also adopted as the basis for its correctional programming a cognitive 
model of correctional intervention. As described by the then Commissioner, Ole Ingstrup:  
Our overall strategy focuses on programs that not only change behaviour, but also ensure that be-
liefs and attitudes change so that the change is more durable. The strategy focuses on the personal 
development of offenders so that they may acquire the skills and abilities required for the pro-social 
adaptation necessary for successful reintegration as law abiding citizens.  . .  
 
The cognitive model attempts to teach offenders how to think logically, objectively and rationally 
without over-generalizing or externalizing blame. It is based on methods of changing the way of-
fenders think because their thinking patterns seem to be instrumental in propelling them towards in-
volvement in criminal activities. The model, a fairly recent innovation in correctional treatment, is 
founded on a substantial body of research indicating that many offenders lack a number of cognitive 
skills essential for social adaptation. For example, many lack self-control, tending to be action-
oriented, non-reflective and impulsive. They often seem unable to look at the world from another 
person's perspective. They act without adequately considering the consequences of their actions. 
They are lacking in inter-personal problem-solving, critical reasoning and planning skills. The end re-
                                                     
63  Justice Behind the Walls, p.19, online at http://justicebehindthewalls.net/book.asp?cid=7&pid=273  
64  J. M. Beattie, Attitudes towards Crime and Punishment in Upper Canada, 1830-1850: A Documentary Study [To-
ronto: University of Toronto Centre of Criminology, 1977], p. 12-13 
65  Dennis Curtis et al., Kingston Penitentiary: The First 150 Years, 1835-1985 [Ottawa: Correctional Services of Can-
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sult is that offenders become caught in a cycle of thinking errors -- the situation that programs based 
on the cognitive model attempt to change.66  
As we will see, one of the Panel’s observations was that “employment and employability programs 
appear to have been placed on the back burner by CSC and not given the attention that they re-
quire”67 and they recommend that CSC should once again give more emphasis to providing em-
ployment programs to offenders. In doing so the Panel is hardly advocating for transformation but 
a return to a correctional theme that dates back to the birth of the penitentiary and one, like so 
many of its noble intentions, where the rhetoric has never lived up to the reality. We will be exam-
ining whether the Panel’s latest version of employment and employability programs as a correc-
tional intervention will prove any different.  
As for the Panel’s analysis of the recurring problem of offenders traversing the treadmill of correc-
tional institutions, compare it with that of that of the 1977 House of Commons Sub-Committee on 
the Penitentiary System in Canada (the MacGuigan Report): 
The persistent recidivist statistic can be related to the fact that so many in prison have been irre-
versibly damaged by the system by the time they reach the final storehouse of the Criminal Justice 
System -- the penitentiary . . . It was compounded in schools, foster homes, group homes, orphan-
ages, the juvenile justice system, the courts, the police stations, provincial jails, and finally in the uni-
versity of the system, the penitentiary. 
Most of those in prison are not dangerous. However, cruel lockups, isolation, the injustices and har-
assment deliberately inflicted on prisoners unable to fight back, make non-violent inmates violent, 
and those already dangerous more dangerous 
Society has spent millions of dollars over the years to create and maintain the proven failure of pris-
ons. Incarceration has failed in its two essential purposes -- correcting the offender and providing 
permanent protection to society.68  
As documented so vividly in the MacGuigan Report, the penitentiary system in Canada experienced 
violence and massive riots during the 1970 to 1976 period that was entirely unprecedented in Ca-
nadian history and has never been approached since. Before concluding that today’s penitentiary 
population is a more violent one the Panel might have found it worth reading the MacGuigan Re-
port’s description of those times 30 years ago: 
Seven years of comparative peace in the Canadian penitentiary system ended in 1970 with a series of 
upheavals (riots, strikes, murders and hostage-takings) that grew in numbers and size with each 
passing year. By 1976 the prison explosions were almost constant; hardly a week passed without an-
other violent incident. The majority were in Canada's maximum security institutions. In the 42 years 
between 1932 and 1974, there was a total of 65 major incidents in federal penitentiaries. Yet in two 
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years -- 1975 and 1976 -- there was a total of 69 major incidents, including 35 hostage-takings in-
volving 92 victims, one of whom (a prison officer) was killed.69 
One has to wonder what the implications for the MacGuigan report’s conclusions would have been 
if the focus had been entirely on the “changing prisoner profile” during those years. In fact, it was 
the promise of fair treatment and respect for human rights that brought about the end to this vio-
lence even before the Parliamentary Sub-committee’s report had been tabled.In the period that 
the Sub-Committee traveled and held hearings not one major incident occurred in a Canadian Peni-
tentiary. It was the longest stretch since 1973 without a smashup or hostage incident.70In 1977 Par-
liamentarians from all political parties recognized, like so many other official reports, that the ex-
perience of imprisonment, as a response to crime, is itself criminogenic: it actually produces and 
reproduces the very behaviour it seeks to control. There is another theme that runs the historical 
course of 170 years between the early days of the penitentiary and the first decade of the twenty-
first century. It is that the experience of imprisonment, intended to inculcate respect for the law by 
punishing those who breach its commands, actually creates disrespect for the very legal order in 
whose name it is invoked. This theme - the need for and the absence of respect for human rights 
behind the walls - has seen its most recent expression in the 1996 report of Madam Justice Arbour 
into events at the Prison for Women. The Panel’s report, by totally disregarding this theme, is be-
reft of any recommendations to address it. It is however a theme to which we will be returning be-
cause it lies at the heart of any roadmap to transformation.  
The relationship between a safe prison, for both staff and prisoners, and a regime that is respectful 
of human rights is well understood by experienced correctional staff, although apparently not by 
those the Panel consulted. Jim Mackie, a senior correctional supervisor at Kent institution, in com-
paring conditions he had experienced in the 1970s in the B.C. Penitentiary to those at Kent institu-
tion 20 years later, had this to say: 
I know that the prisons when I first walked in the door at B.C. Pen were so damn dangerous that you 
were glad to be home any given day. I know now when I walk in the door I expect to be home . . . At 
the B.C. Pen there were excesses in force. There was no such thing as use-of-force documents, you 
didn't record anything. You were told to go deal with the person and drag him to the hole. If the guy 
went hard so be it, if he went easy so be it. We've learned to do things better and it is paying a divi-
dend to us now. Possibly there are some people that are saying there are too many rights for in-
mates, but if they lose those rights then possibly we lose the same rights. Because when they take 
away their rights, they take away our rights71. 
So much of the Panel’s Roadmap is premised on the asserted increasingly violent population it is of 
great concern that the Panel failed to explore the validity of this premise, using CSC’s own readily-
available figures. Both of the authors, who have experienced the changes in the Canadian Peniten-
tiary over the past 30 years, have the strong sense that prisons are less violent places, a perception 
supported by the description of the state of affairs in the 1970s described in the MacGuigan Re-
port. Is this sense supported by the evidence on the ground or does that evidence validate the 
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Panel’s premise of increasing violence? To answer this question we asked the Correctional Service 
of Canada to provide us with their best evidence of the current situation and the trend. That evi-
dence is contained in the Security Branch’s Annual Report for 2006-7 of Institutional Security Inci-
dents. As explained at the beginning of the report: 
This report contains an overview of institutionally based security incidents which include data on Of-
fenders sustaining ‘MAJOR’ injury, as well as information pertaining to Serious Offences committed 
by federal offenders while subject to conditional release in the Community.  Furthermore, a com-
parative analysis of this past Fiscal Year’s results with those reported during the preceding years is 
included. 72 
These then are the facts of institutional violence according to CSC’s best evidence:  
INMATE MURDERS;  
There was no change in the number of Inmate Murders, three (3), committed in Fiscal Years 2006-07, 
2005-06 and 2004-05, respectively.  This remains below the annual average of four (4) Inmate Mur-
ders recorded during the preceding nine year period, 
MAJOR INMATE ASSAULTS: 2.5% INCREASE over Fiscal Year 2005-2006; 
There has been a minor increase in the number of Major Inmate Assaults recorded during this past 
Fiscal Year, forty (40) compared to thirty nine (39) in FY 2005-2006.  This remains below the average 
of forty-one (41) Major Inmate Assaults recorded during the preceding nine year period, 
MAJOR STAFF ASSAULTS; 67% DECREASE over Fiscal Year 2005-2006; 
There has been a significant decrease in the number of Major Staff Assaults recorded during this past 
Fiscal Year, two (2) compared to six (6) in FY 2005-2006.  This is also slightly below the average of 
(2.2) Major Staff Assaults recorded in the preceding nine year period,  
MAJOR DISTURBANCES (Institutions);  
There were two (2) Major Disturbances reported in Fiscal Year 2006-2007, compared to none in Fis-
cal Year 2005-2006, which is also below the average of  6.4 Major Disturbances recorded during the 
preceding nine year period, 
INMATE SUICIDE INCIDENTS; 
Ten (10) inmates committed suicide during this past Fiscal Year, which represents the same number 
of suicide incidents that had occurred in the previous year.  This is slightly below the annual average 
of eleven (11) for the period of 1997-98 to 2005-06.   
 
 Notwithstanding the Prime Minister's disparaging comments about the use of statistics that we 
quoted earlier, there is only one way to read these figures. No amount of manipulation or spin can 
support the Panel’s view that prisoner violence within the institutions is on the increase. Given that 
it is UCCO that continually beats the drum that their members are working in an increasingly dan-
gerous environment, the most significant statistic is that in 2006-7 major assaults on staff de-
creased by 67%, falling from 6 to 2, and that the average of major staff assaults recorded in the 
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preceding nine year period was 2.2. The number of inmate assaults on other inmates, while much 
higher numerically in 2006-7, at 40, is still below the average of 41 recorded during the preceding 
nine year period.  
To avoid the mistake made by the Panel of interpreting single year changes as a trend, it is impor-
tant to note that there is also evidence of a decrease in institutional violence over a longer period 
than reported in the Security Branch’s 2006 -7 report. In 2002, in responding to similar assertions 
of an increasingly violent prisoner population in Michael Harris' book Con Game: The Truth about 
Canada's Prisons, Professor Jackson reviewed CSC's figures on major assaults on inmates for the 
two years before the CCRA was introduced (1990-1992) and for the ten years after (1992-2002). 
Looking at the numbers as a whole it was  clear that there had not been any increase in major as-
saults from 1990 to 2002; indeed comparing the six years from 1990-1996 with the six years from 
1996-2002 there was a downward trend, to which 2000-01 was  the exception.( The 2000-1 figure 
was the only one used by Mr. Harris).73 Professor Jackson concluded that CSC’s own numbers pro-
vided no support and indeed contradicted Mr. Harris’ thesis that “violence is rampant and escalat-
ing”. Exactly the same conclusion must be drawn regarding UCCO’s and the Panel’s reiteration of 
this claim. 
Many of the Panel’s assertions regarding crime, criminals, and prisoners’ rights bear a remarkable 
similarity to those that appeared in the Harris book, assertions that inflamed public fear. In re-
sponding to the Harris thesis that the Canadian prison system is too concerned about rights and not 
concerned enough about security, Professor Jackson wrote:  
In the process Mr. Harris manages to misread the history of correctional policy, misinterpret the rele-
vant law (including the impact of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms) and gets many of 
the facts wrong. As an exercise in populist journalism, designed to curry favour with those who advo-
cate tougher prison regimes and longer sentences, Con Game plays well. As an exercise in providing 
public information to move the Canadian prison system in the direction that balances public safety 
and human rights, Michael Harris' book is indeed, as its title states, a "con game".74  
We will let the reader decide, based on the evidence and analysis we provide, whether the same 
criticism can be made of the Panel’s Roadmap.          
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4 Constitutional and Legislative Framework of Corrections 
 
The first recommendations made by the Panel centre around “Refocusing the CCRA”. Before set-
ting out those recommendations the report provides the following one paragraph summary of the 
legislative framework of federal corrections:  
The Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA) came into force in 1992, replacing the Peniten-
tiary and Parole Act with a modern, comprehensive framework for corrections and conditional re-
lease that makes clear that public protection is the paramount consideration in all decisions relating 
to the incarceration and release of offenders. Also, for the first time, victims of crime were formally 
recognized in the federal corrections and parole process 75  
Anyone familiar with the enormous work that went into the development of the CCRA would rec-
ognize that this is an incomplete and inadequate characterization of the Act. The purpose of the 
Act is set out in section 3: 
 
The Panel further fails to appreciate that one, if not the primary, objective of the new legislation 
was to bring Canadian correctional legislation into compliance with the Charter of Rights and Free-
doms. Indeed, in assessing developments in correctional law since 1982, a strong case can be made 
that the most significant impact of the Charter has been in the development of new correctional 
legislation, culminating in the Corrections and Conditional Release Act in 1992. The genesis of this 
legislation was the Federal Department of Justice's publication in 1982 of The Criminal Law in Ca-
nadian Society which set out a comprehensive vision of the federal government's policy on the 
purpose and principles of criminal and correctional law. Along with the publication, the Depart-
ment of Justice launched the Criminal Law Review, which included as a component the Correctional 
Law Review (CLR) conducted by the Ministry of the Solicitor General. Over the course of several 
years, the CLR published a series of working papers which were widely circulated and the subject of 
public consultation. In its working papers, the CLR specifically addressed the need for new correc-
tional legislation that would incorporate the values of the Charter and work out the appropriate 
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Purpose 
3. The purpose of the federal correctional system is to contribute 
to the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by  
(a) carrying out sentences imposed by courts through the safe 
and humane custody and supervision of offenders; and 
(b) assisting the rehabilitation of offenders and their reintegra-
tion into the community as law-abiding citizens through the pro-
vision of programs in penitentiaries and in the community.  
Section 3 CCRA 




balance between correctional authority and prisoners' rights as mandated by the Charter. In its 
fifth working paper, appropriately entitled "Correctional Authority and Inmate Rights," the Working 
Group of the CLR explained the rationale for a new legislative framework.  
There are a number of reasons why matters governing inmate rights should now be placed in law.  
One is that legislated provisions are particularly important where the Charter is concerned. Because 
the Charter is drafted in general, abstract terms, legislative provisions play a crucial role in articu-
lating and clarifying Charter rights and any restrictions on them that are necessary in the correc-
tions context . . . In addition, development of legislative provisions at this time appears vastly pref-
erable to a future of incremental and potentially inconsistent change forced upon the correctional 
system by the courts. Although judicial intervention plays an important role in providing outside in-
spection and scrutiny, the courts should be relied on as a last resort, rather than a first measure. In 
short, there is a need for legislative provisions to be developed in a way which does justice to all par-
ticipants, in an effort to improve their collective enterprise. Litigation, in contrast, results in a win or 
loss for one side or the other, and often results in maximizing polarity.  
In considering long term solutions, the need for resort to the courts should be avoided by developing 
legislative rules that recognize yet structure discretion consistent with principles that are under-
standable to inmates, prison staff and administrators, and the public. Legislative rules that are 
based on clearly stated principles and objectives would structure discretion to allow for the neces-
sary degree of flexibility while ensuring the greatest possible degree of accountability. Develop-
ment of legislative provisions to govern inmate rights and staff powers, with input from all those 
affected by the correction system, is necessary to strike the appropriate balance. In addition, legis-
lative rules which reflect the interests of staff, offenders and the public are critical if they are to be 
fair and voluntarily complied with. It should also be noted that pro-active legislation that takes into 
account the administrative resource burdens on corrections would allow inmate rights to be pro-
tected in the most cost-efficient manner. 
Legislative rules help to accomplish other goals: to clearly set out the individual rights of inmates in 
the corrections context, and to provide guidance to staff in how to carry out their functions. Inmates 
should be aware of and understand the restrictions which may be lawfully imposed on them, as 
well as the rights and responsibilities they have, and staff must be aware of their legal responsi-
bilities and duties and the extent of their powers. Uncertainty in the law is not conducive to either a 
fair or effective correctional system. It is therefore in the interest of both staff and inmates that the 
law clearly define inmate rights and staff powers.76 
It is clear from this statement, particularly the bolded passages, that legislatively articulating the 
nature and scope and restrictions on rights, was not inspired or premised on a “soft” approach to 
offenders, but on ensuring a fair, flexible, accountable and cost-effective correctional system con-
sistent with Charter values.  
The working papers of the CLR were designed to provide a comprehensive, coherent and principled 
legislative framework which would embody the modern philosophy of corrections and incorporate  
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the rights and guarantees of the Charter. They remain the clearest articulation of the need to work 
out the critical “balance between correctional authority and prisoners' rights as mandated by the 
Charter”, a balance ultimately reflected in the CCRA. The working papers were reissued in 2003 in 
PDF format and are posted on the Ministry of Public Safety’s website.77 In his Preface to their re-
publication the then Solicitor General, the Hon. Wayne Easter, stated: 
This work provides a valuable record of the thinking that underlies Canada’s correctional law, includ-
ing its relationship to the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
Many features of the new Corrections and Conditional Release Act have their genesis in proposals set 
out in the working papers of the Correctional Law Review. Not the least of these is a statement of 
purpose and principles for corrections in the context of Canada’s criminal justice system. 
A special Sub-Committee of the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights completed a re-
view of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act in May 2000. Their findings endorse the enduring 
soundness of the purpose, values and principles of the Act. 
This outcome is a legacy of the members of the Correctional Law Review team and those who par-
ticipated in related consultations. Thanks to their efforts, Canadians have a correctional system 
that is held in high regard by jurisdictions throughout the world.78                      
The work of those involved in the Correctional Law Review was indeed transformative, yet this im-
portant window into the CCRA is not even deemed worthy of a footnote by the Panel.  
As we will demonstrate, the failure of the Panel to understand that the CCRA was designed to in-
corporate a Charter culture of rights into correctional operations undermines their principal rec-
ommendations for amending the Act. It is to these recommendations that we will now turn. 
4.1 Refocusing the CCRA 
In justifying what is described as “refocusing the CCRA” the Panel accepts “the key rehabilitative 
principle and CSC’s responsibility …to provide the offender with ample opportunity to learn the 
skills required to correct behaviour”. At the same time, the Panel “does not view the rehabilitation 
mandate of CSC as a one-way commitment.” We are told that “the foundation of the Panel’s phi-
losophy is the belief that if rehabilitation is to occur and truly be sustained, it must be shared be-
tween CSC and the offender.” Offenders “must seize those opportunities, pick up the tools of reha-
bilitation and use them.” The Panel, therefore,  recommends legislative change “to support an in-
creased emphasis on offender accountability” and because the CCRA “is highly prescriptive in how 
CSC should operate, and what it can and cannot do” proposes changing the principle of ‘least re-
strictive measures’ with the principle of ‘appropriate measures’ to support correctional plan im-
plementation”. 79 
The increased emphasis on accountability of offenders to rehabilitate themselves is justified by the 
Panel’s view of fundamental principles of democracy.  
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A fundamental principle of democracy is that individuals are responsible and must be held ac-
countable for their actions. This should be no different simply because an individual is incarcer-
ated. In fact, the Panel believes that it becomes even more important for offenders to accept ac-
countability for their criminal acts. They must learn that they are responsible for their actions 
and are obligated to respect the rights and freedoms of others in society.80  
4.2 Proposed Amendments to s. 4  
Based on this “fundamental principle of democracy” rationale, the Panel set out its recommen-
dations for amending s.4 of the CCRA81, the section that contains the principles that guide the 
interpretation and implementation of the Act. Some of the Panel’s recommended changes are 
welcome. For example the change to s.4 (h) that “correctional policies, programs and practices 
respect… the needs of offenders with special mental health requirements” will give legal force 
to the Panel’s recommendations, (ones that have been previously made to CSC by the Correc-
tional Investigator) regarding the dire need for improved services to this vulnerable group. Oth-
er proposed amendments seem to be no more than authoritarian rhetoric adding nothing of 
substance to the existing legislation.  The clearest examples are a proposed new section enti-
tled “Offender Accountabilities” and changes to the existing section 4(j). 
The existing s.4 (j) reads “that offenders are expected to obey penitentiary rules and conditions 
governing temporary absence, work release, parole and statutory release, and to actively partici-
pate in programs designed to promote their rehabilitation and reintegration”. The Panel’s amend-
ment would have the section read “those offenders be obligated to obey penitentiary rules and to 
respect the authority and position of the staff, and any conditions governing their release to the 
community”. The underlined changes convert “expected” to “obligated” and enlarge the obligation 
of offenders to  “to respect the authority and position of the staff”. The changes are unnecessary. 
Under other sections of the Act it is crystal clear that prisoners are already “obligated” to obey 
penitentiary rules and respect the authority and position of the staff. The CCRA and CCR Regula-
tions set out a comprehensive prison disciplinary process which includes a code of offences for 
breach of which prisoners can be disciplined. Section 40 CCRA provides:  
40. An inmate commits a disciplinary offence who 
(a) disobeys a justifiable order of a staff member; 
f) is disrespectful or abusive toward a staff member in a manner that could undermine a 
staff member’s authority;  
(r) wilfully disobeys a written rule governing the conduct of inmates. 
 It is important to note that these disciplinary offences require that any order given be “justifiable”, 
that disrespect be of such a nature that “could undermine a staff member’s authority” and that in 
the case of disobedience of a rule it be wilful and and that the rule be a written one so a prisoner 
can have notice of its existence. The purpose of this carefully drafted language is to reinforce both 
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the legitimate exercises of staff authority and concepts of individual offender responsibility. The 
Panel’s amendments seem informed by an authoritarian concept of compliance that characterized 
the penitentiaries of the nineteenth century.  
As to the Panel’s concern that offenders being obligated to “respect any conditions governing their 
release to the community, ss.133-4 CCRA already provide: 
Conditions of release 
133 (2) Subject to subsection (6), every offender released on parole, statutory release or unes-
corted temporary absence is subject to the conditions prescribed by the regulations.  
134. (1) An offender who has been released on parole, statutory release or unescorted tempo-
rary absence shall comply with any instructions given by a member of the Board or a person 
designated, by name or by position, by the Chairperson of the Board or the Commissioner, or 
given by the institutional head or by the offender’s parole supervisor, respecting any condi-
tions of parole, statutory release or unescorted temporary absence in order to prevent a 
breach of any condition or to protect society. 
Breach of these conditions and instructions can and does lead to suspension and revocation of 
conditional release and return to prison. In light of these existing statutory provisions there is no 
reason to amend the Act and the Panel’s recommendation raises only the issue of redundancy.  
The rationale that the report offered for the finding that offender accountability must be consid-
ered a key focus of the CSC is that the responsibilities associated with the rehabilitative mandate of 
the CSC are being unevenly shared between CSC staff and prisoners.  The Panel, earlier in its execu-
tive summary, writes:   
CSC is to be commended for its efforts to rehabilitate offenders but it continues to face resistance 
from a portion of offenders who have no interest in rehabilitation and are content to “wait out” the 
system until they reach statutory release... It is the belief of the Panel that life inside a penitentiary 
should promote a positive work ethic. Today, an offender working hard at rehabilitation is often 
treated no differently than an offender who is seeking only to continue his criminal lifestyle.82 
The Panel goes on to state that while “it is the responsibility of CSC to provide …the offender with 
ample opportunity to learn the skills required to correct behaviour”83, it is the offender’s responsi-
bility to then use those tools to rehabilitate themselves.  Consequently, the Panel concluded that it 
was necessary to strengthen the language of the CCRA to include a more robust conception of of-
fender responsibility and accountability. In furtherance of this conclusion, the Panel proposes that 
two changes be made to the CCRA.  First, the Panel recommends that a substantive section entitled 
“Offender Accountabilities” be inserted into the Act and that the proposed section contain, at a 
minimum, the following language: 
Offenders, as part of their commitment to society to change their behaviour and in order to help pro-
tect society, must:  
a) obey penitentiary rules as established by CSC;  
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b) respect the authority of staff at all times; and  
c)  actively participate in programs identified by CSC in their correctional plans (e.g., education, work, 
correctional programs).  
As we have shown the CCRA already leaves no doubt as to offenders’ accountability to obey peni-
tentiary rules and respect staff authority so this recommendation, at least with regard to (a) and 
(b), is unnecessary. Similarly, with respect to (c) the CCRA already provides that offenders are “ex-
pected to participate in programs designed to promote their rehabilitation and safe reintegration” 
and since these programs will have been identified in their correctional plans the Panel’s change 
adds nothing to offender accountability. The inclusion of the correctional plan in this proposed 
amendment does however raise other issues. As we will demonstrate later, this recommendation 
reflects the Panel’s unjustifiable belief that the “correctional plan’ contains such a powerful elixir of 
rehabilitative potential that an offender who refuses to participate in it can be legitimately de-
prived of rights and privileges. 
We would also note a revealing omission in the Panel’s recommended amendments. The Panel, in 
response to several submissions acknowledged the lengthy waiting periods for some programs that 
are identified on offenders’ correctional plan, which often means that access to early release is de-
nied to individuals who might otherwise be safely managed in the community. The Panel recom-
mended, therefore. that “every effort should be made to review the modules of cognitive-based 
correctional programs to identify and lessen redundancies, thereby shortening program content 
and required time frames.”84 Consistent with its mantra of greater accountability, why then would 
the Panel not recommend a correlative amendment to the CCRA that CSC not just make “every ef-
fort” but be legally obligated to deliver programs on an offender’s correctional plan in a timely 
manner? 
4.3 Retained Rights and the Least Restrictive Principles 
If some of the recommended amendments raise issues of authoritarian rhetoric without substan-
tive change and an asymmetrical concept of accountability there are others that raise fundamental 
questions about the constitutional limits on correctional authority in a free and democratic society. 
The Panel’s most significant and far reaching proposed amendments are to ss. 4(d) and 4(e).The 
sections currently read: 
The principles that shall guide the Service in achieving the purpose referred to in section 3 are  
 (d) that the Service use the least restrictive measures consistent with the protection of the public, 
staff members and offenders; 
(e) that offenders retain the rights and privileges of all members of society, except those rights and 
privileges that are necessarily removed or restricted as a consequence of the sentence; 
In furtherance of its goal to more firmly establish the principle of offender responsibility in the Act, 
the Panel suggested several changes to the wording of these sections.  In s. 4(d), the Panel sug-
                                                     
84  Roadmap, p.39 




gested that instead of reading “that the Service use the least restrictive measures consistent with 
the protection of the public, staff members and offenders, it read  
“that, in managing the offender populations in general and the individual offenders, in particular, 
the Service use appropriate measures that will ensure the protection of the public, staff members 
and offenders, and that are consistent with the management of the offender’s correctional plan; 
Regarding s. 4(e), the Panel recommends that instead of reading “that offenders retain the rights 
and privileges of all members of society, except those rights and privileges that are necessarily re-
moved or restricted as a consequence of the sentence”, the section should read that  
“offenders retain the basic rights and privileges of all members of society, except those rights and 
privileges that are necessarily removed or restricted as a consequence of the sentence, or that are 
required in order to encourage the offender to begin to and continue to engage in his or her cor-
rectional plan”  
According to the Panel, offenders must be encouraged to take responsibility for their actions.  
Therefore, the Panel is suggesting that corrections in Canada should take a new approach: instead 
of assuming that prisoners are to be imprisoned according to the least restrictive measures and 
that prisoners retain all the rights that adhere to members of society except for those necessarily 
removed as a result of their imprisonment, prisoners would be expected to earn their rights and 
privileges.  The only rights that prisoners would retain will be “basic rights”.  
The recommendation of reducing prisoners’ legal entitlements to “basic rights” has a certain ambi-
guity never clarified by the Panel. Perhaps the Panel would like to see Canada going back to the 
Penitentiary Act of 1886 which stated,  
51. The following general rules shall be observed in the treatment of convicts in a penitentiary:  
(a) every convict shall, during the term of his confinement, be clothed, at the expense of the peni-
tentiary, in suitable prison garments;  
(b) he shall be fed on a sufficient quantity of wholesome food;  
(c) he shall be provided with a bed and pillow and sufficient covering, varied according to the 
season; and  
(d) he shall, except in case of sickness, be kept in a cell by himself at night, and during the day 
when not employed. 85 
Some indication of the Panel’s correctional philosophy can be gained from the articulation of the 
same “basic rights” correctional philosophy that was advanced by members of the former Canadian 
Alliance Party in its dissenting report to the Parliamentary Sub-committee’s Five Year review of the 
CCRA:  
Putting the protection of a law-abiding society first means that it is necessary to accept to some de-
gree that the rights and privileges of those who obey the laws of this country are fundamentally dif-
ferent from the rights of those who do not. The system does not do this. 
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Section 4 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act (CCRA) states "that offenders retain the 
rights and privileges of all members of society, except those rights and privileges that are necessarily 
removed or restricted as a consequence of the sentence." The Canadian Alliance believes that any 
person who has been convicted in a Canadian court should temporarily lose some of their rights and 
privileges as a Canadian. Primary exceptions to this are basic Charter rights such as right to an attor-
ney and the right to humane and healthful treatment. We define this as the right to be incarcerated 
in accommodations with reasonable environmental control, to be provided with basic personal care 
supplies, to be fed according to the Canadian nutrition guide, and to be provided with access to basic 
medical treatment. Beyond this, prisoners should have the ability to earn other rights and privileges 
such as more freedom within the prison, transfers to more desirable facilities, training programs, 
sports programs, visitor privileges, payment for work performance, canteen privileges, temporary 
absences and parole. Each of these rights and privileges must be earned by appropriate behaviour 
which in turn means that they can also be taken away for inappropriate behaviour.86 
There is a populist attraction to this vision of corrections, rehabilitation and offender responsibility 
that the Panel is promoting.  It claims to place responsibility for the crimes committed squarely on 
the shoulders of offenders and uses the incentive of converting existing rights beyond “basic rights” 
to privileges that must be earned to encourage offenders to reform their character.  So what is so 
wrong with requiring prisoners to earn the “right” to have anything more than their basic rights? 
Particularly when all we are asking them to do is to participate in their own rehabilitation and in 
complying with institutional rules? The fundamental flaw in this and the Panel’s vision of correc-
tional principles is fivefold:  
(1) it is inconsistent with the evolving common law and Charter jurisprudence on the human 
rights of prisoners, specifically the judgments of the Supreme Court of Canada in Solosky v. 
The Queen [1980] and Sauvé v. Canada [2003]; 
(2) it disregards the extensive legislative history and context of the CCRA (specifically the work 
of the Correctional Law Review); 
(3) it is out of step with international human rights standards;  
(4) it would compromise respect for the rule of law and human rights in Canadian prisons and  
(5) it would undermine rather than promote prisoner reintegration. 
4.4 The Legal and Constitutional Context of the CCRA 
Fully understanding the negative human rights implications for Canadian corrections of the Panel’s 
recommended amendments to the CCRA entails a review of the legal and constitutional origins of 
the original provisions. Both the retained rights and the least restrictive measures principles have 
their jurisprudential origins in the pre- charter Supreme Court of Canada decision of Solosky v. The 
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Queen.87  Those origins and the bases for the principles are described in the working papers of the 
Correctional Law Review. We have reproduced the relevant passages below and we encourage our 
readers to consider them carefully because they reveal the necessary kind of discussion of constitu-
tional and correctional principles that is conspicuously lacking in the Panel’s Roadmap: 
The view that an individual in prison does not lose "the right to have rights" is recognized in Cana-
dian law. Even before the Charter, in R. v. Solosky, the Supreme Court of Canada expressly endorsed 
the view that inmates retain rights, except for those necessarily limited by the nature of incarcera-
tion or expressly or impliedly taken away by law. Moreover, the Supreme Court endorsed the "least 
restrictive means" approach which recognizes that any interference with inmate rights by institu-
tional authorities must be for a valid correctional goal and must be the least restrictive means avail-
able. 
In effect, the "retained rights" principle means that it is not giving rights to inmates which requires 
justification, but rather, it is restricting them which does. Undoubtedly, some individual rights of in-
mates, such as liberty, must be limited by the nature of incarceration, in the same way that the rights 
of non-inmates in open society must be limited in certain situations. The important point, however, is 
that it is limitations on inmate rights which must be justified, and that the only justifiable limitations 
are those that are necessary to achieve a legitimate correctional goal, and that are the least restric-
tive possible. 
There are also very significant policy reasons, flowing from our statement of purpose, for recognizing 
and protecting the rights of inmates. As practically all inmates eventually get out of prison, society's 
long term interests are best protected if the correctional system influences them to begin or resume 
law abiding lives. According rights and responsibilities to inmates supports and furthers this goal. On 
the other hand, lack of respect for individual rights in the corrections context can build up resent-
ments and frustrations on the part of inmates and undermine the system's short term and long term 
security goals. Arbitrary treatment may lead not only to resentment on the part of inmates who are 
sent to prison for breaking the law, but the ensuing tension could create an atmosphere of mistrust, 
which could lead to violence, and which is contrary not only to the interests of inmates, but to staff, 
management and the larger community as well. Thus the Working Group is firmly of the view that 
humane treatment of inmates and the recognition of their rights while they are in prison aids in their 
successful reintegration into the community.88  
The enactment of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as with other components of the criminal 
justice system, has had major impacts on corrections. As described by the Correctional Law Review: 
Although the Charter gives rights to all individuals (in some cases just to citizens) in Canada, and 
does not specify the precise nature of those rights in the correctional context, it is clear that the 
Charter does apply to prisoners, subject to restrictions on rights upheld pursuant to section 1. In the 
jurisprudence to date, the courts have been particularly concerned that any correctional decisions 
which affect a prisoner's liberty, that is to say, any decisions which could either extend the period of 
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his incarceration or place him in a more restrictive environment, must be made in accordance with 
fundamental justice.89 
Many of the specific rights referred to in the Charter would touch on correctional authority: freedom 
of association, the right to vote, mobility rights, the right to life, liberty and security of the person, 
security against unreasonable search and seizure, and freedom from cruel and unusual treatment or 
punishment. 
Section 1 of the Charter will increasingly mean that the burden will fall on government to articu-
late and "demonstrably justify" the limits which it wishes to place on offenders' rights. These limits 
will, furthermore, have to be stated in law. 
This apparent Charter trend is echoed by the CLICS [The Criminal Law in Canadian Society] principle 
(a) that the criminal law should be administered "in a manner which interferes with individual rights 
and freedoms only to the extent necessary for the attainment of its purpose". Indeed, fairness sug-
gests that we should not arbitrarily limit the civil rights of offenders, although we must recognize 
that some restrictions are a necessary consequence of a sentence of imprisonment. One principle, 
therefore, which should govern punishment could be stated as follows: 
Individuals under sentence retain all the rights and privileges of a member of society, except 
those that are necessarily removed or restricted by the fact of incarceration. These rights and 
privileges and any limitations on them should be clearly and accessibly set forth in law.90 
 It was this principle that was embodied in s.4 (e) of the CCRA.  
The Correctional Law Review further explained the constitutional lineage of the requirement that 
correctional authorities must use the least restrictive measure, now reflected in s.4 (d) of the CCRA:   
Section 1 of the Charter enables Parliament or a Legislature to enact a law which has the effect of 
limiting one of the guaranteed rights or freedoms. However, the government must prove that any 
limitation is a "reasonable limit prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and de-
mocratic society". 
 In a series of cases dealing with such diverse areas as immigration and narcotic control, the Supreme 
Court of Canada has set the test for limits on Charter rights. This test is extremely important for cor-
rections, as it is at this stage that such serious concerns as security and good order of the institution 
will be balanced against the guarantee of Charter rights. The Supreme Court stresses that in applying 
this test it is committed to upholding Charter rights, and that any limits on Charter rights must be 
proven by the government to be necessary, and not just preferable as a matter of administrative 
convenience. 
[The Oakes test] sets out two central criteria which must be satisfied to establish that a limit is rea-
sonable and justified under section 1. The first, the objective to be served by any measure limiting a 
Charter right (for example, security of the institution) must be sufficiently important to warrant over-
riding a constitutionally protected right of freedom. Second, the party invoking section 1 (in the cor-
rections context, this would be the government or the correctional authorities) must show the means 
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to be reasonable and demonstrably justified. This involves a form of proportionality test that has 
three components: 
1)  the measures must be fair and not arbitrary, carefully designed to achieve the objective and 
rationally connected to it, 
2)  the means should impair the right in question as little as possible, and  
3)  there must be a proportionality between the effects of the limiting measure and the objective 
- the more severe the negative effects of a measure, the more important the objective must be.  
This proportionality test shows that protection of inmate rights must be balanced against the impor-
tant and legitimate institutional and security concerns of penitentiaries and the community; con-
cerns that in several respects relate to human life and safety. Such factors play an important role 
when it comes to the question of the extent to which inmate rights may be restricted or limited by 
the nature of incarceration. The answer to this question is complex and depends not only on security 
concerns but also on the nature of the particular right or interest at stake, the limit in question and 
the impact on the inmate. 
Of major significance in balancing the various factors involved is the recognition that prison practices 
and programs vary in degree of intrusiveness on inmate rights, and that as the level of intrusiveness 
increases, the objective must be increasingly important and protections and safeguards must corre-
spondingly increase. Finding the proper balance necessary to protect inmate rights while maintaining 
a safe, secure institution through a sliding scale approach is one of the primary concerns of this pa-
per.91 
4.5 Least Restrictive vs. Appropriate Measures 
It was to reflect Charter derived principles that the CLR recommended that new correctional legis-
lation include in its statement of principles a provision that:  
In administering the sentence, the least restrictive course of action should be adopted that meets the 
legal requirements of the disposition, and consistent with public protection and institutional safety 
and order. 
The implication of this principle, taken together with others, is that corrections would have the bur-
den of demonstrating why a given correctional environment should not, either in general or in re-
spect of a particular offender, approximate the conditions and freedoms of society generally. If there 
are two ways of accomplishing the same end, but one impinges considerably less on the offender's 
rights and interests, it is the less drastic course which should be chosen unless there are defensible 
reasons to reject it. A good example is the need to have identifiable photos of all inmates in order to 
assist in finding an escaped convict. One way to ensure an inmate will not be able to use facial hair 
to thwart identification is to require all inmates to remain clean-shaven at all times; a less restrictive 
option is to take photos of an inmate with and without facial hair, if he wishes to grow a beard or 
moustache. The same principle of restraint can apply to much more significant questions of initial 
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placement in maximum, medium or minimum security, as well as transfers, choice of treatment pro-
gram, and conditions of release.92  
The principle of restraint found its legislative form in s.4 (d) of the CCRA: 
that the Service use the least restrictive measures consistent with the protection of the public, staff 
members and offenders. 
We can now consider the nature of the change envisaged by the Panel’s recommendation that 4(e) 
be amended to read: 
that, in managing the offender populations in general and the individual offenders, in particular, the 
Service use appropriate measures that will ensure the protection of the public, staff members and of-
fenders and that are consistent with the management of the offender’s correctional plan. 
This is the Panel’s rationale for the change: 
The Panel believes that this principle has been emphasized too much by the staff and management 
of CSC, and even by the courts in everyday decision-making about offenders. As a result an imbal-
ance has been created that places the onus on CSC to justify why the least restrictive measures 
shouldn’t be used, rather than on offenders to justify why they should have access to privileges based 
upon their performance under their correctional plans. The Panel believes that this imbalance is det-
rimental to offender responsibility and accountability.93  
The Panel clearly has no appreciation that the principle has been appropriately and necessarily em-
phasised by staff and management and “even by the courts” because it is in keeping with a Charter 
derived constitutional test to justify reasonable limits on Charter rights and that under that test the 
only justifiable limitations are those that are necessary to achieve a legitimate correctional goal, 
and that are the least restrictive possible. The onus on the correctional authorities to justify that 
the exercise of their legal authority is in accordance with the least restrictive measure is consistent 
with and indeed mandated by  the "retained rights" principle endorsed by the Supreme Court of 
Canada which means that it is not giving rights to inmates which requires justification, but rather, 
restricting them, which does.  
The Panel’s amendment would substitute “appropriate” for “least restrictive measures”. This 
change would substitute for a constitutionally derived standard of restraint on the exercise of 
state power, a policy and operationally derived standard that leaves it entirely up to correctional 
authorities to determine what are the “appropriate” measures, so long as they are designed to en-
sure the protection of the public, staff members and offenders and that are consistent with the 
management of the offender’s correctional plan. The operational difference and legal dissonance 
between a “least restrictive” and “appropriate” measures standard can be best understood in the 
context of the common justification of many aspects of prison regimes, that of administrative con-
venience. Viewed through this lens, providing for disciplinary hearings with procedural safeguards 
such as advance written notice and the assistance of counsel, is administratively inconvenient in 
terms of delaying the process and therefore it can be argued that limiting these elements would be 
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“appropriate”. The problem with such a standard was most eloquently revealed in the 1984 judg-
ment of Justice Mark MacGuigan in the Federal Court of Appeal in Howard, a case dealing with the 
right to counsel in prison disciplinary hearings. Justice MacGuigan, who prior to his appointment to 
the Federal Court of Appeal, had, as a Member of Parliament, chaired the 1977 House of Commons 
Sub-Committee on the Penitentiary System in Canada and had served subsequently as Canada’s 
Minister of Justice. In response to arguments that allowing for counsel would hinder the swift dis-
position of cases and undermine the administrative efficiency of the process, Justice MacGuigan 
stated:  
It would be an ill-informed court that was not aware of the necessity for immediate response by 
prison authorities to breaches of prison order and it would be a rash one that would deny them the 
means to react effectively. But not every feature of present disciplinary practice is objectively neces-
sary for immediate disciplinary purposes. The mere convenience of the authorities will serve as no 
justification; as Lord Atkin put it in General Medical Consulate Council v. Spackman, "Convenience 
and justice are often not on speaking terms . . . " All that is not immediately necessary must certainly 
yield to the fullest exigencies of liberty. 94   
CSC’s former Director General of Rights, Redress and Resolution, Shereen Benzvy Miller, in a com-
munication to senior management regarding the Panel’s proposed amendments to s.4(d), suc-
cinctly expressed the relationship between the “least restrictive” and “appropriate” measures as 
standards to guide CSC decision-making:   
..the least intrusive, least restrictive measures.. are the most and only appropriate [limits] and no 
special Task Force can diminish the force and power of the enshrined rights and entitlements that 
have been reflected in the CCRA.95  
The questions never posed and therefore never answered by the Panel are what legitimate cor-
rectional initiatives or interventions are presently precluded by requiring CSC to ensure that it 
respects the least restrictive measures consistent with the protection of the public, staff mem-
bers and offenders and on what conceivable basis  should the federal correctional system, the 
deep end of the criminal justice system, be excepted from the constitutional standards that go-
vern all other exercises of state coercive power?   
4.6 The Nature of Prisoners’ Rights – The Citizen Lawbreaker 
The second major amendment proposed by the Panel is to s. 4(e). The amendment would change 
the current wording which reads: 
(e) that offenders retain the rights and privileges of all members of society, except those rights and 
privileges that are necessarily removed or restricted as a consequence of the sentence; 
so that it would read:  
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“that offenders retain the basic rights and privileges of all members of society, except those rights 
and privileges that are necessarily removed or restricted as a consequence of the sentence, or that 
are required in order to encourage the offender to begin to and continue to engage in his or her 
correctional plan”   
We have already cited the Working Papers of the Correctional Law Review to demonstrate that the 
current wording of 4(e) is a legislative codification of the Supreme Court of Canada’s pre-Charter 
decision in Solosky. Subsequent decisions of the Court interpreting the Charter have greatly rein-
forced this concept of retained rights and a careful review of the most important of these cases, 
Sauvé v. Canada - the prisoners voting case - will demonstrate that the Panel’s proposed changes 
are not only inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s approach to human rights but would under-
mine decades of important work in Canada and internationally to establish a culture of respect for 
human rights behind prison walls. 
According to the Panel, apart from a basic level of rights, prisoners do not have the right to have 
rights.  The assumption seems to be that human rights properly belong to those who are law-
abiding members of society. For those who have crossed the threshold to become law-breakers 
and have been sentenced to prison the right to bear all but the most “basic” rights is forfeited.  Any 
further rights must then be earned back by the law-breakers who must show they have taken re-
sponsibility for their criminal actions and are actively engaging in rehabilitating themselves.  
In Sauvé,96 the Supreme Court of Canada takes a very different approach to how prisoners’ rights 
are to be understood.  First, and most importantly, Chief Justice McLachlin uses the evocative 
phrase “citizen-lawbreakers”97 to describe prisoners and their relationship to Charter rights.  The 
significance of this description is that it emphasizes that in any analysis concerning prisoners’ rights, 
prisoners are to be primarily understood as citizens and as members of society, and only secondar-
ily as law breakers.  Chief Justice McLachlin describes the importance of the “citizen-lawbreaker” 
description as follows: 
The social compact requires the citizen to obey the laws created by the democratic process.  But it 
does not follow that failure to do so nullifies the citizen’s continued membership in the self-governing 
polity. Indeed, the remedy of imprisonment for a term rather than permanent exile implies our ac-
ceptance of continued membership in the social order.  Certain rights are justifiably limited for penal 
reasons, including aspects of the rights to liberty, security of the person, mobility, and security 
against search and seizure.  But whether a right is justifiably limited cannot be determined by ob-
serving that an offender has, by his or her actions, withdrawn from the social compact.  Indeed, the 
right of the state to punish and the obligation of the criminal to accept punishment are tied to so-
ciety’s acceptance of the criminal as a person with rights and responsibilities.  Other Charter provi-
sions make this clear.  Thus s. 11 protects convicted offenders from unfair trials, and s. 12 from “cruel 
and unusual treatment or punishment”.98 (emphasis added) 
The crucial point is that even after conviction and imprisonment, an offender remains a rights-
bearing individual: the connection between the individual and their common law and Charter rights 
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is not severed by a finding of criminal guilt and a sentence of imprisonment. Consequently, prison-
ers’ rights include the majority of the most robust rights listed in the Charter, including freedom of 
conscience and religion, freedom of thought, equality rights, the right to life, liberty and security of 
the person, language rights, and a considerable list of legal rights. 
This approach is very much in keeping with the understanding of prisoners’ rights that has emerged 
under the common law over the last century. Originally at common law, persons convicted of fel-
ony and sentenced to imprisonment underwent a “civil death”, whereby they lost all rights they 
had previously held. A Virginia court declared in 1871 that a prisoner "has, as a consequence of his 
crime, not only forfeited his liberty, but all his personal rights except those which the law in its hu-
manity accords to him. He is for the time being the slave of the State"99 The warden of Kingston 
Penitentiary was properly reflecting the traditional status of the felon when in 1867 he wrote, "So 
long as a convict is confined here I regard him as dead to all transactions of the outer world." 100  As 
a result of this idea, prisoners, ceased to be rights bearing individuals, rendering them beyond the 
purview of the courts.  However, this approach to prisoners’ rights has changed substantially in the 
course of the last century. 
The change in approach in Canada began in 1892 when the concept of civil death was abandoned.  
The movement towards an understanding of prisoners as rights-bearing individuals was fortified in 
the pre-Charter court rulings such as Solosky and developments in administrative law, particularly 
the Supreme Court rulings on the duty to act fairly, that emphasized the importance of procedural 
protections in contexts where state action has a serious impact on individual rights and interests, 
such as in a prison.101  These two developments served to encourage the courts to take a more ac-
tive role in reviewing how prison administrators handled issues around prisoners’ rights within the 
prison walls.   
Viewed from this historical perspective therefore the recommendations advanced by the Panel are 
out of step with both the common law developments regarding prisoners’ rights and the Supreme 
Court of Canada’s findings with respect to prisoners’ access to Charter rights. The Panel, in propos-
ing that prisoners be allowed  “basic rights” and that any additional rights must be earned, views 
rights as being contingent, in that they can be taken away for ‘bad’ behaviour and restored for 
‘good ‘behaviour.  This view, however, misconceives at a fundamental level the very nature of hu-
man rights, as rights that are inherent in the human person, based upon a sense of common hu-
manity and dignity. The inherent nature of the rights contained within the Charter has been recog-
nized and affirmed by the Supreme Court in Sauvé in their statement that “Charter rights are not a 
matter of privilege or merit, but a function of membership in the Canadian polity that cannot 
lightly be cast aside”.102  
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4.7 Removing Prisoners’ Rights – A Suspect Enterprise  
The Panel’s view of human rights is rendered without reference to the constitutional framework 
established by Canadian courts. Charter rights are to be defined using a broad and liberal ap-
proach.103 Charter rights are constitutionally entrenched and, as such, can only be infringed upon 
for a valid reason and in accordance with the least restrictive means.  More specific to the prison 
context, the Supreme Court in Sauvé makes two important points regarding the nature of Charter 
rights.  First, Charter rights are based on the principles of respect for human dignity and equality of 
membership in a political community. Second, the rights in the Charter are fundamental to democ-
racy. The role of Charter rights in a democracy is to protect the integrity of the individual from the 
coercive power of the state. This function is especially important in the criminal law context, not 
only because of the potential for unfair and arbitrary action on the part of the state, but also be-
cause it is in the criminal context where the individual has the most to lose – the right to liberty.  
Courts have taken their role as protectors of these rights seriously and there is a strong jurispru-
dential history of defending the rights of an accused in the criminal law context. However, it must 
never be forgotten that the correctional system is an extension of the criminal justice system.  An 
individual, while incarcerated, is even more vulnerable to rights-infringing action by the state, as he 
or she is dependent on the state for access to all the necessities of life. It is the state that provides 
their shelter, their food, ensures their safety and allows them access to their families through visits, 
phone calls and mail.  As Justice Louise Arbour has stated:  
A guilty verdict followed by a custodial sentence is not a grant of authority for the State to disregard 
the very values that the law, particularly criminal law, seeks to uphold and to vindicate, such as hon-
esty, respect for the physical safety of others, respect for privacy and for human dignity. The admini-
stration of criminal justice does not end with the verdict and the imposition of a sentence. Correc-
tions officials are held to the same standards of integrity and decency as their partners in the ad-
ministration of criminal law. My objective in bringing forward recommendations on various aspects 
of corrections… is to assist the correctional system in coming into the fold of two basic Canadian 
constitutional ideals, towards which the rest of the administration of criminal justice strives: the 
protection of individual rights and the entitlement to equality. 104  
The Panel proposes that depriving prisoners of some rights should be part of prisoners’ punish-
ment/accountability for the crime committed and that to earn these rights back prisoners must 
demonstrate a commitment to rehabilitation.  In the correctional context, it is undoubtedly true 
that some Charter rights must necessarily be restricted to accomplish the purpose of imprison-
ment, for example “aspects of the rights to liberty, security of the person, mobility, and security 
against search and seizure.”105  However, Sauvé also asserts that while there is no “doubt that Par-
liament may limit constitutional rights in the name of punishment provided that it can justify the 
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limitation”106, depriving prisoners of rights over and above the rights deprivations inherent in im-
prisonment should be approached with caution.   
Chief Justice McLachlin in Sauvé subscribes to a vision of prisoners’ rights that sees human rights as 
inherent to every individual, both those that abide by the laws and those that do not. Not only is 
denying prisoners their rights suspect because it effectively removes them from Charter protection, 
it is also suspect because such a blanket denial of rights “runs counter to our constitutional com-
mitment to the inherent worth and dignity of every individual”.107  Therefore, while a prisoner may 
be legitimately deprived of some Charter rights for the purposes of imprisonment  
it is another thing to say that a particular class of people for a particular time will completely lose a 
particular constitutional right.  This is tantamount to saying that the affected class is outside the full 
protection of the Charter.  It is doubtful that such an unmodulated deprivation,…is capable of justifi-
cation…108 
The second concern that the court in Sauvé raises with regard to depriving prisoners of their rights 
it that it is “bad pedagogy”. The Federal Government in seeking to justify denying federal prisoners 
the right to vote  had argued  that it sent  an “educative message” about the importance of respect 
for the law to inmates and to the citizenry at large. In the case of the Panel’s suggestions, the ra-
tionale offered for depriving prisoners of all but their basic rights is that this approach will teach 
offenders to be “responsible for their actions and *that they+ are obligated to respect the rights and 
freedoms of others in society.”109 However, Chief Justice McLachlin in Sauvé held that denying 
prisoners rights  
is bad pedagogy.  It misrepresents the nature of our rights and obligations under the law, and it 
communicates a message more likely to harm than to help respect for the law. .. [It]is more likely to 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy than a spur to reintegration.  Depriving at-risk individuals of their 
sense of collective identity and membership in the community is unlikely to instill a sense of respon-
sibility and community identity.110  
Furthermore, the Chief Justice McLachlin goes on to hold that “more profoundly, it sends the unac-
ceptable message that democratic values are less important than punitive measures ostensibly de-
signed to promote order.”111  Through these statements, we once again see the Chief Justice re-
turning to the idea that prisoners, regardless of what crimes they have committed, retain their 
membership in the citizen-community.  Charter rights are meant to embody democratic values and 
recognize the importance of the dignity of every human being.    
It should be clear from this analysis that the Panel’s suggestion that prisoners, rights be seen as 
contingent on good behaviour and that diminution of rights be determined by corrections officials 
and used as a form of punishment, is out of step with common law traditions and conflicts with the 
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spirit of the decision in Sauvé.  Not only are prisoners rights-bearing individuals, the rights they 
hold are of great importance and cannot be cavalierly or lightly set aside.  When the Panel starts 
from the assumption that the relationship between prisoners and their human rights may be bro-
ken upon incarceration, they are proposing an approach that is not supported by Canadian legal 
traditions. While this may be reason enough to reject the recommendations of the Panel, there is a 
more profound issue at stake. When human rights are seen as contingent, when the value of pun-
ishment is prioritized over our constitutional commitment to the principle of the inherent dignity of 
every individual, we risk undermining the very value of that foundational principle.  Our commit-
ment to human dignity, as it is expressed through Charter rights, is a commitment to the idea em-
bodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that every individual is worthy of respect sim-
ply because they are human.  When we begin deeming people ‘worthy’ and ‘not worthy’ of such 
respect, the value of human dignity is diminished.  As such, to act upon the Panel’s recommenda-
tions would not only result in undermining the human rights of prisoners, it would result in the de-
valuation of foundational constitutional principles.          
There is another important dimension to understanding the implications of a roadmap that would 
direct Canadian corrections on a journey featuring regimes that limit rights. A consistent theme in 
the history of corrections, not just in Canada but throughout the world, has been the struggle to 
achieve a balance between potentially competing goals, whether expressed as justice vs. secu-
rity/public safety, punishment vs. rehabilitation, or restraint vs. reintegration. A prominent feature 
of this history has been that the invocation of imprisonment and the practices that accompany its 
execution have been punctuated over the course of two centuries by a succession of crises. These 
crises have led to commissions of inquiry and reports cataloguing both the abuses of power taking 
place within prison walls and the prison's pervasive tendency to make prisoners more dangerous 
and more anti-social. In the last part of the twentieth century and into this century it has been in-
creasingly recognized that an indispensable component in reconciling the goals of public safety and 
justice has been promoting a culture of respect for the rule of law and human rights and holding 
correctional authorities accountable for abuses of power.   
The most recent of these inquiries in Canada to address this component is that of Justice Louise 
Arbour in 1996 arising from the strip searching and segregation of a group of women at the Prison 
for Women. The Arbour report is a seminal document in the history of Canadian corrections yet the 
Panel’s report gives no consideration to the recommendations of the Arbour report to entrench 
respect for the rule of law and human rights in Canada’s penitentiaries. It has been left to CSC’s 
former human rights director general, Shereen Benzvy Miller, after CSC’s endorsement of the 
Roadmap, to remind the Service of the lessons of Arbour and their relationship to the Panel’s rec-
ommendations for limiting prisoners’ rights in the name of accountability and rehabilitation:     
So how can we meet the objective of ensuring offenders are held accountable for their reintegration 
(bearing in mind that their incarceration is society’s way of holding them accountable for their of-
fences). The CCRA and the Charter provide the context of the discussion, but we at CSC have history 
that sets the stage for our deliberations as well. It is not lost on me that I started writing this on April 
22, 2008- exactly 14 years after the infamous ‘Certain Events at the Prison for Women in Kingston’ 
that led to the Arbour Report.  So let us review a few highlights as we ask ourselves, should we be 




amending law to solve the accountability dilemma? Would more legislation, Commissioner’s Di-
rectives or Standing Orders improve the situation? Did limiting the rights of those offenders in that 
incident serve us well? 
In her report, commissioned by Solicitor General Herb Gray, Arbour attacked prison officials' "ongo-
ing infringement of prisoners' legal rights" and their "cruel, inhumane and degrading" treatment of 
the women. Nor did [justice Arbour] limit her criticism to the Prison for Women: she said the short-
comings were "systemic" and "part of a prison culture" in Canada. Specifically, she says: 
The breakdown of the Rule of Law in corrections has been denounced in the past, often in the 
most forceful terms. In 1977, the Report of the Subcommittee on the Penitentiary System in Can-
ada, chaired by The Honourable Mark MacGuigan stated that: ``There is a great deal of irony in 
the fact that imprisonment...the ultimate product of our system of criminal justice itself epito-
mizes injustice.''… 
In my view, if anything emerges from this inquiry, it is the realization that the Rule of Law will 
not find its place in corrections by ``swift and certain disciplinary action'' against staff and in-
mates. The absence of the Rule of Law is most noticeable at the management level, both within 
the prison and at the Regional and National levels. The Rule of Law has to be imported and inte-
grated, at those levels, from the other partners in the criminal justice enterprise, as there is no 
evidence that it will emerge spontaneously. 
This dual characteristic of the role of legal norms in a penal institution was amply demonstrated 
throughout this inquiry. On the one hand, the multiplicity of regulatory sources largely contrib-
uted to the applicable law or policy being often unknown, or easily forgotten and ignored. On the 
other hand, despite this plethora of normative requirements, one sees little evidence of the will 
to yield pragmatic concerns to the dictates of a legal order. The Rule of Law is absent, although 
rules are everywhere…. 
The Service would be well advised to resist the impulse to further regulate itself by the issuance 
of even more administrative directions. Rather, the effort must be made to bring home to all the 
participants in the correctional enterprise the need to yield to the external power of Parliament 
and of the courts, and to join in the legal order that binds the other branches of the criminal jus-
tice system.112 
In [another] section of the Report, she says: 
The denial of rights and privileges in the Segregation Unit between April 22nd and April 26th was 
in contravention of the applicable law and policy. This was clearly based on a managerial strat-
egy for handling the situation in the unit. It was an ill advised strategy which, in my opinion, con-
tributed to an escalation of the situation. Rather than assisting the authorities in controlling the 
unit, it forced them to abandon any hope, at least in their own minds, of ever doing so. It was 
apparent early on that this was not effective. The fact that the policy of ``they get nothing'' was 
never changed, even after the intervention of the IERT, raises serious questions as to whether it 
was indeed merely a managerial strategy to control the unit, or whether it was, in part, the 
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manifestation of a punitive attitude which would be a more serious contravention, not only of 
the policies, but of the law.113 
Ms. Benzvy Miller pointedly brings the Arbour perspective to bear on the Panel’s recommenda-
tions: 
Arbour’s plea that the rule of law ought to be better captured and the spirit of such legislation better 
understood at all levels of the organization could have been written about the suggestion that we 
abandon ‘least restrictive measures consistent with the protection of the public, staff members and 
offenders’ The road down which one would travel with this amendment leads eventually to the 
‘they get nothing’ approach to management because we, as managers and staff, might actually 
believe that we have the constitutional authority, legislative power and moral entitlement to de-
cide such a thing. The notion of least restriction does not bind us, it guides us to do the right thing 
in remembering that we are responsible for the custody and control of human beings who have 
rights.114 
The Panel’s recommendations reflect a profound lack of understanding of the constitutional and 
correctional basis for the recognition of and legitimate limitations on the human rights of offend-
ers. Implementation of its recommendations, far from being “transformative”, would be a deeply 
regressive development in Canada’s human rights history. 
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5 Conditions of Confinement     
5.1 Context 
The Panel's recommendations to CSC on how the Service should restructure the conditions of con-
finement in Canadian penitentiaries reveal the same fundamental flaws as its recommendations 
regarding amendments to the CCRA. Like those recommendations the Panel’s approach would be a 
step backwards in the history of Canadian corrections and compromise Canada's commitment na-
tionally and internationally to a human rights framework for the treatment of prisoners. 
The distance and dissonance between the Panel’s framework and a principled human rights’ 
framework is easily demonstrated. A human rights framework starts with the clear understanding 
that; 
Men, women and children who are in prison are still human beings. Their humanity extends far be-
yond the fact that they are prisoners. Equally, prison staff are human beings. The extent to which 
these two groups recognize and observe their common humanity is the most important measure-
ment of a decent and humane prison. Where such recognition is lacking there will be a real danger 
that human rights will be abused.115  
The Panel’s principal recommendations and their rationale on this subject are these:  
The Panel believes that living conditions in penitentiaries should serve two purposes: 
a) to provide a safe, secure environment, and 
b) promote positive, pro-social behaviour, and an active interest in participating in the offender’s 
correctional plan.116     
.. life inside a penitentiary should promote a positive work ethic. Today, an offender who is actively 
engaged in his/her correctional plan is often treated no differently than an offender who is still en-
gaged in criminal behaviour. The Panel feels that this is detrimental to promoting offender account-
ability.  In this context, the Panel supports an approach that links conditions of confinement to an of-
fender’s responsibilities and accountabilities. These conditions must be identified and managed un-
der the rights and privileges stated in the Act. The following areas could be targeted: degree of asso-
ciation with other offenders; movement (escorted, unescorted, and supervised); private family visits 
(access to and degree of frequency); leisure activity; personal clothing and property; searching; pay 
levels and access to money; access to penitentiary and CORCAN employment; access to programs 
(school or cell-based).117  
Recommendations 
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3. The Panel recommends that, at each security level (minimum, medium and maximum), a basic 
level of rights should be defined. 
4. The Panel recommends that differing conditions of confinement should be dependent on an of-
fender’s engagement in his or her correctional plan and the offender’s security level.118  
5.2 The Correctional Plan    
The Panel clearly places great weight on and indeed unquestioning belief in the prescriptive excel-
lence of the correctional plan and regard an offender’s willingness to engage with it as the pre-
requisite to certain rights and privileges and conditions of confinement and propose that it be en-
trenched as an “accountability contract” on which parole release would be contingent. But is the 
correctional plan such a silver bullet that justifies this linkage with rights, privileges, conditions of 
confinement and release to the community?119 
We must first demystify exactly what a correctional plan is and its role in a prisoner’s life. As de-
scribed by the Panel: 
Upon admission to the federal correctional system, all offenders undergo intake assessment which is 
designed to assess each offender’s risks and needs. …To thoroughly evaluate the offender, the intake 
assessment process includes a review of information on the impact of the offender’s crime(s) on the 
victim(s), as well as information gathered from police reports, court transcripts, judges’ comments 
on sentencing and other information. The assessment also establishes a multidisciplinary correc-
tional plan for treatment and intervention to be carried out during the offender’s sentence. Once this 
assessment process is complete, the offender is transferred to the appropriate penitentiary and the 
rehabilitative process begins.120  
From the perspective of case management the most important document prepared as a result of 
the intake assessment process is the Correctional Plan. Commissioner`s Directives define the objec-
tives and components of the Plan: 
24. The Correctional Plan is the principal document that provides a comprehensive initial assessment 
of the offender and an identification of proposed interventions. It is the base document against 
which all progress is measured. The Correctional Plan provides a succinct description of the critical in-
formation that is required to understand how the offender's sentence is to be managed from begin-
ning to end. 121 
29. Based on the results of the Intake Assessment, interviews with the offender, a review of all file in-
formation, including files from previous sentences, and consultations with institutional and commu-
nity staff, the Parole Officer/Primary Worker will define the goals for change, determine the key in-
terventions (programs and activities) required, and indicate the location (the institution or the com-
munity), depending on the critical dates during the sentence (transfers, eligibility dates for various 
types of release, etc.). 
30. The Correctional Plan is comprised of the following elements: 
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a. static factor assessment;  
b. dynamic factor identification and analysis;  
c. level of motivation;  
d. reintegration potential;  
e. Aboriginal Healing Plan (as applicable)  
f. sentence planning; and,  
g. determination of contributing factors and the interventions required to address them.  
31. Input from institutional and community staff, Elders and Aboriginal Liaison Officers will be ob-
tained in applicable cases. 
32. For offenders serving sentences of 10 years or more, the focus of the initial activities or programs 
should be related to assisting the offender in adjusting to the institution and to the sentence. 
33. Correctional Plans are not changed unless there is a significant change in the factors contributing 
to the offender's criminal behaviour. In these cases, a change in the Correctional Plan is addressed by 
completing a Correctional Plan Progress Report.122  
There is more than a little correctional hubris in the assumption that CSC assessors can, in the first 
few months of a long sentence, definitively diagnose and prescribe the exact programs that will 
address the prisoner’s problems, now and in the future. Here as with so much of corrections the 
distance between the rhetoric and the reality is vast.  
The correctional plan typically will identify which of the CSC "menu" of cognitive-based programs 
are necessary to address the prisoner's criminogenic needs, risk factors, and reintegration poten-
tial, and any educational upgrading or job training that may be appropriate and available. Accord-
ing to policy the development of an offender`s correctional plan is handmade and carefully tailored 
to the offender`s needs, risks and motivation. In practice it more resembles an assembly line mass 
produced product made from standardised parts. A review of any fifty correctional plans will reveal 
that they broadly fit into a quite limited number of distinct models and that the same sets of pro-
grams are identified for many prisoners. For prisoners who are serving long sentences the policy 
acknowledges that the "focus of the initial activities or programs should be related to assisting the 
offender in adjusting to the institution and to the sentence." In other words the correctional plan is 
initially to help the prisoner do time. For other prisoners, particularly those who have chosen a 
criminal career path, no programs may be available. Consider for example this assessment of a 
prisoner believed to be a high-ranking gang member sentenced to nine years for offenses involving 
drug trafficking: 
Mr. A`s contributing factors have been identified as Personal/Emotional Orientation, Attitude and 
Associates/Social Interactions. Marital /Family and Community Functioning have been assessed as 
an asset. Mr. A. does not have any identifiable issues in the area of Employment. Mr. A`s. initial cor-
rectional plan did not recommend any programs for Mr. A as it was deemed that he did not require 
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program involvement to address his contributing factors because his criminal behavior was due to 
personal choice.123 
While we do not dispute the necessity for a correctional plan, we also reject the notion that as 
presently structured it is all that is required to manage future risk and prepare the person for suc-
cessful release. It is not, as the Panel mistakenly thinks, the be-all and end-all of a prisoner’s path-
way to rehabilitation. The compilation of program credits: grade 10 English, anger management, 
CORCAN employment for 6 months, and so on – spread sometimes over years of a sentence, while 
helpful, are not sufficient to create a predictably rehabilitative environment.  
Effective corrections cannot consist of simply participating in a pre-ordered set of programs taken 
from a very limited menu. It is difficult to imagine how a person could feel motivated under such 
circumstances. As we describe in more detail in the section on education, personal development 
must include choice as it is through making choices that the person matures and come to the point 
where they can understand their needs and problems and thereby commit to a different life. In 
that sense, development of the person in prison is the same as the development of all people. Few 
of us during the important years of our development had a clear goal in life and an understanding 
of what we needed to learn and do to get there. The road of personal development is rarely a 
straight one. The route and goals change as we discover new options or barriers. So long as choice 
is involved, the correctional plan must be flexible – to reflect changes in the person and his or her 
goals. Similarly, all the elements must tie together to make sense and build towards a process of 
change. The Roadmap recognizes the need for continuity but seems to be overly and unrealistically 
confident that this can be accomplished by the professional staff under the current framework of 
the correctional plan. 
The Panel`s recommendations not only suffer from the lack of appreciation of the limitations of the 
correctional plan in the rehabilitative/reintegration process but also a misunderstanding of actual 
practice under the current regime. The Panel asserts “Today, an offender who is actively engaged 
in his/her correctional plan is often treated no differently than an offender who is still engaged in 
criminal behaviour. The Panel feels that this is detrimental to promoting offender accountabil-
ity.”124 It is unclear from where this misconception came but the reality is that it is not the way in 
which case management of offenders works. Even the most cursory review of case management 
policy and practice reveals how important participation in a correctional plan is to an offender's 
security rating and his or her progress through the correctional system. Two of the factors used in 
the security rating scale are the degree to which the offender has completed the programs on their 
correctional plan and an assessment of the offender’s motivation towards such completion. An of-
fender who has low motivation or who fails to participate in their plan is deemed to be a higher risk 
and this will be reflected in determining not just that offender’s security rating but also any deci-
sions regarding  access to the community through passes or conditional release. An offender who 
thumbs his nose at the correctional authorities and does nothing to better his or her situation does 
so at their peril.  
                                                     
123  Document on file with Professor Jackson 
124  Roadmap, p. 59 
A Flawed Compass             Conditions of Confinement   
60 
 
It is this offender who presumably the Panel wishes to motivate to better cooperate with the cor-
rectional authorities by encouraging CSC to identify and prescribe conditions of confinement that 
are tougher for such offenders  than those available to their more compliant peers.125 Shereen 
Benzvy Miller, CSC’s former Director General of Human Rights has correctly identified the danger-
ous implications of this deprivation - “they get less” - model of motivation:  
If the consequence of something is an improved feeling of self-worth or even hope for a better future 
then I agree that we ought to ensure consequences of participation in the Correctional plan. But if 
they involve deprivation then we are sliding down a slippery slope that does not lead to reintegration 
of offenders, but rather to a harder, tougher cohort of individuals who, in large measure are already 
quite used to privation. It is also clear from our years of experience that if offenders ‘participate’ or 
attend programs for the sole purpose of avoiding a negative consequence, or to meet expectations of 
a decision-making authority, they are less likely to internalize the benefits and therefore, ultimately, 
defeats the purpose of the correctional plan in the end.126 
The Panel would have CSC undergo a re-examination of rights and privileges and develop regimes 
based on an offender’s performance under his or her correctional plan and differentiating access to 
‘rights and privileges’ both by security level and such performance.  Less than a decade ago when 
this “regimes” concept was first advanced, CSC, after consultation with the National Associations 
Active in Criminal Justice (NAACJ) and the Canadian Bar Association, correctly stepped back from 
this approach. Yet it is now proposed by the Panel as a new idea with no appreciation of its implica-
tions or of the road previously travelled by CSC. 
In her memo to senior management CSC’s former Director General of Human Rights reviewed 
some of these implications:  
If we were to allow greater access to privileges when an offender is participating in his/her correc-
tional plan, what would we do for lifers whose programs and correctional plan usually don’t kick in 
for many years into sentence?  
Can rights be limited based on security level (maximum) due to the risk engaging in it presents at dif-
ferent levels of security, for instance providing access to different levels of freedom of association 
and visiting at different levels or security?  
Visits are also, to a certain extent, already different at different levels of security. Look at the SHU --
as an example of the way we have ‘justified’ limiting this entitlement. I would also draw you atten-
tion to the fact that in my 6 years as DGRRR I never once had a SHU inmate tell me that not being al-
lowed visits was motivating him to work hard to cascade to a less secure facility! I would recommend 
strongly against using visits as any kind of reward or carrot to motivate participation in other pro-
grams for several reasons: 
 1. on the face of it is like using children as hostages- ‘engage in your correctional plan or you may 
never see your child again’;  
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2. maintaining family contacts is by far the most important key to successful reintegration, so CSC 
ought to encourage, facilitate and respect this right making every effort never to limit unnecessarily- 
even in the name of an anti-drug strategy;  
3.  if our most difficult offenders (presumably those whose rights you would want to limit because 
they are likely the ones at higher levels of security) are those that have the most anti-social tenden-
cies, then we are really playing with fire to break the ties they have with their community support if 
we limit their access because they will be the least likely to be able to build these networks back up 
later since they are the least skilled anyway. 
You could perhaps put in place a system whereby, if you were deemed to be ‘participating’ you could 
order more canteen, for example, but experience has taught us through the inmate pay system that 
determining levels of participation and then downgrading levels is a bureaucratic nightmare and one 
that leads often to expensive, cumbersome, not always fair decisions. 
One might be able to devise a system that provided access to greater ‘privileges’ in less secure envi-
ronments but I cannot help to define what those privileges would be. I could suggest that one might 
need to be very careful that (1) those chosen do not actually constitute entitlements like visits, asso-
ciation, access to religious practice, free speech, access to information, or anything the touches upon 
life, liberty or security of the person; (2) the way the system is administered serves your overall rein-
tegration purpose (based preferably on solid research) so that it can be demonstrated that it sup-
ports effective corrections; and (3) that it is administered in such a way as to respect the principles of 
the duty to act fairly and the rule of law. 
Ms Benzvy Miller’s cautionary observations are insightful. Consider her caveat that any strategy 
must serve “overall reintegration purpose (based preferably on solid research)”. In an editorial arti-
cle in the British Journal of Psychiatry Sheleigh Hodgins, in reviewing the problem of persistent vio-
lent offending, writes: 
[O]ne of the characteristics of boys with conduct disorder and callous– unemotional traits and of-
fenders with psychopathy is their altered perception of reward and punishment. Both in neuropsy-
chological tests and in real-life situations, they focus on rewards and ignore punishments. Conse-
quently, they persistently miss the signal – the punishment – that a behaviour is inappropriate. As 
children, this may be one of the key mechanisms that promotes their antisocial behaviour and that 
limits their access to the usual socialising experiences such as sports and other community activities, 
and eventually even to school. The problem persists into adulthood and is present, for example, later 
in life when they are incarcerated and enrolled in an offender rehabilitation programme.127  
Offenders with this history and diagnosis often find themselves labelled uncooperative and unmo-
tivated and hence would be a prime target of the negative reinforcement regime being prescribed 
by the Panel: yet according to this research, such an offender is the least likely to get the message.  
Nor would such offenders be the only ones who would not get the message. One of the prisoners 
who participated in our community hearing at Matsqui Institution had this to say regarding the 
Panel’s suggested approach of linking “meaningful incentives and consequences” to encourage of-
fenders to participate in their correctional plans:                
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Years ago I went to boot camp and everything was structured. I spent a lot of time being punished by 
being sent to the woodpile seven days a week all day until 6 p.m. and I wasn't allowed time out or 
many visits or even to use weights in the gym. Guess what happened? I turned into a bigger ass, I 
cared less, I worried about nothing. They “consequenced” so much that I thought it was my free 
time. I could think on my own at those times and most importantly I grew so negatively towards 
coppers and screws and judges and law that when I walked out, I came out... evil. That is the reality 
of a structured environment. Rebellion is a major side effect and a dangerous one. When a person is 
forced into a corner for so long, as history has proven, the oppressed fight and die for their cause to 
get out of the corner. 128 
Some years ago another prisoner, in an interview with Michael Jackson, eloquently described the 
inherent limitations of a correctional strategy based on restricting rights:  
If you want to change a man, you must change his thoughts. And you don't change thoughts by ap-
pealing to a man's fear of reprisal. You have to appeal to his humanity no matter how far we fall. In 
order to appeal to a prisoner's humanity, you must first believe and accept that he has some. If you 
have an attitude, a perspective and a perception of prisoners as having humanity -- not necessarily 
being humane because by and large most of us aren't -- I believe there's very few of us that will not 
respond in time to humane, fair, and kind approaches. If you're going to have any chance at all of 
turning men like me around, you must treat us fairly, you must treat us kindly. And yes, you must 
treat us with discipline and continuity in all that you do, and all but those who suffer from dementia 
cannot help but respond to kindness and fairness. That is the most dangerous weapon you have 
against the criminal element. But you can't get me to buy into a system where you tell me no vio-
lence should ever be used when the first time I do not do what you say, you come down with gas 
masks and clubs and beat the living shit out of me.  
To survive in prison the prisoner must come up with his own values that give him self-esteem, a sense 
of purpose, a sense of direction. You don't dole these out like they're privileges. The need to love and 
the need to be loved, a sense of direction, of self-worth, of purpose, those are indigenous to the hu-
man being. This is what raises us above the beasts. You don't tell us to act human and then you will 
give us back those things as privileges. Those things that you are willingly prepared to give us if we 
act human are the things we need to be human, free of the fear of reprisal.129  
Organising  a prison/prisoner  management system around principles of human dignity and fair and 
just decision-making  rather than an appeal to prisoners’ fear of reprisal and deprivation of rights 
and privileges  is not only more consistent with  human rights law but with the empirical evidence. 
A recent 2009 study conducted in a prison in Slovakia confirmed other research findings in North 
America that show that fair and just procedures are associated with compliance with rules and 
regulations. The authors conclude:  
the strong and consistent relationship between procedural justice judgements and inmate miscon-
duct is evidence that the ways in which prison officers deal with inmates on a daily basis contribute 
to the maintenance of order. Correctional policymakers who assume inmates solely pursue self-
interests and can only be effectively managed by manipulating rewards and sanctions should take 
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notice and avoid casually dismissing the empirical evidence simply because they find deterrence-
based offender management strategies intuitively appealing and politically acceptable”.130 
5.3 Segregation: The Litmus Test of Legitimacy  
That the Panel’s recommendations would both compromise principles of human dignity and fair 
and just decision-making and undermine the already difficult task of developing within the federal 
correctional system a culture of respect for rights is manifested in the Panel’s observations and 
recommendations regarding administrative segregation. Segregation is perhaps the best docu-
mented example in Canada of the abuse of correctional power yet the Panel devoted little space to 
this issue. It did however make recommendations to tighten the conditions in voluntary segrega-
tion. To understand the correctional poverty of the Panel’s recommendations it is necessary first to 
understand the legislative framework for segregation. 
 The CCRA provides for two forms of segregation.131 The first is entitled disciplinary segregation. 
This can be imposed as a sanction after a prisoner has been found guilty of a serious disciplinary 
offence in a hearing before an independent chairperson. Segregation is the most severe form of 
punishment that can be administered as a disciplinary sanction. However it is limited to a maximum 
of 30 days, which can be increased to a maximum of 45 days for multiple convictions.132 
 The second form of segregation is administrative segregation. Its purpose is to keep a prisoner 
from associating with the general population. It can be used whenever the institutional head has 
reasonable grounds to believe that the continued presence of the prisoner in the general popula-
tion jeopardizes the security of the penitentiary or the safety of any person, including the pris-
oner’s own safety or would interfere with a serious investigation. In all cases, the institutional head 
must be satisfied that there is no alternative but to segregate the prisoner, and must ensure that 
the prisoner is returned to the general population as soon as possible.133 Unlike disciplinary segre-
gation there are no legislative limits to the duration of administrative segregation although it is 
subject to periodic review. In practice the time in administrative segregation can extend to months, 
even years.134  
 Although there are cases in which prisoners placed in segregation for their own protection argue 
there is no basis for this fear, most prisoners segregated on this ground acknowledge that the fear 
is well-founded, and in many cases the prisoners themselves have requested protection. Thus, 
within the population of administratively segregated prisoners, there has arisen a distinction be-
tween "involuntary" and "voluntary" cases. 
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The Panel limited its comments to prisoners in voluntary segregation. It has this to say: 
The composition of the voluntarily segregated population can generally be described as offenders 
who: 
 have significant ‘debts’ and seek voluntary segregation as a temporary way to escape their 
creditors; 
 are at risk in any of the subpopulations (multiple number of incompatibles) and seek the pro-
tection of segregation; 
 generally fear for their safety and seek the protection of segregation; 
 threaten violence if released from segregation and refuse to accept any proposed alterna-
tive; 
 are not disruptive but are not following their correctional plans; and 
 want to be or should be fully engaged in their correctional plans but cannot be integrated 
into a population that will provide that opportunity.135 
 The panel has heard that another factor contributing to this rise has been the fact that, while in seg-
regation, offenders maintain living conditions that are almost identical to those elsewhere in the 
penitentiary, without having to resolve the issues that brought them to segregation… Furthermore, 
CSC policy prohibits double-bunking in segregation. A single cell can be considered to be another ad-
vantage over the offender’s circumstances in the general population. 
The Panel is concerned that if the living conditions in segregation continue to equal or exceed those 
found in other parts of the penitentiary and there are no viable alternatives to placement in the peni-
tentiary, more offenders will seek voluntary segregation. The Panel believes that offenders may not 
see any benefit to engaging in their correctional plan, thereby allowing them to be isolated from the 
level of intervention necessary for their rehabilitation. 
Without having any incentives to provide to offenders who are working to rehabilitate, the Panel be-
lieves that the current environment of voluntary segregation diminishes offender responsibility and 
accountability.136 
The use by CSC and the Panel of “voluntary” to describe this population is a cruel euphemism. 
These offenders are seeking protection from other offenders, a protectorate that is part of CSC’s 
statutory mandate. Their placement in segregation is not the offenders’ choice but CSC’s failure to 
provide adequate alternatives.  
The clear implication of the Panel’s analysis is that the conditions of confinement for those prison-
ers in “voluntary” segregation are too soft and need to be toughened up to discourage prisoners 
from checking into or remaining in voluntary segregation. What is remarkable about this very lim-
ited focus is that the issue of the use of segregation is one of the most well documented and stud-
ied area of corrections. Because the time in administrative segregation can extend to months, even 
years, it represents the most powerful form of carceral authority. Further, because the conditions 
                                                     
135  Roadmap, p. 23 
136  Roadmap, p. 21-2 
A Flawed Compass             Conditions of Confinement   
65 
 
of confinement are the closest thing to solitary confinement, it is also the most intensive form of 
imprisonment. Historically it has also been the most abused.  
In 1977 the Supreme Court rightly characterized segregation as “a prison within a prison”.137   Ad-
ministrative segregation was the subject of CSC’s 1975 Vantour report, the 1996 Arbour Commis-
sion of Inquiry and CSC’s 1997 Report of the Task Force on Segregation, a task force convened spe-
cifically in response to the damning criticism of Justice Arbour.138  It is also the subject of a large 
body of scholarly work.139 Yet the Panel makes no mention of any of this, even though the Task 
Force devoted considerable attention to the issue of voluntary segregation and the challenges it 
presented for CSC.  Every other report that has looked at segregation has addressed the human 
rights implications of the conditions of confinement as central to its deliberations as well as ad-
dressing the importance of due process in making decisions about placing prisoners in segregation 
and reviewing these cases to minimize the duration of segregation.  Yet the Roadmap has nothing 
more to contribute to the continuing debate than the need to increase the rigour of conditions in 
voluntary segregation. Inexplicably, in the light of the analysis of every other report, particularly 
Arbour, regarding the existing rigours of segregation and the undermining of respect for human 
dignity, we are told, in the complete absence of any supporting research, that “the Panel believes 
that the current environment of voluntary segregation diminishes offender responsibility and ac-
countability.140 
According to the Panel, the only pressing agenda facing CSC regarding administrative segregation 
worthy of inclusion in the transformation agenda is to make the conditions of such segregation less 
comfortable- presumably by taking away any aspect of confinement - such as a single cell - that 
seems to confer an advantage over those existing in general population. The Panel virtually invites 
CSC to reverse its policy, adopted in response to the recommendations of the Task Force on Segre-
gation and after repeated criticism from the Correctional Investigator, that prisoners in segregation 
shall not be double bunked.  The Panel’s thinking seems to be that a return to double bunking 
would be an appropriate way to remove the supposed advantage that checking in to segregation 
now confers in institutions where those in general population are double-bunked. Consider care-
fully that thinking in light of this description by Michael Jackson of the nature of double bunking in 
segregation at Kent Maximum Security and the effects it has on the human spirit and human dig-
nity of one man subjected to its rigours: 
There were months in which segregated prisoners represented almost 30 per cent of the total popu-
lation, the highest percentage in the country. Segregation therefore came close to being the normal 
condition of imprisonment for a significant part of the population. Normalcy in this context involved 
confinement in an often double-bunked cell for twenty-three hours a day, with an hour out for exer-
cise and a few more minutes for a shower, where life was shared in all its intimacies with another 
person and privacy reduced to the thickness of a curtain around a toilet standing only a few feet 
from your bed. Although the presence of televisions and Walkman radios suggested a degree of pro-
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gress from the sterility of the Penthouse in the B.C. Penitentiary, for many prisoners long-term segre-
gation under double-bunked conditions was seen as a regression… 
On May 25, 1994, I spent a deeply disturbing shift in the segregation unit at Kent interviewing pris-
oners, listening to their stories and to their screams, some issued aloud, others confined to prisoners’ 
minds. These interviews bear testament to the ways in which long-term segregation undermines a 
person’s psychological hold on reality and intensifies a sense of injustice and paranoia.  
John Edwards set out his recent institutional history, which he claimed was filled with unfair treat-
ment. This had generated within him a rage which, given that he was just three months away from 
statutory release, should have been -- but did not seem to be -- of great concern to the Segregation 
Review Board. Mr. Edwards was serving a 4-year sentence for robbery. He had been transferred from 
Alberta’s Bowden Institution to Matsqui in November 1992, although he had requested Mission Insti-
tution as he had an incompatible at Matsqui. Within days of arriving at Matsqui, his incompatible 
left a note in his jacket to the effect, "Check in, goof, or you die." He passed this note on to staff, who 
told him to try to settle the issue on his own. The next day a prisoner wearing a hood came into the 
cell where Mr. Edwards was watching television and struck him on the head with a chair leg, opening 
a gash that required twenty-three stitches to close. After leaving hospital, Mr. Edwards was placed in 
segregation at Matsqui for his own protection. He was there for forty-seven days, until his transfer to 
Mission early in January 1993. He spent Christmas and New Year's Day in segregation.  
In June of 1993, Mr. Edwards was transferred to Kent because of alleged negative and deteriorating 
behaviour, including a threat to set a fire by piling up a bunch of grievance papers and igniting them. 
He told me this was a protest against the inadequate responses he had received to the grievances 
and was not meant as a serious threat. He was in segregation at Kent for some two months before 
being transferred to the PC population. He remained there until April of 1994, when he was placed in 
segregation following being punched by another prisoner. The last several weeks had been particu-
larly difficult for Mr. Edwards. He was double-bunked with Mr. Pope, who had slashed himself in 
frustration at his own situation. He was placed in the observation cell for a day and then brought 
back into Mr. Edwards’ cell. Mr. Edwards was extremely frightened by the situation, because he did 
not know whether Mr. Pope would try to slash again or might attack him. In fact, Mr. Pope did slash 
himself again, and this time he was taken to the Regional Psychiatric Centre. Mr. Edwards was left to 
clean up the blood himself. He had not spoken to anyone about the incident, although he admitted it 
had had a traumatic impact on him.  
As I have explained ... there are procedures in place for dealing with possible post-traumatic stress 
among staff who experience incidents involving threats or violence to themselves or their colleagues. 
Had a staff member witnessed a slashing, it would have been the subject of a debriefing with the in-
stitutional psychologist. Yet Mr. Edwards had experienced, close up, two slashings by his cellmate 
and had received no counselling. 141 
The perversity of the Panel’s suggestion that segregation conditions need to be toughened up and 
that there be more restriction on the rights and privileges of those voluntarily segregated prisoners 
to encourage them to take “an active interest in participating in their correctional plan” can be best 
judged by contrasting it with the analysis of the CSC Task Force on Segregation. As the Panel notes, 
the CCRA provides that prisoners in administrative segregation shall be given the same rights, privi-
leges and conditions of confinement as the general population, except for those rights, privileges 
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and conditions that can only be enjoined in association with other prisoners or cannot reasonably 
be given owing to limitations specific to the administrative segregation area or security require-
ments. The Task Force found that "the operational reality has been that inmates, their advocates or 
program staff have had to demonstrate why they should be provided the same rights, privileges 
and programs. The legal reality is that the CSC has to demonstrate why they should not be pro-
vided". 142 To get a more informed picture of the national situation, the Task Force distributed a 
questionnaire to all segregated prisoners in late 1996 and received responses from almost four 
hundred. The purpose of the questionnaire was to determine whether prisoners had the same, 
less, or more access to rights, privileges, and services while in segregation. The responses con-
firmed that, under current practice, administrative convenience and security considerations had all 
but eclipsed legal programming requirements.  
At the time prisoner Glen Rosenthal responded to the questionnaire, he had served a year in seg-
regation at Edmonton Max after being attacked by another prisoner. In addition to checking off the 
list of questions, he offered these reflections:  
In the course of completing this survey I have found it extremely difficult to convey the reality of liv-
ing in this segregation unit for nearly a year. I have spent fifteen years in many different prisons and 
have found myself in the segregation units of most of them at one time or another. Never have I ex-
perienced anything remotely comparable to what I am experiencing now. It is one thing to be locked 
in a cell for a year, and that of itself is bad enough. Add to that the fact that you have no idea how 
long it will continue . . . And add to that the fact that your health has deteriorated to the point where 
you doubt you will ever be healthy again . . . You can’t sleep more than three or at best four hours at 
a time. You are constantly getting awoken by music blasting, barriers clanging open and shut. You 
are always tired. You have gone from a hundred and fifty pounds to a hundred and ninety pounds 
and every muscle in your body is either knotted or atrophied. The warden told you he would transfer 
you to B.C., so your wife moved there six months ago and you have watched your marriage fall apart 
one piece at a time since then. You have been wearing stinking rags for so long you don’t notice it 
anymore. You look older, fatter, disgusting to yourself when you look in the mirror. Your self-esteem 
is sub-zero . . .  
You want to complain about the rags you get for clothes but you know the cleaners will spit in your 
food or urinate in your coffee if you do. You want to complain about the guard who miscounted your 
phone calls for the month, only giving you one or two, but you know next month you won’t get any if 
you do. You want to complain about not being transferred but you know that this will piss somebody 
off and you will never get out. You can’t bear the thought of people you love seeing you in this condi-
tion so you don’t take any visits. Your life is so static there is nothing, absolutely nothing left to write 
to anyone about. Your once passionate and hopeful phone conversations with your wife turn into a 
string of uncomfortable silences and misdirected frustrations. But she is the only one who will listen, 
and then one day there is no one. You spend twenty hours a day on your back, somewhere between 
waking and sleeping, trying to keep your mind out of the dark places but you can’t. Your mind seems 
full of thoughts that don’t belong there. You can’t carry a conversation anymore because you are 
afraid one of them will slip out. You don’t tell anyone because you are even more afraid of the medi-
cation they might think you need.  
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I don’t use words like "afraid" easily. I have always identified myself with being up to whatever chal-
lenge came my way, and so far I have. I have never faced a challenge that threatens who and what I 
am more than this last year in this segregation unit. It is no exaggeration to call this cruel and un-
usual punishment. Though the circumstances here are likely more the product of indifference than 
malice, it is no less insidious and destructive. My health is gone, my life has fallen apart, parts of me 
that words can’t describe will not recover from this. And I did nothing wrong. All this is happening to 
me because the machine isn’t working and no one seems obliged to fix it.143 
The Panel's “fix”- limiting the rights of those prisoners in voluntary segregation - can only aggravate 
the already debilitating and destructive effects of segregation described by Mr. Rosenthal, and in 
the process undermine prisoners’ potential for reintegration and ultimately weaken, not 
strengthen,  public safety. 
Elsewhere in the Panel's report there is reference to the Parliamentary Committee’s report on the 
five-year review of the CCRA, “A Work in Progress”. That Committee specifically addressed the is-
sue of administrative segregation and one of its recommendations was that CSC should appoint in-
dependent chairpersons for administrative segregation similar to the regime for the disciplinary 
process. The system of independent adjudication of disciplinary cases in which a prisoner can be 
sentenced to a maximum of 30 days in segregation (which can be increased to 45 days for multiple 
convictions) was introduced in 1980 following the recommendations of the 1977 report of the Par-
liamentary Subcommittee on the Penitentiary System in Canada.  Since then there have been a 
succession of recommendations from other inquiries, committees and experts for the introduction 
of independent adjudication into the process of placement of prisoners in indefinite administrative 
segregation. It has been argued that independent adjudication of segregation decisions is neces-
sary to ensure a fair and unbiased hearing, compliance with the statutory framework, protection of 
prisoners’ rights and privileges while segregated, and the implementation of re-integration plans to 
ensure that the correctional authorities, in administering the sentence, use the least restrictive 
measures. The recommendation for independent adjudication has been advanced by  Justice Ar-
bour, CSC’s Task Force on Segregation, the Yalden Working Group on Human Rights, the Parliamen-
tary Sub-Committee on the CCRA, the Canadian Human Rights Commission and the Correctional 
Investigator, and this consensus would seem to all but guarantee that CSC would recognize that it 
merited space in the correctional legal landscape. CSC has steadfastly resisted implementation of 
these recommendations.144  Yet the Panel makes no mention of this outstanding issue of inde-
pendent adjudication despite its identification by an increasing chorus of commentators, academic, 
judicial and parliamentary, as an essential part of the roadmap for a fair and effective correctional 
regime.   
As a final note, neither author can drive from their minds the disturbing image that at the very 
same time the Panel was minimising the conditions within segregation, Ashley Smith, a nineteen 
year of girl, strangled herself to death after more than a year of continuous segregation in our fed-
eral prisons.145 The omission of any discussion in the Panel report of the important issues associ-
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ated with segregation reveals the one-dimensional view the Panel has of their roadmap to public 
safety; a roadmap in which principles of fundamental justice, fairness and human rights are left by 
the wayside.   
5.4 Gangs  
The Panel seems to be particularly concerned with those offenders who are doing relatively short 
sentences, who have gang affiliations and who continue to maintain criminal values. Yet here again, 
the research literature that the Panel seems  not to have read strongly suggests that a strategy 
based on greater privation by toughening of the conditions of confinement is unlikely to make a 
positive impression on those who have already experienced a life of alienation and privation that  
led to their gang involvement. Ironically, as the Panel deliberated CSC received a report that pro-
vided a comprehensive analysis of the origins of Aboriginal gangs and the social and economic con-
ditions that lead to the formation and recruitment of members. The study provides insight into the 
underlying and systemic forces that produce and sustain gangs in the community and in prison and 
its major findings provide powerful evidence for rejecting the Panel’s “they get less” strategy to 
motivate the non-compliant gang member: 
Gangs serve a function both inside and outside institutional walls. Why individuals join gangs is a 
complex issue and it is one that has been the focus of research efforts since the early 1900s. The 
gang can be a source of both self-esteem and identity for "lost" youth. For these reasons, it is likely 
that the gang has an appeal to youth coming from broken homes, single parent families, and abusive 
situations. The gang becomes a surrogate family for these disenfranchised young people. In addition 
to this, the gang can also serve as an economic organization, providing money to its members. As a 
social organization, the gang unit is a source of pro-criminal entertainment, status, excitement, ca-
maraderie, prestige, and protection. However, the gang can also be a source of punishment, pain, 
assignment of criminal tasks, and can plague individuals with the constant threat of lost member-
ship. 
Within prison, a gang can offer new inmates exactly what they require in their new, hostile environ-
ment: support and protection. From this perspective, joining a gang, or making the move to become 
a recruit, seems to make sense. Gangs are functional for individuals in this situation. If individuals are 
at risk for assault and victimization because they are members of a visible minority group, joining an 
ethnic or culturally-based gang may protect them from such assault. Predatory inmates exist and 
vulnerable inmates do what it takes to avoid and prevent becoming victims. However, we also know 
that membership in gangs open individuals up to increased assault rates through predation from ri-
val gangs and from disciplinary tactics within one's own gang. 
Gang membership is a double-edged sword and individuals join for a variety of reasons. Survival and 
protection in prison may be one reason. Joining may be a band-aid solution to a variety of deeper, 
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core issues and internal conflicts. Yet, despite the drawbacks, the risk of injury, criminal record, and 
death, youth and adults continue to turn to this alternative, criminal lifestyle.146 
Our respondents indicate that gang members are people who had "nothing going" for them and 
joined as a means of finding recognition and respect. Membership in a gang may be a means for in-
creasing one's status in a particular community. Gangs offer members the opportunity to feel a sense 
of self-worth and a sense of identity. Belonging to something "bigger than themselves" can make 
people feel important.  Group membership is a significant component to human interaction and feel-
ings of self-worth. No one wants to feel like or be treated as an outsider. Being part of a "gang" ful-
fils a need for social interaction and a feeling of importance on the part of individuals who may lack 
such a response from conventional, law-abiding society. It provides a positive label, at least within 
the group itself, for individuals who may never have experienced the respect and feelings of self-
worth that accompany that kind of identification. The lack of such feelings of self-worth is exacer-
bated by the prison experience. It is here where we see a good deal of recruitment into gangs, and 
into Aboriginal gangs in particular. 147 
Based on their comprehensive research the authors offer pathways to addressing the multi faceted 
issues arising from their analysis: 
One of the themes that emerged from the interviews with correctional personnel is the need to at-
tack the core issues which have contributed to gang involvement among Aboriginal and other of-
fenders. Addressing the vast array of suspected causes, many of which are rooted in childhood ex-
periences, and others which are grounded in the nature of the prison structure itself, is a daunting 
task, one that requires addressing many aspects in an individual's personality, coping skills, child-
hood, and belief system. 
Many respondents, officers and ex-gang members alike, point to spirituality and culture as possibly 
one of the most effective means of reaching Aboriginal gang members. Citing cases where culture 
has facilitated gang exit for former members, these individuals place much faith in reconnecting or, 
in many cases, connecting with cultural heritage. For many (but not all) Aboriginal inmates, getting 
in touch with Aboriginal culture and spirituality can be an integral part of the healing process. The 
traditional cultural theme is a recurring one in the answers of many respondents. These individuals 
point to the importance of educating Aboriginal inmates on culture and spirituality, utilizing tradi-
tional healing concepts and processes in working with gang involved offenders, and finally, turning 
to Elders in the community to achieve these goals… Cultural awareness and programming, perhaps 
more so in the case of Aboriginal offenders than any other  group, has the added benefit of directly 
addressing some of the core issues or causes of gang behaviour. Connecting with culture and with 
respected Aboriginal leaders means that one of the main reasons for joining a gang – the feeling of 
belonging, is addressed in a more functional, positive way. The image we have of gang members is 
that they are individuals with problems, problems often stemming back to family and childhood. 
These are people who need to heal. Aboriginal culture and spirituality have the potential to directly 
address this need.  
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Along these lines one respondent indicated that when dealing with Aboriginal offenders, conflict 
resolution could be done traditionally. A restorative justice approach is desirable, he claims, because 
the process is not about saving face, or an imbalance of power (which is what much gang-related 
behaviour is about), rather it is about empowering everyone, giving everyone a share in the process 
and the peaceful outcome.148 
Of particular interest and a testament to the energy that some CSC administrators and staff, in con-
junction with community groups, have invested in creative responses to these complex issues is 
this account of what the authors refer to as “Healing Through Dynamic Intervention”:   
One maximum security institution is currently using this innovative approach for working with gang-
involved inmates. This approach deals directly with the core causes of prison gang involvement dis-
cussed above and confronts the myths surrounding prison populations head on. Faced with increas-
ing tension and violence within the institution, it was imperative that "something be done" about the 
Aboriginal gang problem. There were several stages to the process, which eventually led to the es-
tablishment of a "truce" or "peace treaty" among Aboriginal gangs and the General Population of 
inmates in this institution. 
Prior to the current state of affairs, the institution was plagued with the complexity and need for ex-
tensive coordination in order to manage seven different populations who were segregated. Many of-
ficers and inmates alike were ready for a change. It had become unrealistic and problematic for the 
institution to continue with its policy of segregation, separation and intensive movement control of 
the rival groups in the institution.  
Currently, units contain a mix of inmates. Gangs can reside in separate units, mixed with other in-
mate groups (i.e. general population inmates). However, all inmates have the opportunity to inter-
act. For example, all inmates work, eat, and participate in recreation together. 
Officers involved in this process indicate that it appears to be working well. The truce has resulted in 
an atmosphere where correctional personnel can now focus on the types of programming that get to 
the root of the issues and problems that many inmates have. Communication skills development, in-
terpersonal skills development, and employment skill development are the types of programs that 
inmates (who are interested and ready) and staff can realistically focus on in a less restricted prison 
environment. Currently at this particular institution, the focus is on working individually with in-
mates, in group settings through programming. An atmosphere conducive to real change in indi-
viduals has been created through the truce process. Therapeutic intervention programming targets 
the deficient skill base of individual inmates. In many cases program facilitators are imparting par-
enting values to individual inmates who may never have been "parented properly". As one facilitator 
states: 
"It all comes down to three things and this is what we stress with individual inmates: respect 
other people; try not to hurt anyone; and do the right thing."  
Ultimately by treating inmates like human beings, by embodying these three things in their own in-
teractions with inmates, individual officers can teach through example. Dynamic Intervention has the 
potential to change people's lives in a positive way. 
The officers directly involved in this peace process reveal that the challenge for them now on a daily 
basis is "population management" as opposed to gang management or control. They must con-
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stantly manage the issues that emerge. This requires diligence and vigilance by focusing on those 
"little things" that can quickly escalate into much bigger issues, issues that could realistically 
threaten the current peaceful state of affairs. These officers are fully aware of the precarious nature 
of the situation they have helped create. But the truce appears to be working and success stories, 
few and far between in corrections, are worth listening to.149 
This important research report, commissioned by CSC, was available to the Panel had they been 
concerned with ensuring that their analysis and recommendations were based on research and the 
best evidence. What the report demonstrates clearly is that the issue of responding in the correc-
tional context to young, unmotivated gang members is complex, rooted as it is in larger societal 
conditions and that the avenues for advancing CSC’s  mission and mandate must be nuanced  and 
must above all else  be based on “treating inmates like human beings.” Instead what we get from 
the Panel is a blunt recommendation to sanction the non-compliant by developing a hierarchy of 
rights and privileges with more privation and more onerous conditions of confinement for the un-
motivated prisoner. Instead of encouraging the courageous efforts of those correctional staff who 
have attempted to reach out to the most disaffected and alienated prisoners, the Panel would en-
courage senior managers to spend their time fractioning rights and privileges into ever smaller por-
tions and figuring out how to dole these out to a population whose life experience has shown them 
little else except privation.  
The limitations of the Panel’s simplistic and hard line approach to the complexities of prison ad-
ministration and its dangerous implications in fostering inhumane and unfair conditions of con-
finement are most clearly reflected in its approach to drug use. 
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6 Drugs in Prison  
6.1 The Panel’s Approach 
The Panel makes far-reaching recommendations which it believes will enable the Correctional Ser-
vice of Canada to better wage the war on drugs inside the walls. The Panel’s approach to drug use 
is one dimensional focusing exclusively on greater enforcement with no sensitivity or consideration 
to the implications of the measures proposed on the human rights of prisoners and their families to 
visit and associate. In this section we review the Panel’s proposals, profile the importance of the 
right to visit as an integral part of a humane prison and assess the dangers of proposals that would 
make its exercise more difficult and demeaning. 
 The Panel provides us with this analysis of the problem: 
“The Panel is convinced that drugs have also propagated the increase in organized gangs within 
penitentiaries and the ensuing violence as these gangs attempt to continue their criminal activity. 
Gang members are not averse to using violence to advance their agenda and to maintain or enhance 
their positions within the offender hierarchy. As long as drugs are a major source of revenue and 
power, the introduction of drugs into penitentiaries will continue to be their primary focus. Whether 
it is through the direct use of their associates in the community or through threats and intimidation 
of other offenders and their families, gang members will continue to use as many possible conduits 
as possible to introduce drugs into CSC penitentiaries. 
The Panel members believe that illicit drugs are unacceptable in a federal penitentiary and create a 
dangerous environment for staff and offenders that translates into assaults on offenders and staff, 
promotes transmittable diseases such as HIV/AIDS and Hepatitis, and destroys any hope of providing 
a safe and secure environment where offenders can focus on rehabilitation.150 
There can be no argument that the trafficking of illegal drugs within penitentiaries is a serious 
problem that contributes to violence, the spread of disease and undermines prisoner rehabilita-
tion. There can be no argument that because of these reasons, “illicit drugs are unacceptable in a 
federal penitentiary”. There is also no argument that the proliferation of drugs within Canadian so-
ciety and the enormous profits to be made from the distribution of illegal drugs has led to the 
growth of international, national and local criminal networks to manufacture and distribute these 
commodities. That the drug trade would be a major problem in Canadian penitentiaries is neither a 
revelation nor surprising. A significant part of the federal prison population is made up of offenders 
who come to prison (1) because of illegal drug use - those who are addicted to illegal drugs and 
commit offenses such as robberies, to feed their habits or commit offences while under the influ-
ence of drugs and (2) because of their involvement in the networks of drug trafficking. Within the 
prison walls, therefore, are replicated and concentrated  the market conditions for a profitable 
drug trade that exist outside the walls – a demand side of users eager to acquire drugs and a supply 
side of  offenders connected to networks to fill that demand. In 1990 a British Columbia Court of 
Appeal judge commented during a sentencing appeal that “Drugs of all sorts are readily available in 
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our prisons and penitentiaries. Only the price varies, in kind and amount, from that which is ex-
acted on the street”.151  This comment remains as true today as then.  
There is another dimension to “the drug problem” inside the walls that the Panel fails to identify or 
consider in formulating its recommendations. Its best exposition is by one of Canada’s most experi-
enced correctional administrators, whose career spanned 30 years, beginning with the dark days of 
the BC penitentiary in the 1970’s. Ken Peterson, the then Warden of Mission Institution, laid bare 
the way in which the realities of confinement contribute to the use of drugs:  
In this institution, as in all institutions, there is a drug subculture. It carries on feeding those who have a 
habit and it brings new people in. It is responsible for an undercurrent of violence that exists in all institu-
tions. It is something to which you have to pay a lot of attention if you are an offender, because there is 
no neutral ground in here. I can see why inmates use drugs . . . it is to sedate themselves from what is 
going on. I don't think they use it to get high, I think they use it to get normal, whatever normal may be. 
It is to relieve that undercurrent of fear, tension, angst, whatever it may be. It's mood-altering, and when 
you get down to the mood in here, the mood in any prison is not good.152  
 The pressing issue is what should be the appropriate set of responses of CSC to these correctional 
realities. The Panel identifies CSC current approach to this issue: 
CSC’s current drug interdiction strategy is based on prevention, treatment, and enforcement. This 
strategy is guided by Canada’s National Drug Strategy, and is briefly outlined below. 
Prevention 
CSC’s Drug Strategy includes awareness programs, immunization programs, infectious disease 
testing, methadone maintenance treatment and intensive support units. Harm reduction initia-
tives are also available. 
Treatment 
CSC provides a range of internationally accredited programs to offenders whose substance de-
pendence is related to their criminal behaviour. The more difficult the offender’s problem, the 
more intense the intervention. 
Programs have also been designed especially for women and Aboriginal offenders. These sub-
stance abuse and maintenance programs teach offenders to manage their patterns of substance 
abuse, with the goal of decreasing recidivism. 
Enforcement 
To reduce violence and illicit drugs in penitentiaries, all offenders — including those belonging to 
organized criminal groups—are monitored to prevent incidents and thus enhance safety. Of-
fenders involved in violent incidents or found possessing or using illicit drugs face disciplinary ac-
tions and criminal charges. 
As to future directions, the Panel offers a prescription that is unilaterally focussed on greater en-
forcement. The Roadmap does not even acknowledge the fourth “pillar” in the fight against the 
harm of drug use in the community – harm reduction.  Harm reduction strategies, arising from pub-
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lic health considerations, attempts to minimize the significant risk to life and health that illegal drug 
use and, in particular injection drug use, carries. Strategies such as needle exchange, supervised 
use and maintenance programs for confirmed addicts and related measures related to safer sex, 
and tattoo services can at least address the deadly diseases that are side effects of injection drug 
use. While CSC has ventured tentatively into harm reduction through the distribution of condoms 
and bleach kits to sanitize injection needles, other initiatives such as the tattoo pilot program was 
dropped even before the evaluation of its health benefits could be established153. In the context of 
the evidence of effectiveness and increasing prevalence of such harm reduction measures in the 
community, one should have expected that a serious review of the issue of drug use in prison 
would have at least considered the available research, particularly since Canada has one of the 
most respected centers of such research in the world.154   
The importance of this research to a roadmap that truly addresses issues of public safety is made 
clear in the most recent publication by Canadian researchers in Lancet, the world's leading general 
medical journal:    
As in the community, where there has been evidence for over a decade that HIV epidemics among 
IDUs¸ [intravenous drug users] can be prevented, stabilised, and reversed, there is now also an in-
creasing body of knowledge and practice on effective prevention of the spread of HIV through drug 
use in prison. For the past decade, prison systems and governments have argued that measures such 
as needle and syringe programmes or opioid substitution therapy cannot be introduced in prisons for 
safety reasons, and that making them available would mean condoning drug use in prisons. Many 
prisoners are in prison because of drug or drug-related offences. Preventing their drug use is seen as 
an important part of their rehabilitation. In the eyes of many, acknowledging that drug use is a real-
ity in prisons would be to acknowledge that prison authorities have failed. Far from condoning drug 
use in prisons, however, making available to prisoners the means that are necessary to protect them 
from HIV (and HCV) transmission acknowledges that protection of prisoners’ health needs to be the 
primary objective of drug policy in prisons. As the Scottish report on drug use and prisons pointed 
out, “the idea of a drug free prison does not seem to be any more realistic than the idea of a drug 
free society”, and “stability may actually be better achieved by moving beyond this concept”.155 
Far from acknowledging that “protection of prisoners’ health needs to be the primary objective of 
drug policy” the Panel recommends that CSC concentrates its resources on drug interdiction.  
While the Panel appreciates that CSC’s approach to drug interdiction is headed in the right direction, 
we believe that much more can be done to prevent drugs from entering federal penitentiaries, and to 
reduce the negative impact they have on CSC’s operations.156 
…The Panel recommends that CSC must become more rigorous in its approach to drug interdiction by 
enhancing its control and management of the introduction and use of illicit substances. 
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8. The Panel recommends that CSC’s approach should: 
a) entail the submission of an integrated request for resources supported by  detailed perform-
ance targets, monitoring and an evaluation plan that requires  report on CSC’s progress to the 
Minister, Public Safety, by no later than 2009-10; 
b) incorporate a commitment to more stringent control measures (i.e., elimination  of contact 
visits), supported by changes in legislation, if the results of the evaluation (see rec. (i)) does 
not support the expected progress; 
c) increase the number of drug dog detection teams in each penitentiary to ensure that a drug 
dog is available for every shift; 
d) involve the introduction of ‘scheduled visits’ so that more effective use of drug dogs can be 
made; 
e) increase perimeter surveillance (vehicle patrol by Correctional Officers) and the re-introduction 
of tower surveillance, where appropriate, to counter the entry of drugs over perimeter fences; 
f) include a more thorough, non-intrusive search procedure at penitentiary entry points for all 
vehicles, individuals and their personal belongings; 
g) include the immediate limitation and/or elimination of the use of contact visits when there is 
reasonable proof that they pose a threat to the safety and security of the penitentiary; 
h) include the purchase of new technologies, to detect the presence of drugs; (resources should 
be available for the ongoing maintenance and staff training); 
i) enhance the policies and procedures related to the management of prescription drugs, urinaly-
sis testing and the routine searches of offenders and their cells for illicit substances; 
j) work closely with local police forces and Crown Attorneys to develop a more proactive ap-
proach for criminal sanctions related to the seizure of drugs; 
k) include an amendment to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act to create an aggravating 
factor (or a separate offence) for the introduction or trafficking within a penitentiary in Can-
ada of any controlled or designated substance with a mandatory minimum penalty consecu-
tively to any existing sentence(s); 
l) include the authority for CSC to prohibit individuals who are found guilty of such charges (high-
lighted in XI) from entering a federal penitentiary for a period of not less than 10 years; and  
m) include the development and implementation of a heightened public awareness campaign to 
communicate the repercussions of smuggling drugs into penitentiaries. 
9. The Panel recommends that CSC, as a priority, continue to strengthen its security intelligence 
framework for the collection, analysis and dissemination of information within federal corrections, 
police services and other criminal justice partners. 
10. The Panel recommends that a national database of all visitors should be created.157 
It is clear from the list of the Panel recommendations that enhanced security measures, increased 
use of drug dogs and drug-sensing technology, greater limitations on contact visits, more intense 
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surveillance and strengthening of intelligence information and more punitive sanctions are the ex-
clusive focus of the Panel’s approach to reform.   Completely absent from the Panel’s analysis is any 
recognition that under the existing law, correctional authorities already have and use significantly 
greater powers to conduct searches within federal penitentiaries than Canadian society would ever 
tolerate by the police on the street. Even with these greater powers, drugs continue to flow into 
prisons.   While it might seem reasonable to believe that implementing the Panel’s recommenda-
tion of “more stringent control measures (i.e. elimination of contact visits)” and requiring that all 
visits be behind glass might have some impact on reducing the flow of drugs, there is no research 
evidence to support this. In fact CSC’s own internal audit of drug interdiction reveals that over the 
period 2001-6 drug seizures in the visits areas accounted for less than 20% of drug seizures in peni-
tentiaries.158 In any event greater curtailment of contact visits would not be sufficient to stop other 
sources of drugs or prevent the development of new sources.   
It needs to be recognized that where there is a demand for drugs they can always be found. Can-
ada’s prisons are not unique in that respect. We also need to consider that even if the flow  could 
be  successfully reduced, this increased scarcity  would significantly increase the value of drugs and 
competition for them with the result that the drug trade in prison could become more lucrative, 
desperate and, therefore, more violent.  
Restricting visits beyond the current practice of selective restrictions for those who present security 
risks would also have a crippling effect on prisoners and their families. The already difficult task of 
maintaining a semblance of family life and the maintenance or development of community support 
networks to help prisoners  on their return to society would be made even more difficult. Permit-
ting a humane visiting regime while ensuring a drug-free penitentiary is impossible if either the vis-
its or the drug interdiction must be absolute. Both outcomes are desirable as they reflect recogni-
tion of the competing interests at stake, recognition entirely absent from the Panel’s analysis. 
Without recognizing these competing interests, the Panel is unable to consider strategies other 
than simply allowing one to exclude the other.  
The Panel makes the mistake of not recognizing that most prisoners and most visitors are not in-
volved in the drug trade at all. Depriving them of the opportunity to maintain crucial relationships 
in the faint hope of  seriously interfering with drug trafficking in prison is naive, arbitrary and comes 
at a cost that is substantial while offering no evidence or reason to think  that drugs will not come 
in through other, potentially more problematic channels. Interference with contact visits for spe-
cific individuals might well be justified where there is abuse of visiting rules provided that the re-
strictions are proportional to the violation.   The current law adequately provides for this. The need 
to identify those who are engaged in trafficking might well justify demonstrably improved interdic-
tion methods, but does not justify grand-scale damage to family access.  
6.2 The Importance of a Humane Visiting Regime 
One of the most important developments in the operation of modern prisons has been the liberali-
zation of the regime governing visits between prisoners and their family and friends. The current 
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visiting regime in the Canadian federal prison system bears scant resemblance to the movie stereo-
type of the prisoner desperately touching hand to glass in a facsimile of physical contact. In con-
trast to the cramped and often dingy spaces of thirty years ago, the visiting areas of both new and 
renovated institutions are more spacious, have comfortable chairs, pop machines and toys for the 
kids; in medium and minimum security institutions, there are adjacent, open areas with swing sets 
and other apparatus upon which both kids and their parents can play. Canadian institutions, with 
the exception of the super maximum security Special Handling Unit, have private family visiting 
houses or trailers in which prisoners can occasionally spend up to three days (and, exceptionally, 
longer periods) with their families; during this time they can interact in a more normal, relaxed, 
manner. They can cook their own meals, interact as parents with their children, have long private 
conversations and pursue the physical and emotional intimacy that is not possible in the visiting 
areas.  In addition, in most institutions there is access to socials, powwows and other functions in 
which members of the community can come into the prison, either in the gymnasium or one of the 
outside recreation areas, to share a meal, some music and companionship. The availability of these 
expanded opportunities for social interaction is muted, however, by the reality that there are many 
prisoners who have lost community and family  contact - or even hope of release - and rarely if ever 
receive visits.   In all maximum and medium security institutions there are still areas for "closed" 
visits where prisoners are separated from their visitors by glass partitions and where communica-
tion is through intercom phone. These facilities are used when security risks are suspected; how-
ever, most visits now are "open" and prisoners can talk to and touch their visitors, so long as cer-
tain standards of decency and modesty are maintained. None of this is a substitute for family life 
but it is a far cry from the old regimes.  
In the modern penitentiary, the correctional theory underlying prisoner's access to their loved ones 
and friends is to maintain the bonds of community to facilitate prisoners' re-integration into the 
community when they leave the prison gates. Providing for a humane visitation regime is directly 
linked to what the Panel claims to be its primary agenda -greater public safety. Researchers from 
Florida State University in 2008 reported the results of the most comprehensive study to date on 
the relationship between visiting and recidivism. No comparable research has been conducted in 
Canada and as the US’s fourth largest state prison system the Florida study is the best empirical 
evidence we have. These are the findings:      
Using Florida prisoner data that overcome many of the limitations of prior studies—which typically 
have focused only on men, inmates from a single facility, a single and often indirect measure of visi-
tatio, bivariate analyses with no statistical controls. and limited (e.g.. one year or less) postrelease 
follow-up—we tested a series of hypotheses concerning the relationship between visitation and re-
cidivism, Briefly, we found that only 42 percent of inmates received any visitation in the year prior to 
release, reinforcing the notion that incarceration indeed severs individuals' t ies  to society. Our cen-
tral overarching hypothesis was that visitation reduces recidivism, and save for a few exceptions, 
the analyses largely supported this expectation. Specifically, and consonant with the few extant 
empirical studies of the topic… any visitation and more frequent visitation were both associated 
with a lower likelihood of recidivism. Additional, more nuanced analyses conveyed similar findings 
such as the notion that visitation over many different months exerts a greater effect than visits over 
fewer months. Visitation was also associated with delaying the onset or timing, of recidivism. In ad-
dition, visitation of many types, including both family and friends, was associated with reduced 
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and delayed onset of recidivism, with spousal visitation producing a more pronounced reduction in 
recidivism.159 
The 1992 Corrections and Conditional Release Act and Regulations provides the legal architecture 
for a humane visiting regime that facilitates reintegration. The legislation marks a legally significant 
shift from the pre-1992 Penitentiary Act, in which receiving visits was a privilege, to a regime in 
which prisoners have a right to maintain contact with the community. The legislation recognises 
that under the Charter everyone, including prisoners, have the right to association, subject to rea-
sonable limits.  In the context of the penitentiary reasonable limitations on the degree and manner 
of association may be justified by legitimate security and safety concerns consistent with the least 
restrictive measures test. Thus section 71(1) of the CCRA provides:  
In order to promote relationships between inmates and the community, an inmate is entitled to have 
reasonable contact, including visits and correspondence, with family, friends and other person from 
outside the penitentiary, subject to such reasonable limits as are prescribed for protecting the secu-
rity of the penitentiary or the safety of persons.  
The CCR Regulations make it clear that prisoners have a presumptive entitlement to a contact 
(open) visit. Section 90(1) provides:  
Every inmate shall have a reasonable opportunity to meet with their visitor without a physical barrier 
to physical contact unless  
(a) the institutional head or a staff member designated by the institutional head believes on rea-
sonable grounds that the barrier is necessary for the security of the penitentiary or the safety 
of any person; and  
(b) no less restrictive measure is available.  
The Regulations also specify the conditions under which a prisoner's right to visit can be denied or 
suspended. Section 91(1) provides:  
(1) The institutional head or a staff member designated by the institutional head may authorize the 
refusal or suspension of a visit to an inmate where the institutional head or staff member believes 
on reasonable grounds  
(a) that during the course of the visit, the inmate or visitor would  
(i) jeopardize the security of the penitentiary or the safety of any person, or  
(ii) plan or commit a criminal offence; and  
(b) that restrictions on the manner in which the visit takes place would not be adequate to control 
the risk.  
(2) Where a refusal or suspension is authorized under subsection (1),  
(a) the refusal or suspension may continue for as long as the risk referred to in that subsection 
continues; and  
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(b) the institutional head or staff member shall promptly inform the inmate and the visitor of the 
reasons for the refusal or suspension and shall give the inmate and the visitor an opportunity 
to make representations with respect thereto.  
The drafting of these provisions recognizes the Charter rights of prisoners and visitors, articulates in 
legislative form the correctional objectives that provide the substantial and compelling grounds for 
placing limitations on those rights and requires that any such limitation be the least restrictive 
measure. These criteria appropriately reflect principles articulated by the Supreme Court in its 
Charter jurisprudence and cannot be easily modified without raising serious questions of constitu-
tionality. The significance of this carefully calibrated constitutional order in framing recommenda-
tions for reform is completely ignored by the Panel. 
6.3 Reconciling Humane Visiting with Safe Penitentiaries 
 From the perspective of a correctional administrator, the liberalization of visiting regimes and the 
recognition of the principle that maintaining contacts with the community is an essential element 
of a prisoner’s eventual reintegration carry a cost. Every step in opening up the prison to the out-
side results in potential holes in the security perimeter through which drugs can flow. Through di-
verse routes, hidden within the folds of clothing and underwear, "suit-cased" in condoms inserted 
into body orifices, implanted in tennis balls and other projectiles that are hurled over fences, or the 
intimidation or bribery of staff, the couriering business flourishes within federal penitentiaries. 
Over a decade ago, in 1996, the Correctional Service of Canada joined in the War on Drugs and un-
der the rubric of a National Drug Strategy implemented "administrative" sanctions to buttress the 
deterrent effect of the disciplinary code that prohibits the use or possession of drugs. Part of the 
artillery in the war were increased use of drug dogs and the introduction of devices that use “ion 
mobility spectrometry” to detect minute particles of substances associated with the production of 
illegal drugs on items submitted for analysis by the scanner. Initially introduced under the name 
“plasma chromatography” in the 1970s as a means of detecting selective trace amounts of organic 
compounds, IMS and its various forms has since been utilized in the detection of explosives, narcot-
ics, and pesticides.160 CSC operates two mass-manufactured portable ion scanners: the Ion Tracks 
Inc. “Itemizer” and the Smiths Detection “Ionscan”.  
 
The units, collectively referred to as the “ionscan” are installed at the front gate of the penitentiary, 
and like a metal detector, are classified as a non-intrusive search method. As ion scanners detect 
trace amounts of substance residue found on objects, the search procedure is carried out by asking 
the visitor for personal possessions (e.g. keys, watch, wallet or piece of jewellery) and either wiping 
the objects with specially treated swabs or by use of a specialized vacuum which traps particles on 
a Teflon filter. The first swab method is used more often because it can be done quickly. Following 
collection, the sample is placed in the machine where it is heated to vaporization, after which the 
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neutral molecules of vapour are carried in a stream of filtered air into the reaction region of the 
device to be ionized. After the vapour has been ionized and split into positive and negative parti-
cles, these particles move into an electric field from which they travel to a collector electrode. The 
amount of time required for the particles to reach the collector electrode (the “flight time”) is 
compiled by the device, recorded, and used to produce a spectrum which is specific to the nature 
of that particular substance. If the spectrum produced by the ion scanner upon analyzing the sam-
ple being tested matches a spectrum of an illicit substance a positive hit for that substance is regis-
tered.161 
 
One significant aspect of the ionscan units is their sensitivity and ability to detect minute amounts 
of a substance. While methods of drug detection such as chemical reagent sprays are capable of 
detecting 10 micrograms of a substance, the Barringer Mobility-Ion machine is able to detect 1000 
of a millionth of a gram of a drug (ie: a nanogram). As a result of their hyper-sensitivity to micro-
scopic trace amounts of drug residue, ionscan units can be calibrated to a specific threshold level at 
which a positive hit is registered. What this adjustable threshold is set at will be dependent on the 
particular purpose and situations in which the ionscan is being used; what might be an acceptable 
level of a substance in one environment may be inappropriate in another. Currently, CSC guidelines 
provide threshold levels of 750 nanograms for cocaine and 500 nanograms for heroin in relation to 
the Itemiser ion scanner, and thresholds of 500 nanograms for cocaine and 100 nanograms for 
heroin in relation to the IonScan scanner.162 
 
Two of the Panel’s recommendations call for greater use of ionscan equipment and drug dogs 
without any cost-benefit analysis or review of CSC’s experience with these anti-drug initiatives.  In 
fact, CSC has never been able to produce evidence of studies conducted by them or anyone else 
that establish the reliability of the technology in the field. There is no doubt that the technology is 
highly sensitive to certain substances and can identify extremely small amounts. What is in dispute, 
however, is the degree to which the technology can reliably differentiate between substances as-
sociated with illegal drugs and many other perfectly legal substances.  Requests of CSC to produce 
a list of known substances such as, cosmetics, cleansers and other items that can produce false-
positive readings have been refused on the grounds that their agreement with the manufacturer 
explicitly forbids such disclosure. As a result visitors to prisons cannot take informed measures to 
avoid unintentional contamination by everyday items. Many go to extreme, but often ineffective 
and even hazardous methods such as washing in strong chlorine solutions, to clean themselves of 
any materials that might generate a false test.  
Despite its widespread use in a variety of settings there is a dearth of independent research on the 
reliability of the technology in drug testing in field situations, such as the front gate of a prison. In 
1998, at the order of Her Majesty’s Prison Service in the United Kingdom, the Police Scientific De-
velopment Branch conducted a study of six electronic trace drug detection devices, under both 
                                                     
161  T. Keller et al., “Application of ion mobility spectrometry in cases of forensic interest”, in Forensic Science Interna-
tional 161 (2006) 130-140 p. 130-131 
162 Correctional Service Canada, Guideline 566-8-2 “Technical Requirements for Ion Mobility Spectrometry Devices”, 
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field and laboratory conditions. Included in these machines were those utilized by CSC, the Bar-
ringer Ionscan and the Ion Track Itemiser. The detailed results of the experiments could not be re-
leased due to “commercial confidentiality”, but a general conclusion revealed that the only illegal 
drug that the machines detected reliably was cocaine, and that for other drugs, the machines were 
“not…currently reliable.”163  
 
A private conversation between one of the authors with a senior researcher with one of the most 
prominent independent research facility in the United States provided further information that se-
riously challenges the reliability of using ionscan technology in field situations such as prisons.  He 
advised that while the US government had frequently commissioned research of ionscan technol-
ogy with explosives, to his knowledge, it had not commissioned such research for drugs. He advised 
that because of the more limited number of substances used to make explosives, detecting them is 
much more reliable than detecting drugs. Given the problem still faced with false positives for ex-
plosives, we should expect a far greater rate of false positive for drugs – particularly in environ-
ments that are likely to be contaminated such as the front entrances of prisons. 
 
In research conducted as part of the  Justice behind the Walls project  at two federal penitentiaries 
in the years following the launch of the National Drug Strategy, one of the authors reviewed the 
way internal Visits Review Boards make decisions authorizing or restricting visits based on safety or 
security concerns, and whether these decisions were consistent with the governing legislation or 
reflected  a pattern of pre-1992 customary law in which visits were seen as privileges rather than 
legal entitlements. The research findings were that visit review boards used drug dog and ionscan 
hits as virtual proof of a visitor’s drug involvement resulting in visitors being unfairly stigmatized 
and visits unfairly restricted. The implications for the prisoner whose visitor was identified as hav-
ing contact with drugs can have an adverse impact on his security status and ultimately, release on 
parole. The use of the results of a ‘hit’ on the ionscan, or a ‘sit’ by a drug dog demonstrated that 
inside the walls in the War Against Drugs, armed with the new drug detection technology, one of 
the casualties was fairness164  
                                                     
163 Sheldon, T.; Smith, G.; Doherty, S.; Waddell, R.; Donelly, T.; Parker, A. Detection of Concealed Drugs on Prison Visi-
tors: Realistic Laboratory and Field Trials of Six Drugs Trace Detectors and Passive Dogs, Sheldon, T.; Smith, G.; Do-
herty, S.; Waddell, R.; Donelly, T.; Parker, A. Security Technology, 1998. Proceedings., 32nd Annual 1998 Interna-
tional Carnahan Conference on Volume , Issue , 12-14 Oct 1998 234 - 237. A second study of the Barringer Ionscan 
350, published in Spectroscopy in 2000 determined that nicotine interferes with the machine’s ability to detect 
methamphetamine and that the Ionscan “may confirm the existence of methamphetamine when *a+ sample is 
contaminated with nicotine.”
163
 L.A. Shaw and P. de B. Harrington “Seeing through the Smoke with Dynamic Data 
Analysis: Detection of Methampetamine in Forensic Samples Contaminated with Nicotine” (2000) Spectroscopy, 
Vol. 15, No. 11, pp. 40-45.A third study about ion scan technology published in Forensic Science International in 
2008 included a number of widely available detergents in its test and found that, in certain concentrations, several 
detergents gave a false positive for heroin. The study also notes that other substances, such as atropine and papa-
verine, interfered with detection of cocaine and heroin. Dussy, F. et al. “Validation of an ion mobility spectrometry 
(IMS) method for the detection of heroin and cocaine on incriminated material”. Forensic Science International 177 
(2008): 105-111. 
 
164  Justice behind the Walls, internet version Sector 5 Ch.3 http://justicebehindthewalls.net/book.asp?cid=213    
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In response to CSC’s confident assurances that the ionscan devices are reliable and the thresholds 
set for the various drugs being measured are indicative of more than incidental contact with the 
drugs, we need to consider additional facts. The manufacturers of the devices have made it clear 
that hitting above a threshold does not mean that the person knowingly came in contact with drug 
traces.165  
False positives are commonplace. One type of common false positive is where a hit is read as posi-
tive for a prohibited drug when in fact the traces detected are of a perfectly legal substance pre-
sent in a commercially available product. For example, testing at Masqui revealed that Clorox 
wipes, which visitors had been advised to use to decontaminate items of jewellery, registered posi-
tive above the threshold set for cocaine. At Kent certain brands of perfume, available at Sears, reg-
istered positive for methamphetamines. 
 Perhaps the most glaring and high-profile example of the inherent risk of false positives took place 
in 2005 at Matsqui institution in the course of a mediation of a grievance rising from a positive hit 
on the ionscan. Participating in the mediation were officials from CSC's national and regional head-
quarters and the Office of the Correctional Investigator. As part of a demonstration of the ionscan 
procedures, test were performed by the senior officer in charge of ionscan staff training in the Pa-
cific region on the watches of two the national headquarters officials, counsel for the Correctional 
Investigator and Professor Jackson, who was participating in the mediation as counsel for the  pris-
oner. One CSC official hit above the threshold for cocaine, the other above the threshold for 
methamphetamines; counsel for the Correctional Investigator hit above the threshold for heroin 
and only Professor Jackson's test gave a negative result. On this occasion it was readily accepted 
that the positive hits were false-positives, an acceptance that is entirely absent in the day-to-day 
front gate operations for ordinary visitors.  
 On the same day that these false positives occurred there was a tragic event at Matsqui that fur-
ther underscored the fallibility of the ionscan.  During regular visiting hours a visitor came through 
the front gate, was subjected to the ionscan with negative results and proceeded to the open visit-
ing area. At some point during the visit, the visitor orally passed to the prisoner being visited a bal-
loon that had been secreted in the visitor’s body containing a mix of heroin and cocaine. The pris-
oner asphyxiated and died. Thus, on the very same day as the ionscan produced false positives on 
CSC officials for cocaine, methamphetamines and heroin, it failed to identify a visitor actually carry-
ing heroin and cocaine on their person. While this incident demonstrates the very real dangers of 
drug trafficking, it just as clearly demonstrates that the ionscan is not a technological panacea to its 
eradication.  
CSC’s own instructions to staff on the setup and calibration of ionscan equipment conclude by tell-
ing staff to test themselves. If a positive hit is registered, they are to wash their hands in alcohol 
and repeat the test. This is an implicit admission that false positives occur either through equip-
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ment failure or accidental contamination. It certainly gives the benefit of the doubt to staff that 
visitors never enjoy.166 
 
Because the Panel seems to be unaware of or is indifferent to the impact of the use of this “non-
intrusive technology” on the lives of prisoners and their loved ones, we have set out one of many 
case studies taken from the Justice behind the Walls research project against which to judge the 
implications of the Panel’s recommendations for extending their use without providing better pro-
tections against their abuse.  
A case that arose at Mission Institution in 1998 is illustrative. On August 29, 1998, while Mrs. M was 
visiting her husband, the drug dog handler reported to the IPSO (the Institutional Preventive Security 
officer, since changed to Security Intelligence Officer) that the dog indicated that Mrs. M had the 
odour of narcotics on her person. Mrs. agreed to submit to a strip search or any other procedures the 
institution wished to conduct to demonstrate that she was not in possession of any drugs but her re-
quests were rebuffed. Subsequently, she explained to the institutional authorities that she had al-
lowed her son to use her car shortly before her visit to Mission Institution and that he had now ad-
mitted to her that he had smoked a joint in the car. That explanation made no difference to a three 
month ban on open visits. As I have described earlier in the book, it was Mr. Ms case in the 1970s 
that resulted in the judgement of the Supreme Court of Canada that correctional decisions must be 
made in conformity with the duty to act fairly. In her letter to the Visits Review Board Mrs. M ably 
described the manner in which the suspension of her open visits with her husband contradicted what 
she had come to understand as fundamental principles of justice.  
The Board is making decisions based on a belief that I was carrying narcotics. During my detain-
ment and interrogation I requested many times that [the IPSO] or the RCMP do whatever proce-
dures they felt necessary to prove that I was not in possession of narcotics. They refused. This 
now leaves me in the position of being treated as though I were guilty, yet I was given no chance 
to prove my innocence. In the outside world where I hold a responsible professional position, 
own my own home, and do everything else an ordinary Canadian citizen does, a person is inno-
cent until proven guilty. I was disgusted to find that within the world of Corrections Canada, a 
person is guilty on suspicion, with no opportunity to prove his/her innocence. If your mandate is 
as you stated and [the IPSO] had suspicions that I was carrying contraband, then why wasn't 
everything possible done to find out the truth? I signed a document when I first started visiting 
which stated that I would submit to any procedures necessary to a contraband investigation, and 
I asked repeatedly and emphatically on August 29 that these procedures be carried out. Why 
weren't they? Is it easier for the Visitor Review Board to make decisions based only on suspicion? 
What about the truth? I know longer feel safe as a citizen visiting the Institution because my 
right to be innocent until proven guilty has been violated, and I am perceived as something very 
different than what I am. 167 
Since the publication of  Justice behind the Walls there has accumulated a great deal of evidence 
that the unfairness and violations of the CCRA associated with the use of the ionscan and drug dogs 
now constitutes some of the most disturbing examples of correctional arbitrariness. As opposed to 
other examples of arbitrariness, this latest one is dramatically affecting innocent citizens whose 
                                                     
166  Correctional Service of Canada, Itemizer Operating Procedures, Annex C GL 566-8-2 Procedure 4. 1.  2004 
http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/plcy/doc/566-8-2gl-annex-C_e.pdf  
167  Justice behind the Walls, internet version http://justicebehindthewalls.net/book.asp?cid=213&pid=653  
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only crime is offering support to the imprisoned. Here are some of the anguished letters that have 
been sent to the website of JusticebehindtheWalls.net that highlights the human costs of ill-
conceived and arbitrary correctional policies: 
I visit William Head prison and participate as a volunteer in Creative Writing Workshops, Writing to 
the Light, in the hope that telling the stories may be healing to prisoners, many of whom have been 
disadvantaged by our social priorities, by unaddressed learning disabilities, poverty and abuse. Many 
of these men are from the First Nations.  
Last week-end, there was a pow wow at William Head. Elders from the Saanich Nation were invited 
to lead healing circles. Healing is critical at this time as the prison is downsizing and many inmates 
live in fear of being moved away from family and friends, their only connection to emotional support. 
Last week, there was a suicide that followed the rejection of one inmate's elderly mother, a very 
straight middle class lady, because she failed the ion test for drugs at the gate. This lady lost her 
pride when her son went to jail. The test took away her dignity. The aftermath took her son.  
The ejection of the two elderly First Nations ladies who had come to help was an insult to their cul-
ture and another demoralizing experience for the inmates. In all, I believe, eleven people were re-
jected yesterday by a machine that, I have heard, is notoriously inaccurate. Mothers, wives, children 
and sisters, many of whom had travelled long distances to be with their loved ones in a positive set-
ting, were humiliated. The healing day was a shambles. I saw men women and children in tears, and 
I wouldn't be surprised to see more suicides.  
It is not the mandate of Corrections Canada to destroy families. This is a prescription for cultivating 
another generation of rage and despair.  
I have decided to act because I perceive this system to be an attack on the family. I have no family in 
prison, by the grace of God, but I do belong to the human family and we are all responsible. Society 
prepares the crime, and the criminal commits it.168  
… 
I have had many false positives when visiting my fiance who is in Kingston Penitentiary. I don't use 
any drugs, and no one else has used my driver's license for that purpose. But almost every single time 
I go in there, the stupid machine goes off. We were on closed visits, and were finally getting our des-
ignated seating back and then this happens. We are trying to get married, but will not be able to un-
til we are on open visits. This is extremely frustrating and humiliating. These machines are NOT  reli-
able. I even clean my ID with windex, then without touching it, put  it in a ziploc bag. When I get to 
the prison, I hand it to the guard to  swipe. And every time it goes off, it makes me look like I am a se-
rious  drug addict. Do you know of anything else that may be setting this thing off on me all the 
time?169 
I visited my brother at Matsqui Institution on October 26, 2008.  After I checked in with the front desk 
and locked my things away, the guard asked if he could swipe my jacket for drugs.  I consented and 
when he swiped my jacket it tested positive for crack cocaine.  He asked if he could perform a second 
swipe test. I consented and the second test (on my pant leg) was negative.  
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At that point, he told me to sit to the side and wait.  He did not tell me who I was waiting for or what 
was happening.  I was sitting in the foyer of the building and other people were coming and going at 
the same time and looking at me curiously.  I waited on the chair for about 15-20 minutes before a 
more senior guard came to speak to me.   
He told me that I had tested positive for crack cocaine in an amount that was 2-3 times in excess of 
the “trace amount”.  He asked me to explain why I had tested positive.  I was dumbfounded.  I had 
never even seen crack cocaine before, let alone used it or touched it.  He told me that I must have 
had crack cocaine “on my person” in order for it to show up in that quantity on the drug test ma-
chine.  I said perhaps my jacket had touched it on the bus, or in a restaurant or bar, I said I lived 
downtown where many homeless and drug-addicted people roam the streets and that perhaps I 
could have come in contact with it by walking around, opening doors or even giving money to pan-
handlers.  He did not accept any of those explanations.  Again, he pressed me to explain why I had 
tested positive; it was very uncomfortable because I had offered all of the plausible reasons for test-
ing positive on the machine.  He kept asking me the same question over and over and I was simply 
unable to offer an acceptable explanation to him.  I was frustrated with his aggressive line of ques-
tioning and refusal to believe me and I started to get upset and emotional, he was interrogating me 
in the foyer of the prison in front of three other prison staff who were listening to our conversation.  I 
was embarrassed and humiliated. I felt like a criminal.  I was being accused of using or possessing 
crack cocaine and the guard would not believe a word that came out of my mouth. At one point I 
said to him “I am a lawyer, I would be risking my career to smuggle drugs into prison, why would I do 
that?” He said that he didn’t think I was bringing drugs into prison, but that I was a “high risk” visitor 
as a drug user or seller. I told him I didn’t use drugs and I never had used drugs and that I could not 
explain why drugs were showing up on my jacket.   
After about 15-20 minutes, he said he would let me visit my brother but that I was not allowed to 
touch him and that I had to stay “up front” in front of the glass where I could be watched at all 
times.  He told me I was on a list of people to watch and gave me a number to call to complain. The 
whole ordeal from the first drug swipe to the time I finally visited my brother lasted about an hour.  
My 2.5 hr visit turned into an hour and a half and I only go to visit him every few months.  
Although I was embarrassed, humiliated and upset by the whole experience my biggest concern is for 
my brother and how this will reflect on him and his ability to get parole or be moved to a prison 
closer to his fiancée and daughter on Vancouver Island.  I have never used or touched crack cocaine 
before and I have no criminal record, nor have I ever been charged with a crime.  I am an upstanding 
member of the B.C. Bar and have no connections to anyone in the drug trade.170   
… 
I have been visiting my partner every weekend since he was sent to Matsqui in January of this year.  I 
travel with our daughter who is now one year old from Duncan on Vancouver Island via the ferries 
and stay overnight in a hotel so that we can visit for two days every week. We have had numerous 
times where either my daughter or I have tested positive on the swipes that have been taken from 
our clothing.  At first I was suspicious that it was because of the fact that we were staying in a hotel 
and riding on the ferry.  You can imagine that traveling with a small child means that we come into 
close contact with every kind of surface imaginable.  Ella crawls and touches everything and then I 
pick her up.  I attempted to rectify our difficulties by coming up with an elaborate routine where we 
                                                     
170  Email to Michael Jackson  November 10, 2008 
A Flawed Compass              Drugs in Prison 
87 
 
wipe ourselves down and change into clothing that has been washed and bagged before hand so as 
to have thoroughly cleaned any possibility of contamination prior to our entering the prison.  This 
has not changed the fact that we still set the machine off on a fairly regular basis.  I am, to say the 
least, thoroughly distressed at this point and time.  I am full of fear and anxiety every time I make the 
trip as there does not seem to be anything I can do to stop the machine from going off.  Every time 
we have tested positive we have been detained and interrogated.  It is upsetting and I find the whole 
thing to be extremely traumatic. At this point my status for visiting at the prison is listed as open but 
they have made it clear that any further hits will result in visits being suspended.  I am really frus-
trated as I have not done anything at all wrong and feel I am being unjustly "punished".  I keep going 
around in circles in my head about how best to go about this so that we no longer set the machine 
off but I can't seem to see where the solution lies in all of this.  I have nothing to do with drugs so 
why the machine goes off remains one of life's great mysteries.  I have serious suspicions that the 
machine itself is faulty and it is not picking up on anything at all.  I also wonder if there is the possi-
bility of something like the baby wipes I use on Ella giving off false readings.  I am wondering if you 
have any knowledge as to whether something like baby wipes could be tested by their machine to 
find out if this could be setting it off.  I have looked online and have read of similar cases to mine 
where they did in fact link positive drug hits to be actually related to some other substance.  There 
have been references made to certain lotions and the like but I have been unable to find any concrete 
information.171 
The questions and issues raised in these emails are serious ones and should give rise to extreme 
caution in continuing the use of the ionscan under the present procedures, rather than the Panel’s 
blanket endorsement and enthusiastic call for their greater deployment.  
After years adamantly denying that the ionscan technology ever produced false positive results, 
CSC's national policy directives setting out the procedures for the use of the ionscan now make it 
clear that a positive hit is not a sufficient stand-alone basis upon which to restrict an open visit.172 
Where a visitor registers a positive hit, a second test must be performed on a different item, fol-
lowed by an interview with a supervisor or manager in which the individual is given the opportunity 
to provide an explanation for the positive search result (including mention of any products or 
medications)173. That manager is to then conduct a Risk/Threat Assessment (TRA) that  considers 
the results of the first and second swipe,  the interview in combination with other applicable in-
formation that may be available (e.g. intelligence information, past inmate and/or visitor history 
and  observed behaviour). Based on an assessment of these factors, the manager is required to 
make a decision, whether to allow an unrestricted open visit, a visit with designated seating (at the 
front of the visiting area close to staff) or a closed visit or deny any visit. The criteria for the deci-
sion are whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that permitting an unrestricted open visit 
would jeopardize the security of the penitentiary or the safety of any person. The manager is fur-
ther required to provide a brief summary of the assessment and the rationale for the decision. 174 
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The results of the TRA are provided to the Visits Review Board for their consideration and further 
action regarding future visits. 
There is mounting evidence, however, that notwithstanding these national guidelines, there is 
great variation in their application not only from institution to institution but from manager to 
manager. In far too many cases the result of a positive hit, even when followed by a second nega-
tive hit, and in the absence of any further evidence of risk, results in some restriction on the visit. 
The restriction might take the form of an embarrassing and demeaning “up front” visit where eve-
ryone in the visiting room is aware of the fact that the visitor is under a drug related suspicion. Ac-
cumulating a series of positive hits may result in further restrictions on visiting.  
The practice of visit review boards is characterized by a spectrum of responses. In some institutions 
where the visiting had previously been on an open visit basis, the practice is to impose screened 
visits until such time as the visitor on three consecutive visits makes 3 clean passes through the  
ionscan. If during one of those passes a positive hit is registered, the screened status would be 
maintained until the visitor made six consecutive clean passes. If during that period a further hit 
was registered, then the visitor's right to enter the institution would be suspended for a period of 
at least 30 days. At other institutions the practice is far less flexible. In some cases after a second 
hit on the ionscan, a visitor will be barred from entering the prison for any kind of visit for periods 
of up to 3 months.175 In this way the presence of the ionscan device at the front gate of an institu-
tion has become a new site for the development of customary practices that vary from institution 
to institution. 
In 2006, as a result of the concerns by offenders and their visitors about the proper use of ionscan 
devices, an audit was conducted by CSC’s Internal Audit Branch of thirteen Canadian prisons to de-
termine if the institutions were in compliance with the National Drug Strategy and if they had “im-
plemented drug interdiction activities that balance detection and deterrence, and are in compli-
ance with law and policy”176 Although parts of the audit is redacted, what is available for public re-
view shows a litany of noncompliance with policy that provides powerful confirmation of much of 
the arbitrary use of  the ionscan that is reflected in the accounts of visitors that we have cited. 
 
Regarding the use of ion scan machines, the Audit found that while ionscan operators in twelve of 
thirteen prisons had received training on how to use the devices, “IMS devices’ policy and proce-
dures are not being followed.”177 Among the problems noted were the following: a failure to verify 
non-contamination of officers’ hands, the unavailability of approved cleaning supplies, the failure 
to clean the sample area before conducting a swipe, and tests being conducted by officers without 
gloves. The Audit team concluded that “the verification of these *drug interdiction+ tools requires 
stronger management oversight.”178 
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The Audit also examined the overall compliance with drug strategies, including procedures for 
searches and “Threat-Risk Assessments” (TRAs). The Audit reported that while all thirteen of the 
prisons studied had drug strategies in place, only nine of them had these strategies in writing, and 
at all thirteen prisons there were staff members who were “generally unaware of the strategy and 
it was unclear how the strategies were being communicated to institutional staff.”179 Indeed, they 
discovered that CSC’s Guideline 566-8-1, “Use of Non-Intrusive Search Tools” is not part of the 
training programs for Correctional Supervisors or Security Intelligence Officers. The Audit team 
noted that training on this guideline is “imperative to ensure compliance” with the National Drug 
Strategy.180 
 
Perhaps the greatest deficiency seen at the prisons was in the use of the very mechanism designed 
to prevent arbitrariness in restricting visitors’ access, the Threat Risk Assessment. The Audit noted 
particular problems with the performance of the TRA and found that, partly due to this noted lack 
of instruction on drug interdiction policies and guidelines, the TRA is not being conducted in accor-
dance with CSC policy. In ten of the thirteen institutions studied, the TRA forms were not properly 
completed. Problems reported by the Audit team included: 
 
 no indication that the Visits and Correspondence Department and the Security Intelligence 
Departments were consulted during the decision making process;  
 no indication that a review of Offender Management System (OMS) and Reports of Auto-
mated Data Applied to Reintegration (RADAR) system was conducted;  
 no evidence to indicate the visitor was interviewed;  
 some TRAs were conducted by non-designated managers; and  
 forms did not consistently indicate the decision rendered.  
 Positive alerts resulting from the use of the IMSD and/or the drug dog could not be consis-
tently linked to the completion of the TRA process;  
 The required Designation Letters for the conduct of TRAs were not completed in 6 of 13 sites 
visited;  
 The corresponding OMS Incident Report was not always completed in accordance with pol-
icy;  
 Letters to offenders and visitors following the completion of TRAs were not filed in accor-
dance with policy and decisions rendered were not consistently recorded in OMS.  
The Audit team found that one of the thirteen institutions was not even doing TRAs:  
 
The institution indicated that due to a construction issue, they are unable to conduct interviews in a 
private area (as required) and therefore do not complete any part of the process. Following a positive 
alert from either the detector dog team or the IMS Device, this institution turns away those who 
have hit positive.181  
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Due to the lack of training and evidence and incorrect completion of the TRA, it becomes clear from 
the 2006 Audit that the process for determining the admission of visitors following a positive ion 
scan hit is not being conducted correctly (if at all). This means that in some situations, visitors and 
inmates may be denied visits based solely on false positives from the ion scan machines. The Audit 
team’s made their concerns about this lack of compliance evident: 
 
The TRA process has the potential to affect visitor status. By not completing the TRA forms in accor-
dance with the policy, there is no evidence that decisions have been rendered based on all informa-
tion available when determining whether visitors may introduce drugs into the institution.This poses 
the risk that a visitor will gain access to or be restricted from the facility without due consideration of 
all the facts.182  
 
CSC’s own audit demonstrates that the abuse of ionscanning is not an aberration but part of a sys-
temic failure by CSC staff to comply with law and policy. The Panel does not seem to have been 
aware of the existence of this Audit. Still, they confidently recommend that CSC place more re-
sources in the deployment of this technology without insisting on reliability studies conducted in 
the field and without requiring that CSC demonstrate its compliance with law and policy. It is hard 
to understand therefore, the Panel’s unquestioning endorsement of this and other unnamed “new 
technologies” except in terms of an unremitting and unquestioning faith in intensifying the war on 
drugs, irrespective of the costs to justice or its impact on effective corrections.     
The Panel also calls for the greater use of drug dogs in the penitentiary again without any consid-
eration to the potential for greater incidence of false positives. The Panel’s assumption, mirroring 
that of CSC’s, is that drug dog “hits” are sufficiently reliable  to base  restricting visiting rights on 
them. This is a misplaced assumption. Of particular relevance in considering the Panel’s uncritical 
recommendation for greater use of drug dogs  are  the recent Supreme Court of Canada decisions 
in The Queen v. A.M. and Gurmakh Kang-Brown v The Queen.183 These cases raised the Charter im-
plications of the use of sniffer dogs, in the one case in a Toronto high school and the other at the 
Calgary bus station. The Court was evenly split on whether the appropriate Charter standard for a 
reasonable search within section 8 involving a sniffer dog was “reasonable grounds to believe” or a 
lower threshold of “reasonable suspicion” that drugs were present. However even those judges 
who were of the opinion that the lower threshold was justified, clearly expressed the view that the 
Charter  had an important role in to ensure that law enforcement authorities not deploy sniffer 
dogs on the basis of speculative hunches in pursuit of a zero-tolerance drug policy. Justice Binnie 
wrote:  
I accept the youth court judge’s finding of fact that this was a random speculative search. What was 
done here may have been seen by the police as an efficient use of their resources, and by the princi-
pal of the school as an efficient way to advance a zero tolerance policy. But these objectives were 
achieved at the expense of the privacy interest (and constitutional rights) of every student in the 
school, as the youth court judge and the Court of Appeal pointed out. The Charter weighs other val-
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ues, including privacy, against an appetite for police efficiency. A hunch is not enough to warrant 
a search of citizens or their belongings by police dogs.184 
The Supreme Court also addressed police claims of the accuracy of sniffer dog “hits” and the issue 
of false positives:  
Thirdly, the evidence in this case is that the sniffer dog Chief has an enviable record of accuracy. Of 
course dogs, being living creatures, exhibit individual capacities that vary from animal to animal. 
While a false positive may be rare for Chief, it is not thus with all dogs. The importance of proper 
tests and records of particular dogs will be an important element in establishing the reasonableness 
of a particular sniffer -dog search. 
The Crown attaches considerable importance to what it says are statistics relevant to the detection 
rate, that is to say the successful location of drugs in a search conducted pursuant to a dog sniff (true 
positives), but an important concern for the Court is the number of false positives. From the police 
perspective, a dog that fails to detect half of the narcotics present is still better than no detection at 
all. From the perspective of the general population, a dog that falsely alerts half of the time raises 
serious concerns about the invasion of the privacy of innocent people. 
Robert Bird, in his article “An Examination of the Training and Reliability of the Narcotics Detection 
Dog” (1996-97), 85 Ky. L.J. 405, claims that many dogs maintain “a near perfect record of narcotics 
detection” (p. 406). However, Justice Souter’s dissent in Caballes provides a useful compilation of 
some of the decided cases in the United States where, on the facts, the result was otherwise: 
The infallible dog, however, is a creature of legal fiction. Although the Supreme Court of Illinois 
did not get into the sniffing averages of drug dogs, their supposed infallibility is belied by judicial 
opinions describing well-trained animals sniffing and alerting with less than perfect accuracy, 
whether owing to errors by their handlers, the limitations of the dogs themselves, or even the 
pervasive contamination of currency by cocaine. [pp.411-12] 
Broadly based studies demonstrate an enormous variation in sniffer-dog performances, with some 
dogs giving false positives more than 50 percent of the time. Canadian police data seem not to be 
available, but in 2006, the New South Wales Ombudsman issued a report containing extensive em-
pirical data on the use of sniffer dogs by police since the introduction of the Police Powers Act. Dur-
ing the review period, 17 different drug detection dogs made 10,211 indications during general drug 
detection operations. The Ombudsman reported: 
Almost all persons indicated by a drug detection dog were subsequently searched by police. This 
is in accordance with police policy which states that an indication by a drug detection dog gives 
police reasonable suspicion to search a person. Prohibited drugs were only located in 26% of 
the searches following an indication. That is, almost three-quarters of all indications did not 
result in the location of prohibited drugs. The rate of finding drugs varied from dog to dog, 
ranging from 7% (of all indications) to 56%. 
(NSW Ombudsman, Review of the Police Powers (Drug Detections Dogs) Act 2001 (2006), at p. ii 
(emphasis added).) 
I mention these conflicting reports because it is important not to treat the capacity and accuracy of 
sniffer dogs as interchangeable from one dog to the next. Dogs are not mechanical or chemical de-
vices. The police claim that they have available dogs like Chief who have a high accuracy rate and a 
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low percentage of false positives. If the lawfulness of a search is challenged, the outcome may de-
pend on evidence before the court in each case about the individual dog and its established reliabil-
ity. Neither the police nor other government authorities are justified in relying on the “myth of the 
infallible dog”. Proper police manuals require a handler to record a dog’s (or the team’s) perform-
ance. This is (or should be) accepted as an essential part of a handler’s work to be adduced as part of 
the evidentiary basis laid before the trial court at which sniffer dog evidence is sought to be intro-
duced.185 
Let us consider the implications of the Supreme Court’s comments for CSC’s use of sniffer dogs. 
First we must note that there are important differences in how the police use sniffer dogs com-
pared with CSC’s deployment of them at the front gate of penitentiaries. In a case where a police 
sniffer dog indicates a positive hit the normal practice is that the person is subjected to a physical 
search to confirm the presence of drugs. If no drugs are found, in most cases in the absence of any 
other implicating evidence, there is no further consequence. If illegal drugs are found and charges 
are laid the accused may challenge the search and the courts will have to assess its reasonableness 
under the Charter.186  
In the case of a CSC drug dog deployed at the front gate of the penitentiary randomly sniffing visi-
tors, the usual practice after a positive hit is not to conduct a physical search to confirm the pres-
ence (or absence) of drugs but to use the hit to trigger a Threat-Risk Assessment which may and 
often does result in a restriction on visits, as illustrated by the previous case study of Ms. M. There 
is no opportunity for an after-the-fact judicial review at which the reasonableness of the search can 
be challenged, including an inquiry into the accuracy record of the particular drug dog. The only 
review conducted will be by the institution’s own visit review board. At that institutional review the 
positive hit will be taken at face value. The drug dog handler will not be called upon to demonstrate 
the individual dog’s performance record and any argument made by a prisoner or their visitor that 
the hit is a false positive and that “neither the police nor other government authorities are justified 
in relying on the “myth of the infallible dog”” will be summarily rejected. Yet this is the process that 
the Panel implicitly accepts and recommends that CSC expand. It is an expansion that compounds 
further the unfairness and arbitrariness of existing practices and moves correctional decision-
making along a path further away from Charter values and the rule of law.  
6.4 Conclusion 
CSC's uncritical endorsement of the Panel’s recommendations on stepping up the war against drugs 
coupled with the allocation of new money to introduce more ionscan equipment, more drug dogs 
and more security intelligence officers, has had the effect of encouraging correctional managers 
and visit review boards to be more aggressive in this ongoing war, minimizing the mounting  evi-
                                                     
185  R. v. A.M., paras.84-88. 
186  The process is set out by Justice Binnie: 
 If the sniff is conducted on the basis of reasonable suspicion and discloses the presence of illegal drugs on the 
person or other place of concealment, the police may, in my view, confirm the accuracy of that information 
with a physical search, again without prior judicial authorization... But, of course, all such searches by the dogs 
or the police are subject to after -the-fact judicial review if it is alleged that no grounds of reasonable suspicion 
existed, or that the search was otherwise carried out in an unreasonable manner. R. v. A.M., para. 14 
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dence of the fallibility of the technology and giving short shrift to visitors who plaintively protest 
their innocence of any involvement or association with drugs. We have been told of visitors who 
with great reluctance have decided to limit or even terminate their visiting of loved ones, for fear 
both of the embarrassment and demeaning consequences of false positive hits and also that this 
will build a record which will inhibit their loved ones’ transfers to lower security or grant of parole.  
We have seen no evidence to support the case that “a more rigorous approach to drug interdic-
tion” would have any more success within prisons than the array of increased enforcement and 
tougher sentencing has had on stemming the flow of drugs coming into Canadian cities and com-
munities. In prison, as on the street, prevention and treatment are more hopeful and productive 
strategies to address the intractable problems of drug use. Harm reduction strategies offer the best 
hope to modify the deadly transfer of HIV and Hep C within the prisons and, after release, in the 
community.  
CSC’s current Drug Strategy rightly emphasises the elements of prevention and treatment along 
with enforcement. Shifting resources by addressing only “more stringent measures”, as advocated 
by the Panel, carries unconsidered heavy costs for both a crucial element necessary for a humane 
environment and for an effective drug strategy. Unfairly inhibiting the rights and ability  of prison-
ers, their families and their support networks to maintain the bonds of family and community nec-
essary for their reintegration into society, has no legitimate place  in a roadmap to a just, peaceful 
and safe society. 
A Flawed Compass          Adequacy of the Inmate Disciplinary Process  
94 
 
7 Adequacy of the Inmate Disciplinary Process 
No other section of the Roadmap raises suspicion about the Panel’s bias towards pleasing a politi-
cal constituency so much as the section on prison discipline. When one recognizes that the review 
was the fulfilment of the political promises made by the current government to prison guards187, 
one might expect that their long-standing criticism of the disciplinary process would be taken seri-
ously. In fact, the uncorroborated claims contained in a brief from the Union of Canadian Correc-
tional Officers (UCCO) drove the entire content of this section of the report - to the exclusion of all 
other sources both within and outside of CSC. As a result, this is another area where the Roadmap 
reveals its one dimensional approach, one in which primacy is given to security concerns with no 
consideration to the justice goals of the process.  
The Panel summarised what it learnt from UCCO’s submission: 
The Panel heard from UCCO-SACC-CSN representatives that they believe that the disciplinary process 
is not working as it should. They specifically commented on the situation where “a non-compliant of-
fender sentenced to segregation serves the penalty in a regular cell, with all the property and privi-
leges enjoyed before conviction in Disciplinary Court.”188 
UCCO-SAAC-CSN also provided the Panel with an analysis of what they termed “the Discipline 
Regime” and as an example, gave an analysis of offence reports at Donnacona Penitentiary between 
January 1 and October 19, 2006….  
The union noted issues around the timelines of the application of the disciplinary process. Section 36 
of Commissioner’s Directive 580 stipulates that the initial hearing of major and minor charges of a 
disciplinary offence shall normally take place within two weeks after the charge is laid. However, the 
statistics reveal that only 20.5% of the hearings are held within these time limits. Out of all offence 
reports filed, only 41.2%, led to sanctions of some sort. Hence, 58.8% of the major reports were re-
jected for various reasons, including administrative reasons such as timeliness. 
The union also noted that many rejected offence reports are not passed on to the offender’s future 
parole officers and thus are not considered during National Parole Board hearings. In addition, two 
out of five reports are not recorded in the Offender Management System (OMS). The union’s study 
revealed that 135 reports with guilty verdicts were not officially recorded in OMS, which had a sig-
nificant impact on case management, given that parole officers depend heavily on the OMS when 
evaluating cases to be presented to the Parole Board. 
The Panel was not able to confirm the accuracy of the union’s allegations with CSC management but, 
the essence of the union’s submission has led the Panel to conclude that in order to reduce levels of 
violence by offenders within the walls of the penitentiary system, there must be significant and 
meaningful consequences for abusive or assaultive behaviour. While the Panel heard from frontline 
correctional officers that some verbal abuse is to be expected from offenders given their profile, staff 
                                                     
187  Minister Day fulfils pledge to review correctional system  http://www.ps-sp.gc.ca/media/nr/2007/nr20070420-
eng.aspx    
188  “Rewards and Consequences: A Correctional Service for the 21st Century—A brief to the Independent Review 
Panel studying the future of Correctional Service Canada,” UCCO-SACC-CSN, June 2007,page 11 
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should not be feel they have to accept this behaviour. There should be appropriate and meaningful 
consequences for offenders’ behaviour that is not deemed acceptable. Staff has repeatedly told the 
Panel that current sanctions are inadequate, and are handed down too late to have any deterrent ef-
fect on the offender.189 
Remarkably in its comments on the disciplinary process the Panel makes no reference to the CCRA 
and the CCRA regulations or CSC's own Commissioners Directives. CD 580, which was revised in 
2004, recognizes that the disciplinary process must be both fair and effective by providing the pol-
icy objective and principles pro-
vided in the text box. 190 
Without any reference to either this 
policy objective and principles, or 
the law on which it is based, the 
Panel focuses solely on the issues of 
administrative efficiency and, to 
make matters worse, only from the 
perspective of the guards. This is 
made clear from the fact that the 
only submission that the Panel 
mentions in this part of its report is 
that from UCCO.  
The time is long past when correc-
tional officials were able to impose 
disciplinary sanctions without con-
cern for complying with the legal 
obligation to act fairly. The pre-
sumption of innocence, the right to 
know the charge and evidence, and 
the right to be heard before an im-
partial judge are fundamental to 
our democracy and system of jus-
tice. For decades now it has been 
accepted, at least in principle if not 
always in practice, that the rule of 
law must apply within the prison in 
the same way that it must apply in 
the community if the justice system is to command respect. The Commissioners Directives reflect 
those principles and legal obligation. Only by ignoring the law and policy objectives and principles 
                                                     
189  Roadmap, p. 24-5 




To contribute to public safety and an orderly and safe cor-
rectional environment through a fair and transparent disci-
plinary process by: 
a. promoting compliance and discouraging non-
compliance with institutional rules; and  
b. contributing to offender rehabilitation and suc-
cessful community reintegration. 
c. PRINCIPLES  
8. Inmate discipline shall: 
a. be fair;  
b. use the least restrictive measures within the con-
text of a particular decision, consistent with the 
protection of the public, staff and offenders;  
c. be corrective by design;  
d. reinforce the inmate's responsibility and account-
ability;  
e. give due consideration to culturally appropriate 
restorative approaches to discipline and informal 
resolution to encourage positive interaction be-
tween inmates and staff;  
f. be timely;  
g. be impartially determined and administered;  
h. take into consideration the inmate's mental 
health and, where applicable, consult with the pa-
tient's attending psychiatrist, before proceeding; 
and  
i. apply only those sanctions imposed by the person 
conducting the hearing 
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of the Commissioner’s Directives is the Panel able to rely in a singularly uncritical manner on the 
UCCO perspective alone.  
To make matters worse, we have reviewed the UCCO submission and found that the study it cites is 
woefully inadequate as a basis for any conclusions regarding the disciplinary system. Yet, the Panel 
cites the study uncritically while either disregarding or being unaware of the extensive scholarly 
literature that would provide a more balanced assessment of the adequacy of the disciplinary 
process and reform measures that strive to maintain the balance between the justice and security 
goals of the process. A few examples will illustrate this point. 
The Panel report states that “UCCO provided the Panel with an analysis of what they termed “the 
Discipline Regime” and as an example, gave an analysis of offence reports at Donnacona Peniten-
tiary between January 1 and October 19, 2006”. The UCCO brief in presenting the Panel with its 
analysis stated "we believe that the results of an in-depth study recently undertaken by the Union 
into the discipline regime at maximum security Donnacona Institution are reasonably representa-
tive of how discipline is handled within CSC institutions across Canada.  An analysis of 3648 major 
offense reports between January 1 2006 and October 19, 2006 provides a statistical portrait of how 
the discipline system in this institution is managed”191. 
The Union provides no support for its statement that Donnacona is “reasonably representative” of 
how discipline is handled in other CSC institutions.  In fact there are several compelling reasons to 
believe Donnacona is not representative.  The 3648 serious offense reports in a 9 1/2 month pe-
riod, on a per capita basis, are the highest of any institution in the country. Donnacona has a rated 
population of around 355 and in 2006 an average population of 289.192 The 3468 figure therefore 
represents a charge rate of over one serious (major) charge for every prisoner every month. We 
are not aware of any other institution that matches this. To give a comparative reference, in the 
fiscal year 2006-7 (a 12 month period) there were only 1,161 serious charges (a third of Donna-
cona) laid for the entire Pacific region, comprising 10 institutions with a prisoner population of  
2,020, a population 7 times that of Donnacona!193  Donnacona therefore had a serious charge rate 
                                                     
191  Although the UCCO brief refers to “major” offenses, the legal term used in the legislation and CDs is “serious” (or 
“infraction grave”). Serious disciplinary offences are adjudicated by independent chairpersons appointed from out-
side of the Correctional Service of Canada. Minor offenses are adjudicated by CSC correctional supervisors or man-
agers. The task of designating an offence as serious or minor is made by a CSC correctional manager.  More severe 
sanctions, including segregation, can be imposed following conviction of a serious offense. CD 580 provides this 
definition of serious and minor offences 
Serious offence: 
 Commits, attempts, or incites acts that are:  
 serious breaches of security; 
 violent;  
 harmful to others;  
 repetitive violations of rules.  
 Minor offence: Other negative or non-productive inmate behaviour that is contrary to institutional rules. CD 580 
2004/01/19  http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/plcy/cdshtm/580-cde-eng.shtml  
192  These population figures were supplied by National Headquarters of CSC.   
193  The figures for the total number of charges for all regions of CSC were provided to the authors by National Head-
quarters of CSC.  
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in 2006 that, per prisoner, was 21 times (2,100%) higher than the Pacific region.194. Further, and 
distancing Donnacona even more from other institutions, the UCCO brief tells us that “in a context 
of budget cutbacks local management decided to close the institution’s segregation unit. This deci-
sion had a major impact on how disciplinary actions are handled.”195 
The Panel, citing the Donnacona study, states “41.2% of the offence reports resulted in sanctions 
after being filed, while 58.8% of the reports were dismissed for various reasons (not guilty, un-
timely, stay of proceedings, and so on).”  The inference is that an outcome in which less than half of 
the charges result in a guilty plea or verdict demonstrates that something is seriously wrong with 
the system.  Indeed it is clear from the UUCO brief itself that in the Union’s view their concern is 
not just that less than half of the offense reports resulted in a guilty plea or verdict but that, even 
worse, only 30% of the offence reports gave rise to a sanction of segregation and that 9 out of 10 
sanctions involved a suspended sentence or a fine.  In other words, in UCCO’s view any result less 
than a sentence of segregation demonstrates a flaw in the disciplinary process. It is not the discipli-
nary process but UCCO’s line of thinking that is flawed here. The CCRA Regulations set out legally 
binding considerations to be taken into account by the independent chairperson in imposing a 
sanction following conviction of a serious disciplinary offence. They are  
a) the seriousness of the offence and the degree of responsibility the inmate bears for its commis-
sion;  
(b) the least restrictive measure that would be appropriate in the circumstances;  
(c) all relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances, including the inmate's behaviour in the 
penitentiary;  
(d) the sanctions that have been imposed on other inmates for similar disciplinary offences commit-
ted in similar circumstances;  
(e) the nature and duration of any other sanction described in section 44 of the Act that has been 
imposed on the inmate, to ensure that the combination of the sanctions is not excessive;  
(f) any measures taken by the Service in connection with the offence before the disposition of the dis-
ciplinary charge; and  
(g) any recommendations respecting the appropriate sanctions made during the hearing.196 
A sanction of segregation is the most serious punishment in the penitentiary, the equivalent of be-
ing sent to “a prison within the prison” as the Supreme Court of Canada has characterized it.197  
Consistent with the sentencing principle of proportionality, it is therefore the appropriate punish-
ment for only the most serious offenses or those offenders who have repeatedly committed of-
fenses.  To view segregation as the preferred punishment for all or even a majority of serious disci-
plinary offenses, and see any lesser outcome such as suspended sentences or fines as a failure of 
                                                     
194  Quebec had the highest number of charges in the five regions, but even in Quebec the 3848 serious charges at 
Donnacona represents over ¾ of the total charges for the whole of Quebec.  
195  UCCO submission  p. 22 
196  CCRA Regulations s.34 
197  Martineau v Matsqui Institution [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602 
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the system, as UCCO apparently does, represents a serious misunderstanding and misinterpreta-
tion of correctional law and policy.  
Not only does UCCO’s argument misinterpret correctional law and policy but it would also amount 
to an administrative and resource nightmare. In most maximum and medium security institutions 
the disciplinary court for serious charges sits either once a week or every other week. If every one 
of the 3648 offence report that was designated serious at Donnacona in the first 9 1/2 months of 
2006 had been heard in disciplinary court it would make for a weekly court docket of 91 cases. The 
Panel also cites uncritically UCCO’s complaints about the timeliness of disciplinary hearings:  
 “Section 36 of Commissioner’s Directive 580 stipulates that the initial hearing of major and minor 
charges of a disciplinary offence shall normally take place within two weeks after the charge is laid. 
However, the statistics reveal that only 20.5% of the hearings are held within these time limits.”   
The correctional reality underlying this statistic requires much more elaboration than this simplistic 
recitation. As other research has demonstrated, given the procedural protections that are built into 
the disciplinary regime to ensure a fair hearing, it is virtually impossible to have a hearing within 
two weeks unless the prisoner is prepared to plead guilty at their first appearance.198  If a plea of 
not guilty is entered, a hearing date has to be scheduled to ensure that any correctional officers 
who are required to attend as witnesses are available. In many cases the hearing date is set to a 
date that fits with the officers’ schedules, in order to avoid unnecessary overtime.  In other cases, 
adjournments are granted to enable the prisoner to exercise his legal right to consult with counsel 
and in some cases be represented at the hearing by counsel.  Such adjournments are essential for 
the conduct of a fair hearing and ensure compliance with the common law duty to act fairly and 
section 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.  In all such cases where the expectation of the CD - 
that hearings normally take place within two weeks after the charge is laid - conflicts with the legal 
requirements for a fair hearing, those requirements rightfully take precedence.  
The Panel also uncritically cites this statement from UCCO’s brief:  
“The union also noted that many rejected offence reports are not passed on to the offender’s future 
parole officers and thus are not considered during National Parole Board hearings.” 
UCCO’s statement seems to reject the application of the principle of presumed innocence. Even 
when a charge fails and the offence report is rejected UCCO suggests that the Parole Board, which 
wields the greatest power over the liberty of prisoners, should be routinely and negatively influ-
enced by unsubstantiated accusations. Does UCCO really assume that the facts and allegations in 
every offense report written by one of its members are so reliable and unchallengeable that its 
contents should be considered by the National Parole Board?  Does this include offense reports 
where an offender has been found not guilty by the independent chairperson? In independent re-
search of the discipline process over many years and at different institutions, it has been shown 
that the allegations in correctional officers’ offense reports, no more than what is alleged in police 
officers’ reports, cannot be taken as demonstrating the presumptive guilt of an offender.  If an of-
fender has been found not guilty by an independent chairperson of allegations contained in a cor-
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rectional officer’s offense report, on what fair correctional basis does UCCO or the Panel suggest 
the National Parole Board should consider those same allegations in assessing that offender’s risk 
to the community?199 
The Panel makes only one recommendation relating to the disciplinary process: 
The Panel recommends that current disciplinary sanctions be reviewed and become more aligned 
with the severity of assaults and threatening behaviour, including the verbal abuse of correctional 
staff.200 
The sole source of this recommendation is the voiced concerns of UCCO members. Yet there was 
available to the Panel a body of independent scholarly research of the disciplinary process in Cana-
dian penitentiaries that extends over the last 30 years.201 This research traces the evolution from 
the old warden's court regime of the 1970s through to the introduction in the 1980s of independ-
ent chairpersons to adjudicate serious offenses. Using a methodology based upon observation of 
actual cases, interviews with correctional staff, correctional managers, independent chairpersons 
and prisoners, this provides a balanced and measured assessment of the strengths and weaknesses 
of the process and a series of recommendations to improve the process to make it both fairer and 
more efficient.202  This research is readily available both in hard copy and online and indeed there 
is a link to the research on CSC's own website.  That the Panel either did not discover this research 
or chose to disregard it severely compromises the validity of its one recommendation in terms of a 
comprehensive roadmap to reform.  
On the merits of the Panel’s specific recommendation the scholarly research provides no evidence 
that independent chairpersons do not already “align sanctions with the severity of assaults and 
threatening behaviour” in accordance with the CCRA regulations that requires sanctions to reflect 
“the seriousness of the offence and the degree of responsibility the inmate bears for its commis-
sion”.203 But as the Regulations also require, other considerations come into play, including “all 
relevant aggravating and mitigating circumstances, including the inmate's behaviour in the peniten-
tiary,”204  and “the nature and duration of any other sanction described in section 44 of the Act 
that has been imposed on the inmate, to ensure that the combination of the sanctions is not exces-
sive”.205  
While UCCO is perfectly entitled to make their case and to have it considered, we think the Panel 
had an obligation to test the claims made by UCCO before reaching any conclusions or making any 
recommendations. The admission that they were “not able to confirm the accuracy of the Union’s 
allegations with CSC management” demands further explanation. Was CSC management unable to 
confirm the accuracy because its own data contradicted the UCCO claims or are we to understand 
that management was unable to provide any data on disciplinary hearings – at Donnacona or else-
                                                     
199  See Justice Behind the Walls, p. 203-211 
200  Roadmap, p. 60 
201  Justice Behind the Walls p. 187- 283 online at  http://justicebehindthewalls.net/book.asp?cid=101&pid=422  
202  Reform  proposals for addressing staff concerns are dealt with at p. 268-275. 
203  CCRA Regs s.34(a) 
204  s.34(c) 
205  s.34(e)  
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where? This would seem highly unlikely given the ease with which we were able to obtain such 
data from the Pacific regional headquarters. Was CSC unable to comment on the degree to which 
Donnacona is “representative” of other prisons across Canada? Again this is difficult to fathom 
given our analysis, which based on CSC’s own data, easily demonstrates how unrepresentive it is. 
If CSC had not conducted any reviews or assessments of the disciplinary process then the Panel 
might have rightfully been very critical of CSC’s record keeping - but no such claim was made. In 
fact CSC has conducted periodic evaluations of the disciplinary process and had available to it the 
carefully researched work of independent reviewers.  
It is a disturbing reflection of the Panel’s limited and myopic understanding of existing correctional 
law and policy, and the goal of achieving the necessary balance involved in contributing “to public 
safety and an orderly and safe correctional environment through a fair and transparent disciplinary 
process,” that its commentary and recommendation would jeopardize that balance. 
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8 Earned Parole 
The Panel proposes that Statutory Release and Accelerated Day Parole be abolished and replaced 
with a system they call “earned parole” where an offender’s release prior to the warrant expiry 
date (WED) would only be possible through a parole decision by the National Parole Board.206 In 
the following section we will consider the historical record and the research evidence relevant to 
the Panel’s recommendations and discuss why we think they are ill-conceived and inimical to public 
safety.     
 
We have identified what appears to be several crucial assumptions on which the Panel has based 
its recommendations: 
 the abolition of statutory release would encourage individuals to pursue their correctional 
plan to avoid extending their time in prison, 
 having pursued their correctional plan more vigorously,  the National Parole Board will be 
willing to release these individuals on parole, 
 the increase in newly motivated prisoners “earning’ their parole will compensate for  the 
abolition of statutory release  and  
 the paramount consideration of public safety would be achieved better in a situation where 
the remaining “unmotivated” offenders were in jail longer and spent less, if any, time under 
gradual release in community-based supervision. 
If any of these assumptions are incorrect, the changes that the Panel proposes will be costly finan-
cially while undermining, not advancing, public safety. It is a far-reaching change that the Panel 
proposes to the reintegration process and we would therefore expect that it would be based on 
careful analysis of the nature and purpose of statutory release and accelerated parole review and 
the record of their success in relation to those purposes. We should also expect that the recom-
mendations would be based on documented experience and research that identifies inadequacies 
with the existing system that would make the abolition of such reintegration programs necessary. 
As we will show, the Panel here as elsewhere in their report, is oblivious to the history and disre-
gards the available research generated by CSC’s own Research Branch. In fact, little is offered to 
justify this radical change other than the opinion of the Panel supported by a few carefully selected 
and spun statistics.  
Our analysis raises serious doubts about the assumptions on which the Panel’s recommendations 
are based and demonstrate the potential for a sharp increase in the period of incarceration for 
most offenders while reducing post release supervision and support. We argue that an objective 
review demonstrates that the radical change proposed by the Panel is neither necessary nor likely 
to contribute to greater public safety. 
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8.1 The Promise and Purpose of Statutory Release  
The Panel provides virtually no historical context to explain the purpose of statutory release or why 
it was included in our federal correctional law. In our view it is essential to understand this context 
to determine whether those purposes are still valid and to assess the degree to which they have 
been met. We will then turn our minds to the implications of the Panel’s recommendations for the 
federal prison population. 
Beginning in 1868 a system of remission was introduced into federal corrections through which 
prisoners could shorten their time in custody as a reward for good behaviour. Prisoners could ob-
tain early release by up to one-third of a determinate sentence. (Those serving life or indetermi-
nate sentences did not earn remission.) Once the prisoner reached his remission date he was re-
leased without condition. The practice of earning remission continues to this day in all provincial 
prisons where prisoners serve sentences of less than two years.   
The Canadian parole system has its roots in reforms introduced at the very end of the nineteenth 
century.207 Initially and appropriately called “ticket-of-leave”, this form of release was subject to 
the discretion of officials in the Department of Justice.208  This evolved into our modern concept of 
parole with the passage of the Parole Act in 1958 that transferred authority for release to the 
newly created National Parole Board and for the first time set out in legislative form the criteria for 
release. Later the Parole Act was integrated into Part II of the CCRA in 1992. The modern concept of 
an independent paroling authority therefore has been with us for the last 50 years. 
In 1969 the Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections reviewed Canada’s experience after 
the first decade of the Parole Act.209 The Committee noted that while the lowest risk offenders 
were being released through parole under community based supervision, those who had not been 
granted parole were being released directly to the street with neither supervision nor assistance. In 
other words, those for whom the transition to the community was likely to be the most difficult 
were being ignored and left to their own devices. 
In considering the purpose and value of parole, the Committee recognized that any form of gradual 
release implied some risk: 
“... there are risks in any form of treatment of the offender. The short-term risks of parole are calcu-
lated risks and in the opinion of the Committee are less than the risks in the alternative of sudden 
and dramatic contrast between incarceration and total freedom” 210 
                                                     
207  An excellent history of the Canadian parole system can be found on the National Parole Board’s site at 
http://www.npb-cnlc.gc.ca/about/part1_e.htm      
208  The  1899 Act to Provide for the Conditional Liberation of Convicts- the Ticket of Leave Act   provided: It shall be 
lawful for the Governor General by an order in writing under the hand and seal of the Secretary of State to grant to 
any convict under sentence of imprisonment in a penitentiary a license to be at large in Canada, or in such part 
thereof as in such license shall be mentioned, during such portion of his term of imprisonment, and upon such 
conditions in all respects as to the Governor General may seem fit; and the Governor General may from time to 
time revoke or alter such license by a like order in writing.  
209  Ouimet,R (Chairman) 1969)  Report of the Canadian Committee on Corrections-Towards Unity: Criminal Justice and 
Corrections.       
210  Ouimet, p.331 
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They went on to elaborate: 
“One cannot learn to live in freedom without experiencing freedom and even the most open institu-
tion provides a restricted, protective environment.  The offender who is to succeed in becoming a 
law-abiding and, hopefully, contributing citizen, must do so in the outside community.  It is here that 
he has previously failed, and he returns to the community usually feeling more isolated from what-
ever possible personal and social relationships he previously had when he went into prison.” 
The Ouimet Committee took pains to note that while ticket-of-leave was originally developed as a 
form of clemency, this was no longer the case.  The Committee had little difficulty recognizing the 
ability of parole to achieve public safety through successful reintegration of offenders into the 
community. The apparent success of parole only served to raise the question as to whether gradual 
supervised release would also reduce the rate of re-offending by those who had not been selected 
for parole. 
“increasingly, however, it has been pointed out that the practice of paroling only the better risks 
means that those inmates who are potentially the most dangerous to society are still, as a rule, being 
released directly into full freedom in the community without the intermediate step represented by 
parole.” 211 
To address this shortcoming the Committee proposed that a system be developed “under which 
almost everyone would be released under some form of supervision.” Recognizing that “there will 
be many who will not qualify for parole” they proposed “making the period of statutory remission a 
period of supervision in the community subject to the same procedures that apply to parole.”212 By 
recommending that community supervision occur during the remitted portion of the sentence, the 
Committee ensured that the community supervision period would be added, not subtracted, to the 
time that would otherwise be served in prison. The Committee’s recommendations were imple-
mented in 1970 through amendments to the Parole Act. 
It is important to understand the consequences for corrections of the introduction of what from 
1970 until 1992 was called “mandatory supervision”.213 Prior to 1970 a prisoner who was not 
granted parole and who had not lost remission through bad behaviour would be entitled to be re-
leased at the end of two-thirds of their sentence. At that point the prisoner became a free person, 
subject to no further restraint by the state. As a result of the implementation of the recommenda-
tions of the Ouimet Committee in 1970, those prisoners not granted parole remained entitled to be 
released at the two thirds point in their sentence, but instead of being free they were now subject 
to mandatory supervision by a parole officer- in effect a compulsory form of parole. During this pe-
riod of supervision they could be returned to prison to serve the rest of their sentence for breach 
of the conditions of their supervision even though they committed no new crime. Quite clearly the 
changes in 1970 amounted to a substantial tightening of the correctional screws. The period of 
time under sentence was increased by fifty percent214 through the addition of the period under 
                                                     
211  Ouimet, (1969) p.348 
212  Ouimet, (1969) p.350 
213  After 1992 mandatory supervision was renamed by the CCRA to “statutory release”. 
214  While statutory release is calculated as being one-third of the sentence, the impact on prisoners of being required 
to serve that portion of the sentence either in prison or under community supervision means that total time 
served before the person was free and clear had  increased by fifty percent. 
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mandatory supervision. This change was justified by the correctional theory that it would help 
those who were considered too high risk for parole to safely reintegrate into the community.  
The introduction of mandatory supervision was controversial from its inception as it meant that 
time spent under sentence was being significantly increased. Given that those subject to  manda-
tory supervision were considered those most likely to reoffend, the potential impact on incarcera-
tion levels was substantial, particularly when one considers the power of the National Parole Board 
to revoke the community supervision and return the offender to prison at any time for “technical” 
breaches of the conditions of release such as, drinking alcohol, returning late to a halfway house, 
traveling beyond a designated radius or anything parole authorities think might reflect an adverse 
change in risk such as a deteriorating attitude. Obviously, mandatory supervision was not popular 
with prisoners. Equally obvious, popularity with prisoners was not an important consideration of 
the Ouimet Committee. Mandatory supervision was introduced because it was considered the 
most effective form of re-integration while avoiding any short term risk associated with “early re-
lease” from prison. 
One of the other reasons why the Ouimet Committee made their recommendation was in recogni-
tion of the fact that “only 60%” of prisoners were applying for parole.  The Committee believed 
that the rate of parole application was so low because for some prisoners release with complete 
freedom after two-thirds of the sentence was more attractive. To be released on parole meant that 
prisoners, while often saving only a few months of incarceration if granted parole, had to remain 
under supervision until the completion of their full sentence, including their remission period.  Fur-
thermore, until 1977 if returned to prison on a revocation they received no credit for time served 
while on parole and would have to serve the entire period already served on parole in prison - a 
form of doing double time. In order to maximize the potential benefits of parole, the Ouimet 
Committee wanted to encourage more people to apply, and failing this result, subject prisoners 
who still did not apply or who were rejected as bad risks to mandatory supervision.  
Over the following years after its implementation, mandatory supervision – renamed “statutory 
release” - became associated with early release rather than extended supervision in the minds of 
the public and many politicians. It became increasingly difficult for either to reconcile the concept 
of early release with high risk. In an attempt to address fears associated with the release on statu-
tory release of very high-risk prisoners, changes to the legislation were enacted in 1987 that gave 
authority to the National Parole Board to refuse release on statutory release of particularly high 
risk prisoners. With these changes CSC began reviewing every offender prior to their statutory re-
lease date and makes recommendations to the National Parole Board regarding release of deten-
tion during the statutory release period.  The Board can impose a residency requirement at a half-
way house as a condition of the release, and where it believes the offender is likely, before warrant 
expiry, to commit an offence involving death or serious harm, a sexual offence involving a child or a 
serious drug offence, may detain the offender in prison until warrant expiry. 
In 1992 The CCRA was amended to abolish the concept of earned remission largely because it had 
become a nightmare to administer and because the failure to earn remission would conflict with 
the goal of ensuring that all but the highest risk prisoners would be released through community 
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supervision. Henceforth most prisoners who had not previously been paroled became entitled to 
release on “statutory release” at the two third point in their sentence. 
In surely what is the ultimate case of correctional irony, the Panel, 40 years after the Ouimet report 
was tabled, recommends the abolition of statutory release citing “public safety” as the reason: the 
very rationale used by Ouimet to recommend it in the first place and relied upon ever since by CSC 
and successive governments to justify its continuance. The Panel does so in apparent ignorance of 
the history of statutory release and the reasons for its implementation. The Panel’s lack of histori-
cal context for its recommendation is a major public policy shortfall.  Had the Panel reviewed that 
history and the underlying justification for the introduction of statutory release it might have rec-
ognized that abolition would conflict with its own observation “that public safety is best served 
through a period of supervised and supported release for offenders prior to the end of the sen-
tence”.215 
8.2   Discrediting Statutory Release 
The Panel views statutory release as being an unsuccessful program. That conclusion appears to be 
driven primarily by the following recitation of a few statistics. 
 “Of all statutory release supervision periods in 2005–06, 6 in 10 were completed without revocation; 
however, statutory release cases accounted for 79% of violent reoffending in the community, while 
representing 35% of the conditionally released population. 216 
By using the phrase “79% of violent reoffending in the community”, the Panel magnifies the pub-
lic’s already exaggerated perception of violent reoffending by those under federal community su-
pervision. Adding to the alarm, the Panel goes on to state: 
“The Panel is concerned about the statistics on statutory releases: approximately 40% of statutory 
releases are revoked, 30% for breach of conditions and 10% for new offences, and violent reoffend-
ing rates are three times higher for statutory releases than for discretionary releases. The risk posed 
by these offenders and the potential for even greater risk as a result of the changing profile of the 
federal population points to the need for change.”217 
After using the actual rates of success for every other category the Panel suddenly switched to the 
relative rates when describing the rates of violent offences. The relative difference in the rate of 
violence is expressed as “three times higher” for statutory release then parole. The following chart 
(Revocations with Violent Offence Rates for Federal Conditional Release218) showing comparable 
rates of offending as provided by the National Parole Board. 
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Over the five years of data shown in the chart, the average rate of violent offending by those on 
parole is 1.16% while the average for statutory release is 2.5% - a difference of only 1.34%. To gen-
erate the alarming relative rate of 300% only the data in the last year was used. By using this form 
of statistical comparison the Panel was able to turn a small difference in violent offending of 1.7% 
into an alarming statistic of 300%.  
For another perspective on the risks of violent offences committed in the community by those on 
statutory release, consideration should be given to the overall contribution of this group to violent 
crime in Canada. In 2006-07 117219  violent offences (all types and severity) committed by statutory 
release cases constituted 0.035 % of the 306,559 (35 per 100,000) violent crimes reported by Sta-
tistics Canada for that year.220 No violent crime is acceptable, but before we abolish statutory re-
lease as an unsafe program it must be understood that only a tiny fraction of violent crime would 
be addressed.  Further, given that release at warrant expiry would follow anyway in less than 7 
months on average, the likelihood that the offences would only be delayed slightly would mean no 
noticeable or real difference in the violent crime we experience in the community. 
As the following table shows, in 2006-07, 58.1% of those on statutory release completed their su-
pervision period successfully, while 30.7% who failed to live by the rules were returned to prison 
for “technical” violations and 9 % were returned with a non-violent crime. That leaves 2.2% who 
returned for committing a violent crime. In fact, the overall rates of both violent and non-violent 
reoffending by those on statutory release have been dropping steadily from an already low rate for 
many years.  
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The Panel presents data in such a way as to build a case for their proposition that a violent failure 
rate of just 2.2% amongst those identified as being both the highest need and highest risk offend-
ers is a failed program that should be abolished.  However the most concerning omission in the 
Panel’s analysis is that they make no attempt to address the single factor that would justify the 
abolition of statutory release: whether the same people, if released free and clear at the end of 
their sentence would, during a similar period, commit violent offences at a rate lower than the 
2.2% rate of statutory release cases. Without this information the Panel is unable to provide any 
valid evidence that abolishing gradual supervised release for these higher-risk prisoners is not a 
reasonable balancing of risk against the competing risk of direct unsupervised release to the com-
munity. 
The fact that the statutory release cases do relatively worse than the parole group is hardly a reve-
lation. As noted already, this outcome was predicted by the Ouimet Committee in recognition of 
the fact that statutory release was intended to be used for those who had been refused or did not 
apply for parole.  
The Panel provides a graph and relative rates that shows that “offenders that completed their sen-
tence of statutory release are between 2 and 2 ½ times more likely to be re-admitted on a federal 
sentence than offenders that complete their sentences on full parole.”221 The fact that those re-
leased on statutory release tend to have higher rates of offending after their period of community 
supervision does not make the case for its abolition as implied by the Panel. If anything, the data 
shows that supervision actually suppresses offending during the period under supervision. Consid-
ering that statutory release periods last on average 6.6 months compared with 25.3 months for pa-
role222, one could just as easily make the case that the substantially higher rate of offending of 
statutory release cases after supervision ends is, in part, because the period of supervised reinte-
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gration is substantially shorter than with parole. This difference suggests that if we are considering 
modifying statutory release we should be thinking of longer periods of community supervision be-
fore warrant expiry - not its elimination. We have no way of knowing whether the reoffending rates 
for parole cases after expiry of the sentence would be greater if the period of supervision was lim-
ited to 6.6 months, but the prospect of greater rates of offending is quite plausible. 
Surely the true test of statutory release is not whether those released by this method commit more 
crimes than those released on parole, but whether they commit more crimes than would be the 
case if they had been released directly to the street with no access to community programming de-
signed to meet their needs nor direction and support that is part of the supervision process. The 
Panel makes no effort to address that question. Instead the Panel strung together and presented 
largely irrelevant statistics to bolster their case while ignoring years of work by the Research Branch 
of the Correctional Service of Canada on effective reintegration. The most recent summary of that 
research stated boldly:  
“Of all the factors that influence public safety, the Correctional Service of Canada, in collaboration 
with the National Parole Board, can only influence the safe release of offenders into the community.  
There is solid evidence to support the premise that the gradual and structured release of offenders 
is the safest strategy for the protection of society against new offences by released offenders.  
For example, recidivism studies have found that the percentage of safe returns to the community is 
higher for supervised offenders than for those released with no supervision.”223 [Emphasis in original 
text] 
It is difficult not to conclude that the case presented by the Panel for the abolition of statutory re-
lease was a superficial justification of the position already taken by the government rather than an 
objective review of the facts.  
8.3 Parole as an Alternative to Statutory Release  
The Panel confidently asserts that even with the abolition of statutory release, the goal of commu-
nity reintegration and public safety will be furthered through the implementation of the Panel’s 
other recommendations. Prisoners who currently leave prison on statutory release, would, in fu-
ture, become motivated and able to gain their release under the reformed “earned parole” model 
advanced by the Panel. The National Parole Board’s grant rate would increase obviating the need 
for statutory release. It is our judgment that such confidence is not only misplaced, but based upon 
any objective analysis, demonstrably misconceived.  
Consider the description offered by the Panel of those presently being released on statutory re-
lease and who are, therefore, the particular targets for the new earned parole regime. The Panel 
acknowledges that the statutory release group includes many people with systemic disadvantages: 
“According to CSC, the average profile of an offender who reoffends while on statutory release is an 
Aboriginal male under 35 years of age, with low educational attainment (no high school diploma), 
unemployed at arrest, with gang affiliation, serving a sentence of less than three years usually for 
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robbery. In addition, the typical offender tends to have a history of substance abuse, a previous 
criminal history, a previous negative correctional history (escape, segregation, revocation of parole), 
low program completion rates and higher levels of imposed residency conditions at release.”224   
The Panel “believes” that should statutory release be abolished many individuals who are either 
denied or who do not apply for parole would approach their correctional plan with new-found en-
thusiasm. In fact, the circumstances of the offense, the inability to produce coherent release plans, 
addictions and mental illness, learning disabilities, illiteracy and many other disadvantages weigh 
heavily against a successful parole application. These are not factors that most prisoners can easily 
compensate for or change. Other prisoners will have already failed on parole and regardless of the 
effort they put into their correctional plan, have no reasonable chance of being released on parole 
again. Additionally, it needs to be recognized that family and community support, crucial factors for 
success, are not available for many prisoners and cannot be addressed through a correctional plan.   
The continuous focus of the Panel on “motivation” as a primary factor that determines release on 
parole overlooks the enormous barriers to parole faced by so many prisoners and ignores or mini-
mizes what would be required to overcome them.  Clearly, it is difficult to be “motivated” to ad-
dress factors that are perceived to be beyond a person’s capacity to control.  No incentive or pun-
ishment can address this perception. The suggestion that large numbers of those currently being 
released on statutory release might be released under parole if they tried harder is simplistic and 
insensitive to the onerous systemic barriers and personal  disadvantages so many of these people 
face.  
Consider further that the Panel in recommending the abolition of statutory release makes a series 
of recommendations that would make it more difficult to “earn” parole. Currently, the CCRA sets 
out the criteria for release on parole as follows:  
102. The Board or a provincial parole board may grant parole to an offender if, in its opinion,  
(a) the offender will not, by reoffending, present an undue risk to society before the expiration 
according to law of the sentence the offender is serving; and 
(b) the release of the offender will contribute to the protection of society by facilitating the rein-
tegration of the offender into society as a law-abiding citizen.225.   
                                                     
224  Roadmap, p. 109 
225  CCRA Part II s.102 Criteria for granting parole. Section 101 sets out the  principles for parole decision-making as 
follows:  
101. The principles that shall guide the Board and the provincial parole boards in achieving the purpose of condi-
tional release are  
(a) that the protection of society be the paramount consideration in the determination of any case; 
(b) that parole boards take into consideration all available information that is relevant to a case, including the 
stated reasons and recommendations of the sentencing judge, any other information from the trial or the sen-
tencing hearing, information and assessments provided by correctional authorities, and information obtained 
from victims and the offender; 
(c) that parole boards enhance their effectiveness and openness through the timely exchange of relevant informa-
tion with other components of the criminal justice system and through communication of their policies and 
programs to offenders, victims and the general public; 
(d) that parole boards make the least restrictive determination consistent with the protection of society; 
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The first criterium relates to the risk of harm should the person reoffend. The clause does not talk 
about the risk “of” reoffending but rather the risk “by” reoffending. In this way the Board must 
consider both the risk that an offence might occur and the seriousness of any such offence.  
We should ask why it is that the first criterium does not set a zero tolerance policy for offending. 
The answer is given in the second criterium where it says that the Board must conclude that re-
lease under supervision will contribute to the protection of society by facilitating reintegration. The 
operative words here are “contribute” and “facilitate” – neither of which implies certainty. In short, 
the question that must be answered by the Parole Board in each case it hears is not just whether 
an offence might occur but whether it is less likely to occur while under supervision than on full re-
lease. It is the task of the Board to choose the least risky strategy because the “no-risk strategy” 
does not exist. 
There is nothing in the legislative criteria that suggest that applicants must do something to “earn” 
release. Parole is not intended as a reward for compliance with institutional rules, participation in 
treatment, or positive attitude although the Board should and does consider all of these factors 
relevant to assessing risk. In the end, however, consistent with the human rights principle of least 
restrictive measure, the  statutory mandate  of the Parole Board is to assess only the relative risk to  
public safety should the applicant be released under supervision now or released at a later date 
without supervision.  
Adding criteria that are intended to meet other purposes, such as prison management or to reward 
“good” behaviour, introduces objectives that are not related to public safety. Indeed, if parole is 
denied even though it is assessed as the best way to “facilitate” reintegration, public safety is actu-
ally reduced. The legislative rationale for parole is the long-term safety of the community, not to 
advance any particular agenda of the correctional system. It is, therefore, quite concerning that the 
Panel would make recommendations for parole granting that appear to introduce a whole addi-
tional  set of criteria related to “earning” parole that are not necessarily related to risk that would 
not only make obtaining parole even more difficult but raise serious issues of implementation. Two 
of these additional problematic elements of earned parole relate to adherence to the correctional 
plan and the prospect of community employment.  
The Panel recommends that: 
 additional criteria for granting parole would reflect the requirement for the offender to earn re-
lease through adherence to the correctional plan.226 
Offenders must fully understand the consequences of not meeting correctional plan require-
ments with respect to access to penitentiary privileges and conditional release, and the conse-
quences of reoffending while in the community on conditional release.227 [Emphasis added] 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
(e) that parole boards adopt and be guided by appropriate policies and that their members be provided with the 
training necessary to implement those policies; and 
(f) that offenders be provided with relevant information, reasons for decisions and access to the review of deci-
sions in order to ensure a fair and understandable conditional release process. 
226  Roadmap, p. 116 
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Case management strategies would include intensive and ongoing risk assessment and predic-
tion; the development of a comprehensive correctional plan that sets out a blueprint for the of-
fender to move to gradual release to the community with a job or the strong likelihood of a 
job placement; clear statements of the offender’s responsibilities and accountabilities for follow-
ing that blueprint to earn parole; engagement of offenders in the parole process as early as 
possible and on a continuing basis; and preparation of offenders for release through more com-
prehensive community release planning.228 [Emphasis added] 
 These additional elements of earned parole raise serious issues of implementation and accoun-
tability that undermine the Panel’s confidence that earned parole is an effective substitute for 
statutory release.  
8.4 Employment as a Condition for Conditional Release  
Throughout the section on earned parole, the Panel refers frequently to the necessity of employ-
ment after release suggesting that the likelihood of immediate employment would become a much 
more important criterion than it is now for release on parole.   
“… parole eligibility would be considered after assessing risk, assessing progress in addressing crimi-
nogenic, behavioural and skills deficits described in the offender’s comprehensive correctional plan, 
and assessing the community reintegration requirements, including employment options when re-
leased as outlined in the community release plan; 
“… any release plan submitted to the NPB should include CSC’s consideration of either the placement 
of the offender directly into a job or with a high likelihood of a job placement229 
 “The two key components of conditional release, day parole and full parole, must be reviewed to en-
sure they are aligned with the earned parole and community employment approaches and are fully 
supported by a community infrastructure that offers supervision, programming interventions, and 
service delivery. This will mean closer liaison with police services, provinces and municipalities, new 
and innovative supervision strategies, and comprehensive release planning that continues the em-
ployment training and job-readiness programs started in the penitentiary. ”230 
While everyone would agree that employment after release is often important, the proposal to 
make employment an important factor for granting parole could have serious and unintended con-
sequences. It is very difficult to arrange employment for prisoners or for prisoners to find their own 
employment while incarcerated. Even amongst those few employers who might consider employ-
ing a person straight out of prison, even fewer would be willing to promise a job without the op-
portunity to interview the individual, being able to assess his qualifications or character and not 
knowing when or if the person would become available. While having a job is an important advan-
tage, requiring that a person have a job “or strong likelihood of a job placement” would be an in-
surmountable barrier to parole for the great majority. No feasible prison training or placement ser-
vice would ever be able to meet the requirement for locating employment for more than a tiny 
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fraction of prisoners. Indeed the approach of the Panel to employment and employability is fraught 
with so many issues we have dedicated a chapter to this topic alone. 
8.5 The Promise and Implications of an “Accountability Contract” 
The Panel not only proposes that additional criteria be added for release under parole, they also 
propose what they call an “accountability contract”. 
The Panel suggests that the comprehensive release plan be developed as an accountability contract 
between the offender and CSC with clearly defined expectations associated with well-developed 
milestones for the duration of the conditional release period.231 
At first this contract idea appears to relate only to expectations of individuals while under commu-
nity supervision. If  by “contract” the Panel means that those on release should have an explicit un-
derstanding of the expectations of them to remain on parole, then this is neither new nor prob-
lematic. However, taken in the context of the other statements and recommendations, the pro-
posal is neither clear in its application nor are the implications adequately considered. 
What is troubling about this concept is that the “contract” appears to have applicability to far more 
than simply “clear statements of offender accountability with respect to expected behaviour in the 
community.”232 Indeed, the contract appears to apply throughout the entire sentence and be based 
largely on the correctional plan - a plan developed not by the Parole Board in the context of the 
legal criteria of the CCRA, but by institutional staff at the very beginning of the sentence.  
Consider, for instance, the following statements: 
The Panel believes that particular emphasis will have to be given to the following key transition fac-
tors to ensure a comprehensive release plan is put in place, ensuring the seamless blending of the 
offender’s institutional and community correctional plans: *Emphasis added+… 
b) focus on the need for the extension  of correctional interventions that link penitentiary program 
results with the identification of behavioural, educational and employment programs in the commu-
nity;233 
The implications of viewing parole as a contractual obligation which extends to decisions of the Na-
tional Parole Board based on the successful completion of the correctional plan is inconsistent with 
the legislative criteria and principles for granting parole as set out in the CCRA. The Panel, with its 
proposed “accountability contract” fails to recognize that the National Parole Board is an inde-
pendent body completely distinct from the Correctional Service of Canada.  This is not an accident. 
Separation of release decisions from the operations of corrections helps to avoid the potential con-
flict of parole being used as a carrot by CSC for objectives that are unrelated to the criteria for re-
lease. 
As noted earlier, the criteria for parole as set out in the CCRA relate to the risk to society by reof-
fending and the potential contribution of parole for successful reintegration into society.234 Award-
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ing parole as a response to the completion of the correctional plan, while considered by the Parole 
Board as relevant to both risk assessment and reintegration potential, is not a sufficient or neces-
sary independent criterium that can either justify the grant or denial of parole.  
In the normal meaning of a “contract”, obligations flow in both directions. If one party meets the 
terms of the contract the other party is obligated to deliver on their reciprocal obligations. If com-
pletion of the correctional plan becomes an “accountability contract” that leads to a person “earn-
ing” parole, then clearly conflicts would develop with legislated principles that the Panel also ap-
pears to support. For instance, if a person was released on the basis of completion of the correc-
tional plan but was not otherwise an acceptable risk, the principle of public safety would be vio-
lated. On the other hand if a person is denied release because they failed to complete the plan but 
were otherwise considered an acceptable risk, the denial of release conflicts with the principle of 
using the “least restrictive measure”. The National Parole Board cannot be obligated to make deci-
sions on the basis of an “accountability contract” and certainly not one developed by a case man-
agement officer during the first few weeks of the sentence. 
Even if we ignore the serious problem of the “accountability contract” conflicting with the criteria 
of the CCRA,  it would put a substantial responsibility on CSC to provide the required programs with 
sufficient timeliness and quality to make it possible for prisoners to complete their obligations prior 
to their parole eligibility date. It would be both unfair and also a violation of CSC’s end of the con-
tract if an offender was ultimately detained in prison solely because the programs were not avail-
able. Yet as we have noted earlier the Panel refrained from recommending in its menu of legislative 
changes a provision that would obligate CSC to deliver programs in a timely manner, likely because 
CSC would be either unable or unwilling to meet that responsibility, given that they have been 
chronically unable to meet parole eligibility dates for most short term and many other prisoners. 
Clearly, the promise of a “contract” for parole in response to completion of the correctional plan is 
one that prisoners will immediately perceive as completely one-sided and empty rhetoric. They 
would understandably see it as a barrier to release rather than as an incentive. Hollow rhetoric 
about “contracts” and “earned” parole provide neither motivation nor reward and only contribute 
to prisoner cynicism that the proposals are intended to sound good to the public, who do not un-
derstand the implications, rather than be a means to help prisoners succeed.235  
In the final analysis, it is very difficult to reconcile the notion of a contract with either “the protec-
tion of society *as+ the paramount consideration in the determination of conditional release”236 or 
with the human rights principle of employing the least restrictive measure. Once again we see how 
human rights considerations, which limit the potential for the misuse of authority, and good cor-
rections are complimentary concepts that the ideology and recommendations and of the Panel se-
riously threaten.  
We are left in no doubt that the abolition of statutory release will have a huge impact on the fed-
eral prison population. The release mechanism that is used in two-thirds of all releases will be abol-
                                                     
235  Our concern about an accountability contract being the basis of granting parole applies equally, and for the same 
reasons, to decisions to suspend or revoke parole. 
236  Roadmap, p.118 Recommendation 61 
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ished,  leaving those so affected to serve 50% more time in prison than is the case now. The Panel’s 
minimises this impact by suggesting that their proposals for work and employment and the motiva-
tional effect of accountability contacts based on the correctional plan will result in a sharp increase 
in parole being granted and that will compensate for the restrictions on gradual release. This is lit-
tle more than “pie in the sky” corrections. To compensate for their statutory release recommenda-
tions every prisoner would need to be released on earned parole before the two-thirds point in 
their sentence. The Parole Board would need to have a grant rate of almost 100%. We challenge 
any experienced correctional or parole administrator/decision maker to seriously argue that is a 
realistic scenario.  
8.6 Implications for the Overrepresentation of Aboriginal Prisoners 
While we have addressed the issue of overrepresentation of Aboriginal people in federal prisons in 
chapter 10 of this response, one very disturbing consequence of the Panel’s proposal to abolish 
statutory release is the impact it will have on Aboriginal offenders. The overrepresentation of Abo-
riginal offenders in Canadian prisons has been condemned by the Supreme Court of Canada as a 
“national crisis” and “a staggering injustice”237. As the CSC Research Branch and the Correctional 
Investigator have documented, the grant rates at full parole for Aboriginal offenders fall below the 
rates for non-Aboriginal offenders, leading to Aboriginal offenders being released and supervised 
on statutory release at a significantly higher rate.238 The Panel’s proposed abolition of statutory re-
lease would see a greater representation of Aboriginal offenders serving their complete sentences 
in prison, further increasing their over representation in federal custody, and thereby deepening 
the national crisis and intensifying the injustice. Yet nowhere in its Roadmap does the Panel give 
this implication any consideration. In light of our analysis in Chapter 10 a strong case can be made 
that the aggravating impact of the abolition of statutory release on the systemic discrimination fac-
ing Aboriginal offenders should in and of itself be sufficient reason to reject the Panel’s proposal. 
8.7 The Unspecified Cost of Abolishing Statutory Release  
The Panel makes no effort to quantify the financial costs of its proposed abolition of statutory re-
lease. However, the Canadian Criminal Justice Association and the John Howard Society of Ontario 
reviewed the likely cost implications of abolition and provided the following calculation showing 
that the price for this change could approach one billion dollars239:  
1. In 2006-7, there were a total of 8,027 releases from federal institutions - 2,245 (28%) Day Parole, 
168 (2%) Full Parole, 5,250 (65%) Statutory Release, 264 (3%) Warrant Expiry and 100 (1%) “Other” 
(death, transfer to other countries, etc)  
2. The average length of supervision on statutory release was 6.6 months.  
3. Assuming the worst case scenario, that is all current SR cases will only be released upon Warrant 
Expiry, we would be looking at an average increase of 2888 incarcerated inmates at any point in time 
                                                     
237  R v Gladue [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 
238  See the Correctional Investigator’s 2005-6 Annual Report and backgrounder  at http://www.oci-
bec.gc.ca/newsroom/bk-AR0506_e.asp . see also http://justicebehindthewalls.net/news.asp?nid=74    
239  John Howard Society of Canada and Canadian Criminal Justice Association, unpublished, August 2008 . 
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(5,250 X 6.6 months/12 months). However, in an average year, about 40% are already revoked at 
some point during their statutory release. Assuming that on average, this happens after the half way 
point of their release period, some 20% would already be accounted for within the current cell occu-
pation and would not require new cell capacity, leaving a net requirement for 2310 additional cells 
(2888 less 20 %). 
4. It is not possible to predict how successful the new motivational, program, and educational ini-
tiatives may be at this time, so looking only at the worst case at this time for planning purposes, 
translates into dramatic cost increases for CSC. 
5. Assuming that cell space is currently at, or close to, capacity an additional 2,310 cells will have to 
be brought on stream. The average construction period for an institution is 5 years so there could be 
a massive increase in current cell occupation norms in the interim.  
6. An additional 2310 cells require 5 major institutions (using the UN standard of 500 per institu-
tion). Based upon the CSC estimates quoted in the Deloitte & Touche report of $400,000 per medium 
security cell all-in cost, this would require an expenditure of approximately $924 million.    
7. The 2004-05 cost of keeping an inmate in a penitentiary was $87,919. With this number, the an-
nual costs of maintaining an additional 2,310 inmates would be $203 million. With the average cost 
of community supervision at $20,320 per offender, abolishing statutory release would lead to a re-
duction of $47 million in the community, leaving the net cost to be approximately $156 million per 
year.  
8. We do not suggest that every offender currently released via SR would be detained until Warrant 
Expiry, however, for discussion purposes this does illustrate the potential, worst case costs.  A more 
conservative assumption would be that approximately one-third of this group would be granted pa-
role, given that the grant rate for Full Parole was 43% in 2006-07 and a significant portion of those 
released on SR were not granted parole.  Even under this scenario, there would be an additional 
1,525 inmates on average, requiring capital cost of $610 million and additional operating costs of 
$103 million. 
While costs should not outweigh community safety, proposing huge expenditures of this nature 
without any evidence of increased community safety is irresponsible public policy, especially in the 
context of the lost opportunities that spending in this way represents. With just a fraction of this 
amount we could better address the issues of mental illness in prison and the community and make 
real progress in reversing the many impediments to Aboriginal reintegration. 
8.8 Abolition of Accelerated Parole Review 
Non-violent first time penitentiary prisoners are eligible for release under what is called “acceler-
ated parole review”. Under the CCRA it is presumed that when certain eligibility criteria are met, 
the person will be granted parole unless the National Parole Board has reasons to believe that the 
person is likely to commit a violent offence before warrant expiry.  
Accelerated Parole Review is a way to address the problem, identified by the Panel and many oth-
ers including the Auditor General, where those serving short terms are effectively excluded from 
parole consideration because the time available before a parole hearing is not sufficient to com-
plete the correctional plan. By pre-screening prisoners on the basis of being first-time penitentiary 
inmates convicted of a non-violent offence, the application process is expedited by having the re-
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view take place without a hearing, and presuming release unless the National Parole Board has 
grounds, documented by CSC case managers, to override the presumption. 
Ironically, those who are least likely to be released on parole are those who are serving short fed-
eral sentences simply because there is insufficient time to be assessed, placed in an appropriate 
institution and complete the required programs prior to their parole eligibility date. The Panel’s 
proposal to abolish accelerated parole review removes the means that was developed specifically 
to address this problem.  The Panel’s expectation that people complete their “correctional plan” 
prior to being considered for earned parole only serves to ensure that those serving short sen-
tences will remain in prison longer simply because it is not possible to be assigned and complete 
the correctional plan in the time available.  
The Panel makes other recommendations that it thinks might speed up the initial assessment and 
programming of short-term offenders, but those proposals are neither new nor adequate to ad-
dress the problem. The inability of CSC to process prisoners and have them complete their correc-
tional plan before their parole eligibility date was the focus of Auditor General reports as far back 
as 1996240 and has already been the subject of considerable scrutiny and effort by CSC. The fact 
remains that the time available for those serving shorter sentences to complete their plan, espe-
cially with the additional components like work readiness proposed by the Panel, will be impossible 
to achieve. 
The Panel, in an apparent major contradiction acknowledges that it “will require a longer period of 
time for the preparation of the plan and should be the result of a collaborative approach between 
institutional and community parole officers.”241 Clearly these new expectations will undermine the 
prospect of parole for those serving short prison terms. 
The net result is that these non-violent offenders will serve their full sentence and be released 
without support of supervision into the community. There is no logic or evidence provided by the 
Panel to support its contention that the elimination of accelerated parole review does not address 
a real and substantial problem or that its loss could be compensated for in other ways.  
8.9 An Implied Alternative 
The Panel suggests that the abolition of statutory release could in some way be achieved without 
sacrificing the availability post-release supervision.  
There was common agreement that if statutory release was eliminated, conditional release options 
would have to continue to support the benefits of gradual release to the community. Particular con-
cern was expressed about the impact of releases directly from penitentiaries of offenders who had 
reached their warrant expiry dates, meaning they would not be under the supervision of CSC in the 
community.   
                                                     
240  Auditor General of Canada, Correctional Service of Canada – Reintegration of Offenders, Chapter 30,  November 
1996 
241  Roadmap p.107 
A Flawed Compass              Earned Parole 
117 
 
The Panel follows this declaration with a quote from one of the authors, Graham Stewart, which 
was presented as a reason to retain statutory release but used in the Roadmap to imply endorse-
ment of post-warrant supervision – a complete distortion of his position. 
The Panel goes on to conclude that: 
As a consequence, the Panel believes that a review is required of how community-based interven-
tions would be retooled to meet changing requirements for supervision and service delivery, while 
appropriate measures are taken to prepare the offender for the warrant expiry. 
We are left to wonder what “retooling” would mean in the context of forcing a person to submit to 
supervision and possibly imprisonment – after the sentence had completely expired. Further we 
are mystified as to why the Panel would presume to impose on free people a measure that it had 
just proposed abolishing on the basis that is was not effective.  
8.10 Conclusion 
 In 1969 the Ouimet Committee acknowledged that conditional release was no longer based on 
clemency. It was not something that was given on the basis of desert, but rather on the basis of 
risk. We introduced statutory release – not because prisoners deserve it but because the commu-
nity needs it to maximize the potential for successful reintegration without subsequent new of-
fenses.  
The CCRA stipulates that the grant of parole is determined, independently of CSC, by the National 
Parole Board on the basis of the risk the individual presents to the community – not on whether 
they think he deserves to be released because of completion of the correctional plan. Many people 
are low risk whether they complete their correctional plan or not. Conversely, others continue to 
be viewed as high risk even after completion of all aspects of their correctional plan. The principle 
of “least restrictive measures”, when considered in combination with the first principle of public 
safety, requires that the Board focus entirely on risk – not desert.  
Risk is not a one-sided calculation. The risk of release under supervision is balanced against the risk 
associated with release to the street without supervision or support. This balance cannot be ad-
dressed thoughtfully by relying on notions of “earned” parole. Misusing statistics to create exag-
gerated fears while ignoring the mass of contrary evidence mocks serious public policy develop-
ment. 
To abolish statutory release and accelerated parole review would have profound but unexplored 
implications for the terms and costs of imprisonment. The Panel’s recommended approach contra-
dicts the Panel’s own support for conditional release and undermines, rather than strengthens, 
public safety. 
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57. Imprisonment and other measures 
which result in cutting off an offender 
from the outside world are afflictive by 
the very fact of taking from the person 
the right of self-determination by de-
priving him of his liberty. Therefore the 
prison system shall not, except as inci-
dental to justifiable segregation or the 
maintenance of discipline, aggravate 
the suffering inherent in such a situa-
tion. 
 
58. The purpose and justification of a 
sentence of imprisonment or a similar 
measure deprivative of liberty is ulti-
mately to protect society against 
crime. This end can only be achieved if 
the period of imprisonment is used to 
ensure, so far as possible, that upon 
his return to society the offender is not 
only willing but able to lead a law-
abiding and self-supporting life.  
 
9 Education, Employment and Human Rights 
9.1 Introduction 
Before addressing the Panel’s proposals for prison work and education, it is worthwhile stating why 
we think these subjects have relevance to our human rights analysis of the Panel’s recommenda-
tions. After all, surely useful prison work and education programs are positive initiatives that re-
quire no further justification.  
If human rights are premised on respect for human dignity, the provision of opportunities for peo-
ple to advance their capacity to live constructively in 
free society is not only consistent with but essential to 
that respect. Respect for such needs is reflected in the 
United Nations Standards for the Treatment of prison-
ers (see inserts).242  
We may put a person in prison as punishment, but 
when we do so we also bring them into our care. Im-
prisonment by its nature makes people vulnerable. 
Prisoners have no substantial control over their most 
basic needs such as the quality or sufficiency of their 
shelter, food or medical care and there is little that they 
can do to protect themselves from the threat of harm from others. A prison system that ignores 
such fundamental needs is disrespectful of the human dignity of the individual and in doing so vio-
lates the person’s human rights.  
While basic needs relating to food, shelter and safety 
are necessary to survive, they are not sufficient for a 
meaningful life. Human beings cannot live for long in 
isolation even when their basic survival needs are met. 
Elsewhere in this paper we discuss the impact of segre-
gation on individuals and its ability to drive a person to 
death or insanity or both.  Segregation deprives prison-
ers of two necessities of life – social interaction and self 
actualization. Our humanity is only experienced in rela-
tion to others. Relationships define who we are and our 
place in this world. Without interaction with others, 
friendship, love, self esteem, respect and generosity 
                                                     
242  Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners  Adopted by the First United Nations Congress on the Pre-
vention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held at Geneva in 1955, and approved by the Economic and So-
cial Council by its resolution 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957 and 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 1977 at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_comp34.htm  
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60. (1) The regime of the institution 
should seek to minimize any differenc-
es between prison life and life at liber-
ty which tend to lessen the responsibil-
ity of the prisoners or the respect due 
to their dignity as human beings. 
59. To this end, the institution should 
utilize all the remedial, educational, 
moral, spiritual and other forces and 
forms of assistance which are appro-
priate and available, and should seek 
to apply them according to the indi-
vidual treatment needs of the prison-
ers.  
 
cannot be received or given.  
Self actualization relates to being able to grow and develop through learning, creating and produc-
ing. It involves opportunities to make choices about one’s future. Removing these opportunities is 
an assault to one’s humanity.  Having a person in our care means that we must take steps to ensure 
that their human needs are met beyond those that relate only to physical survival. 
If the punishment is intended only to limit one’s free-
dom – not to allow the person to starve or be killed, to 
go insane or lose their family ties, then prisons must 
ensure that the potential for these unintended conse-
quences are minimized. Hence the law provides that 
decisions affecting prisoners use the least restrictive 
means. The law also obligates prison officials to make 
available those aspects of social life that we consider 
necessary for human development.  
Education in the community is both free and mandatory for children up to age 16. Medical care is 
provided to all. Welfare meets basic needs for food and shelter and police services are intended to 
protect us all from harm. We consider those and other related services to be fundamental to a so-
ciety in which we can thrive. Providing such services to us all reflects our collective respect for our 
human dignity as individuals.  Those same standards of service must, logically, also apply in our 
care for prisoners. To do less degrades their humanity, their human dignity and their human rights. 
It also jeopardizes the successful reintegration of the individual into the community. 
Consistently applying community service standards to prisoners is both difficult and costly. The 
costs alone challenge us to use imprisonment only to the degree that is absolutely necessary. We 
try to achieve this minimal use of imprisonment through sentencing principles and through release 
mechanisms that allow people to complete their prison sentence in the community.  
Most would agree that prison work programs, education and gradual release are central to good 
corrections. However, the three initiatives do not operate in isolation: education improves the per-
son’s prospects for meaningful work and both education 
and work skills improve the person’s prospect for gradual 
release. Work and education are more than just pastimes 
intended to keep prisoners occupied. As such the quality 
and feasibility of the work and education programs is cru-
cial if prisons are to do more than simply detain. Recog-
nizing that work and education programs can vary sub-
stantially in quality and impact, we must consider the following questions when examining current 
and proposed approaches to work and education programs:  
o Do the work and education programs change for the better the person’s ability to reinte-
grate into society?  
o Do the programs improve the person’s prospects for being released on parole?  
o Are resources used to their greatest effect with these programs?  
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The importance of the relationship between work, education and successful reintegration are not 
lost on the Panel. They acknowledge that their proposals to abolish accelerated parole review and 
statutory release would have very substantial implications for expansion of prison populations 
unless the education and work outcomes are substantially enhanced from their current levels and 
prove to be effective both in terms of recidivism and in terms of the Parole Board being to release 
the person under community supervision. 
A sharp increase in the prison population threatens the correctional abilities of the entire system. 
When populations increase suddenly, overcrowding is the inevitable result as it takes years to build 
and prepare a new prison. Overcrowding is more than double bunking cells – problematic as this is, 
Overcrowding makes access to programs, counselling and visits more difficult. Staff and prisoners 
know each other less well and become more suspicious of the other. Simple solutions for brewing 
conflicts such as moving a prisoner from one range to another are unavailable. Prisoners are seen 
as more threatening and increased pressure is created to asses them as dangerous thereby requir-
ing higher levels of control and security. This apprehension, along with the inability to access pro-
grams, makes it more difficult for prisoners to obtain parole – thereby adding further to their frus-
tration and the population size. Overcrowding begets more overcrowding. In this context work and 
education become more difficult to provide as staff, space and prison movement become increas-
ingly restricted. The system can quickly grow out of control and will increasingly be forced to rely 
on static control measure to maintain security. Development programs intended to attain success-
ful integration into both the prison and community go by the wayside. 
Good and effective work and education programs are essential but will the programs proposed by 
the Panel be sufficient to compensate for the problems being created by their other proposals for 
statutory release and parole? If not, the conditions of prisons will degrade quickly, costs will rise 
sharply and those being released will be less likely to be successful - all at the expense of the com-
munity in both dollars and victimization and to the prisoner in lost years of freedom.  
Wasting lives through ineffective corrections is inhumane when other ways of achieving effective 
corrections are known. Policy that would presume to set a transformation agenda for corrections 
would be expected to draw on that knowledge through extensive reference to research and best 
practices. The human rights of prisoners cannot be respected if they are used as guinea pigs in an 
ideological experiment. Anything less than a plan well grounded in evidence risks a major step 
backwards in the care of those dependent on us for their  rehabilitation and an unacceptable dis-
service to  the public that rightfully expects that their safety will be enhanced through effective 
corrections. 
As we will document, the Panel would have CSC embark on a set of work related initiatives that are 
costly, unresearched and likely unrealizable. Yet the Panel not only would subordinate existing 
education  initiatives to its flawed work strategy but pays scant regard to  an education strategy 
that is cost effective,  reflects community standards, is realistic, well researched and consistent 
with the core values of human rights.   
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9.2  Employment and Employability 
The terms of reference for the Panel include the expectation that they would consider “The avail-
ability and effectiveness of work programs, including impact on recidivism;”243 Although only one 
of a number of areas identified in the Terms of Reference, work readiness, training and placement 
both in prison and the community clearly became a substantial focus and priority of the Roadmap. 
If implemented as described by the Panel, the recommendations relating to work, training and 
placement are likely to have enormous cost implications – rivalled only by the proposal to abolish 
statutory release. The recommendations also have very substantial implications for prison admini-
stration, program management, community supervision and decisions to grant parole. 
The history of corrections is filled with work or work-training initiatives that in their day were 
thought would reduce recidivism based on the common-sense idea that to be successful after re-
lease one needed a source of livelihood and a productive place in society. It is difficult to see how 
ex-prisoners can stay free of crime indefinitely without a way to sustain themselves and this view is 
reflected from the start of the report when the Panel states that “without the means to earn a liv-
ing upon release, an offender’s rehabilitation is jeopardized.” However, as the Panel notes ”em-
ployment has been eclipsed as a priority over the past decade by programs that address other core 
needs (e.g., substance abuse and violence).”244 
The Panel makes no attempt to trace the reasons for the drift from historically popular focus on 
employment skills to those relating to cognitive skills, mental health, addictions, anger manage-
ment, literacy, education and other programs developed over the last few decades. Are we to un-
derstand from the Panel that these changes were not made on the basis of evidence of better re-
sults? It would appear that the Panel is simply not familiar with the reasons for this very clear and 
deliberate shift– reflected repeatedly in the “what works” literature that CSC has embraced.245 Not 
only does the literature establish clear criteria for effective programming and the focus of that pro-
gramming, it cautions that misdirected initiates can actually make matters worse. 
Treatment interventions that do not adhere to any of the three principles (that is, they target the 
non-criminogenic needs of low risk offenders using non-cognitive-behavioural techniques) are actu-
ally criminogenic! This situation is particularly exacerbated when the treatment is given in residen-
tial/custodial settings (we presume because the offender cannot escape from the well-intentioned 
but poorly designed treatment).246 
One might expect that the Panel would be aware of the problems that arose from simple assump-
tions in the past about effective programming and be sensitive to the fact that often ideas that 
seem to make sense intuitively often do not work as expected in the unusual world of the prison. 
Further it would be reasonable to expect that the work of the Panel would be strongly influenced 
by the research in recent decades – much of it by the Department of Public Safety and CSC that 
                                                     
243  Roadmap, p. iii 
244  Roadmap, p. 47 
245  For an overview of the development of effective treatment that has been a continuing theme within CSC over re-
cent decades see Bonta,J., Andrews, D. Risk-Need-Responsivity Model for Offender Assessment and Rehabilitation 
2007-06, Public Safety Canada, http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/res/cor/rep/_fl/Risk_Need_2007-06_e.pdf  
246  Risk-Need-Responsivity Model for Offender Assessment 2006 -2007 p.12  
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builds an increasingly stronger case for effective program design that works to reduce recidivism. 
For that reason it is essential that the Panel, to the degree that it takes a different course, would 
marshal evidence that supports the notion that pre-release preparation for work, prison-based 
employment and job placement on release for the majority of prisoners is technically possible, fi-
nancially and operationally feasible and effective in reducing recidivism.  Unfortunately, here as 
with so many of their other recommendations, they do not make an evidence-based case and seem 
oblivious to the implications of the direction they set. 
In the words of the Panel:  
The Panel has been presented with evidence that programs based on sound research and theory do 
work and ultimately reduce reoffending. However, the Panel did not witness any extensive CSC work 
on integrating these programs with job readiness programs. In fact, employment and employability 
programs appear to have been placed on the back burner by CSC and not given the attention that 
they require. 247 
Later in their report: 
The Panel notes the lack of current CSC research on what works and doesn’t work with respect to the 
contribution of work to positive reintegration outcomes. However, the available research did confirm 
what other correctional jurisdictions have found: that offenders need knowledge and skills that make 
an offender job ready in the eyes of employers. Furthermore, the Panel notes a lack of current CSC 
evaluation and performance information that it could turn to for assistance in determining the suc-
cess of current employment interventions on reoffending.248 
The Panel seems to think that the CSC Research Branch has placed relatively modest amounts of 
their resources into employment and training research simply as an oversight rather than a delib-
erate strategy to focus research in those areas that their existing research and that of other juris-
dictions see as being most promising.  So certain it is of its conclusions, the Panel actually proposes 
that the researchers go out and prove what the Panel is convinced must be there - somewhere.  
Consequently, the Panel suggests that CSC review and rebuild its research and evaluation frame-
works to demonstrate the effectiveness of its employment initiatives in meeting labour market re-
quirements and targeted employer requirements, and its contribution to reducing reoffending.249 
It is remarkable that the Panel would propose far-reaching changes first and then ask the CSC Re-
search Branch to find the evidence to justify those changes. Surely this completely distorts the very 
notion of evidence-based policy into something that could only be described as policy-based evi-
dence. Further, CSC has already conducted some research on their employment initiatives as well 
as reviews of research in other jurisdictions that appears to have been ignored by the Panel.250 
What is proposed by the Panel seems to simply underscore their ignorance of both effective pro-
gramming in accordance with the literature on “what works” and the difficulty involved in conduct-
                                                     
247  Roadmap, p.37 
248  Roadmap, p.77 
249  Roadmap, p.77 
250  Gillis, Christa A., Offender Employment Programming in Compendium 2000 on Effective Correctional Program-
ming, Chapter 10, Eds. Motiuk, Laurence L and Serin, Ralph C. Research Branch, Correctional Service of Canada, p 
16 http://www.csc-scc.gc.ca/text/rsrch/compendium/2000/index-eng.shtml    
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ing meaningful research on large complex programs being applied to individuals without clear and 
precise needs and outcomes being identified. The effectiveness of programming depends on 
whether the programming actually targets the criminogenic needs of the prisoner.251 Large scale 
employment programs may include many individuals for whom employment is not the most impor-
tant or even relevant factor that influences their criminal activity. Being one of the most expensive 
programs,252 the potential for serious cost-benefit misjudgements in relation to employment initia-
tives is substantial. 
The focus and criteria for research on employment initiatives was articulated by Dr. Christa Gillis 
and published by the Correctional Service of Canada. In her article she conducted an extensive re-
view of the CSC and international research literature relating to employment and while positive 
about the potential benefits of employment initiatives she clearly was a long way from suggesting 
that CSC was ready for massive changes to its approach to offender employability initiatives.  
It can safely be asserted that there is a resurgence of interest in employment as an important factor 
in the safe reintegration of offenders. However, the systematic study of employment as a risk and 
need factor is still in its infancy. Although we know employment is important in contributing to out-
comes for offenders, we are in the preliminary stage of understanding the processes and factors that 
are important to employment success and community reintegration. 
This parallels the status of risk and needs assessment in corrections. Our knowledge of risk is good, 
but our understanding and ability to effectively intervene to decrease criminogenic needs is con-
stantly evolving as our knowledge base increases. Employment, as a subset of offender needs, consti-
tutes an important area of study. Once an enhanced understanding of the mechanisms and proc-
esses associated with employment stability is attained, this information may be used to guide the 
development of intervention strategies, both at the institutional and community level. Moreover, 
once this level of understanding has been achieved, subsequent intervention efforts should focus on 
responsivity issues (including gender, ethnicity, motivation, and different learning styles), which have 
received relatively little exploration to date in the correctional literature.253 
Knowing the difference between correlation and causality is crucial to creating sound policy pro-
posals. Although few would dispute that there is a relationship between success after release from 
prison and attaining employment, there is considerable uncertainty about whether the relationship 
is one of correlation, causality or perhaps both.  While the Panel assumes that employment is a ma-
jor, if not the major contribution to success after release, the case can also be made for the con-
verse – that those who address the other barriers to community reintegration are better able to 
find and keep work.  Understanding which comes first is crucial. The Panel assumes a causal rela-
tionship based on what appears to be an ideological leap of faith:  
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the Panel believes that life inside a penitentiary should promote a positive work ethic.254 
Most thoughtful observers of the correctional milieu would likely support the development of care-
fully evaluated projects intended to answer the difficult questions identified by Gillis. Most would 
also recognize that work is a regular part of necessary prison activity. Few would oppose efforts to 
improve the quality and relevance of that work to improve the experience of the prisoner. As we 
heard at our forum at Matsqui Institution, prisoners would welcome the opportunity for meaning-
ful work, particularly if is helped in their job search after release, in preference to the numbing 
boredom of doing time. But what the Panel proposes goes far beyond what can be substantiated 
by the research or supported by a cost-benefit analysis. The proposals are enormous in scope, 
would involve huge expenditures that might well drain resource from other necessary and proven 
initiatives, and conflict with, rather than enhance gradual release. 
9.2.1 Scope  
Throughout the report the Panel emphasises the “changing offender profile” and in so doing paints 
the picture of a population with large numbers of violent persons with serious mental health, ad-
diction, social deficits, and a plethora of other barriers – all needing to be treated by CSC under 
shorter and shorter time frames. They paint a picture of recalcitrant and unmotivated prisoners 
who often seek out segregation to avoid addressing their correctional plan that the Panel thinks is 
already undemanding. Having proffered this description of the prison population as a foundation 
for their review, the Panel then claim to have seen examples 
that demonstrate that basic education and specific skills can guarantee immediate employment 
and can offer a solid base that an employer can use to build increasing expertise through on-the-job 
experience and training.”255 [Emphasis added]  
Based on their discovery of these unidentified magical programs, the Panel then places enormous 
expectations on CSC to make employment during and after release a priority - apparently unfazed 
by the fact that their recommendations are breathtaking in their scope, complexity and cost. The 
scope of their proposals is, perhaps, best illustrated and made self-evident by simply bringing them 
together in one place. The Panel proposes that every aspect of prison life from initial assessment to 
parole would involve a major focus on employment. 
The Panel sees the refocusing of CSC to an employability–employment model that prepares offenders 
to be ‘skills-ready’ for the labour market as a key priority in a new integrated approach to work. 
Work-oriented programs must play a key role in CSC’s rehabilitative approach. CSC must move ahead 
to reorient its program base to include pre-apprenticeship and apprenticeship accreditation pro-
grams that are developed and sanctioned by recognized outside organizations. 
The new approach should ensure:  
 employability becomes an integral part of the offender’s correctional plan at intake as-
sessment;  
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 the implementation of the plan includes penitentiary program integration (linking co-
educational, vocational and/or apprenticeship and employability programs, and work 
assignments);   
 pre-release planning is linked to opportunities for community employment; and   
 community employment is directly linked to employer-generated job opportunities.256  
To achieve the “refocusing” of CSC the Panel proposes that CSC should substantially expand the 
resources and mandate of CORCAN as well as its dependence on CSC for financial support:  
CORCAN’s capacity to respond to market opportunities for products and services varies significantly 
by region and penitentiary. The Panel notes that without investment in new capacity and increased 
markets, CORCAN faces a significant challenge in generating sufficient revenues to support invest-
ment strategies that would create employment opportunities for offenders and offset the costs of 
employability and employment training.   
The Panel questions whether CORCAN can continue to balance revenues and expenditures to provide 
future employment and training requirements under its current operating model. The Panel ques-
tions whether CORCAN’s prime objective is sufficiently focused on its core responsibility to produce 
fully trained and job-ready offenders ready for release to positions in the community.257  
Education programs should be tied almost exclusively to employability: 
The Panel has indicated its belief that education and employment are key cornerstones of the suc-
cessful reintegration of offenders to the community. The ‘stove-piped’ environment currently associ-
ated with the delivery of these programs must be changed. Offenders must be provided with the best 
portfolio of knowledge and skills that prepare them to find and keep jobs after release into the com-
munity. At the same time, offenders must be motivated to participate in these programs by introduc-
ing an increased sense of purpose—the ability to be employed.  
The Panel also recommends that these educational programs be reviewed and integrated with initia-
tives that are being undertaken to provide employability and employment skills for offenders.  
In this section, we focus on ensuring employment becomes an integral part of the correctional plan, 
is linked to other programs (particularly  education and skills development), is an integral part of pre-
release planning and is linked to employer-generated job opportunities in the community.258 
The Panel would require CSC to make employment available to large numbers of prisoners prior to 
release and after release: 
This will mean closer liaison with police services, provinces and municipalities, new and innovative 
supervision strategies, and comprehensive release planning that continues the employment training 
and job-readiness programs started in the penitentiary.259  
The Panel would like to see CSC review and refocus Aboriginal community support initiatives to-
wards employment for ex-offenders re-entering Aboriginal communities already suffering with 
enormous problems of unemployment: 
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Successful Aboriginal employment initiatives can only be realized if CSC works in close cooperation 
with federal government departments and is an integral part of the government’s initiatives to iden-
tify Aboriginal solutions by Aboriginal communities.260  
A primary objective for Aboriginal communities must be the employment of offenders returning to 
their communities.261  
In order to develop a longer-term strategy on community release, CSC should re-examine the interre-
lationships among the use of CCRA Section 81 (Healing Lodges) and Section 84 Agreements (supervi-
sion by an Aboriginal community) and the use of community correctional facilities. This review should 
include the role of these release alternatives in supporting the Aboriginal offender in seeking, finding 
and keeping a job. 262 
The Panel suggests that CSC work closely with the National Aboriginal Board in pursuing economic 
measures that help the reintegration of Aboriginal offenders to their communities by creating em-
ployment opportunities.263  
The Panel recommends that CSC/CORCAN focus on building formal relationships with employers to 
expand the employment opportunities for offenders. The Panel recommends the following specific 
priorities in this area: 
a) CSC redevelop its Aboriginal Employment Strategy focusing on building economic opportuni-
ties for Aboriginal community-based enterprises that support concrete employment opportuni-
ties for Aboriginal people;  
b) CSC and CORCAN work with a Provincial Building and Construction Trades Council or another 
similar entity to create a pilot project that creates a pre-apprenticeship and/or apprenticeship 
program for offenders that leads directly to employment on release;  
c) the Panel recommends that CSC and CORCAN work with the Saskatchewan Construction Asso-
ciation in establishing apprenticeship opportunities for young Aboriginals  and opportunities that 
could be provided specifically to Aboriginal offender;   
d) after evaluation of the above noted pilot and building on best practices, forge other such 
partnerships in other regions; and  
e) CSC re-positions the recommendations identified above with respect to reassessing the Na-
tional Employment Strategy for Women Offenders.264  
The Panel proposes that CSC develop transitional employment through the private sector for of-
fenders on release – in particular with building trades that, at the time the report was written, 
were in a boom cycle: 
As part of the community supervision and support process, CSC should ensure that opportunities for 
transitional employment for offenders have been identified and are in place. CSC will have to 
strengthen its labour market ties by ensuring employers are engaged prior to release and ready to 
accept pre-screened offenders for immediate employment.  
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CSC should strengthen its partnerships with various employers, associations, unions, universities and 
colleges, and private sector firms, to provide transitional support for offenders on conditional release 
leading to full-time employment.  
The Panel believes that these strategic partnerships can start by identifying opportunities related to 
the building and construction sector.265  
CSC would be required to anticipate and plan for employment needs in the community: 
In light of the fact that 50% of employable women on conditional release in the community are not 
working, particular attention must be paid to and integrate transitional employment requirements 
with CSC’s enhanced community supervision and intervention infrastructure for women. 266   
The Panel recommends CORCAN must pay particular attention to:   
a) integrating employability/employment initiatives and correctional and educational 
programs within a re-structured work day, and   
b) focusing on preparing offenders to be skills-ready (vocational/ apprenticeship) for na-
tional and local labour market opportunities.267  
As discussed in more detail in the section of this response entitled “Earned Parole”, the expectation 
of the Panel appears to be that the National Parole Board would, contrary to their own legislated 
criteria, make the likelihood of employment a crucial criterion for release on parole  
The institutional and community case management processes should be more closely linked to de-
velop a comprehensive community release plan that considers employment as a key priority.268  
Finally, there is a requirement to work in conjunction with the National Parole Board to determine 
how employment will be factored into decisions for and conditions of release.269  
The implementation of the enhanced strategy should respect the positive benefits that can be dem-
onstrated with gradual, job-focused release. The principle should guide CSC in ensuring that every ef-
fort is made to support offenders in actively and successfully engaging in their correctional plan to 
reduce their risk to reoffend and consequently improve their eligibility for release. The two key com-
ponents of conditional release, day parole and full parole, must be reviewed to ensure they are 
aligned with the earned parole and community employment approaches and are fully supported by a 
community infrastructure that offers supervision, programming interventions, and service deliv-
ery.270  
CSC, and presumably the NPB, would redirect those being released from their home destinations to 
those areas where employment opportunities appear to be better –apparently assuming that em-
ployment possibilities are more important than family or community support in reducing recidi-
vism. They also seem to ignore the fact that prisoners on release are entitled to go to their home or 
other community provided that destination does not present serious risks of reoffending. 
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Particular attention will have to be given to the availability of employment as a key determinant of 
location of release. It is important to recognize the disparity between the home residences of return-
ing offenders and the location and availability of skill-appropriate jobs, often defined as a ‘spatial 
mismatch.’  The consideration of this disparity is fundamental in building both a short-term and 
longer-term community transition plan for the offender and requires attention in identifying job op-
portunities for offenders in general.271 
CSC would be expected to focus on the readiness of short term offenders for employment: 
The needs of other groups of offenders should also be considered. For example, CSC staff indicated 
that offenders with short-term sentences and younger offenders need significantly more support to 
make them employment-oriented and job-ready.272  
The Panel expects that CSC would require that community agencies like halfway houses “retool” for 
employment support: 
CSC should re-evaluate the support structures in the community, including CORCAN community em-
ployment offices and community residential facilities, to ensure they can meet the challenges posed 
by an offender’s reorientation of resources toward employment.273   
The Panel also recommends that CORCAN support the job and skill needs of offenders on conditional 
release in the community and that CSC/CORCAN:  
a)  identify approaches to strengthen release planning, by ‘bridging’ the offender to an available 
job in the community by ensuring the offender’s job-readiness status is effectively matched to 
community support initiatives;  
b)  ensure that opportunities for transitional employment for offenders have been identified and 
linked with the responsibilities of community correctional centres and halfway houses, and 
 c) ensure that CSC has developed relationships with employers, to provide a seamless transition 
of pre-screened offenders from the penitentiary to immediate employment.274 
The institutional and community case management processes should be more closely linked to de-
velop a comprehensive community release plan that considers employment as a key priority. There 
are benefits associated with extending the time available for this process to facilitate improved 
communications between institution and community parole officers and ensure the offender’s job-
readiness status is effectively matched to community support initiatives and employment prior to re-
lease.275  
CSC should expand the prison work day from 8 to 12 hours in order to permit sufficient time for 
both program activity and work: 
...the availability of offenders for employment is often limited by penitentiary routines, competing 
requirements for program participation and related resourcing constraints.276  
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We support the benefits of increasing the number of available productive hours and note that this 
change has resource implications with respect to operating systems and related resource alloca-
tions.277  
9.2.2 Feasibility 
While some or even most of the initiatives proposed by the Panel could be beneficial, together they 
would require a massive influx of new money to implement. Even with unlimited funds, some 
would be logistically near impossible to achieve. The Panel does not address the financial or logisti-
cal implications to any serious degree – a flaw that seems even more glaring when the current eco-
nomic downturn and the new economic reality of continuing and increasing government deficit are 
considered. Nor is the employment of ex-prisoners likely to become a priority for government 
spending or the private sector in the face of increasing unemployment generally. 
A significant increase in the size of prison populations would make it extremely difficult for CSC to 
retain the current programs as they exist, let alone engage in massive expansion.  The lack of space 
in programs, already a barrier to achieving prisoners’ correctional plans, can only become much 
worse. In fact, the Panel does not take into account the anticipated prison population increase to 
be created by new legislation that introduces long mandatory minimum sentences for a whole 
range of offences and barely considers its own recommendations to abolish statutory release and 
accelerated parole review. This is truly a troubling omission for a report that purports to be creat-
ing a roadmap for the future. 
The Panel’s only attempt to address the overwhelming logistical and cost problems likely to be 
faced by substantially increased prison populations falls woefully short of being a basis for serious 
public policy decision-making.  
The introduction of a new parole or release system could affect the size of the incarcerated popula-
tion because of potential increases in time served. However, a new focus on employability and em-
ployment could have an opposite effect—the effectiveness of programming both inside and outside 
the walls would likely lead to a reduction in reoffending and a consequent reduction in the return 
rate of offenders to a federal penitentiary. While the Panel believes that the overall impact will be a 
reduction in reoffending, CSC, in conjunction with NPB, should develop impact statements that define 
a time frame for management—preparing for and changing legislation and then applying the legisla-
tive change—and should establish cost estimates for a phased implementation of the  Panel’s rec-
ommendations.  These estimates should be fully integrated with the Panel’s recommendations on 
the introduction of regional complexes. 278  
No evidence or experience in other jurisdictions is presented that would give any reason to support 
the Panel’s “beliefs”.  
9.2.3 Logistics 
Prisons are a difficult place to create meaningful work let alone the development of specific work 
skills for a substantial portion of the population. Real work requires the production of products or 
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services that are valued. They must be relevant to market needs and professionally made and/or 
delivered. Prison work tends, therefore, to focus primarily on either its training value, its commer-
cial value, or simply its value in keeping prisoners occupied. If the focus is on training the program 
will employ unskilled workers or those with employment issues. It is very difficult to produce a 
commercially viable product with unskilled workers. If the focus is on the production of a commer-
cially viable product, then the work force needs to be made up of primarily competent staff – peo-
ple who already have skills and, therefore, might not actually reduce their risk of recidivism be-
cause of the work experience - although they might prefer this work to help pass time. If the focus 
is on keeping people occupied, then the efficiencies of automation and scale of production are 
counterproductive to the primary goal of creating work, the antithesis of what one expects to find 
in the private sector.  
Creating meaningful work for unskilled individuals is difficult and expensive. Doing so in prison 
where there are competing demands for space and time is particularly difficult. Developing a vari-
ety of work placements that train individuals in skills that are appropriate to their abilities requires 
a great diversity of programs. If the skill development is to continue throughout the sentence, then 
similar opportunities need to be available in all institutions to accommodate frequent inter-
institutional transfers. There are huge capital costs for equipment. There is a need to hire staff with 
the expertise to teach particular skills. If the employment and training is to be consistent with de-
mand of employers in the community, the programs and staff will need to be constantly adapting 
and changing. 
In short, there are a plethora of factors relating to the needs and abilities of the prisoners, the 
physical space and capacity of institutions, staff abilities and the workforce needs in general that 
conspire to defeat major work and training initiatives that are intended to affect a substantial por-
tion of the prison population. The Panel acknowledges that CORCAN, the primary initiative to pro-
vide more meaningful work experience in prison, today can employ only about 15% of the popula-
tion279. While it is beyond the scope of this review to elaborate on all of these factors and their ap-
plicability to the Roadmap recommendations, the identification of these formidable problems 
should at least give some cause for reflection and consultation on the Panel’s recommendations. 
Instead of mature reflection or deep consultation with the NGO communities who have spent life-
times on reintegration strategies  we find CSC’s immediate endorsement of all of the Roadmap’s 
recommendations. 
9.2.4 Conclusion 
 The proposals of the Panel reflect the complete opposite of what one might expect of an evidence-
based approach to prison rehabilitation. We should expect that the evidence for effectiveness for 
their employment focus would be clearly identified first, followed by a feasible strategy for imple-
mentation. That strategy would include cost implications.  Instead, the Panel first recommends 
“transformative” changes for CSC with employment as a keystone element, and then proposes that 
CSC develop hitherto unavailable “evidence” that will demonstrates the effectiveness of their pro-
posals to reduce recidivism for a large proportion of offenders. Only then do suggest that CSC begin 
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to estimate the costs and impact of their proposals as they proceed with the implementation of the 
recommendations.  
In fact, without any of the evidence, implementation strategy or costs addressed, and in the face of 
contrary considerations, CSC announced that it is fully committed to the implementation of the 
Panel’s recommendations. Yet it is difficult not to conclude that the prospect of success, as the 
Panel seems to envisage it, is remote while the costs are likely to be enormous. It all looks re-
markably like another example of what has been termed ’faith based’ criminal justice policy. 
Minister Stockwell Day, the same minister who appointed the Panel and determined its terms of 
reference, announced upon unveiling the Government’s legislation to expand the list of gun-related 
crimes subject to mandatory minimum penalties, and dramatically lengthen sentences for such of-
fences: "We believe there will be a deterring effect from getting serious about serious crime." 
Journalist Dan Gardner, in critiquing the legislation in light of the available research that showed 
little if any support for a deterrent impact of similar legislation in other jurisdictions, responded:   
The government "believes." And as every man of faith knows, belief can conquer even the mightiest 
army of facts. But for those of us in the reality-based community -- the famously dismissive phrase of 
a Bush official -- belief isn't good enough. We expect policy to be supported by facts and research. 
Perhaps that makes us lesser men and women, but we can't accept something as true simply be-
cause it's been given Stephen Harper's benediction. So where's the evidence that the government's 
radical, U.S.-style approach to criminal justice will make us safer? You won't find it on its website. 
There are lots of bold claims, of course. But in the press release and background information, there 
isn't a word about evidence. 
Not that any of this will bother Mr. Harper or his ministers. They've got faith. And they've made it 
clear they have no intention of changing their minds, no matter what the research says. It's the rest 
of us -- those who still value evidence and reason --who should be concerned.280 
Much the same critique can be made of the Panel’s belief, unsupported by the evidence, that the 
massive investment in prison-related employment initiatives will produce dividends in public 
safety. We should all be concerned, however, that the new focus on employment will take re-
sources from other areas that have greater potential to reduce recidivism and that the Panel’s ini-
tiatives will mark another chapter in the history of costly if well intentioned correctional failures. 
9.3 Education 
For many years in Canada the education of prisoners has been viewed as a legitimate and worth-
while correctional endeavour. The Panel agrees with this view and clearly supports education as 
one of four crucial areas– along with employment/employability, programs, and structured leisure 
time as key components of a structured work day.281 Throughout the report the Panel endorses 
education as an effective way to reduce recidivism and as a key component of improving employ-
ability.  
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The Panel views education as being a substantial component of their employment and employabil-
ity focus when it states:” Education has an undisputed role in the personal development and pro-
fessional or vocational success of an individual in Canadian society”.282 While we agree that this 
relationship is firmly entrenched in our social experience, and does not need to be the subject of 
further analysis here, what is surprising is that given the importance of education to recidivism and 
its crucial relationship to the Panel’s emphasis on employment, education is the subject of so few 
recommendations and those that are presented are so general. These are the Panel’s recommen-
dations: 
15.  The Panel recommends that CSC pay more attention to the attainment of higher educational 
levels and development of work skills and training to provide the offender with increased opportuni-
ties for employment in the community.283  
18.  The Panel recommends that CSC review the reasons for the low offender participation rates in its 
adult basic education programs and identify new methodologies to motivate and support offenders 
in attaining education certificates by the end of their conditional release periods.  
19. The Panel also recommends that these educational programs be reviewed and integrated with 
initiatives that are being undertaken to provide employability and employment skills for offenders.284 
59. The Panel recommends that community reintegration planning, for offenders serving a fixed sen-
tence, start at admission to ensure that focus is placed on programming, education, employment, 
and mental health treatment.285   
Only recommendations 18 and 19 appear in the section entitled “Education”.  Recommendation 15 
appears in the section entitled “Structured Workday” while recommendation 59 appears in the sec-
tion entitled “Comprehensive Community Reintegration Planning”. On closer examination the 
Roadmap’s support for education is qualified by other recommendations and statements that 
make it clear that the Panel is only supportive of basic education where it is directly tied to em-
ployment.  
We note that CSC has focused on the development and delivery of core programs at the expense of 
the development and delivery of basic adult education and employment programs. 286 
… 
The Panel has indicated its belief that education and employment are key cornerstones of the suc-
cessful reintegration of offenders to the community. The ‘stove-piped’ environment currently associ-
ated with the delivery of these programs must be changed. Offenders must be provided with the best 
portfolio of knowledge and skills that prepare them to find and keep jobs after release into the com-
munity. At the same time, offenders must be motivated to participate in these programs by introduc-
ing an increased sense of purpose—the ability to be employed. 287 
                                                     
282  Roadmap, p. 41 
283  Roadmap, p.65 
284  Roadmap, p. 68 
285  Roadmap, p. 105 
286  Roadmap, p.36 
287  Roadmap, p.68 
A Flawed Compass             Employment and Employability 
133 
 
As noted in our response to the employment and employability proposals, the Panel has made 
many employment-related recommendations that, together, have massive cost implications and 
logistical problems. These limitations along with minimal evidence presented for effectiveness in 
reducing recidivism, raises serious doubts in our minds regarding the cost-benefits of their propos-
als.  It is interesting therefore to compare their proposals for employment with that of education 
and the relative cost-benefit implications of each.  
We suggest that in considering the relative importance of education in prison, particularly in com-
parison to other programs that might compete for the same resources, there are three important 
criteria that should be considered: (1) its efficacy- its impact on reintegration and recidivism; (2) its 
viability in the correctional context - the ability of CSC to make the program available to the right 
people at the right time, and (3) its costs. We will address each criterion. 
9.3.1 Education and Recidivism  
The Panel cites a CSC publication in which extensive evidence is identified showing that education 
appears to reduce recidivism.  
The importance placed on education has been supported by research. A review of 97 articles that ex-
amined the relationship between correctional education and recidivism levels revealed “solid support 
for a positive relationship between correctional education 15 and (lower) recidivism.” 288 
The article cited, commissioned and published by CSC was written by Dennis Stevens of the Univer-
sity of Massachusetts, College of Public and Community Services, and is a comprehensive review of 
research relating to the effectiveness of prison education programs. The article cited the work of J. 
E. McCormick who reviewed the 97 research articles. He concluded that “In the 97 articles, 83 
(85%) reported documented evidence of recidivism control through correctional education, while 
only 14 (15%) reported a negative relationship between correctional education and reduced recidi-
vism.” 289 Stevens shows through his article that some educational programs may not show a posi-
tive effect because the program standards and accessibility to those programs may be very limited 
in some areas. Additionally, Stephens cites many other studies that show a positive relationship 
concluding that “Offering individuals under correctional supervision a student-centred advanced 
educational program provides an avenue for those offenders who want change, an opportunity to 
advance themselves and ultimately the community”.290 
Other academics such as Gerald Gaes have documented the success of prison education in the re-
duction of recidivism.  In a recent publication Gaes found through his exhaustive and rigorous re-
view of meta-analyses that: 
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“correctional education does promote successful prisoner reentry.  However, we only have an ap-
proximation of the true impact – the actual effect size. Even small effect sizes can produce substan-
tial net cost-benefits especially for criminal justice costs that include adult corrections.291 
In Canada we have the results of studies by CSC of their ABE (Adult Basic Education) program. The 
ABE review concluded that: 
The results of this study (n = 6074) indicate that the ABE-8 program provides a modest but significant 
reintegration benefit for federal offenders who complete the program, as well as a literacy improve-
ment of almost 3 school grades . 
In brief, the three areas measured by this study (positive inmate attitudes and experiences with the 
ABE program, literacy gain and release outcome) all support a similar conclusion — ABE participa-
tion provides significant benefits for offenders and contributes to their safe reintegration to the 
community.292 
At the other end of the education continuum is university level course work. The Final Report of the 
British Columbia Prison Education Project, (the Duguid Report) describes the theory, practice and 
efficacy of what many, including prisoners, regard as the most successful educational initiatives in 
the history of the Canadian penitentiary. Given that this evaluation is the most sophisticated and 
detailed study of the value of prison education ever undertaken in Canada one might have thought 
it would have been given some particular attention by the Panel. Because the evaluation addresses 
the role of education in the context of humanistic values, and not just as an avenue to employ-
ment, it has special significance in any correctional roadmap that gives primacy to the development 
of a culture that respects human rights. It is for this reason that we intend to quote at some length 
from the Duguid Report.    
The University Program: Theory and Practice  
What is the link between knowledge and behaviour? Can a more developed moral understanding 
persuade a law-breaker to adopt a more law-abiding stance toward society and the other? Can vir-
tue be taught? Do more highly developed critical thinking skills lead to better decision-making in the 
"real world"? Are thinking skills more important than employment skills in the preparation of offend-
ers for returning to the community? Are thinking skills and values best taught directly or through Lib-
eral Arts academic courses? Why should criminals be educated? These questions and others like 
them provided the basis for on-going intellectual debate within the prison education program in Brit-
ish Columbia and an on-going discussion of policy issues between that program and the Correctional 
Service of Canada (CSC). Indeed, it would appear after reviewing the twenty-year history of the en-
deavour that the dynamism of these debates and discussions played a large part in the program’s 
longevity.  
Between 1974 and 1993 university liberal arts courses were offered to prisoners in several federal 
correctional institutions in British Columbia, Canada. Delivered first by the University of Victoria 
(1973-1984) and then by Simon Fraser University (1984-1993), well over a thousand individual pris-
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oners were enrolled in courses taught by university faculty in traditional seminar settings within the 
prisons. Ranging from maximum to medium security, each of the correctional institutions contained 
a school or academic centre, a library and a sufficient level of support services to make possible the 
creation of relatively self-contained "learning centres" or "academic communities" behind the walls 
and fences. While distinct from the more formally "medicalized" or treatment approaches to prisoner 
rehabilitation that had characterized correctional interventions in the previous post-war decades, the 
university program in British Columbia nonetheless was based on the premise that education could 
result in rehabilitative outcomes. This premise stemmed from the conviction that education in the 
liberal arts, if carried out properly, could trigger processes of individual reclamation, reformation, 
and in some cases transformation. This conviction was in turn built on a diverse set of theoretical 
foundations in adult education and psychology, focusing in particular on the role of humanistic study 
in encouraging cognitive and moral development and the subsequent impact of that development on 
behaviour. The university program thus made certain claims as to its efficacy in inhibiting future 
criminal behaviour on the part of its prisoner-students, and unlike many other such programs, opera-
tionalized the claim by insisting that it would be demonstrated by lower rates of recidivism (return to 
imprisonment for a new offence following release) on the part of its students. A small research study 
carried out in 1979 seemed to bear out this claim, reporting very low rates of recidivism for program 
participants.    (Ayers, et al., 1980; Duguid, 1981; Ross, 1980) 
In 1993, co-determinus but not linked with the cancellation of the university program by the Correc-
tional Service of Canada as a cost-cutting measure, a major follow-up study was undertaken of the 
prisoner-students who had been participants in that program from 1973 to 1993. The study was 
funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada and was completed in 
1997. The objective was, put simply, to test the claim made by the program staff over its twenty-year 
life span that it had been effective in reducing the rate of recidivism of its students. Finding early on 
in the research that recidivism was in fact lower for this group than the average rate in Canada, the 
more ambitious objectives became to: (a) establish the degree to which the education program could 
be shown to be the significant factor in this success; (b) identify specific groups of prisoner-students 
who seemed to benefit the most from participation in the program, and; (c) identify the specific 
mechanisms and circumstances intrinsic to the education program that were linked with the success 
of these groups.293  
One of the important findings of the Duguid Report related to the nature of the varying effects of 
higher education on recidivism. 
Our task was to discover ‘what worked for whom under what circumstances’ - what mechanisms as-
sociated with the education program proved to be effective with what types of students in what par-
ticular circumstances? As the analyses of the Working Groups showed, the outcome - improving on 
one’s predicted success of remaining free of prison - varied considerably with mechanisms having dif-
ferential impacts. Thus what we called "hard slogging" in the academic core of the program, the ac-
tual university courses, proved to be associated with post-release success for certain groups of 
younger prisoners, especially those who we hypothesized might perceive education giving them a 
‘second chance’ in society. Likewise academic success in the form of improving grades may have had 
an impact on the self-esteem of some men which in turn may have contributed to success. For other 
students the mechanisms associated with extra-curricular activities such as theatre or tutoring were 
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more strongly linked with success than was academic performance. In a surprising development 
which did not stem from a research hypothesis, completion of even minimal post-release education 
and training courses or programs was highly correlated to post-release success in virtually every 
Working Group studied.  294 
The Duguid Report’s findings regarding high risk offenders are of particular interest:  
Thus in our "Worst Cases", a high priority group to be sure, both from the perspective of Corrections 
and from the perspective of the public, we were able to conclude that for a significant number of in-
dividuals in that group the education program made a decisive difference. The SIR predicted that 
only 43 men from that group of 119 would be successful after release, but instead 54 were success-
ful...While 11 additional successful individuals may not seem a lot, given their age and records the 
social savings implicit in their abandoning a criminal career are no doubt substantial. Each high risk 
criminal deterred from further criminal activity, then, represents a ‘value-added’ component of effec-
tiveness. 295 
Given the cautionary approach throughout this research report in linking cause and effect, we would 
be more than hypocritical to suggest that the results point to university liberal arts education being 
the panacea or ‘magic bullet’ so long sought after by corrections and by society. Still, the results are 
impressive and certainly indicate that for a perhaps surprisingly wide range of prisoners this inter-
vention in their lives played a decisive role in shifting them away from further involvement with crime 
- at least for three years! It did not achieve this impact on only an ‘enlightened elite’ within the pris-
ons, but was at its most impressive with the worst of the ‘Worst Cases’, the most disadvantaged of 
the ‘Young Robbers’ and the most fragile of the ‘Second Chancers’ - in other words, this program was 
particularly effective with a great many high risk offenders.296  
Both the basic education and university programs clearly identify important correlations between 
education and recidivism. While all education programs appear to have an important impact on 
recidivism, the greatest impact appears to be with the more advanced courses. This implies that 
the further a student-prisoner progresses with education the greater the likely benefit on recidi-
vism. Clearly the implications of a relatively arbitrary cut off at grade 12 needs to be carefully con-
sidered. Does ending education for a student-prisoner at grade 12, sometimes years prior to his or 
her release, diminish the value of that education? Would forcing the student into work activity at 
that point be more likely to generate motivation or frustration?  The Roadmap does not consider 
these questions. It relies, without analysis, on the view that only basic education leading to job en-
try is worth considering. While that might be appropriate for some or even most prisoners, we are 
not convinced that it is appropriate for many others. Everyone needs some place to advance to if 
they are to continue their personal development. For some the next step is literacy and for others 
it is a university math course. Individualized planning requires that each next step be available for 
each individual. Given the benefits of advanced education and the feasibility of providing such edu-
cation, the Panel should have considered whether CSC should terminate educational advances by 
focussing exclusively on “basic” education.  
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One of the reasons Duguid suggests that post-secondary education appears to have a greater im-
pact on recidivism than education limited to lower grades may be that the nature of the advanced 
course involves immersion into an academic community where the prisoner becomes a student 
who is involved much more than simply attaining credits. The students were faced with a broad 
range of choices that they were free to make in accordance with their interests. 
It is the sum total of a myriad such decisions which add up to the big choice - should I quit crime? 
Here lies a vital and uncomfortable message for policy-maker and evaluator alike - it is not programs 
which work, but their capacity to offer resources which allow subjects the choice of making them 
work.297 
It is ironic, to say the least, that the university education program was cancelled in 1993, ostensibly 
as a cost-cutting initiative, shortly before the research evaluation of it was initiated. The extremely 
positive results identified in the Duguid report beg the question whether the decision to cut the 
program was justifiable in terms of either the correctional mandate of CSC or on the basis of cost 
effectiveness. This obvious and important question is one of many that were ignored by the Panel.  
The only indication that post secondary education was given any consideration by the Panel is 
found in a single paragraph which stated:  
Post-secondary education gives offenders the opportunity to acquire a trade or profession, and to 
update trade qualifications. Less than 10% of participants in education programs opt for post-
secondary education. Offenders generally pay for their own post-secondary studies, unless it can be 
demonstrated that the education addresses a very specific need.298 
The cancellation of the post-secondary education programs in penitentiaries across the country 
was very controversial at the time and, as the research that followed showed, unwise whether 
viewed in terms of individual reintegration or public safety. The Panel missed a golden opportunity 
to rectify this mistake. The quote immediately above from the Roadmap is distressing in the way it 
so easily dismisses the importance and potential of higher level education.  The reference to post-
secondary education involving “less than 10% of participants in education programs” implies that 
either there is general disinterest or capacity for such education. However, the Panel seems either 
unaware or unconcerned about the strong interest in such educational opportunities when CSC 
made them available or the enormous disincentives that currently exist for post-secondary educa-
tion in penitentiaries. Had they considered such barriers, the level of activity would have been sug-
gestive of an area where there is strong motivation for personal development – something the 
Panel decries the absence of but has no clear explanation for. 
It is of concern to the Panel that the completion rate for all educational programs is currently 31% 
(see Appendix C). If education is a critical component of an offender’s successful return to society as 
a productive, law-abiding citizen, the completion rate must be improved. The Panel did not receive 
any findings from CSC to explain why these results are so low. Anecdotally, we have heard of several 
reasons, including systemic (i.e., offender transfers or competing correctional program demands) 
and issues of motivation.   
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Interestingly, the completion rate for vocational programs is twice as high as that for educational 
programs. Again, whether this is due to systemic or motivational issues is not clear to the Panel.299 
The Panel should have acknowledged that participating in post secondary education is extremely 
difficult while in a Canadian penitentiary today. The cost of the courses is prohibitive for a person 
earning only a few dollars a day. Since the cancellation of the university program all post secondary 
education is distance education without direct instruction or class participation. Most distance 
education programs and virtually all post-secondary education depends heavily, and often exclu-
sively,  on the use of computers, email and internet access to course materials, lectures, course ma-
terials, student–professor communication,  and for submission of assignments – none of which is 
available to prisoners. Prison library materials are not sufficient or relevant to post-secondary 
courses. Books are prohibitively expensive. It is often impossible to meet timelines for courses 
when the student must rely on the prison and community mail system. There is often no place to 
study or keep course material and books. In short, it is a testament to the motivation and commit-
ment of prisoners that any post-secondary education exists at all.  
Apparently the Panel was either unaware of or unconcerned about these virtually impenetrable 
barriers to what is now recognized as a very important means to reduce recidivism. Nor were they 
apparently aware that the potential impact on recidivism relies on much more than simply credit 
achievement. 
The concept of education being justifiable only as an avenue to work is contradicted by the evi-
dence and speaks, again, to the ideological focus of the Panel. The solution to recidivism is not just 
about finding work, although that is obviously important, it is also about addressing the myriad of 
problems that stand in the way of finding work or other means to sustain oneself as a law-abiding 
citizen. These factors interact in iterative and complex ways. Addictions might preclude the positive 
opportunities of education or work if left uncontrolled. Education might improve the person’s sus-
ceptibility to treatment and allow them to progress more quickly. Employment might well be the 
outcome of successful rehabilitation as much as a contributor to successful rehabilitation.  Gaes ex-
presses this point well:   
If there are limitations to the potential impact of correctional education on reentry success, 
it may be because other offender needs may have to be addressed such as their drug de-
pendence or lack of work skills. Education effects may be muted by these other unmet needs. 
However, education may be fundamental to other correctional goals. It may be a prerequi-
site to the success of many of the other kinds of prison rehabilitation programs. The more 
literate the inmate, the more he or she may benefit from all other forms of training. Thus, 
the link between correctional education and successful post-release outcomes may have 
many paths which analysts do not consider when they evaluate education programs inde-
pendent of its other influences.300 
The lack of context and nuance in the Roadmap’s consideration of education has the effect of forc-
ing people into an ideologically-determined set of programs rather than create an environment of 
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personal development through which prisoners are encouraged and supported to find their way to 
a law abiding life after prison.  
In earlier parts of this review we have discussed the unquestioning belief of the Panel in the pre-
scriptive excellence of the correctional plan. The Panel buys completely into the notion that the 
professional assessor can, in the first few months of a long sentence, diagnose and prescribe the 
exact programs that will address the prisoner’s problems, now and in the future. So comfortable is 
the Panel with the correctional plan, they propose that it be entrenched as an “accountability con-
tract” on which parole release would be contingent.301 As we have stated, while we do not dis-
count the necessity for a correctional plan, we also reject the notion that it is all that is required to 
manage future risk and prepare the person for successful release.  
One lesson to be learned from Stephen Duguid’s work is that it is insufficient to rely only on a pro-
fessional assessor and diagnostician to know what is best. The apparent lack of motivation and low 
completion rates that the Panel is at a loss to understand and therefore believes must be ad-
dressed almost entirely through coercion and control, look suspiciously like possible outcomes for 
an already overly professionalized, coercive approach to personal development. Engaging a pris-
oner in his personal development means creating an environment that is not of the prison. En-
gagement of the prisoner in his development will more likely occur in an environment that is of the 
community in that those things that drive decisions are not dominated by the external rigidity and 
coercion of prison routine and control so much as it is dominated by values that support achieve-
ment and growth – as in the community.  
An understanding of the larger concept of personal development based on humanistic values, in-
cluding individual choice, is captured in the words of a Canadian prisoner, David Turner, in a vale-
dictorian address given at Mountain Institution in 1985. One of three graduates of the Simon Fraser 
University Program that year, Mr. Turner told the assembled guests, including the Warden, CSC 
staff and family members: 
This program exists, survives, on the premise that it brings change to the individuals who participate 
within it. If this were not true I sincerely doubt we would be here today. Those of you who know me 
from before will recognize that my changes speak for themselves. The more difficult task is to illus-
trate how I became who I am… The fact that we are educated within a prison, separated from the 
community by time and space, has served to enhance our concept of humanity elsewhere and yet 
always in relation to ourselves. It his book Language and Silence, George Steiner notes that he was 
perplexed to consider how the torture and murders committed at Treblinka could be occurring at 
precisely the same time that people in New York were making love or going to the theatre. Were 
there two kinds of time in the world, Steiner wondered, good times and inhuman times? 
It is a question such as this which lends itself to the lessons found in our study of the humanities. To 
become more human   is to discover the relations between inside and outside, between those dying 
and those alive when death occurs and the relation of all three to ourselves . . 
Humanities has taught me that if I do not feel deeply the suffering I am powerless to prevent, how 
could I be alert to the suffering I might put an end to .. . 
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A very dear friend gave to me a remarkable definition of nobility .. . "True nobility is never found in 
being superior to someone else, but rather, it is found in being superior to one's former self." In this 
regard we three graduates can now claim nobility, true nobility. 
In closing, I would like to share a short, but meaningful prayer. These words were first spoken by a 
newly emancipated slave, over a hundred and twenty years ago, but the spirit is especially appropri-
ate today. It is not a prayer for a bowed head, but rather for a raised head. It goes: 
Dear Lord, I ain't what I should be, And I ain't what I'm going to be, 
       But thank you Lord, I ain't what I used to be302 
A key component of supporting achievement through a culture of development is that of individual 
choice. Individual choice is largely suppressed in prisons but is central to education. A well-
developed school within a prison is a refuge from the structure and the humiliation that the prison 
structure asserts. The relationship with a teacher has only one purpose – the development of the 
student – not control of the prisoner. Education is about making better informed choices and so 
those choices cannot be suppressed in an educational environment. In the school, the “prisoner” 
becomes the “student” and that provides a taste of normalcy – along with the challenges that go 
with it, bringing the person to what Duguid refers to as “the big choice - should I quit crime”? 
Of course some of these elements are also possible in other areas such as treatment programs and 
work. Indeed the Panel noted the power of the different supportive relationship that often occurs 
between CORCAN instructors and prisoners.  
The Panel has concluded that CORCAN supervisors, working at the front line, have an important per-
sonal relationship with offenders. As such, they are in a position to have a significant positive impact 
on them. They are seen as providing offenders with a sense of purpose, and are a key contributor to 
increasing offender motivation for employment and in promoting self awareness among offenders in 
being able to handle a job effectively.303 
To the extent this different atmosphere is possible it should be encouraged. In our view the school 
is one place where the potential for this different environment is greatest. This not to say that any 
prison “school” necessarily has all of these positive qualities in place as some school programs can 
begin to look more like sweat shops than places of learning, but where the school is led by qualified 
educators with a range of options that allow for appropriate choice and growth, the potential is 
substantial. 
9.3.2 Logistics  
Education has some distinct advantages over programs like work from a management and en-
gagement perspective. Work almost always involves teams working to produce something. Educa-
tion is personal. The benefits are therefore entirely personal as well. For those reasons education is 
delivered as a set of interrelated building blocks selected and assembled by the student in order to 
get from here to there.  
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Education is individualized, incremental and self-rewarding. Individualized programs are much eas-
ier to manage in a prison setting than large group productivity activities like manufacturing. Be-
cause it is individualized, education is transferable between institutions. One can take an English 
course in one prison and a math course in another prison – or in the community after release. The 
frequent movement of prisoners between prisons can be accommodated fairly easily in education 
programs while with many work and trades programs a move terminates the program or work ac-
tivity as trades programs and manufacturing work is almost always unique to a particular institu-
tion. As a result, often very few credits that might lead to apprenticeship can be earned. 
Educational programs can be set up just about anywhere with no significant infrastructure needed 
other than space. Manufacturing needs expensive equipment and/or service contracts and the con-
tinuing maintenance of external demands for the product – not a simple set of arrangements to 
develop and maintain. While education programs do not have significant capital requirements, in-
dustry and trades can be extremely expensive and often the value of equipment is short lived as it 
becomes obsolete.  
Because of the ubiquitous nature of education in our society, qualified teachers for most subjects 
are available virtually everywhere. Indeed, in the past whole institutions for education have been 
employed through contracts with CSC to provide education by supplying both the staff and curricu-
lum. Trades and work production often depend on tradesmen or industrial specialists that are 
unique to particular manufacturing activities. Recruitment of qualified people can be difficult and 
the loss of key people can seriously interrupt the work activity. Manufacturing activity requires ex-
pert people for such activities as marketing, design, engineering, market trend analysis, industrial 
relations etc. that is rarely needed in general education programs. 
While CSC has relied heavily on private contractors to deliver educational programs, it has, on oc-
casion, made extensive use of existing community based educational institutions such as boards of 
education, community colleges and universities. There are a broad range of alternative educational 
service providers. On the other hand, outside contracts to operate industrial operations are often 
not available and hence CSC has had to develop its own capacity through CORCAN to develop and 
operate such operations. 
Education goes on regardless of the changes in the economy. Manufacturing and trades are highly 
dependent on the economy, changing market, demographic trends, other suppliers and a multi-
tude of factors that can interrupt or negate production or training.  
9.3.3 Costs and Benefits 
For all of the logistical advantages identified above, education costs per student are low compared 
with most work and trades training activity. It costs far more to “employ” a prisoner in most prison 
work programs or production activity or skill-training than have that person engaged in educational 
activity. As noted in the section on Employment and Employability, the Auditor General noted in 
1995 (the last relevant audit by the Auditor General) that the cost of CORCAN work was double 
that of education.304  This data needs to be updated by an independent agency like the Auditor 
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General to verify current true net costs for both education and work activity.  Even with the lack of 
independent data available and claims by CORCAN of substantial revenue through its work activity, 
the Panel raises serious doubts about the capacity of CORCAN to operate within its income gener-
ating mandate. 
The Panel questions whether CORCAN can continue to balance revenues and expenditures to provide 
future employment and training requirements under its current operating model. The Panel ques-
tions whether CORCAN’s prime objective is sufficiently focused on its core responsibility to produce 
fully trained and job-ready offenders ready for release to positions in the community.305 
9.3.4 Computers  
It is quite strange to us that a report that purports to provide a roadmap for the transformation of 
prisons never once mentions the matter of either computer or internet access.  We are of the view 
that this serious omission in the Roadmap requires comment on our part.  
For most prisoners, the many hours of cell time is dead time. There is virtually nothing to do but 
read or watch television – if you have a television. If you can’t read, the options are very limited. 
Computers were understandably  embraced  by many prisoners as a means to use their time pro-
ductively while developing knowledge and skills that would be of potential value in future educa-
tion and /or work activity. Computers made correspondence courses easier to undertake and also 
give some recreational outlet. 
With the growth of information technology in the late 1980’s, federal prisoners were given permis-
sion, with substantial limitations, to purchase and keep personal computers in their cells. They had 
to use their own funds to purchase the hardware and software and maintain their system. For all 
but the most committed, or those with funds from outside the prison, the costs were almost pro-
hibitive.  Prisoners were dependant on the prison administration to arrange any necessary mainte-
nance - often a slow and tedious process. No computers had internet access and there were many 
restrictions on the software that was permitted. Nevertheless, the ownership and use of computers 
had grown steadily over the years reaching the point where about 10% of prisoners had a com-
puter in their cell.  
In the fall of 1994, a working group was tasked with studying the feasibility of continuing this prac-
tice.  During the working group’s examination of this issue, a moratorium on the purchase of pris-
oner owned computers was put in place.  By May 1996 EXCOM released General Principles on the 
uses of prisoner owned computers and the moratorium on the purchase of prisoner owned com-
puters was lifted.  The policy governing personal computers, CD 090, was subsequently amended in 
February 1997 to allow prisoners to own personal computers as long as they did not allow for 
communications with or access to computer networks.  It is important to note that the policy was 
amended “to provide inmates with increased opportunities for personal development, including 
education and entertainment.  These opportunities are comparable to those widely available to the 
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community and support the preparation of inmates for their eventual release as law-abiding citi-
zens.”306  
The 1997 decision included a requirement to review the issue three years after implementation.  
What was seen as a significant change in information technology coupled with continuing IT-
related security incidents prompted CSC to commission an independent Threat Risk Assessment in 
early 2002 to re-evaluate the situation.  The assessment concluded that there was a significant 
threat to CSC’s infrastructure and ability to deliver its mandate.  It was also noted that computer 
inspections were difficult and complex and that IT resources and capabilities were limited while 
operational staff were not qualified to carry out computer inspections.  CSC Security Branch and 
the IT Security Division reported that over 700 incidents occurred between 1998 and 2003 involving 
inmates and computers.  As a result of this information, and with little consideration for the bene-
fits of computers, CSC decided in April 2003 to prohibit the purchase or upgrade of inmate owned 
computers and to provide access to computers through closely monitored and controlled common 
access areas.  Those owning personal computers at the time were allowed to keep them but were 
not allowed to upgrade, or purchase new computers, consigning existing computers to gradual ob-
solescence.  
While there were difficulties ensuring that computers contained only approved materials, the initial 
claims of serious security risks turned out to be greatly exaggerated. The majority of the “security 
incidents” in fact involved no more than embarrassment when prisoners computers were found to 
have sexually provocative (but not legally pornographic) materials on them.  Indeed almost all of 
the serious incidents identified by CSC related to staff permitting their computers to be used by 
prisoners rather than anything involving prisoner’s computers. Even where serious breaches of se-
curity had occurred, there were no incidents of any serious harm that had occurred because of the 
breach.    
In response to a strong and vigorous criticism from both prisoners and community groups to the 
ban on the purchase or upgrade of prisoner owned computers, CSC eventually agreed to form an 
advisory committee comprised of their own senior  managers, CSC senior IT staff, community 
groups and prisoners from four institutions who participated by conference call.307 Of special note, 
particularly in light of the almost total absence of participation of prisoners in the Panel’s delibera-
tions, the inclusion of federally sentenced men and women as equal members of this committee 
was unlike any other committee that National Headquarters had convened in the past. As noted in 
the advisory committee’s report “the federally sentenced men and women contributed their time 
by conducting research, writing papers, participating in conference calls and meetings, consulting 
on documents and sharing experiences.  The direct participation of these men and women regard-
ing the benefits and impacts of having access to a personal computer has been insightful, informa-
tive and tremendously meaningful.”308  
In its report the committee particularly identified the importance of computers to education: 
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Advances in information technology now allow individuals the ability to exercise their own independ-
ence in acquiring and managing information.  Such information may be personally relevant, educa-
tionally valuable or vocationally practical.  Incarcerated persons in Canada are the exceptions to this. 
Core Value # 2 [of the Mission Statement] states "We recognize that the offender has the potential 
to live as a law-abiding citizen."  To the greatest extent possible CSC should introduce inmates to 
computer technology to ensure the greatest opportunity for education, employment and employabil-
ity and for successful living in today’s world.   Studies affirm that there is a positive correlation be-
tween law abiding behaviour and formal education.  From a public safety perspective, recidivism can 
be influenced by providing better access to education for all inmates.  The data on education 
achievement in the federal institutions suggest that about 75 percent of inmates have, at best, 
achieved grade 10 standing. A large majority of them, therefore, have not earned a high school di-
ploma, i.e. what is now considered to be the basic qualification for any employment with prospects 
for advancement and economic security.  
The question can be framed as follows: How can federal inmates be encouraged to pursue education 
roughly in the same proportion as students in the community? Corrections literature commonly re-
fers to lack of motivation as a key reason for this continuing disproportion. How, then, can inmates 
be more motivated to improve their education credentials? The computer is a powerful motivator of 
learning to the extent that it is an enabling and empowering device. It fosters independent enquiry 
through access to the World Wide Web and its capacity to transfer vast amounts of information on-
screen from various other media. There is the related fact of a steady increase in the number and va-
riety of credit courses, both secondary and post-secondary, available on-line, many of them only on-
line. 
By a more liberal use of computer technology, then, individualized to inmates who can meet security 
criteria, CSC could update its education policy and practice without significant new expenditures on 
physical facilities and teaching staff.  In that scenario, the computer becomes the means by which 
prison education could approximate community standards in a short period of time and without a lot 
of new public money. That is a goal worth pursuing.309   
After two years of intensive work the committee reported with recommendations that would per-
mit prisoners to own specially made computers with substantial security features that addressed all 
of the original CSC concerns including internet access prohibition. In its report the advisory commit-
tee wrote: 
The recommendation above complements and supports the basic statutory principles of the Correc-
tional Service of Canada i.e. its legal obligation to support incarcerated men and women in their ef-
forts to re-integrate successfully after release. Computer technology is now central to every aspect of 
society - work applications, personal growth, recreational activity and social communications.  This 
recommendation, then, aims to create a situation where there are ample opportunities for all in-
mates to become computer literate for purposes both educational and recreational. Some will want 
to become technically proficient about computers.  Some will want to advance their education quali-
fications to meet the changing requirements of the job market. Nearly all inmates can take advan-
tage of constructive ways of "doing time" with a computer. The Committee believes that the benefits 
outweigh the risks involved, especially as those risks appear to be manageable.  
                                                     
309  Improving Inmate Access to Computers  Annex A 
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With appropriate security measures and specifications for computers, the committee believes that 
risk to CSC can be mitigated in order to allow inmates to purchase and have in-cell computers.  CSC’s 
IT Security Branch has raised the following IT Security issues as being the most important elements 
that must be addressed in order to reduce the risk to CSC.  These issues are: hardware standardiza-
tion, software standardization, ease of visual inspection, ease of technical inspection, adequacy of 
supervision, external communication, and media tampering.310 
The Committee addressed each of these concerns and proposed viable and cost effective solu-
tions.311  
In its conclusion the Committee suggested that:  
The model presented in this proposal addresses interests common to CSC, stakeholders, staff and 
federally sentenced men and women with respect to access to computers.  The Committee believes 
that this model will allow CSC to improve access to computers for all inmates in a manner that is 
safe, secure and fiscally responsible so that they can be assisted with educational pursuits, employ-
ment and employability pursuits and effective use of leisure time, all of which contribute to a robust 
re-entry into the community. 
The Committee believes that the safeguards presented in the above proposal respond to previous 
views that threats existed to CSC’s infrastructure and ability to deliver its mandate if inmates were 
allowed to have in cell computers.  Under the proposed model computer inspections will be made 
much less difficult and complex and demand on IT resources will be largely reduced.  We anticipate a 
significant reduction in the number of computer related security incidents under our proposed model.   
                                                     
310  Improving Inmate Access to Computers, p. 4 
311 The Committee addressed each of these concerns and proposed viable and cost effective solutions. For example, 
to deal with hardware and software standardization the committee proposed: 
Hardware Standardization: Under this proposed scenario, inmates will be allowed to purchase one particular  
computer configuration. Computers will be designed according to CSC specifications and will be produced by a 
limited number of pre-qualified outside suppliers.  Under the previous policy, operating systems and models of 
computers varied greatly and this contributed to the difficulty of inspection and management.  The proposed 
scenario will allow CSC to monitor, search and control inmate owned computers more easily.   
Specifications for the design of the computers will be reviewed annually to ensure that changing technology is-
sues are incorporated into the design and set-up of computers.  A National Committee with varied representa-
tion (IT Security, Operational Security, Human Rights, Programs, stakeholders etc.) should be formed to provide 
assistance with these annual reviews.   
Software Standardization: CSC will establish a limited list of authorized application software, which inmates 
will be able to purchase and have installed on their computers.  CSC will also establish a limited list of qualified 
vendors from which inmates will be able to purchase educational, self-development and recreational software.      
It is suggested that computers be outfitted with Microsoft Windows XP Professional operating system. In addi-
tion to standardizing all computers with a common OS for ease of inspection and management, the security 
features of Windows XP Professional will be leveraged to provide a degree of protection not available in earlier 
operating systems.   
 CSC will review the list of authorized software on an annual basis and add to it new options accordingly. Imates 
shall pay the cost of all software. Improving Inmate Access to Computers, p. 5 
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The Committee recommends that the Assistant Commissioner Correctional Operations and Programs 
support the recommendations made in this proposal and present this report to the EXCOM so that a 
new decision may be made with respect to allowing inmates to have access to computers.312 
If the committee’s recommendations were even considered by EXCOM, no report back to the 
committee members was ever made. We do not know if the committee’s recommendations were 
ignored or rejected. 
CSC went ahead with alternate plans to make available to prisoners, in common areas, a few older 
staff computers that were being replaced. Those plans have been implemented. Such access, how-
ever, is extremely limited in terms of access as they can be used only when the common areas are 
open and staff supervision is available, there is a low ratio of computers to prisoners, there is very 
restricted availability of software, lack of privacy, inability to store of keep data except on a few 
floppy disks and many other limitations. Again, none of the computers have internet access. 
Any parent today knows that education beyond basics is not possible without the regular use of 
computers and the internet. The work, educational and recreational world outside of prisons have 
embraced the enormous potential that computers offer while our prisons appear virtually Nean-
derthal in comparison. Computers and internet access have the potential to make high-quality edu-
cation available to all prisoners at minimal costs. Indeed, it is increasingly valid to state that good 
education is virtually impossible without them. Conversely, with computers and internet access the 
educational possibilities for prisoners are expanded enormously. 
At the same time, computers have become such a crucial part of community life it seems likely that 
the position that CSC has taken will be increasingly difficult to justify as a reasonable limitation on 
the rights of prisons to communicate and participate in activities. Security issues, to the extent that 
they exist and can be demonstrated, can clearly be addressed.  
9.3.5 Conclusion 
We do not deny the need for work and trades related programming. However, in the interests of 
both public safety and fiscal accountability we feel obliged to raise the question of why the Road-
map gives such overwhelming attention to work and minimal attention to education when, dollar-
for-dollar, and demonstrated effects on recidivism, good education programs appear to offer much 
greater cost-effectiveness and logistically are much easier to implement. 
It is irresponsible for CSC to rely on the conclusions of the Roadmap’s “transformative agenda” in 
the vacuum of knowledge and evidence that the Roadmap reflects and in light of the other impor-
tant areas of inquiry that were never addressed. A commitment to huge and extremely long-term 
investments is unwise before first being able to answer the following questions: 
 For whom and under what circumstances are work and/or education most likely to re-
duce recidivism? Do resources match needs in all locations? 
 How should limited resources be allocated so as to take advantage of relative cost ef-
fectiveness? 
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 What conditions are necessary to create environments within prisons that clearly sup-
port the engagement of individuals in their personal development– as opposed to 
merely forcing compliance?  
 How can environments be created that maximize the options for constructive choices 
for prisoners? 
 How can education be made excellent? Were the previous practices of CSC to use 
community colleges, boards of education and local universities to deliver education at 
the same standard as that given to community students superior to education deliv-
ered through contracts with private commercial firms? Is it feasible for private educa-
tion contractors to meet the same standard as is possible when teachers are part of 
and report to a local public educational institution?  
 Should there be the same support for post-secondary education as is available for 
Adult Basic Education? Does ending education at grade 12 really make sense? 
 Can education occur, particularly at levels above basic literacy, without easy access to 
computers, email and the internet? Can CSC’s policy to prohibit individual ownership 
of computers and access to the internet be justified given the substantial impact of 
education on recidivism? 
It is distressing to see the Roadmap trample though such important aspects of corrections without 
the information necessary to ask or answer these and other key questions.  The confidence with 
which the Panel promotes their plan for corrections seems inversely proportional to how little they 
were influenced by the available evidence.  
A Flawed Compass              Aboriginal Offenders 
148 
 
10 Aboriginal Offenders 
The Panel devotes considerable space to the issue of Aboriginal offenders and its recommenda-
tions broadly  endorse and encourage expansion of CSC's existing initiatives, including  Aboriginal 
specific programming, Aboriginal 
staffing and  cross cultural training 
and recommend that greater prior-
ity be placed on Aboriginal em-
ployment and community reinte-
gration. The full slate of recom-
mendations is set out in the side-
bar:  
Whereas in other parts of our re-
sponse we have criticized the 
Panel for misunderstanding the 
issues and the nature of the prob-
lems facing CSC and for recom-
mending far-reaching, ill-conceived 
and unprincipled changes, our cri-
tique of their discussion of Abo-
riginal offenders is different. Our 
issue is not with the Panel’s rec-
ommendations but rather that 
they have not been given the nec-
essary profile and priority. This il-
lustrates one of the problems 
when a roadmap is developed with 
a one-dimensional focus on public 
safety without sufficient attention 
to the justice goals of the criminal 
justice system. A “transformation” 
agenda that does not address, as 
the first priority, the “staggering 
injustice” that has been and con-
tinues to be inflicted on Aboriginal 
peoples is not one that a just soci-
ety should endorse. 
Recommendations  
30. The Panel recommends that employment be the first priority in supporting 
Aboriginal offenders in returning to the community. 
31. The Panel recommends that, as the second-largest federal public service em-
ployer of Aboriginal people, CSC should: 
a) enhance recruitment, retention and development of Aboriginal staff, particu-
larly in correctional officer, parole officer and management positions in CSC 
penitentiaries and in communities where Aboriginal representation is high; 
b) ensure that Aboriginal staff can demonstrate their knowledge and awareness 
of the particular challenges facing Aboriginal people on reserve and in Abo-
riginal urban communities; and 
c)  promote awareness and understanding of Aboriginal life among non- Abo-
riginal employees, and provide them with the tools and training to work 
more effectively with Aboriginal people and communities. 
32.  The Panel recommends that CSC make resources available to respond to the 
specific needs of Aboriginal offender populations, such as further investment 
in correctional programming tailored specifically to their needs. 
33. The Panel recommends that CSC achieve a balance between correctional an 
healing interventions, and ensure that programming emphasis be placed on 
managing drug and alcohol problems, managing anger, and using conflict 
resolution. 
34.  The Panel also recommends that CSC ensure it can measure the results of 
these programs effectively, so that it can demonstrate to Aboriginal communi-
ties that Aboriginal offenders have addressed their problems and can rejoin 
their communities. 
35.  The Panel recommends that employment be CSC’s first priority in supporting 
Aboriginal offenders’ return to their communities. The Panel recognizes the 
importance of other program interventions to address the behavioural and 
skills deficits of Aboriginal offenders, but recommends that CSC achieve a bet-
ter balance in providing these programs. 
36.  The Panel recommends that CSC review its approach to mental health as-
sessments of Aboriginals at intake and ensure effective screening techniques 
are in place. 
37.  The Panel recommends that the number of Aboriginal Community Develop-
ment Officers should be increased to work with Aboriginal communities and 
support local Aboriginal offender employment. 
38. The Panel recommends that Pathways Units be expanded in CSC penitentiaries 
to meet the requirements of Aboriginal offenders where warranted, and that 
these “Pathways Units” have a job-readiness components. 
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10.1 The Nature of the Problem - Aboriginal Overrepresentation 
The problem of Aboriginal overrepresentation in Canadian prisons is well documented and has re-
ceived the attention of a large number of commissions and inquiries and more recently that of the 
Supreme Court of Canada. Yet one looks in vain for any reference to this in the Roadmap. It does 
not even rate a footnote in the changing offender profile section. This is especially troubling since 
the problem is getting worse. In 1988 in a study prepared for the Canadian Bar Association, titled 
“Locking Up Natives in Canada” one of us provided this account:   
Statistics about crime are often not well understood by the public and are subject to variable inter-
pretation by the experts.  In the case of the statistics regarding the impact of the criminal justice sys-
tem on native people the figures are so stark and appalling that the magnitude of the problem can 
be neither misunderstood nor interpreted away.  Native people come into contact with Canada’s cor-
rectional system in numbers grossly disproportionate to their representation in the community.  
More than any other group in Canada they are subject to the damaging impacts of the criminal jus-
tice system’s heaviest sanctions.  Government figures -- which reflect different definitions of “native” 
and which probably underestimate the number of prisoners who consider themselves native -- show 
that almost 10% of the federal penitentiary population is native (including 13% of the federal wom-
en’s prisoner population) compared to about 2% of the population nationally. . . .  Even more disturb-
ing, the disproportionality is growing.  In 1965 some 22% of the prisoners in Stony Mountain Peniten-
tiary were native; in 1984 this proportion was 33%.  It is realistic to expect that absent radical 
change, the problem will intensify due to the higher birth rate in native communities… 
Prison has become for young Native men the promise of a just society which high school and college 
represents for the rest of us. Placing this in a historical context, the prison has become for many 
young Native people the contemporary equivalent of what the Indian residential school represented 
for their parents.313  
In 1999 the Supreme Court of Canada cited this passage in the Gladue case as a “disturbing account 
of the enormity of the disproportion.” The Court issued this call to action: "These findings cry out 
for recognition of the magnitude and gravity of the problem and for responses to alleviate it. The 
figures are stark and reflect what may fairly be termed a crisis in the Canadian criminal justice 
system". 314 In the decade between “Locking up Natives” and the Gladue case the overrepresenta-
tion had deepened. By 1997 “Aboriginal peoples constituted closer to 3 percent of the population 
of Canada and amounted to 12 percent of all federal inmates”315.  Later in its judgment the Court 
referred to the “staggering injustice” these figures represented.  
Prison overrepresentation is part of a larger pattern. As the Supreme Court observed in Gladue: 
                                                     
313  Canadian Bar Association Committee on Imprisonment and Release, Locking up Natives in Canada by Michael 
Jackson [Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 1988]. Reprinted in [1989] 23 U.B.C. Law Review 215. See also Public 
Inquiry into the Administration of Justice and Aboriginal People, Report of the Aboriginal Justice Inquiry of Mani-
toba, vol. 1, The Justice System and Aboriginal People (1991); Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Bridging 
the Cultural Divide: A Report on Aboriginal People and Criminal Justice in Canada [Ottawa: Canada Com-
munications Group, 1996].) 
314  R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 at para. 64 
315  Solicitor General of Canada, Consolidated Report, Towards a Just, Peaceful and Safe Society: The Corrections and 
Conditional Release Act -- Five Years Later (1998), at pp. 142-55 cited in Gladue at para 58 
A Flawed Compass              Aboriginal Offenders 
150 
 
[T]he excessive imprisonment of aboriginal people is only the tip of the iceberg insofar as the es-
trangement of the aboriginal peoples from the Canadian criminal justice system is concerned.  Ab-
original people are overrepresented in virtually all aspects of the system.  As this Court recently 
noted in R. v. Williams, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 1128, at para. 58, there is widespread bias against aboriginal 
people within Canada, and “*t+here is evidence that this widespread racism has translated into sys-
temic discrimination in the criminal justice system”. 
Statements regarding the extent and severity of this problem are disturbingly common.  In Bridging 
the Cultural Divide, supra, at p. 309, the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (“RCAP”) listed as 
its first “Major Findings and Conclusions” the following striking yet representative statement:  
The Canadian criminal justice system has failed the Aboriginal peoples of Canada -- First Nations, 
Inuit and Métis people, on-reserve and off-reserve, urban and rural -- in all territorial and go-
vernmental jurisdictions.  The principal reason for this crushing failure is the fundamentally dif-
ferent world views of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people with respect to such elemental issues 
as the substantive content of justice and the process of achieving justice.316 
Over representation of this magnitude suggests either that Aboriginal peoples are committing dis-
proportionately more crimes or that they are the victims of systemic discrimination.  Studies and 
Commission reports confirm that both phenomena operate in combination.317  
Although over-policing and other forms of systemic discrimination undoubtedly play their part in 
higher crime rates, the available evidence shows higher Aboriginal crime rates in many reserve 
communities and among urban Aboriginal populations: particularly disturbing are the rates of in-
terpersonal violence in some reserve communities where women are the primary victims. The 
Panel cites a June 2006 report of the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics that presented the grim 
picture of the realities for Aboriginal people and their communities. Specifically, young people aged 
15 to 34 experience violent victimization 2½ times more frequently than those aged 35 or older; 
on-reserve crime rates were about three times higher than crime rates elsewhere in Canada, and 
violent crime rates were significantly higher; rates of spousal violence were 3½ times higher than 
for non-Aboriginals.  
Like the figures on overrepresentation, the statistics on higher crime rates demand further answers 
to hard questions directed to the root causes. Why does crime and social disorder play more havoc 
in personal and community well-being than they do in the lives of non Aboriginal people and com-
munities?  This is a question that the Panel at least needed to consider because “misunderstanding 
the roots of the problem can lead only to solutions that provide, at best, temporary alleviation and, 
at worst, aggravation of the pain reflected in the faces of Aboriginal victims of crimes — in many 
cases women and children — and in the faces of the Aboriginal men and women who receive their 
`just' deserts in the form of a prison sentence”.318 
There are several explanatory theses for this “crisis in the Canadian criminal justice system.” The 
Supreme Court in Gladue referred to the socio-economic causes of overrepresentation: 
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The background factors which figure prominently in the causation of crime by aboriginal offenders 
are by now well known.  Years of dislocation and economic development have translated, for many 
aboriginal peoples, into low incomes, high unemployment, lack of opportunities and options, lack or 
irrelevance of education, substance abuse, loneliness, and community fragmentation.  These and 
other factors contribute to a higher incidence of crime and incarceration.319 A disturbing account of 
these factors is set out by Professor Tim Quigley, “Some Issues in Sentencing of Aboriginal Offend-
ers”, in Continuing Poundmaker and Riel’s Quest (1994), at pp. 269-300.  Quigley ably describes the 
process whereby these various factors produce an overincarceration of aboriginal offenders, noting 
(at pp. 275-76) that “*t+he unemployed, transients, the poorly educated are all better candidates for 
imprisonment.  When the social, political and economic aspects of our society place Aboriginal 
people disproportionately within the ranks of the latter, our society literally sentences more of them 
to jail.”320 
There is a further explanatory pathway in which overrepresentation is linked to the particular and 
distinctive historical and political processes that have made Aboriginal people poor beyond pov-
erty. As described by RCAP  
The relationship of colonialism provides an overarching conceptual and historical link in understand-
ing much of what has happened to Aboriginal peoples. Its relationship to issues of criminal justice 
was identified clearly by the Canadian Bar Association in its 1988 report, Locking Up Natives in Can-
ada. 
What links these views of native criminality as caused by poverty or alcohol is the historical 
process which Native people have experienced in Canada, along with indigenous people in other 
parts of the world, the process of colonization. In the Canadian context that process, with the 
advance first of the agricultural and then the industrial frontier, has left Native people in most 
parts of the country dispossessed of all but the remnants of what was once their homelands; that 
process, superintended by missionaries and Indian agents armed with the power of the law, took 
such extreme forms as criminalizing central Indian institutions such as the Potlatch and Sun-
dance, and systematically undermined the foundations of many Native communities. The Native 
people of Canada have, over the course of the last two centuries, been moved to the margins of 
their own territories and of our `just' society.321 
Over the last decade the overrepresentation has only worsened. One struggles to find the appro-
priate words beyond “staggering injustice” the Supreme Court might now have to employ to de-
scribe the present state of affairs. The percentage of Aboriginal federal prisoners in 2004 rose to 
18.5% with no correlative rise in the non-prison Aboriginal population. In October 2006 the Correc-
tional Investigator, Howard Sapers,  in addressing Parliamentarians on the tabling of his 2005-6 An-
nual Report, highlighted the continuing and accelerating overrepresentation of Aboriginal persons 
in Canada’s federal institutions and the current dimensions of the problem facing federal correc-
tions: 
The overrepresentation of natives in Canada's prisons and penitentiaries is well-known: nationally, 
Aboriginal people are less than 2.7% of the Canadian population but comprise almost 18.5 % of the 
total federal prison population. For women, this overrepresentation is even more acute - they 
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represent 32 % of women in federal penitentiaries. Alarmingly, this huge overrepresentation has 
grown in recent years. While the federal inmate population in Canada actually went down 12.5% be-
tween 1996 and 2004, the number of First Nations people in federal institutions increased by 21.7%. 
This is a 34% difference between Aboriginal and non Aboriginal inmates. Moreover, the number of 
federally incarcerated First Nations women increased a staggering 74.2% over this period. 
While the Correctional Service is not responsible for the social conditions and policy decisions which 
help shape its offender population, it is responsible for operating in compliance with the law and en-
suring all offenders are treated fairly. It is therefore with grave concern I am underscoring today that 
the Correctional Service of Canada falls short of this standard by allowing for systemic discrimination 
against Aboriginal inmates. For example: 
 Inmates of First Nations, Métis and Inuit heritage face routine over-classification resulting in 
their placement in minimum security institutions at only half the rate of non-Aboriginal of-
fenders. 
 The over-classification for Aboriginal women is even worse. For example, at the end of Sep-
tember, native women made up 45 percent of maximum security federally sentenced wom-
en, 44 percent of the medium security population and only 18 percent of minimum security 
women. 
 This over-classification is a problem because it means inmates often serve their sentences far 
away from their family and the valuable support of other community members, friends and 
supports such as Elders. 
 Aboriginal offenders are placed in segregation more often than non-Aboriginal offenders. 
 Placement in a maximum security institution and segregation limits access to rehabilitative 
programming and services intended to prepare inmates for release and successful reintegra-
tion into society. 
 Aboriginal inmates are released later in their sentences than other inmates. 
 The proportion of Full Parole applications resulting in reviews by National Parole Board is 
lower for Aboriginal offenders. 
In short, as stated by the Canadian Human Rights Commission, the general picture is one of institu-
tionalized discrimination. That is, Aboriginal people are routinely disadvantaged once they are 
placed into the custody of the Correctional Service.322 
As a consequence, longer periods of incarceration and more statutory releases, as opposed to parole, 
for Aboriginal offenders contribute to less time in the community for programming and supportive 
                                                     
322  In his 2007-8 Annual Report the Correctional Investigator summarises the cumulative effect of systemic barriers to 
reintegration: “The combination of over-classification and lack of Aboriginal programming best illustrates how sys-
temic barriers can hinder offender reintegration. Aboriginal offenders are over-classified because of a poorly con-
ceived actuarial scale. As a result, Aboriginal offenders are disproportionately and inappropriately placed in higher 
security institutions, which have limited or no access to core programs designed to meet their unique needs. This 
scenario, for the most part, explains why the reintegration of Aboriginal offenders is lagging so significantly behind 
the reintegration of other offenders. Clearly, correctional outcomes cannot be explained by individual differences 
alone”. Annual Report of the Correctional Investigator, 2007-8, online at http://www.oci-
bec.gc.ca/rpt/annrpt/annrpt20072008-eng.aspx   
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intervention than for non-Aboriginal offenders; the proportion of Aboriginal offenders under com-
munity supervision is significantly smaller than the proportion of non-Aboriginal offenders serving 
their sentences on conditional release in the community; Aboriginal offenders continue to be over-
represented as a proportion of offenders referred for detention and ultimately detained compared to 
the other offender groups; parole is more likely to be revoked for Aboriginal offenders than non-
Aboriginal offenders. The rate of revocations for breach of parole conditions (i.e., no new criminal of-
fence) is higher for Aboriginal offenders; Aboriginal offenders are re-admitted to federal custody 
more frequently than non-Aboriginal offenders, and too often this cycle of inequitable treatment be-
gins again. To break this cycle, the Correctional Service must do a better job at preparing Aboriginal 
offenders while in custody, and provide better support while in the community; the outcome gaps 
are even more pronounced when looking at the situation of Aboriginal woman offenders. 
The Correctional Service's own statistics regarding correctional outcomes for offenders confirm that, 
despite years of task force reports, internal reviews, national strategies, partnership agreements and 
action plans, there has been no measurable improvement in the overall situation of Aboriginal of-
fenders during the last 20 years. To the contrary, the gap in outcomes between Aboriginal and other 
offenders continues to grow. Clearly, more commitment and resources are required to address this 
troubling trend. Today, I call on the Correctional Service of Canada to act swiftly to strengthen the 
implementation of its Strategic Plan for Aboriginal Offenders by fully adopting the following recom-
mendations within the year: 
 Implement a security classification process that ends the over-classification of Aboriginal of-
fenders; 
 Significantly increase the number of Aboriginal offenders housed at minimum security insti-
tutions; 
 Increase timely access to programs and services that will significantly reduce time spent in 
medium and maximum security institutions; 
 Significantly increase the use of unescorted temporary absences and work releases programs 
to assist in supporting safe and timely community reintegration; 
 Significantly increase the number of Aboriginal offenders appearing before the National Pa-
role Board at their earliest eligibility dates; 
 Build capacity for and increase use of agreements which provide for the direct involvement 
of Aboriginal communities in supporting timely conditional release; and 
 Significantly increase the number of Aboriginal people working at all levels in the Service, 
and especially at institutions where a majority of offenders are of Aboriginal ancestry. 
Equitable treatment of Aboriginal inmates is required by law. It is also a human rights and public 
safety issue. Clearly, the need to do better is obvious and urgent. My message to the correctional 
service is walk your talk and make real progress a priority. My message to government is give the 
Service the resources required to get the job done.323 
The Correctional Investigator, in his June 2007 presentation to the Panel, advised the Panel that the 
number of Aboriginal offenders is, as predicted, still increasing and now represents 19.6% of the 
                                                     
323  Speaking Notes for Mr. Howard Sapers, Correctional Investigator, 33rd Annual Report to Parliament October 16, 
2006 
A Flawed Compass              Aboriginal Offenders 
154 
 
federal incarcerated population and the gaps in correctional outcomes between Aboriginal and 
other offenders are still widening. He warned, “Should the current trends continue unchecked, ex-
perts project the Aboriginal population in Canada's correctional institutions could reach the 25% 
mark in less than 10 years”. In his latest 2007-8 Annual Report he writes, “using the latest census 
data, we estimate the overall incarceration rate of Aboriginal Canadians to be 983 per 100,000, or 
almost nine times higher than the rate for non-Aboriginal people”.324 
 
10.2 The Appropriate Remedial Response 
Given the characterization of the over representation of Aboriginal   prisoners as a “crisis” and a 
“staggering injustice” and the extensive analysis of the issue by the Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples, the Supreme Court and the Correctional Investigator, it was reasonable to expect that the 
Panel, as part of a transformative roadmap, would have given this issue the highest profile and its 
recommendations the highest priority. Regrettably the Panel’s summary of the nature of the prob-
lem demonstrates no appreciation of national urgency or the need for extraordinary efforts to re-
dress the problems that are within the Service’s mandate. In considering that redress it is impor-
tant to recognize that the Correctional Service cannot, any more than the courts, resolve all the 
contemporary legacies of a colonial history. The Supreme Court specifically addressed the limita-
tions on criminal justice agencies in Gladue.  
It is clear that sentencing innovation by itself cannot remove the causes of aboriginal offending and 
the greater problem of aboriginal alienation from the criminal justice system.  What can and must be 
addressed, though, is the limited role that sentencing judges will play in remedying injustice against 
aboriginal peoples in Canada.  Sentencing judges are among those decision-makers who have the 
power to influence the treatment of aboriginal offenders in the justice system.  They determine most 
directly whether an aboriginal offender will go to jail, or whether other sentencing options may be 
employed which will play perhaps a stronger role in restoring a sense of balance to the offender, vic-
tim, and community, and in preventing future crime.325 
The Supreme Court went on to provide a framework of analysis for the sentencing judge: 
How are sentencing judges to play their remedial role?  The words of s. 718.2(e) [Criminal Code] in-
struct the sentencing judge to pay particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders, 
with the implication that those circumstances are significantly different from those of non-aboriginal 
offenders.  The background considerations regarding the distinct situation of aboriginal peoples in 
Canada encompass a wide range of unique circumstances, including, most particularly:  
(A)  The unique systemic or background factors which may have played a part in bringing the 
particular aboriginal offender before the courts; and  
(B)  The types of sentencing procedures and sanctions which may be appropriate in the circums-
tances for the offender because of his or her particular aboriginal heritage or connection.326 
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The Supreme Court placed particular emphasis on restorative justice which is now recognized as 
part of the purposes of sentencing in the Criminal Code, because “most traditional aboriginal con-
ceptions of sentencing place a primary emphasis upon the ideals of restorative justice”327. 
Parallelling the role of the sentencing court, those who administer our prison system have an obli-
gation in implementing their rehabilitative mandate to take into account the unique systemic and 
background factors that have brought Aboriginal peoples to prison and to recognize correctional 
responses that take into account traditional Aboriginal conceptions and processes of justice. In this 
regard it is not sufficiently well-known that a decade before the Supreme Court's judgment in Gla-
due the Correctional Service of Canada became the first criminal justice agency to take seriously 
the claims of Aboriginal offenders that Aboriginal pathways to healing, what was to become known 
as the “Red Road,” were an integral part of their rehabilitation and reintegration. In 1983, mem-
bers of the Native Brotherhood at Kent Institution went on a hunger strike, maintaining that they 
had the right to practise their spirituality, including participation in spiritual and healing ceremo-
nies, and that this was both an existing Aboriginal right under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982 and a right of freedom of religion protected by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
Beyond these arguments, they maintained that practising culturally relevant ceremonies directed 
to healing was more appropriate in their journey towards rehabilitation and reintegration into the 
community than programs that lacked Aboriginal cultural or spiritual content.  
In the years that followed, the Red Road and Aboriginal spirituality became increasingly powerful 
influences in the lives of many Aboriginal prisoners, who discovered, often for the first time, a 
sense of identity, self-worth and community. Because the path must be taught by those who have 
special knowledge and who are respected for their spiritual strength and wisdom, the practice of 
Aboriginal spirituality requires that prisoners communicate with Elders drawn from outside the 
prison. Some prisoners, by virtue of prior training or the training they undergo in prison, are able to 
lead certain ceremonies and provide spiritual counselling to other prisoners. There has developed, 
therefore, a continuum in which those who are more experienced in spiritual ways are able to help 
those less experienced. From this a sense of community emerges, based not on the common ele-
ment of criminality or membership in a gang but rather on the search for spiritual truth. In place of 
the alienation that prison typically engenders, Aboriginal prisoners are able to experience a sense 
of belonging and sharing in a set of indigenous values. Aboriginal spirituality therefore provides 
prisoners with constructive links not only to each other but with Aboriginal people outside of 
prison and with their collective heritage. Charting a path along the Red Road is seen by many Abo-
riginal people, both inside and outside the prison, as an important element in dealing with prob-
lems of alcohol and drug dependency, violence, and other forms of anti-social behaviour.328  
The Corrections and Conditional Release Act contains provisions which require the Correctional 
Service of Canada to "provide programs designed particularly to address the needs of Aboriginal 
offenders" (section 80). The Act also authorizes the Solicitor General to enter into agreements with 
                                                     
327   Gladue, para. 70 
 
328  James Waldram, The Way of the Pipe: Aboriginal Spirituality and Symbolic Healing in Canadian Prisons (Peterbor-
ough: Broadview Press, 1997) 
A Flawed Compass              Aboriginal Offenders 
156 
 
Aboriginal communities to provide correctional services to Aboriginal offenders (section 81); it 
mandates the establishment of a National Aboriginal Advisory Committee and permits the creation 
of regional and local advisory committees to advise CSC on the provision of correctional services to 
Aboriginal offenders (section 82). Section 83 provides that:  
 (1) For greater certainty, Aboriginal spirituality and Aboriginal spiritual leaders and elders have the 
same status as other religions and other religious leaders.  
(2) The service shall take all reasonable steps to make available to Aboriginal inmates the services of 
an Aboriginal spiritual leader or elder.  
Since the passage of the CCRA CSC, to its great credit has developed, in consultation with Aboriginal 
communities and organizations, an impressive array of culturally sensitive Aboriginal programs to 
address the issues of violence, sexual abuse and substance abuse that incorporate Aboriginal val-
ues and processes that are facilitated by Aboriginal elders and professionals. There are now in the 
correctional landscape a number of minimum-security institutions referred to as healing lodges or 
healing villages where Aboriginal-centred ceremonies and programs are given a prominent place in 
the life of the institution, and where the local Aboriginal communities have a distinct presence and 
role.329 There are also seven funded Pathways Healing Units at medium-security penitentiaries 
where prisoners who demonstrate a commitment to the healing journey can seek some respite 
from the politics and pressures of the mainline. 
The Panel recognized the significance of these healing-based correctional programs: 
According to evaluation information, Aboriginal offenders are more likely to engage in and complete 
programs that are relevant to their life experiences and needs. Research has identified the need for 
healing-based programs designed for and preferably delivered by Aboriginal people. This premise 
has formed the basis for partnerships with Aboriginal organizations to develop and pilot seven na-
tional Aboriginal correctional programs. Their content reflects not only the requirements of CSC but 
also the teachings of the Elders. It is essential to engage Elders in delivering these correctional pro-
grams to ensure they integrate traditional teachings that are appropriate for the diverse needs of 
Aboriginal offenders. CSC should examine its program framework to ensure there is a reasonable 
balance between correctional and healing interventions. Although a continuing emphasis must be 
placed on programs addressing violent behaviour, particularly family violence, and on those that ad-
dress the management of alcohol and drug abuse, CSC must also identify what resources are re-
quired to enhance employability and employment initiatives for Aboriginal offenders.330 
The Panel in reviewing CSC’s strategic plan provides this summary and commentary: 
A Continuum of Care Model, adopted by CSC in 2003, provides the framework to integrate traditional 
Aboriginal approaches to healing within the CSC policy framework. The Strategic Plan for Aboriginal 
Corrections (2006-11) responds to the needs and aspirations of Aboriginal people within the CCRA. It 
is based on the following strategic priority: “to enhance capacities to provide effective interventions 
for First Nations, Métis and Inuit offenders.” National Aboriginal organizations have expressed their 
support for the plan. However, the Panel was told that the lack of resources has restricted its full 
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implementation… The Panel is of the view that the issues and challenges regarding the Inuit are well 
understood by CSC. Progress on a “Northern Strategy” is not for lack of analysis, but rather ac-
tion.331 … 
CSC is at a critical juncture in developing the infrastructure (both physical and interventions and ser-
vices) necessary to move forward with its strategic plan. CSC must continue to be responsive to dis-
parities between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians in the context of initiatives to be underta-
ken by governments and Aboriginal organizations. Creating the conditions for success requires a 
more seamless approach with all stakeholders, while respecting the aspirations of Aboriginal people, 
the jurisdictional mandates of governments, and the needs of Aboriginal offenders and their com-
munities. 
There is an urgent need for broader implementation of Aboriginal-specific interventions, and signifi-
cant investment is needed over the next five years. It should be noted that not all Aboriginal offend-
ers will choose to follow a traditional healing path—some will choose to participate in mainstream 
correctional interventions. Others, particularly those associated with gangs, may resist any type of 
involvement, requiring concerted efforts to motivate them to change. CSC must ensure that the im-
plementation of the Continuum of Care model takes these options into consideration, focuses on ad-
dressing the needs of Aboriginal offenders and their communities, and is fully integrated with CSC’s 
priorities. 
As expressed to the Panel by Donna Duvall of the Canadian Human Rights Commission: 
“It is positive that the Service in its 2007–2008 RPP [Report on Plans and Priorities] recognized 
the unique background and needs of First Nations on reserve, First Nations off reserve, Métis and 
Inuit offenders. However, this needs to be translated into concrete action, one of which is en-
suring that all Aboriginal offenders have access to cultural practices and ceremonies, such as the 
use of sweat lodges and smudging.” 
There is increasingly less capacity to meet the needs of Aboriginal offenders because of the growing 
numbers of Aboriginal offenders. A critical issue for CSC is maintaining these initiatives through ap-
propriate measures and adequate funding.332 
There is a clear theme that emerges from the passages that we have bolded. That theme is the 
substantial disconnect between strategic planning and its implementation. It is this disconnect that 
gives rise to the realities described by the Correctional Investigator in his Annual Report and sub-
mission to the Panel; the over representation of Aboriginal offenders, particularly Aboriginal 
women, in maximum security, which means prisoners often serve their sentences far away from 
their family and the valuable support of other community members, friends and supports such as 
Elders; the absence of Aboriginal programming in maximum-security institutions limiting their abil-
ity to be transferred to lower security institutions; the underrepresentation of Aboriginal offenders 
in minimum-security institutions that contributes to their being released later in their sentences 
than other prisoners; longer periods of incarceration and more statutory releases for Aboriginal 
offenders contribute to less time in the community for programming and supportive intervention 
than for non-Aboriginal offenders; the proportion of Aboriginal offenders under community super-
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vision is  significantly smaller than the proportion of non-Aboriginal offenders serving their sen-
tences on conditional release; Aboriginal offenders continue to be over-represented as a propor-
tion of offenders referred for detention and ultimately detained compared to the other offender 
groups; parole is more likely to be revoked for Aboriginal offenders than non-Aboriginal offenders 
and Aboriginal offenders are re-admitted to federal custody more frequently than non-Aboriginal 
offenders, repeating  the cycle of inequitable treatment.   
It is here that the Panel’s failure to properly review the evidence of overrepresentation becomes so 
important. Had the Panel done so and had it acknowledged that this state of affairs had been de-
scribed and condemned by the Supreme Court as a “staggering injustice”, and had it recognized 
that the root causes of this injustice have deep cultural, social and economic roots arising from our 
colonial history, how could it in all good conscience have concluded that “The Panel recommends 
that employment be the first priority in supporting Aboriginal offenders in returning to the com-
munity”. As we have discussed earlier in our response in the chapter on employment, there is no 
question that finding a job is a vital element for community reintegration and personal develop-
ment. We have also pointed out the enormous difficulties facing a correctional service in imple-
menting an effective employment strategy. It is particularly difficult for Aboriginal prisoners given 
that the communities to which many of them will be returning already suffer from some of the 
highest unemployment figures in the country. But this aside, the evidence is clear that the reasons 
why Aboriginal peoples are overrepresented in prison and underrepresented on conditional release 
cannot be explained by the simplistic notion that they are unemployed. That employment would be 
the Panel's first priority is explained not by a careful consideration of the evidence of injustice but 
by the Panel’s faith that employment, coupled with restricting prisoners to basic rights and tough-
ening up prison regimes, is the correctional wave of the future. 
Nor could the Panel in good conscience have contented itself with simply recommending that “CSC 
make resources available to respond to the specific needs of Aboriginal offender populations, such 
as further investment in correctional programming tailored specifically to their needs.” This is 
hardly the clarion call necessary to respond to a national crisis. In the absence of anything more, 
the recommendation has to compete with the many other recommendations that also call for fur-
ther resources that may and indeed been given much higher priority. Consider the investment that 
has now been committed as a result of the Roadmap for the hiring of many more security intelli-
gence officers and the deployment of more ionscan machines and drug dogs to tackle the problem 
of drugs in the institutions. Drugs in institutions are a serious problem but do not constitute a na-
tional crisis of staggering injustice. 
Had the Panel taken seriously the importance of restorative justice principles to the reintegration 
of Aboriginal offenders, how could it give the green light to CSC to ramp up security measures and 
place further burdens and injustice on community visitors in ways quite antithetical to the healing 
journey? Further, had the Panel given the necessary restitutional attention to overrepresentation 
and that Aboriginal prisoners are released later in their sentences than other prisoners, how in 
good conscience could it recommend the elimination of statutory release without any concern that 
it would almost certainly mean that Aboriginal offenders will serve even more time. It is surely little 
comfort that more of their non-Aboriginal peers will share the fate of extended imprisonment. 
A Flawed Compass              Aboriginal Offenders 
159 
 
It is not too harsh a judgment to conclude that the Panel’s recommendations, in the context of the 
systemic causes of Aboriginal overrepresentation and in conjunction for the other criminal justice 
initiatives of the Government (including restricting the availability of conditional sentences and the 
expansion of mandatory minimum sentences) provide an unintended roadmap for incarcerating 
even more Aboriginal offenders for even longer periods of time.  
As we have described, the Correctional Investigator has done his utmost, through his Annual Re-
ports, to bring to the attention of both the correctional establishment and Parliament the continu-
ing injustice facing Aboriginal prisoners. Had the Panel given this issue greater priority it might have 
invigorated the Government and CSC to pay as much attention and devote as many resource dol-
lars to redressing this problem as it has poured into anti-drug initiatives. Instead of the necessary 
invigoration we can see from the latest 2007-8 Annual Report of the Correctional Investigator that 
there is a lamentable lack of action:  
In past OCI annual reports, this Office recommended that the Correctional Service appoint a deputy 
commissioner specifically responsible for Aboriginal corrections to ensure that the Correctional Ser-
vice incorporates Aboriginal concerns into all of its operational and policy decisions at the senior lev-
el. This recommendation has not been accepted. The Correctional Service instead expanded the role 
and responsibilities of the Senior Deputy Commissioner (SDC) by adding the Aboriginal portfolio to 
his duties. Three years later, there is little evidence that this change has had the desired result. On 
the contrary, the gap in outcomes between Aboriginal and other offenders continues to grow.  
The Corrections and Conditional Release Act stipulates that the Correctional Service shall establish a 
National Aboriginal Advisory Committee to advise the Correctional Service on the provision of correc-
tional services to Aboriginal offenders. The National Aboriginal Advisory Committee has not met 
since June 2004. In response to my last annual report, the Correctional Service indicated that "work 
to select new members for the National Aboriginal Advisory Committee is underway"]. A year later, 
this Office has yet to be informed of the re-establishment of this legally required committee.333  
We continue to be concerned that the Correctional Service does not have the necessary data collec-
tion systems in place to monitor and evaluate its progress in the area of Aboriginal corrections. We 
have for years recommended that the Correctional Service publicly issue detailed quarterly reports 
analyzing key correctional outcomes for Aboriginal offenders, including transfers, segregation, dis-
cipline, temporary absences and work releases, detention referrals, delayed parole reviews, and sus-
pensions and revocations of conditional releases. The Correctional Service indicated in its Strategic 
Plan for Aboriginal Corrections that it would develop and implement an integrated monitoring sys-
tem for assessing the impact of policy and operational changes on Aboriginal offenders by March 
2007. This date has long passed, and there is no evidence of improved data collection or analysis. In 
fact, we have been advised that the Correctional Service will now produce only basic internal annual 
reports on Aboriginal offenders, as it claims trends are not significantly changing over time. Key cor-
rectional outcomes must be the subject of close and regular monitoring to evaluate progress on the 
implementation of the Strategic Plan for Aboriginal Corrections.  
In response to my last annual report, the Correctional Service stated that it uses the Departmental 
Performance Report (DPR) to "...report on progress toward the goals of the National Action Plan on 
Aboriginal Offenders"[66]. Unfortunately, the latest CSC DPR, for 2006/07, does not report on key cor-
rectional outcomes that are of concern to this Office... Therefore, parliamentarians and Canadians 
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have no way of evaluating the Correctional Service's progress, or lack thereof, in this priority area of 
concern. The lack of openness and the refusal to engage in full reporting on this critical file remain a 
serious concern to this Office.334 
10.3 Conclusion 
We want to be clear that we support many of the recommendations made by the Panel regarding 
Aboriginal programming, including the need for community-based maintenance programs that will 
allow Aboriginal offenders to sustain progress after release and beyond their sentences, increased 
partnerships with Aboriginal communities and organizations to  increase community engagement 
in correctional planning, release decision making and community supervision, a re-examination of  
the interrelationships among the use of CCRA Section 81 (Healing Lodges) and Section 84 Agree-
ments (supervision by an Aboriginal community) and the use of community correctional facilities,  
and mobilizing community capacity to develop a more holistic response to Aboriginal victimization. 
The problem is that these recommendations have not been elevated to the profile that the dimen-
sions of the injustice demands. We feel it necessary to restate that a “transformation” agenda that 
does not address, as the first priority, the staggering injustice that has been and continues to be 
inflicted on Aboriginal peoples is not one that a just society should endorse. 
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11  Physical Infrastructure and Regional Complexes 
The Panel appears to have been persuaded by the UCCO submissions that substantial redevelop-
ment of the prison infrastructure is needed in order to impose the control and disciplinary regimes 
that the union wants to see implemented. They quote from the UCCO brief: 
Ideally, new construction would…give CSC the ability to physically separate the inmate populations 
according to their security classification and commitment to their correctional plan.335 
We have already addressed in another chapter the problems with the UCCO brief and the recom-
mendations that the Panel has adopted that flow from the brief. Suffice it to say at this point that if 
the data and analysis from UCCO was seriously flawed, a plan to rebuild the entire federal prison 
infrastructure to accommodate their proposals needs to be seriously questioned. 
Neither author of this response to the Roadmap pretends to be qualified to address matters of in-
frastructure “rust-out” or prison design except in terms of some general principles where the loca-
tion and design of prisons have a bearing on human rights. We will, therefore, focus our response 
largely on the human rights considerations. That said, we recognize that no structure can last for-
ever – or should. This is particularly true of prisons that have gone through important transforma-
tions from the days of the Cherry Hill and Auburn Penitentiaries. While change is inevitable, and 
buildings become obsolete, few structures have the lasting power of the prison. We need to realize 
that any prisons built today will be with us for a very long time and it is, therefore, essential that if 
we are to avoid costly and long-lasting mistakes our plans must be based on clear correctional ob-
jectives, respect for human rights principles and solid evidence as to how design supports those 
objectives and principles.  
The human rights principles we speak of and their relationship to the architecture of prisons have 
been identified by John Paget in his recent review of human rights and prison architecture in Aus-
tralia: 
Provisions common to human rights instruments, such as equality before the law, the right to life, 
protection from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, privacy, the rights of minorities and 
humane treatment when derived of liberty will provide a set of principles against which aspects of 
prison architecture can be assessed and the quality of confinement potentially improved.336  
If the human rights that he identifies are to be relevant to corrections, then the design and location 
of prisons must give very careful consideration to them so as to avoid creating conditions where 
attempts to respect those rights are undermined by the environment. The constitutional standard 
reflected in the CCRA that CSC  use and justify the least restrictive measures demands that the 
structures that give force to the restrictive nature of the prison be developed to ensure that very 
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careful accounting of how “least restrictive measure” has been recognized. Nowhere in the Act 
does it say that administrative convenience, efficiencies or even costs trump rights.  
Paget cautions the reader that:  
All the “best practice” architecture counts for very little if the right staff are not recruited, if they are 
not thoroughly trained, if they are not effectively supervised in the execution of human rights-based 
policies and procedures, if they are not well managed and developed and if they are not inspired by 
leaders of integrity.337 
The key point here is that good management and good design must complement each other in or-
der to achieve the desired outcome. Neither can be considered in isolation of the other and if the 
Roadmap is to set in motion a process that is intended to make major changes in the “philoso-
phy”338 of prison design -to be embodied in concrete and steel – the Panel should articulate the key 
elements of that philosophy and demonstrate how it accommodates the fundamental principles 
relating to human dignity and law of human rights. In fact, other than some tenuous claims to in-
creased efficiencies, we are left to wonder what the plans they articulate tells us about their vision 
of corrections in the 21st century. 
11.1 To Build New or Replace Existing Structures 
Before considering new construction or the repair of old prisons, the bigger question that needs to 
be answered is: “what prison capacity is needed in Canada in the foreseeable future? Prisons are 
enormously expensive to build or repair and in both cases take a great deal of time to plan and im-
plement. In the case of major repair, institutions can have their routine and access to programs se-
riously interfered with for very long periods of time  - sometimes years as exemplified by the years 
of limited use and disruption that as occurred during the renovations to Collins Bay Penitentiary in 
Kingston Ontario. If new prisons are built with the intention to replace existing ones but the prison 
population grows, it is quite possible that by the time the new prison is built the old prison may 
need to continue in service. This occurred when Millhaven was built to replace the old Kingston 
Penitentiary in 1970. The demand for prison space has forced CSC to continue using the oldest fed-
eral prison in Canada even to this date. It is therefore prudent to consider likely population levels 
before building strategies should even be considered. 
Prison population levels are driven by many factors including the growth in the Canadian popula-
tion generally, especially growth in the young male population, and crime rates. However, the size 
of prison populations is also affected by public policy choices that influence how many people are 
sentenced to imprisonment and how long they stay there. The most important factors that increase 
prison population levels are those that bring to prison significant numbers of people who would 
not have been there before or lengthen the period in custody either through longer sentences or 
restrictions on gradual release. Over the last three decades in Canada the prison population levels 
as a proportion of the Canadian population generally has remained flat. In Canada, we imple-
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101. The Panel recommends that any review of 
changes to CSC’s physical infrastructure con-
sider the impact of building new correctional 
facilities in different regional locales or cor-
rectional complexes, financing these new 
capital expenses in a new way, and decom-
missioning facilities that have long served 
their usefulness.  
102. The Panel suggests that CSC look at other 
correctional jurisdictions to determine the 
operational and related cost-effective bene-
fits of building new correctional facilities in 
different regional locales or correctional 
complexes.  
103. The Panel recommends that CSC review 
standards used in the purchase of outside 
medical services in each of its regions. 
104. The Panel recommends that the govern-
ment take into consideration the importance 
of ensuring that both federal and national in-
itiatives related to health care reflect the re-
sponsibilities and accountabilities of CSC. The 
Panel suggests that the Government examine 
how health care costs are funded for federal 
offenders and either consider providing a di-
rect allocation out of Health Canada, or con-
tinue consideration of these core costs in the 
determination of CSC budgetary allocations.  
105. The Panel recommends that the two-year 
bridge funding provided by Treasury Board to 
CSC for the period of 2007–09 be extended as 
part of CSC’s normal operating allocations. 
 
mented sentencing options and principles that clearly directed judges to use imprisonment as a last 
resort. We also maintained programs of gradual release such as parole, day parole, accelerated pa-
role review and statutory release that took pressure off the prison populations. At the same time, 
in the US a plethora of legislative changes intro-
duced legions of mandatory sentencing measures 
that dramatically increased prison length while 
simultaneously sharply reducing gradual release 
options. As a result, our prison population rate 
per 100,000 of the general population increased 
only from 89 in 1974 to 116 in 2007. In the US 
during the same period, the prison population 
increased from 149 to 756.339 
Over the last 30 years crime rates have changed 
largely in tandem between the two countries. 
Property crime is about the same in both coun-
tries and violent crime, while higher in the US, 
has been on a downward trend in unison with the 
decline in violent crime in Canada.340  
The comparison between Canada and the US 
shows that while crime and general growth in the 
population has an impact on imprisonment lev-
els, public policy choices have, by far, the great-
est influence. The fact that over the last two 
years our current federal government has 
adopted what is generally described as “harsh US 
style sentencing policies” that rely heavily on 
mandatory sentences for many offences should 
be of considerable concern for those planning 
future prison accommodations. The Panel, how-
ever, makes no attempt to factor these changes 
in sentencing policies into their proposals. Not 
only did they ignore the likely impact of the shift 
towards greater reliance on longer terms of im-
prisonment through the sentencing process, they 
did not even assess the impact on levels of imprisonment arising from their own recommendations 
relation to parole, statutory release and accelerated parole review. As we write in the chapter enti-
tled Earned Parole, the Panel’s recommendations cannot help but generate sharp increases in our 
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federal prison population. The abolition of statutory release alone will remove the release mecha-
nism that is used in two-thirds of all releases and the Panel’s suggestion that their other reforms 
will result in a dramatic increase in the number of prisoners who will earn parole is unrealistic.  
 It is quite likely that with both the sentencing and releasing policies changing, the federal govern-
ment would be hard pressed to build enough prison capacity to keep up with the growing popula-
tion.  Plans to replace the existing prisons for new ones will become increasingly difficult to 
achieve. For these reasons, the discussion of addressing “rust-out” through new construction 
seems a denial of correctional reality. In fact the current policies of the government when added to 
the new recommendations of the Panel ensures that the problems associated with repair of exist-
ing prisons will continue far in to the future – even with massive new construction. The Panel’s invi-
tation to consider design justified by the need for replacement while ignoring expansion pressures 
presents both a limited and misleading picture. 
11.2 Regional Complexes  
The full recommendations of the Panel are presented in the insert but, in summary, the new pris-
ons envisaged by the Panel would be distinguishable from existing prisons primarily by a number of 
characteristics.  
The Panel proposes that the size and capacity of the new complexes would be much larger than 
any existing federal penitentiaries.  
Instead of groups of inmates with the same classification level being housed in institutions with 
capacities ranging from a few hundred to 500-600 offenders, a regional complex could house be-
tween 1500 and 2000 offenders.”341 
By building physically separate housing units within the complex while using common central ser-
vices such as kitchens, case management, administration, and possibly work programs and visiting 
facilities, distinct populations would be housed, at least at nighttimes, in separate units. 
Contrast this proposal with criteria Paget identifies as crucial to design respectful of human rights. 
Human rights is fundamentally concerned with the dignity of the individual, thus from the perspec-
tive of prison architecture the challenge is to express that idea in the built form..  What is sought is 
an understanding of first, how architecture can assist in creating a physical setting which demonstr-
ably recognises and responds to the needs of various cohorts of prisoners and their social organisa-
tion  and second, how the features of this same setting impact on prisoner behaviour and the nature 
of the custodial experience. The architectural features and building sciences which need to be ex-
amined include the overall environment of the prison, its orientation, colour, light, noise, space, tex-
ture, furniture and fittings and building materials.  
The Panel identifies what they consider to be the problems of discrete facilities in hampering effec-
tive consolidation of resources, limiting the provision of a “continuum of care” and losing econo-
mies of scale: 
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[Isolation of prisons within regions]...makes it extremely difficult to capitalize on approaches to 
manage the diverse challenges presented by the offender population. If a penitentiary is having diffi-
culties with a certain group or category of offenders, it is difficult to combine resources within a re-
gion when the facilities are separated by hundreds of kilometres. In a crisis situation or when there’s 
a need to access professional services at a different institution, the geographical separation of the 
penitentiaries creates a unique set of problems.” 342 
...In many cases, staff at the receiving penitentiary must re-start elements of the correctional plan-
ning process and valuable time is lost in managing the offender’s sentence.” 343 
...having a physical infrastructure strategy that maintains an approach of separation, economies of 
scale are lost by replicating identical management, administrative and operational structures”344 
We have no disagreement that all of these are currently problems for CSC. Our concern is the nar-
row focus that the Panel would bring to bear in addressing them and the Panel’s failure to identify 
a whole range of other issues that are crucial in redesigning the physical organization of imprison-
ment.  
The Panel gives us this profile of the proposed regional complexes:  
[They] would comprise minimum-, medium- and maximum-security accommodation areas, appropri-
ately separated within a common perimeter fence but sharing common services and/or space at dif-
ferent times. For example, common programming or vocational skills development space could be 
accessed separately by different segments of the population or food services could be provided from 
a common preparation unit.   
The presumed advantages of the proposed complexes include the following: 
 A regional complex approach would provide an opportunity to more effectively and efficiently 
manage larger groups of inmates and use a larger pool of resources to address the needs of the 
inmates in a more targeted manner.  345 
 A complex would certainly allow for a better concentration of staff to deliver select, targeted 
programs to offenders. 346  
 It is reasonable to assume that waiting lists for programs could be reduced and that offenders 
would no longer have to wait, as they do in certain cases, to be transferred to another peniten-
tiary before being able to access a program.347  
 CSC could invest in relatively sophisticated equipment to screen not only people but also vehicles 
entering the compound. Also, drug detector dogs could be used much more effectively as well.348 
 A regional complex would also be able to provide appropriate and separate accommodation for 
offenders at various security levels but provide a common management team to oversee the cor-
rectional plans and progress of offenders through their incarceration.349   
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 ... avoid unnecessary costs associated with transferring inmates, the gaps that are created by 
having a new case management team assume responsibility for an offender every time he/she is 
transferred, and worrying about having to duplicate an array of programming responses in each 
and every penitentiary, despite its size. 350  
 … the ability to reinforce an overall correctional management model that stresses offender ac-
countability to follow their correctional plans. …. Offenders would usually be maintained and 
managed within the complex but their overall location within the complex would be dictated by 
their motivation and participation in their correctional plans. Services and resources would be 
aligned within the complex based on inmate participation and motivation. 351  
 … provide an opportunity to focus resources to deal with distinct segments of the population or 
the distinct needs of segments of the population. For example, inmates who require ongoing 
physical health care needs could be housed in regional health care units thus avoiding high costs 
associated with prolonged stays in community hospitals. As well offenders with mental health 
care needs would have better access to services that are located in one facility and not thinly 
spread out between several penitentiaries.352  
 This design would also provide an opportunity to more consistently address problems associated 
with having segregation units in every maximum- and medium-security penitentiary across the 
country. A common segregation unit within a complex would provide a more consistent ap-
proach to managing the behavioural problems that a small segment of the inmate population 
regularly presents. Common approaches by properly trained staff could provide  a safer and 
more effective alternative to the smaller segregation units, which are not staffed properly, to 
motivate inmates to modify their behaviour in a positive way.353   
 Furthermore, since the offender would, as a norm, remain in the same regional complex during 
the sentence, the potential of maintaining important family ties increases.354 
 Although CSC has not had an opportunity to thoroughly identify overall cost savings associated 
with moving to a complex design approach, both the Panel and CSC believe this new approach 
would result in cost savings.355 
The advantages identified above are provided without any evidence that such advantages might 
actually be realized or any analysis of the assumptions upon which they are based. Neither is there 
any discussion of possible disadvantages. Several multiplexes already exist within the federal sys-
tem, as well as the new womens’ institutions but  the Panel does not identify any studies by CSC 
that  seek to measure whether  these do deliver the benefits that are assumed by the Panel.   Might 
some or all of the advantages the Panel identifies be contingent on the regional complex replacing 
existing prisons? Would the advantages apply to the same degree, or at all, if the complexes were 
in addition to existing prisons? Given that most of the costs of operating prisons are salary costs, 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
349  Roadmap, p.158 
350  Roadmap, p.158 
351  Roadmap, p.158 
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might we expect that the savings that might occur with more “efficient” prisons be strongly re-
sisted by the unionized staff – ultimately defeating the potential for savings? 
Among the factors ignored by the Panel are those that relate to the actual environment of the 
prison and the degree to which that environment is conducive to the personal development of 
those who live and work there. In thinking about the specifics of the prison and in particular the 
common facilities for all of the sub-prisons in the proposed complexes we would be wise to keep in 
mind Paget’s comments about “hard” and “soft” architecture.  
Institutional life is mediated by institutional architecture. Hard architecture sends a clear and nega-
tive message about society’s attitude towards its prisoners and the prevailing law and order ap-
proach. The materials of hard architecture are robust, if not industrial, and are selected on the basis 
of cost, durability and ease of maintenance, rather than aesthetics. Hard architecture lacks perme-
ability and encourages psychological withdrawal.  It also invites assault for, as Sommer (1974: 12) 
observes ‘human ingenuity can always find a way to destroy things that are physically or spiritually 
oppressive’.  
“Soft” architecture also provides a cue to behaviour.  The prison experience should encourage the 
prisoner to respect the society and its values which are reflected in the conditions of imprisonment.  
Under a human rights framework, there is no real reason why these conditions should not include the 
elimination of many of the overt symbols of incarceration, such as razor wire, to reduce the sense of 
trauma caused by sudden removal from the outside environment and placement in another which is 
so far removed from the norm.  The conditions of imprisonment should also provide, where feasible, 
for prisoner defensible space, which is defined by real and symbolic barriers that combine to bring an 
environment under a degree of control by its occupants.  This, in turn, invites personalisation, that is, 
the ability to put an individual imprint on one’s immediate surroundings, as a counter to deindividua-
tion. 356 
Recognizing that the elements of “hard” architecture may be necessary more often for high-
security prisoners than those at other levels, we should question how the notions of the less re-
strictive “soft” architecture could exist for low security inmates who would have to share many of 
the same spaces as higher- risk prisoners in a regional complex model. This is already a problematic 
feature of the new womens’ institutions where double chain link fences restictively define the 
status of “minimum security” prisoners.  
Other questions abound, such as: 
 With common areas used by different security levels, would not all those areas need to be built 
with the maximum security risk in mind – thereby subjecting lower security prisoners to more 
restrictive movement and supervision? Can that be consistent with the fundamental principle 
of least restrictive means? 
 Would the ability to invest in new drug detection hardware and dogs not mean that even those 
in  lower security would now be subject, along with their families, to far more intrusive and 
otherwise unjustified screening – along with all of the problems such searches imply as dis-
cussed in our section on Drugs? 
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 Can treatment, school or correctional staff – even administrators easily move between prisoner 
groups of various security levels and adjust to these groups in an appropriate manner or will 
they tend to act as though all were higher security prisoners? 
 Can distinct groups make use of common areas at different times (i.e., programs, recreation, 
work or visiting) without severely limiting access to these areas thereby also limiting their 
rights, programs, recreation, work or visiting activity? 
 Can the units be kept sufficiently distinct without building solid barriers between them? Will 
those in protective custody or who are otherwise vulnerable such as the mentally ill be within 
sight and sound of other prisoners – particularly when in the outdoor recreational spaces?  
 If solid barriers are used to separate populations, would those barriers serve to recreate some 
of the most oppressive environments and undermine entirely the notion of minimum security? 
 Given that prisoners today are already subjected to persistent changes of case management 
staff (frequently every few months) why should we expect that regional complexes would see 
less staff changes? 
 Might ease of transfer between security levels contribute to growth in the higher security lev-
els?  
 Might that same ease of transfer begin to compromise the procedural protections designed to 
ensure that transfers to higher security are made in accordance with the duty to act fairly and 
in accordance with fundamental principles of justice?357 
 Would a common segregation area not mean that those in segregation for their own safety 
would be subjected to the highest security regime? And how might they be reintegrated back 
into general population? Currently, several prisons in Canada are viewed as being ones where 
people who have been segregated for their protection can be more easily integrated back into 
the general population. Without such options the segregated protective custody population 
continues to grow and prisoners housed in protective custody are virtually excluded from pro-
gression to lower security and eventual parole. What will be the impact if all protective custody 
prisoners remain within the same complex? 
 Would the important advantage in the administration of smaller prisons of staff knowing the 
prisoners, and the converse, be lost in an environment with populations four to five times the 
size of today’s largest federal prisons? 
 With new prisons typically built in the more remote areas away from community services and 
professionals, might it become more difficult, rather than less difficult, to recruit sufficient spe-
cialists to meet the heavy demand of very large prison complexes? 
 Would prisons in more remote areas make access for many families even more difficult than it 
is for many now where prisons are in municipalities? Even in Kingston there is an enormous dif-
ference in accessibility between Collins Bay, which lies within the city limits and is serviced by 
city buses and Millhaven, one of the proposed sites, which is well outside the city and requires 
an expensive cab fare to reach?  
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All of these questions relate directly to the ways in which prison design has a dramatic bearing on 
how prisoners are treated and the protection of their human rights. Administrative convenience 
has always been a major counterpoint to human rights358 and a massively large institution justified 
almost entirely on the bases of administrative convenience and efficiencies could well shift the 
pressure even more against the human rights perspective. We believe we could easily make the 
case that each of the problems we have identified in the above questions is at least as valid as the 
“advantages” suggested by the Panel.  
11.3 Cost 
It is interesting to note that the only significant expenditure of the Panel to obtain objective third-
party “evidence” occurred in relation to their proposal for regional complexes.  
To validate the hypothesis as much as possible, the Panel contracted with Deloitte & Touche to inde-
pendently estimate the costs of constructing and operating a new regional complex facility versus 
the status quo.  
Overall, Deloitte & Touche concluded that although a significant level of rigour has been applied to 
developing several aspects of the cost estimates and that this has been conducted in a manner con-
sistent with CSC’s methodologies and practices, it may be possible that the analysis is overly 
weighted towards “business as usual.” That is, although the capital, operating and lifecycle esti-
mates are consistent with CSC methodologies, they may not represent the most advanced thinking, 
such as that available from other departments (for procurement timelines), jurisdictions or third- 
party advisors. The underlying assumptions for the analysis may be considered reasonable only to 
the extent that CSC baseline data and standards (such as resource indicators) are reasonable. In 
many respects, the complex may be considered a transformational business model, potentially re-
quiring new operating approaches and standards. 359 
While we applaud the Panel for seeking something more tangible than their beliefs to ground their 
recommendations in this case, there are two important observations that need to be made about 
the Deloitte & Touche report: 
1. the mandate was extremely limited – with a singular focus on cost while ignoring virtually 
all other correctional and human rights considerations, and  
2. the report’s conclusions about costs are cautious and equivocal.   
Based on the lack of clarity or conviction reflected in the Deloitte & Touche report itself, we cannot 
understand either the unbridled enthusiasm of the Panel for this proposal or the apparently un-
critical endorsement of their recommendations by the Minister and CSC.  
11.4 An Alternative Planning Approach 
It is instructive to compare the process and analysis that characterises the Panel’s rush to judgment  
on correctional regional complexes as the organizational/design paradigm  of the 21st century  with 
                                                     
358  See Michael Jackson, Justice Behind the Walls:Human Rights in Canadian Prisons for details of how Canadian pris-
ons regularly allow administrative convenience to displace human rights. 
359  Roadmap, p. 160 
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that reflected in the commissioning and construction of the Australian Capital Commission’s first 
multi level security prison, the Alexander Maconochie Centre (AMC).360  It was also the first prison 
in Australia to be conceptualised, designed and constructed under the framework of human rights 
legislation. As described by John Paget, the director of this project: 
The decision by the ACT government to proceed with the construction of the AMC and bring into law 
the Human Rights Act 2004, posed a key  question, which is that in responding to the rights of all 
prisoners and to the specific rights of those who are unwell, who are damaged, disabled or discrimi-
nated against, what would a prison designed, constructed and operated under a framework of hu-
man rights actually look like?361... 
The Preliminary Assessment for the site drew upon the Functional Brief for the AMC. Reflecting the 
fact that human rights legislation was imminent, the Assessment notes that ‘A prison in the ACT 
would reflect a Human Rights-based approach to prison management with a focus on rehabilitation 
within the context provided by the “Healthy Prison” model’. The Functional Brief was the primary 
document which informed the design of the AMC. While it was crafted in the emerging human rights 
environment, like the Preliminary Assessment, it initially sought design inspiration through an inter-
pretation of the “Healthy Prison” model adopted by Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Prisons which, in 
turn, had borrowed the concept from the World Health Organisation (WHO 1998). The elements of 
this model are that everyone is and feels safe, that is, staff, prisoners and those who work in or visit 
the prison; everyone is treated with respect as a fellow human being; everyone is encouraged to im-
prove themselves and given the opportunity to do so through access to purposeful activity; and eve-
ryone is enabled to maintain contact with their family and is prepared for release. The passing of the 
ACT Human Rights Act in late 2004 reinforced and validated this design direction of the AMC.362 
To ensure, then, that the architecture of the AMC would stand up to the inevitable criticism the Func-
tional Brief was circulated throughout Australia to correctional practitioners, architects, public and 
capital works staff, academics, inspectorial staff, mental health professionals, Indigenous people, 
and senior professional women with experience in corrections, education, health and Indigenous is-
sues. This process of “peer review” was also necessary to ensure the Functional Brief was sufficiently 
rigorous and comprehensive.363 
The Alexander Maconochie Centre is a small (300 bed) single prison complex. The Panel is propos-
ing a transformation of an entire prison system for thousands of prisoners. Any move to change the 
approach to prison construction must involve very broad and detailed consultations.  The premises 
and assumptions must be seriously challenged and the feasibility tested in terms of the human 
rights implications. The Panel has not suggested any sort of public consultation process to test or 
refine their proposals. Neither have seen any indication that CSC intends to engage in a peer review 
process. 
 
                                                     
360  Prior to its construction ACT exported its small remand and sentenced prisoners to New South Wales , a practice 
referred to as modern day transportation. 
361  Paget, p. 2 
362  Paget, p. 255 
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The Panel’s assessment is blind to the likely impact of the government’s current criminal justice 
policies, as well as to their own recommendations, on the size of future prison populations. In addi-
tion no attempt was made to consider the potential problems regional complexes might create. 
Their selective profiling of the regional complex model resembles a sales pitch more than a serious 
and thoughtful planning document. It seems ill-advised, and the antithesis of responsible correc-
tional governance, to build an infrastructure of prisons – buildings that typically last for over a hun-
dred years - on such a weak foundation. Any plan, especially one as massive and permanent as re-
gional complexes, must be seriously challenged in the planning stages if we are to avoid having 
many future generations saddled with expensive, obsolete structures. Sadly, once again, there is no 
recognition of the relevance, importance, or even the existence, of human rights and their implica-
tions for their proposed design.  
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12  Rhetoric and Reality 
One of the hard lessons the authors have learned from our collective 75 years of being involved 
in Canadian corrections is that there is often a huge gap between the rhetoric and reality of 
change. We have both repeatedly experienced events in Canadian penitentiaries, often in con-
tradiction to the law, policy and stated values of the prison system  that have been huge disap-
pointments in our quest for the humane  treatment of prisoners.  Even when governments are 
not beating the populist drum of “doing real time for real crime” by ratcheting up the pains of 
punishment, the promise of a humane prison system always seems to be out of reach. There 
are many, among both prisoners and those in free society, who would argue that the promise 
itself is an illusion, indeed a delusion that is incapable of fulfillment. Imprisonment by its nature 
– the isolation, forced confinement, loss of privacy, lost opportunities, and danger - is dehu-
manizing and humiliating. Prison is in many ways the antithesis of a respectful environment and 
it is no mystery why respect for human rights is often ignored or seen as an unnecessary en-
cumbrance.  
It was one hundred years ago that  Winston Churchill in a speech to the House of Commons 
reminded us that  our status as a civilization is measured against the degree to which our rheto-
ric and our practices place values that reflect human dignity at the foundation of our social pol-
icy.364 We take great pride as a society in our attempts to respect the human dignity of its 
members by measures which include a progressive constitution with a Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms, a professional judiciary, Medicare, free universal education, and income security 
through welfare and old age benefits. While prison is one of the most difficult environments to 
respect human dignity that means we must be ever more vigilant to ensure that the values that 
we depend on for our quality of life are extended to those in prison. We both continue to pro-
fess and advocate that a humane prison is a substantially realizable and necessary goal. The fact 
that many important steps have been taken during our working lives speaks to the fact that our 
goal is shared by many dedicated administrators and staff within the Correctional Service of 
Canada. But while the achievements are important and a matter for celebration, we must never 
lose sight of the gaps between the rhetoric and reality. The goal of living in a humane society 
cannot be surrendered - particularly in our prisons.  
12.1 Context 
A consistent and reliable Canadian barometer of change in the direction of greater protection 
of human rights is to be found in the annual reports of the Correctional Investigator. Signifi-
cantly the most recent annual report for 2007-8, publicly released in February of this year, 
marks the 35th anniversary of the establishment of the Office of Correctional Investigator and 
the present incumbent, Howard Sapers, has provided a valuable retrospective of the contribu-
tions of the Office.  
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 The Churchill speech can be  read at http://justicebehindthewalls.net/03_voices_01_01_00.html 
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The creation of any ombudsman office ... is  a recognition that even those who have committed seri-
ous crimes must have access to an independent avenue of redress to voice their concerns and ensure 
that they are subject to fair and humane treatment while in the care and custody of government offi-
cials. Through respecting the human rights of prisoners, a society conveys a strong message that eve-
ryone—regardless of their circumstances, race, social status, gender or religion—is to be treated law-
fully, with respect and dignity. 
By their nature, penitentiary systems are largely closed to the public eye and operate behind closed 
doors. Historically, there can be no doubt that this operating reality has on occasion masked unfair-
ness, inequity and even brutality from public view. Openness, transparency and accountability in cor-
rections are thus fundamental objectives to ensure that the rule of law prevails behind prison walls. 
The Office of the Correctional Investigator has contributed significantly to those three objectives in the 
last 35 years….  
In reviewing the 35-year history of the Office, the Correctional Investigator (hereafter CI) identi-
fied the common themes that emerged in the annual reports: 
 Harsh conditions and treatment of prisoners, as well as the denial of access to effective internal and 
external complaint mechanisms, can lead to violence. Introducing effective complaint mechanisms can 
alleviate tensions and reduce violence in prison.  
 Correctional culture is strong and difficult to change. Outside intervention is often not embraced, but 
it is necessary to make significant progress.  
 At times, the Office has made important recommendations that the Correctional Service has not im-
plemented until the courts, royal commissions of inquiry or other oversight agencies, such as the Ca-
nadian Human Rights Commission, have required the CSC to do so.  
 Some issues raised decades ago remain central concerns for the OCI.  
 Independent oversight and external decision-making are essential in instances where prisoners' fun-
damental rights are at stake—for example, in disciplinary and segregation decisions.  
 Segregation, formally known as dissociation—the harshest condition of confinement in a peniten-
tiary—has often played a significant role in high-profile incidents.  
 The Correctional Service has been inconsistent in applying lessons learned from serious incidents, in-




In previous chapters of our response we have addressed several of these issues, particularly 
relating to segregation and independent oversight. Two other systemic issues that have been 
the subject of particular concern of the Correctional Investigator have been the treatment of 
women offenders and the mentally ill. It was the 1995 special report of the CI arising from the 
humiliating and illegal strip searching and segregation of women in the Prison for Women in 
1994 that led to the Arbour commission and the CI’s 2003-4 report included a special section 
that focused on the increasing needs of one of the most vulnerable groups of offenders,  those 
suffering from mental illnesses. In preparing our response to the Roadmap we had initially 
thought that we would not be devoting much space to either of these issues. This was not be-
cause the issues were other than of great significance. Our reasoning was that in the case of the 
mentally ill offender the Panel had appropriately endorsed CSC's comprehensive mental health 
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strategy- one which had received broad support from the Correctional Investigator, mental 
health professionals and community organizations and was an example of principled correc-
tional intervention based on good research. That serious issues of implementation remained  to 
be resolved were identified in the most recent 2007-8 annual report of the Correctional investi-
gator but beyond joining with the CI’s recommendation that “that full implementation of the 
Correctional Service's Mental Health Strategy is urgently required” we felt that we would have 
little more to contribute.366 Indeed the Panel clearly recognized the gap between the strategy 
and its implementation making entirely appropriate recommendations in this respect.367 
On the issues of women offenders we are very aware of the immense literature on the treat-
ment of federally sentenced women in Canada. Few areas of corrections have been the subject 
of as much attention, change and criticism over the years. The issues are substantial, complex 
and in many ways unique. Our initial reason for restraint was that the Panel's mandate368, con-
trary to the mandate relating to most other topics, was very narrowly drawn and limited to only 
a commentary on the earlier report of the Glube Committee369:   
The CSC Review Panel carefully considered the recommendations of the report, Moving Forward with 
Women's Corrections, submitted by the Expert Committee chaired by the former Chief Justice of Nova 
Scotia, Constance Glube, and CSC's response to these recommendations. 
The mandate of the Glube Expert Committee was itself a limited one and unlike the Panel did 
not consider itself charged with designing a transformative agenda for Canadian corrections. 
The scope of the Glube mandate and the nature and context of the Committee’s inquiry is 
clearly set out in its report:  
  *The Committee’s+ mandate is described within a Terms of Reference annexed to this report and 
essentially asks that the Committee assess the progress achieved in women’s corrections through 
a review of CSC’s Ten-Year Status Report on Women’s Corrections.  
The Committee wishes to make clear that the approach it took to this task does not constitute an 
evidentiary investigation, forensic audit, scientific evaluation or an inquiry of the sort that has, 
on many occasions, preceded this undertaking.  
                                                     
366  “The full implementation of the Correctional Service's Mental Health Strategy is urgently required. It will en-
sure that the Correctional Service complies with its legal obligation to provide every inmate with essential 
mental health care and reasonable access to non-essential mental health care that will contribute to the in-
mate's rehabilitation and successful reintegration into the community, according to professionally accepted 
standards. Improving outcomes in this area is critical”. Annual Report of the Correctional Investigator 2007-8. 
367  Most notable in this respect are the following recommendations: 
47.  The Panel recommends that the ‘bridge funding’ approved by Treasury Board for CSC’s Mental Health 
Strategy be provided permanently to CSC so that they can implement and maintain its mental health ini-
tiatives and meet legislative obligations. 
55.  The Panel recommends that the Review  consider the overriding management principle that treatment 
and operational requirements should take place in the context of a “penitentiary within a hospital setting 
rather than a hospital within a penitentiary setting” so that a strategy and business case supporting the 
development of these facilities over the next five years can be developed. 
368  Roadmap, p. iii : “Review the recommendations made in the report Moving Forward with Women’s Correc-
tions;” 
369  Moving Forward with Women's Corrections: The Expert Committee Review of the Correctional Service of Can-
ada’s Ten-Year Status Report on Women’s Corrections, 2007 
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The Committee has chosen, in a manner consistent with the time given to meet its mandate, to 
conduct a global assessment and constructively determine what progress CSC has achieved in re-
lation to the critical studies of the past ten years.370  
The Glube Expert Committee concluded that CSC had made “remarkable progress” and made 
just six recommendations.371 The Panel having reviewing  those recommendation and  CSC's 
response endorsed them, with the exception of  the recommendation that the wardens of the 
women offender institutions report directly to the Deputy Commissioner of Women, a rec-
ommendation originally made by the Arbour Commission, and subsequently concurred in 
by the Canadian Human Rights Commission and the Correctional Investigator.372 
The Glube report in effect gave CSC an A grade in bringing about change in women's corrections 
in Canada. Given that the expert committee was chaired by a former Chief Justice of Nova Sco-
tia it would seem churlish to fault the CSC Review Panel for doing anything other than taking 
the Glube report findings at face value. At the same time, it would be unfair to criticize the 
Panel for staying within its mandate. This was why in formulating our initial response we simi-
larly felt constrained to limit our discussion to the one recommendation from the Glube report 
that the Panel rejected.- that dealing with the direct accountability of wardens to the Deputy 
Commissioner for Women.  
                                                     
370  Moving Forward with Women's Corrections: The Expert Committee Review of the Correctional Service of Can-
ada’s Ten-Year Status Report on Women’s Corrections, 2007 
371  The Glube Committee’s recommendations were: 
 1. The Committee recommends that CSC revisit the women’s corrections governance structure in order to have 
the Wardens of the women offender institutions report directly to the Deputy Commissioner of Women.  
 2. The Committee recommends that CSC put a human resource strategy in place to support its women’s correc-
tions workforce needs.  
 3. The Committee recommends that CSC make women’s community corrections a higher priority in order to 
increase opportunities for successful reintegration into the community.  
 4. The Committee recommends that CSC dedicate full-time Elders to the secure units at Edmonton and Fraser 
Valley.  
 5. The Committee recommends that CSC incorporate the need for an Aboriginal women’s healing lodge facility 
in its long-range accommodation plan on a priority basis for Eastern Canada.  
 6. The Committee recommends that   if CSC decides to discontinue operations at Isabel McNeill House every 
effort be made to retain the existing resources so that they are proportionately distributed to the women’s re-
gional facilities and used to support the orientation of newly arrived women  
372  The Panel’s recommendations were: 
  26. The Panel, overall, endorses the recommendations contained in the report “Moving Forward with Women’s 
Corrections.” 
 27. The Panel recommends that a strong functional role for the Senior Deputy Commissioner, Women be main-
tained. 
 28. The Panel endorses the approach used for women with mental health issues and was impressed by the 
Structured Living Environment (SLE) and recommends that the model should be considered for adaptation to 
men’s corrections. 
29. The Panel recognizes the importance of an independent review of the status of Women’s Corrections in 
Canada and recommends that the recommendations of the Glube Report should form the basis of a formal re-
view in five years. 
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As to the Glube report itself, it would also seem to be unreasonable to quarrel with its overall 
assessment that the changes in women's corrections since the Arbour commission have indeed 
been impressive. The report highlighted the following elements of that changed correctional 
landscape: 
For example, a Human Rights Division has been established; the Prison for Women has been 
closed; the regional facilities are now fully operational; an Aboriginal Healing Lodge for women 
has been opened; a host of women related research has been completed; cultural and gender-
specific programs have been implemented; women-only emergency response teams have been 
created; administrative segregation accountabilities have been strengthened; the Mother-Child 
Program has been introduced; community residential services have been expanded; a mental 
health strategy for women has been implemented; the Structured Living Environment Units have 
been added; and various intervention strategies have been developed to support women admit-
ted to the Secure Units now in place at the regional facilities.  
CSC has clearly applied the sometimes difficult and costly lessons learned from the earlier re-
views, to move forward with women’s corrections.  
This is most evident, in the Committee’s view, in relation to Human Rights, certainly the most 
important theme and the one that represents the foundation for this report.373  
The Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies (CAEFS) whose indefatigable advocacy role 
on behalf of federally-sentenced women  was publicly recognized by Justice Arbour , while ac-
knowledging that there have  been important changes in the physical architecture, women cen-
tered policy and research framework, programs and staff training, have maintained that “some 
of the most insidious and invidious issues” in women's corrections that were not identified in 
the Glube report, because of the expert committee’s limited mandate and reporting time 
frame, give rise to serious reservations on the reality of change for women offenders and con-
tinue to compromise the goal of respect for human rights.374 These issues include the significant 
months of delay in terms of case management, access to programs and preparation/application 
for conditional release and the conditions in the maximum-security units within the new 
women's prisons.  
In 2003, in response to the new regimes planned for the maximum security units that CSC was 
building to replace the temporary375 segregated maximum security units for women in men’s 
prisons, CAEFS advised CSC of their grave concerns that the regimes in these units would aggra-
vate, not ameliorate, threats to public safety and compromise respect for human rights: 
“We believe that responses to problems and incidents in the women's prisons that are primarily 
security-based (such as the creation of Maximum Security Units) are not only destined for failure 
but are more likely to increase, than decrease, the incidence of violence and harm. We are 
gravely concerned that the very existence of these units will create a demand for yet greater lev-
                                                     
373  Moving Forward with Women's Corrections 
374  CAEFS Annual Report 2007-8    
375 Following an escape from the new Edmonton Institution for  Women  all women classified as medium and 
maximum security prisoners were temporarily transferred into segregated maximum security units in prisons 
for men.  These temporary measures were supposed to exist for 18-24 months, but it would be  8 years before 
separate maximum security units were constructed and operational in all the new women’s institutions. 
A Flawed Compass             Rhetoric and Reality 
177 
 
els of static security, which will in turn result in even further increases in the use of force and sys-
temic oppression and repression - all of which will be to the further detriment of everyone who 
lives and works in the women's prisons. The spill over of these approaches will also further nega-
tively impact on the broader community and will undoubtedly heighten public safety concerns.  
CAEFS is of the view that there needs to be a clear recognition that a security-based response 
to women's behaviour too often results in an inhumane response and consequent exacerba-
tion of what are characterized as "behavioural problems". Paradoxically, this entire approach 
tends to increase, rather than decrease, any real or perceived risk of harm to both prisoners and 
staff.  
We believe that the design of the units, together with the explicit condoning of the use of 
force, deprivation, physical and emotional punishment, strip searches and solitary confine-
ment, throughout the remainder of the document is inconsistent with creating a safe and hu-
mane "quality care environment".  
We are concerned about the creation of new degrees or sub-classifications within the maximum 
security designation and oppose the use of instruments of restraint on women prisoners as they 
move about within the prisons. The use of restraints on women classified maximum security 
prisoners will heighten their own emotions and reactions and will likely exacerbate and/or cre-
ated an unnecessary climate of fear amongst the women prisoners who form the general prison 
population towards the women segregated in the maximum security units.  
Particularly in light of the proven success of the first peer support teams at the Prison for Women 
in Kingston, and the modelling of these by CSC in the regional prisons for women, we cannot un-
derstand the rationale for an absolute ban on such a support option. Peer support, whether rec-
ognized by prison administrators or not, is one of the most significant and successful crisis pre-
vention and intervention approaches available to most federally sentenced women.376 
The UK Prison Inspectorate described one aspect of the conditions in the new maximum secu-
rity units in its 2005 report:     
 “Within the maximum security classification there were four levels of security applied to women 
when they were escorted off the unit. These levels were a measurement of progress, improved 
behaviour, reduced risk and proximity to reducing to medium security. Movement from level one 
through to level four was recommended by the interdisciplinary team. Level one women were 
moved off the unit in handcuffs and leg irons and escorted by two staff. However, whatever their 
level, all women on the unit were unlocked with all others on their pod without staff supervision. 
The contrast between this and the requirement for some to be moved in leg irons and handcuffs 
seemed marked and anomalous. We did not consider the level of risk posed by any of the women 
justified the use of leg irons which was degrading… Rule 33 of the United Nations Standard 
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners says that: 'Chains or irons shall not be used except 
in a number of defined circumstances, including as precaution against escape during a transfer 
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or to prevent self-injury. Despite this, the use of leg irons was a national practice, and we did not 
consider their use was appropriate.”377 
Of particular concern to CAEFS and the subject of a communication with the UN Human Rights 
Committee was CSC’s special management protocol for those women who are identified as the 
most disruptive to institutional order.378 There are currently five women on the Protocol, four 
are of Aboriginal ancestry and one is of African Nova Scotian ancestry.  The only woman re-
leased from the protocol into the community at her warrant expiry date, has experienced many 
challenges, but has not gone on to commit the heinous crimes predicted by CSC. 
The conditions of confinement under the protocol are more stringent than those of men in the 
Special Handling Units and many of the behavioural standards set in these protocols are virtu-
ally impossible to meet. It is like a purgatory of segregation where every time a prisoner takes a 
step forward and moves to a lesser level of restrictive segregation, they are so closely scruti-
nized that they end up moving back up a level because nothing but excellent behaviour would 
allow them to continue on the path of lesser restrictions.  The first young Aboriginal woman 
subjected to the ‘protocol’ has described the features of this highly restrictive regime : 
It was during my fourth year, when I was the first federal female to be placed on the “Manage-
ment Protocol” for a fight that allegedly involved a weapon. The Management Protocol was de-
veloped for “high risk women that pose a significant threat to the security of the Institution”. The 
Union of Canadian Correctional Officers had been urging CSC to construct a Special Handling 
Unit for Women. However, the Management Protocol was developed “as an alternative to a 
S.H.U for women”. There are three steps that govern the Management Protocol” 
1. Segregation: the guideline states that although there are no fixed time-frames, it should 
take a minimum of 6 months for a woman to complete all three steps of the Protocol. 
2. Partial reintegration: a woman still resides in the segregation unit but is given increased 
privileges and gradual interaction with others. 
                                                     
377  Report on announced inspection in Canada by HM Chief Inspector of Prisons for England and Wales:  
Grand Valley Institution for Women, 2005 paras 6.23 and 6.42, online at http://www.csc-
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independent statutory body, set up in 1981 to inspect and report on conditions in prisons and the treatment 
of prisoners. 
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3. Movement to a regular cell: a woman is moved onto a range and retains all privileges of 
a regular Maximum Security inmate. Movement off the Max Unit is not permitted. This is 
the only step of the Management Protocol that has a fixed time-frame. Three months of 
stable behaviour along with a recommendation from a woman’s Case Management 
team is required. The recommendation is then sent to the Warden who decides whether 
or not to discharge a woman from the Protocol. Although the Management Protocol 
states that “all policies, procedures, and legal entitlements of the Administrative Segre-
gation Commissioner’s Directive will be adhered to”, this is not the case. The Manage-
ment Protocol and the Administrative segregation directive overlap and contradict both 
policies, procedures, and entitlements. For example, the Admin. Seg. Directive states that 
inmates retain the same privileges and entitlements as those in the general population, 
with the exception of security requirements. The Management Protocol states that all 
items/ privileges will be considered based on risk assessments. CSC officials have used 
this guideline in the Protocol to control items such as toilet paper, basic hygiene items 
(soap, toothpaste, etc) and rights such as confidential legal calls and the right to contact 
family. Some Institutions take the “observation” aspect of the Protocol literally by post-
ing female guards to observe women take a shower and during recreation.  
Given that CSC claims the Federal institutions for women do not have the proper infrastructure 
to house/manage women on the Protocol, plans have been made to expand upon the “security 
requirements”.  In one Institution, a Plexiglas interview room was built to accommodate “safe in-
teractions” between state and Management Protocol women. Management officials have ad-
vised the Protocol women there are plans to build more of the Plexiglas/ secure interview rooms 
for each of the Protocol women. These newly developed interview rooms conjure up macabre 
images of the new female “Hannibal” that CSC is essentially propagating.  One need only look at 
the durations the women have spent on the Management Protocol to deduce it is not a success-
ful OR humane model of confinement. I find it reprehensible that the group of women who de-
signed the Management Protocol with the “special needs of women offenders taken into consid-
eration” cannot even meet with us. Perhaps they don’t want to confront the ghosts of women 
their brilliant Protocol has reduced the women to.379 
This prisoner’s reference to the “ghosts of women” has now taken on an added ghastly signifi-
cance that should stir the conscience of Canadians. Although not a protocol case, the grave 
concerns expressed by CAEFS that the Service has not found an appropriate way to manage the 
custody of women with the most severe behavioural problems and mental health challenges 
has been brought into the sharpest and indeed shocking relief as a result of the release of a 
special report of the Correctional Investigator on the death of 19-year-old Ashley Smith at 
Grand Valley Institution in 2007. This CI’s report, like his previous report in 1995 and the Arbour 
report regarding the incidents at the Prison for Women, raises profound questions as to the 
strength of CSC's commitment to a culture of respect for the human rights of offenders and 
demonstrates why this particular incident cannot be so easily dismissed as an isolated break-
down in an otherwise robust system. Many important changes in corrections, particularly in re-
spect to human rights, were motivated by tragic and horrible failures. For that reason, coupled 
with the Panel’s failure to understand or recognize this vital lesson of history, we deem it nec-
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essary to review the circumstances leading to the death of Ashley Smith. In our opinion the 
agonizing death of this nineteen year old in federal custody illustrates powerfully the fatal flaw 
of the Panel’s vision for corrections, by pointing to larger issues that can only be redressed by a 
roadmap that places human rights protection at the centre, not the periphery, of institutional 
transformation.  
 
12.2 Ashley Smith and the Implications for Human Rights 
12.2.1 What Happened 
The circumstances of Ashley Smith’s death are described in these few damning words: 
On October 19, 2007, at the age of 19, Ms. Smith was pronounced dead in a Kitchener, Ontario 
hospital.  She had been an inmate at Grand Valley Institution for Women (GVI) where she had 
been kept in a segregation cell, at times with no clothing other than a smock, no shoes, no mat-
tress, and no blanket.  During the last weeks of her life she often slept on the floor of her segre-
gation cell, from which the tiles had been removed.  In the hours just prior to her death she spoke 
to a Primary Worker of her strong desire to end her life.  She then wrapped a ligature tightly 
around her neck cutting off her air flow.  Correctional staff failed to respond immediately to this 
medical emergency, and this failure cost Ms. Smith her life.380  
There can be no dispute that Ashley Smith was a difficult, disturbed and challenging prisoner. 
After a stormy experience with the New Brunswick social agencies and youth authorities she 
was sentenced to closed custody at age 16 after which she incurred 50 additional criminal 
charges, many of which were related to her response to incidents in which correctional or 
health professionals were attempting to prevent or stop her self-harming behaviours. As a re-
sult she spent extensive periods of time isolated in the “Therapeutic Quiet Unit” (i.e., segrega-
tion) at that facility. In January 2006, still on segregation status at the youth facility, Ms. Smith 
turned 18 years of age.  Unfortunately, Ms. Smith's challenging behaviours continued and she 
found herself once again in criminal court in October 2006 for offences committed against cus-
todial staff. The presiding judge gave Ms. Smith an adult custodial sentence for the new of-
fences. Because the merged adult sentence was more than two years, Ms. Smith was trans-
ferred to Nova Institution for Women - a federal penitentiary - on October 31, 2006.381 Her year 
in federal custody proved to be as turbulent as her previous incarceration:    
While in federal custody over 11.5 months, Ms. Smith was involved in approximately 150 security 
incidents, many of which revolved around her self-harming behaviours. These incidents consisted 
of self-strangulation using ligatures and some incidents of head-banging and superficial cutting 
of her arms.  Whenever attempts to negotiate the removal of a ligature failed, staff would (on 
most occasions) enter Ms. Smith's cell and use force, as required, to remove it.  This often in-
volved the use of physical handling, inflammatory spray, or restraints.  Ms. Smith was generally 
non-compliant with staff during these interventions.  
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In the space of less than one year, Ms. Smith was moved 17 times amongst and between three 
federal penitentiaries, two treatment facilities, two external hospitals, and one provincial correc-
tional facility. 
 Nine of the above 17 moves of Ms. Smith were institutional transfers that occurred across four 
of the five CSC regions.  The majority of these institutional transfers occurred in order to ad-
dress administrative issues such as cell availability, incompatible inmates and staff fatigue, and 
had little or nothing to do with Ms. Smith's needs.  Each transfer eroded Ms. Smith's trust, esca-
lated her acting out behaviours and made it increasingly more difficult for the Correctional Ser-
vice to manage her. 
12.2.2 Mental Health Issues 
Like the incidents at the Prison for Women in 1994, those in 2007 at Grand Valley were not just 
individual lapses.   
In order to fully appreciate the circumstances of Ms. Smith's death, it is important to isolate the 
larger systemic issues that existed within the federal correctional system during Ms. Smith's pe-
riod of incarceration.  These systemic issues contributed to the environment that permitted the 
individual failures to manifest themselves - with fatal consequences.  Sadly, these systemic con-
cerns are well known to the Correctional Service and have been the subject of previous comment 
from this Office.382  
The Correctional Investigator identified serial and cumulative problems with Ms. Smith’s treat-
ment, starting with the failure to respond to her mental health needs, reflecting a stunning and 
ultimately fatal  gulf between the rhetoric and reality of CSC’s new mental health strategy: 
 Ms. Smith had significant mental health issues.  This fact was well known to the Correctional 
Service prior to Ms. Smith's arrival at the Nova Institution for Women.  In addition, the Cor-
rectional Service knew that: Ms. Smith had been in a segregated status since 2003 at the 
Miramichi Youth Detention Centre, with no significant periods in open population;  
 confinement had had a detrimental effect on Ms. Smith's overall well-being;    
 Despite this information, the Correctional Service placed Ms. Smith on administrative segre-
gation status - under a highly restrictive, and at times, inhumane regime - and maintained 
her on this status during her entire period of incarceration.  
 In addition, despite having Ms. Smith in its custody for over 11 months, and despite having 
access to previous mental health records, the Correctional Service never made any advance-
ments in its treatment of Ms. Smith.  A concrete, comprehensive treatment plan was never 
put into place for this young woman, despite almost daily contact with institutional psy-
chologists.  The attempts that were made to obtain a full psychological assessment were 
thwarted in part by the Correctional Service's decisions to constantly transfer Ms. Smith from 
one institution to another.  As a result, she was never in one place long enough to complete 
an assessment and to develop a treatment plan.  Each transfer further eroded any possibility 
of establishing a therapeutic relationship with Ms. Smith and negatively impacted on her 
willingness to co-operate with treatment staff.  
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 Without a full and proper diagnosis, the Correctional Service was working in the dark.  In ad-
dition, most of the front-line staff, correctional managers and senior mangers lacked the 
specialized mental health training required to adequately assess or address Ms. Smith's be-
haviours.  
 What mental health care Ms. Smith did receive differed from one institution to another; 
there was no consistency.  In fact, some of the interventions that were put into place for 
Ms. Smith actually served to exacerbate her behaviours and worsen her condition rather 
than to assist her.  With time, Ms. Smith's self-injurious behaviours (primarily tying a ligature 
around her neck) became more frequent and increased in severity.  This, in turn, triggered 
even more security-focused responses from the Correctional Service.  
 In the weeks prior to her death, Ms. Smith spent all of her time in a security gown, in a poorly 
lit segregation cell, interacting with staff only through a tiny food slot and with absolutely 
nothing to occupy her time.  A few days prior to her death, an institutional psychologist rec-
ognized that Ms. Smith's mental health had further deteriorated.  At that point she was al-
lowed out of her segregation cell for brief periods of time in an attempt to establish mean-
ingful interaction with staff. 
 Since Ms. Smith's death, the independent psychologist contracted by the Correctional Ser-
vice to review Ms. Smith's treatment during incarceration has interpreted Ms. Smith's self-
injurious behaviour in part as a means of drawing staff into her cell in order to alleviate 
the boredom, loneliness and desperation she had been experiencing as a result of her pro-
longed isolation.  This behaviour was Ms. Smith's way of adapting to the extremely diffi-
cult and increasingly desperate reality of her life in segregation. On eight occasions, 
Ms. Smith was certified under provincial mental health legislation and was admitted to psy-
chiatric facilities; however, she was usually released after a very short period of time without 
having been fully assessed or meaningfully treated.  This left the Correctional Service with a 
dilemma because its own Mental Health Strategy for Women, and its Intensive Interven-
tion Strategy for Women were not appropriately designed or resourced to provide assis-
tance to women who required specialized mental health care and intervention.  
 Things went from bad to worse at GVI.  Senior managers who had limited mental health ex-
pertise drafted, and then redrafted management plans for Ms. Smith. These plans largely ex-
cluded the input of those who should have been best suited to provide Ms. Smith with pro-
fessional assistance, namely, the mental health care staff and physical health care staff.  As 
a result, the plans were largely security-focused, lacked mental health components, and 
were often devoid of explicit directions for addressing Ms. Smith's on-going self-harming be-
haviours.  In addition, these plans were not properly communicated to front-line staff - the 
very people who were responsible for monitoring Ms. Smith and for ensuring her safety and 
well-being.  
 With misinformed and poorly communicated decisions as a backdrop, Ms. Smith died - 
wearing nothing but a suicide smock, lying on the floor of her segregation cell, with a liga-
ture tied tightly around her neck - under the direct observation of several correctional 
staff.383 
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12.2.3 Transfer Issues 
A second failure of law and policy was the manner in which Ms. Smith was shuttled from one 
institution to another, a total of 17 times in less than a year. Section 87 of the CCRA requires 
that all decisions (including transfer decisions) taken by the Correctional Service take into con-
sideration the health status of an inmate. More specifically, Commissioner's Directive 843 - Pre-
vention, Management and Response to Suicide and Self-Injuries clearly prohibits the transfer of 
inmates considered imminently suicidal or self-injurious to an institution other than a treat-
ment facility unless the psychologist managing the case deems the transfer a necessity to re-
duce or eliminate an inmate's potential for suicide or self-injury.384 The CI concluded that Ms. 
Smith’s transfers were made with no proper consideration of these requirements and  
Given that Ms. Smith's mental health needs went unaddressed, that she was actively involved 
in self-injurious behaviour, and that she was almost constantly on suicide watch, it is my con-
clusion that the sheer number of transfers to which she was subjected were not only inappro-
priate, but beyond comprehension.385 
12.2.4 Segregation Issues 
Ashley Smith’s continuous administrative segregation status was a third feature of her impris-
onment that the Correctional Investigator found to be in violation of relevant law and policy as 
well as compounding her inhumane confinement: 
I find that the regime put into place to manage her behaviours was overly restrictive.  She had 
very little positive human contact.  She was provided with very few opportunities for meaningful 
and purposeful activity.  She spent long hours in a cell with no stimulation available - not even a 
book or piece of paper to write on.  
What is most disturbing about the Correctional Service's use of this overly-restrictive form of seg-
regation is the fact that the Correctional Service was aware - from the outset - that Ms. Smith 
had spent extensive periods of time in isolation while incarcerated in the province of New Bruns-
wick, and that confinement had been noted as detrimental to her overall well-being[3].  Despite 
this knowledge, the Correctional Service's response to Ms. Smith's significant needs was to do 
more of the same. 
There is no evidence to suggest that subsequent to her transfer out of the Prairie Regional Psy-
chiatric Centre in April 2007, the Correctional Service ever seriously considered an alternative to 
keeping Ms. Smith on perpetual administrative segregation status, despite the fact that segrega-
tion had done nothing to address her behaviours.  
There is a legal requirement for the Correctional Service to review all cases of inmates who are 
placed on administrative segregation status at the 5-days, 30-days, and 60-days marks.  The 
purpose of these reviews is to closely examine the impact of segregation on the inmate, to de-
termine whether continued placement on this status is appropriate, and to carefully explore and 
document possible alternatives to continued segregation.  
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42.       The legal requirement to review a segregation placement at the 60-days mark extends 
the segregation review process beyond the institution and requires regional authorities to en-
sure compliance with law and policy.  In the case of Ms. Smith, 60-days regional reviews were 
not conducted even though she remained on segregation status for almost one year.  The fail-
ure to review Ms. Smith's segregation status at the 60-days mark was in contravention of sec-
tion 22 of the CCRR and paragraphs 29-32 of the Commissioner's Directive 709 - Administrative 
Segregation.   
43.       The required regional reviews were never conducted because each institution erroneously 
"lifted" Ms. Smith's segregation status whenever she was physically moved out of a CSC facility 
(e.g., to attend criminal court, to be temporarily admitted to a psychiatric facility, or to transfer 
to another correctional facility).  This occurred even though the Correctional Service had every in-
tention of placing Ms. Smith back on segregation status as soon as she stepped foot back into a 
federal institution.  This totally unreasonable practice had the effect of stopping and starting 
"the segregation clock", thereby negating any review external to the institution on the con-
tinuation of the placement in segregation.  This in turn assisted in reinforcing the notion that 
segregation was an acceptable method of managing Ms. Smith's challenging behaviours.386 
12.2.5 Use of Force  
It was the extraordinary manner in which force was deployed against Ms. Smith that drew the 
CI’s strongest condemnation:  
Ms. Smith's self-injurious behaviour either took the form of superficially cutting herself, head-
banging or, most frequently, fashioning a ligature out of material and then tying it around her 
neck.  As stated above, although these behaviours were maladaptive and dangerous, they could 
be understood in part as a means of drawing staff into her cell in order to alleviate the boredom, 
loneliness and desperation she had been experiencing as a result of her constant isolation.  
 Initially, staff responded immediately to the presence of tools for self-harm. For example, staff 
often attempted to negotiate with Ms. Smith to hand over pieces of glass, screws or actual liga-
tures.  When this failed, staff would enter Ms. Smith's cell and use physical force to remove these 
items.  In fact, there were well over 150 incidents which resulted in staff using force against 
Ms. Smith for these reasons. There were days when multiple staff interventions took place and 
when the Institutional Emergency Response Team was deployed in order to prevent Ms. Smith 
from harming herself 
Over time, Ms. Smith's behaviours began to exhaust front-line staff.  For example, during an in-
stitutional visit in June 2007, my staff was advised that Ms. Smith would often "play with liga-
tures" (e.g., tie it in a bow-like fashion) and then taunt staff with it.  There were also times when 
she would wrap a ligature around her neck, hide herself from view (e.g., under her security gown 
or mattress), or lie face down on the floor and "pretend" to be unconscious, and then she would 
assault staff once they had entered her cell to cut off the ligature.  Some staff had begun to 
perceive this as a dangerous game that Ms. Smith was playing and they indicated that they were 
growing more and more uncertain as to when to intervene in these situations. 
Having become aware of this situation, my staff contacted the CSC's Women Offender Sector at 
National Headquarters to organize a conference call with that sector and NHQ …During the call, 
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the necessity of responding immediately to Ms. Smith's ligature use was discussed.  My staff 
were advised by CSC that an intervention plan had been created for Ms. Smith and that front-line 
staff had been engaged and informed of how to best intervene - from a therapeutic perspective - 
with Ms. Smith. 
Despite these discussions evidence indicates that by mid-August 2007, some staff at Nova Insti-
tution for Women shifted from removing ligatures from Ms. Smith as soon as one was visible, to 
permitting her to retain ligatures in her possession for extended periods of time.  It is not clear at 
this time why this shift in approach occurred, however, it appears that it was related to factors 
such as staff fatigue, the over-reliance on largely security-focused intervention approaches, and 
a misinterpretation of the Situation Management Model (SMM). 
It is clear that given Ms. Smith's history of self-harm, staff should have been intervening to re-
move any tool of self-harm - in as humane a fashion as possible - as soon as they became aware 
of its presence.  In my opinion, the "wait and see" approach undertaken at Nova Institution for 
Women was a misapplication of the SMM.  Preventing harm and preserving life should have 
been the overriding principles governing staff interventions.  
When Ms. Smith was transferred to GVI in August 2007, the above "wait and see" approach con-
tinued.  More specifically, evidence shows that senior managers at GVI were directing staff to 
strictly adhere to the SMM by "assessing and reassessing" Ms. Smith whenever she had tied a li-
gature around her neck.  Video evidence indicates that there were times at GVI when 
Ms. Smith would turn blue, have trouble breathing, and break blood vessels from her ligature 
use, before staff would physically intervene.  When these incidents were reviewed at the insti-
tutional level, there was no commentary in the Use of Force documentation from Health Care, 
Psychology or the Institutional Security Officer about these untimely staff interventions.  In 
fact, documentation indicates that the opposite was true: senior managers at GVI had discip-
lined front-line staff for intervening too early when Ms. Smith had tied a ligature around her 
neck, even though she appeared to be in medical distress. 
There were also times when front-line staff had made the decision that Ms. Smith required 
immediate assistance, however correctional managers ordered the staff to not intervene.  In 
one incident, a correctional manager physically prevented a staff member from entering 
Ms. Smith's cell to provide assistance.  
It is my view that these incidents and the action taken by senior managers represent a gross mi-
sinterpretation of both the Situation Management Model and the Correctional Service's duty to 
provide safe and humane custody.  This set the stage for considerable uncertainty on the part of 
front line staff and this had tragic results.387  
12.3 Effects of Segregation 
We have read and reread these paragraphs and struggled to understand the rationale for CSC's 
strategy of non-intervention. More than any case in our collective memory it illustrates the fail-
ure to integrate the dual roles of the Service for control and assistance within a legal culture 
that gives ultimate priority to respect for inherent human dignity. In words of its own creation 
the Mission Statement of CSC “clearly directs *CSC+ to actively encourage and assist offenders in 
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reintegrating as law-abiding citizens while maintaining control. Our aim is to assist and encour-
age to the extent that it is possible and to control to the extent that it is necessary.”388 Faced 
with a young woman, whose behaviour was enormously difficult to ‘control’ the Service seem-
ingly lost sight of its responsibility to assist. If Ashley Smith was a danger to anyone, it was to 
herself.  
The need for someone in a position to assist and step between Ashley and herself was lost. The 
very act of waiting and watching her self-destruct brings into focus the inhuman aspects of con-
trol. But In order to assist someone you must first recognize their shared humanity. It is the 
natural and necessary counter-weight to prevent control measures escalating to abuse of au-
thority.  In Ashley Smith’s case, was extreme isolation intended to improve her behaviour? Did 
management believe that it would frighten her if no one came into her cell and make her stop 
self-strangulating of her own accord? Was it intended to teach her a lesson? Was it purely a 
measure to protect staff? Whatever the rationale, it was clearly not helping her. Whose job 
then was it to help her? Why could no one be assigned to spend the day with her in her cell, or 
the yard, or in close proximity rather than on the other side of a food slot? Is it to be believed 
that there was really no psychiatrist, psychologist, empathic staff member, peer counsellor or 
community advocate who could reach out and touch her? 
 We have come to the conclusion that it was the correctional managers’ view, filtered through 
the lens of power and control, that Ms. Smith's noncompliant and self-destructive behaviour 
was a matter of choice; to change and control that behaviour and render her compliant and 
manageable the staff should do nothing to reinforce or reward her ill-conceived attempts to 
gain attention. This  had already been taken to what we would have thought to be the  extreme 
of letting her choke herself to the point of turning blue and have trouble breathing but  on Oc-
tober 17, 2007 she was allowed, with the staff standing by, to strangle herself to death. In ef-
fect the correctional service, with the full coercive power of the state behind it, played ‘chicken’ 
with Ashley Smith’s life and she lost.  
Since the CI’s report was written more disturbing evidence has emerged in a 142-page tran-
script of the cross-examination of Grand Valley’s security intelligence officer at the preliminary 
hearing for four GVI employees charged with criminal negligence in Ms. Smith's death. The new 
details bolster allegations that Ms. Smith's 2007 death occurred amid efforts by correctional 
managers to contain the amount of paperwork generated by her near-daily attempts at self-
harm. The officer said the warden in the spring of 2007 told her to tailor some reports so they 
wouldn't be considered as involving force. "I was directed to classify it as a different classifica-
tion." 389 
If the staff of CSC interpreted Ashley Smith’s suicidal behaviour as an attempt to resist their au-
thority and control, the independent psychologist contracted by the Correctional Service to re-
view Ms. Smith's treatment during incarceration had a different view. That psychological review 
saw Ms. Smith's self-injurious behaviour in part as a means of drawing staff into her cell in or-
                                                     
388  Introduction to the Mission Statement, reproduced in Our Story: Organizational Renewal in Federal Correc-
tions, Ottawa: Correctional Service of Canada, 1991, p.237 
389  Globe and Mail March 11, 2009 
A Flawed Compass             Rhetoric and Reality 
187 
 
der to alleviate the boredom, loneliness and desperation she had been experiencing as a result 
of her prolonged isolation.  
CSC did not have to wait until after Ashley Smith's death to realize the dynamics involved in her 
behaviour. The damaging psychological effects of prolonged segregation under the conditions 
prevailing in Canadian segregation units had been identified and repeatedly condemned in the 
Canadian literature over the least 35 years. In 1975 in the McCann case the conditions in the 
segregation unit the B.C. penitentiary were found to constitute cruel and unusual punishment 
and treatment by the Federal Court of Canada.390 Michael Jackson has  described the nature of 
the relationship between prisoners and staff in segregation units in the 1970s in a way that 
seems to fairly capture what was  happening in the segregation unit in which Ashley Smith was 
confined over 30 years later; 
There is a perverse symbiotic relationship between guards and prisoners in [segregation]. The 
guards, by perceiving the prisoners as the most dangerous and violent of [wo]men, can justify to 
themselves the intensity of the surveillance and the rigours of detention. Prisoners, by respond-
ing to that perception of dangerousness with acts of defiance, have at least one avenue of as-
serting their individuality and their autonomy, of making manifest their refusal to submit. The 
treadwheels of the 19th-century penitentiaries are no longer with us, but in [segregation] we 
have created a psychological treadwheel put into motion and maintained by ever-increasing hos-
tility and recrimination.391  
One of the expert witnesses in the McCann case, Dr. Stephen Fox, testified that the purpose 
behind the rigor of the regime in segregation was to induce compliance with institutional rules 
and correctional authority. “It is designed, I believe, not so much for security purposes but to 
show that on instant demand you will comply, that you will not move a muscle that is not de-
manded, that is not requested, in the belief, of course, that compliance will move into the 
street.”392  
Dr. Fox testified that the effect of this was to reduce the prisoner to a state where he had no 
self-respect, no identity, and no dignity. However,  
“…to relinquish, to admit to the psychological suicide of non-identity, is essentially to violate all 
conceivable meaning in the evolution of mankind ...To come to have no meaning, to come to be 
nothing, is essentially the greatest human suffering, that is to say, it ultimately leads to insanity 
and suicide.”393  
The Globe and Mail captured the horrifying effectiveness of escalating the intensity of segrega-
tion, “Only by killing herself could Ms. Smith draw attention to her humanity.394 
The psychological effects of long-term segregation were also the subject of evidence before the 
Arbour commission from CSC's own psychologists who were working at the time in the Prison 
for Women. As described by Justice Arbour: 
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In October of 1994, the prison’s psychologists advised the prison staff of the psychological ill ef-
fects being suffered by the women. Their report read:  
If the current situation continues it will ultimately lead to some kind of crisis, including vio-
lence, suicide and self-injury. They will become desperate enough to use any means to assert 
some form of control of their lives. The constant demands to segregation staff [are] related 
to needs for external stimulation and some sense of control of their lives.395 
In her report Justice Arbour made these findings on the management of the segregation unit 
and the segregation process at the Prison for Women:  
The prolonged segregation of the inmates and the conditions and management of their segrega-
tion was again, not in accordance with law and policy, and was, in my opinion, a profound failure 
of the custodial mandate of the Correctional Service. The segregation was administrative in 
name only. In fact it was punitive, and it was a form of punishment that courts would be loathe 
to impose, so destructive are its consequences . . .  
There was no effort on the part of the prison to deal creatively with their reintegration. There 
were no programs available to them, and they were left idle and alone in circumstances that 
could only contribute to their further physical, mental and emotional deterioration…  The bitter-
ness, resentment and anger that this kind of treatment would generate in anyone who still al-
lows herself to feel anything, would greatly overweigh the short-term benefits that their removal 
from the general population could possibly produce . . .  
If prolonged segregation in these deplorable conditions is so common throughout the Correc-
tional Service that it failed to attract anyone’s attention, then I would think that the Service is de-
linquent in the way it discharges its legal mandate.396  
Now, 13 years since the Arbour Report, 10 years since the Task Force on Segregation, a 19 year 
old girl dies in a bare segregation cell. For those who would argue that the inhumane and de-
plorable conditions endured by segregated prisoners in the B.C. Penitentiary in the 1970’s and 
in the Prison for Women in the 1990’s can safely be consigned to the lessons of history, the 
Correctional Investigator’s findings stand as an indictment of the failure of the Correctional Ser-
vice of Canada to take those lessons seriously.  
12.3.1 The Panel’s Consideration of Segregation 
We have in Chapter 5 criticized the Panel’s partial and inadequate scrutiny of administrative 
segregation. We faulted the Panel on several grounds; failing to acknowledge the documented 
historical record of abuse, and encouraging CSC to toughen up the conditions to discourage 
prisoners from seeking admission to voluntary segregation. Of particular note however, was the 
Panel’s failure to challenge CSC’s unwillingness to introduce independent adjudication of segre-
gation decisions, in the face of the repeated recommendations from Justice Arbour, a Parlia-
mentary Subcommittee, the Canadian Human Rights Commission, the Office of the Correctional 
Investigator, the Canadian Bar Association and many others. In his report on the death of Ash-
ley Smith the Correctional Investigator bears witness to the consequences of that recalcitrance: 
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I believe strongly that a thorough external review of Ms. Smith's segregation status could very 
likely have generated viable alternatives to her continued and deleterious placement on such a 
highly restrictive form of confinement.  There is reason to believe that Ms. Smith would be alive 
today if she had not remained on segregation status and if she had received appropriate care. An 
independent adjudicator - as recommended by Justice Arbour - would have been able to under-
take a detailed review of Ms. Smith's case and could have caused the Correctional Service to rig-
orously examine alternatives to simply placing Ms. Smith in increasingly restrictive conditions of 
confinement. At that point, if it had been determined that no immediate and/or appropriate al-
ternatives to segregation were available for Ms. Smith, the independent adjudicator could have 
caused the Correctional Service to expeditiously develop or seek out more suitable, safe and hu-
mane options for this young woman.397  
12.4 Grievances 
As with the need for independent adjudication for those placed in segregation, the importance 
of a fair, timely and responsive grievance system has been a theme of royal commissions, Par-
liamentary committees and government task forces. The CCRA now requires that CSC establish 
“a procedure for fairly and expeditiously resolving offenders' grievances”.398 The difficulty CSC 
has had in living up to the law’s promise has been a recurrent theme of the Annual Reports of 
the Correctional Investigator. The 1994-95 annual report detailed the continuing "excessive de-
lay, defensiveness and non-commitment" of the Service, especially at the National Headquar-
ters level, and concluded with this observation:  
The Service's responses over the course of this reporting year are consistent with their past per-
formances. The responses have avoided the substance of the issues at question including a fail-
ure to address the specific observations and recommendations contained in last year's Annual 
Report. The responses are defensive, display little if any appreciation for the history or signifi-
cance of the issues at question and provide at best a further string of endless promises of future 
action, with no indication as to expected results or how the results of these proposed actions will 
be measured or analyzed.399  
The effectiveness of the grievance system came under particular scrutiny in the course of the 
Arbour Commission's inquiry into events at the Prison for Women in 1994 and was the subject 
of some of Justice Arbour’s harshest criticisms:  
Some of these grievances were never answered at all. Those that were answered were almost 
always answered late, in some cases several months after the answers were due. In a number of 
instances, the grievances were responded to by an inappropriate person: either someone not at 
the appropriate level to respond, or someone who could not be expected to have access to the 
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relevant facts. There is no system to effectively prioritize those grievances where the only effec-
tive response would be one received on an urgent basis.400  
Fast forward 13 years and it is a litmus test of the reality of change, the Glube report not-
withstanding, to read the Correctional Investigator’s unveiling of the blatant failure of the 
grievance system in Ashley Smith’s case. 
In response to Ms. Smith's overly restrictive conditions of confinement at Nova Institution for 
Women, Ms. Smith submitted formal complaints through the CSC's Offender Complaints and 
Grievance System.  Ms. Smith submitted seven complaints in August 2007.  
 Ms. Smith alleged the following in her complaints: 
 CSC used excessive force against her during an incident;  
 CSC inappropriately refused to accept a complaint from her that was written by another in-
mate on her behalf even though she was not permitted paper or writing instruments;  
 for a four-day period, she was not permitted to leave her cell to engage in physical exercise;  
 she did not receive a copy of the decisions from the first and fifth working day reviews of her 
segregation status;  
 she was not being permitted sufficient toilet paper for hygiene purposes;  
 she was not being permitted soap in her cell, was only provided with finger foods, and was 
given only a small piece of deodorant on her finger at a time; and  
 while menstruating, she was not permitted underwear or sufficient sanitary products to 
meet her hygiene needs.   
  Response times for complaints 
According to Commissioner's Directive 081 - Offender Complaints and Grievances, when a com-
plaint or grievance is received from an offender the Correctional Service must identify the time 
frame for response.  That is, the response must be designated as either routine priority (requir-
ing a response within 25 working days) or high priority (requiring a response within 15 working 
days).  Correctional Service policy defines high priority as: 
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...complaints and grievances concerning matters that have a direct effect on life, liberty or 
security of the person or that relate to a griever's access to the complaint and grievance 
process.   
Based on the above definition and our review of the grievance documentation, it is my opinion 
that many, if not all of Ms. Smith's complaints at Nova Institution should have been designated 
as requiring a high priority response.  I note, however, that all seven complaints were designated 
as routine priority.  
Inappropriate responses to Ms. Smith's complaints 
Commissioner's Directive 081 - Offender Complaints and Grievances states that the Complaints 
and Grievance process should: 
...ensure that decisions affecting offenders comply with the rule of law, respect for human 
rights, and are ethically sound. 
All seven of the complaints submitted by Ms. Smith at Nova Institution were denied by the Cor-
rectional Service.  It is my opinion that the responses were largely inappropriate and not in com-
pliance with CSC policy.  For example, Ms. Smith had complained that she was being provided 
with an inadequate amount (four squares at a time) of toilet paper and an insufficient number of 
sanitary products during her menstrual cycle.  The Correctional Service rejected these two com-
plaints on the basis that she had been "misusing" the toilet paper and sanitary products.  She 
was advised that she would be provided with more of these items when she reduced her self-
injurious behaviour.  These responses were inappropriate as they did not permit Ms. Smith to 
meet her basic hygiene needs.  
Lack of vigilance 
 Given that Ms. Smith had never submitted complaints to the Correctional Service prior to August 
2007, and given the subject matter, I question why these complaints did not trigger within the 
Correctional Service a review of Ms. Smith's conditions of confinement to ensure that they 
were in keeping with law, policy and Ms. Smith's basic human rights.  Given the severe restric-
tions placed upon Ms. Smith, the Correctional Service had a heightened duty to remain vigilant of 
her care and treatment, inclusive of any allegations of human rights violations.  This does not 
appear to have occurred at Nova Institution.  There is no evidence that these issues were brought 
to the attention of the Warden.  Furthermore, this lack of vigilance appears to have continued 
after Ms. Smith's subsequent transfer to GVI.   
Upon transfer to GVI at the end of August 2007, Ms. Smith found herself in all too familiar re-
strictive conditions of confinement.  In September 2007, Ms. Smith made a final attempt to 
improve these conditions by placing one more complaint in a sealed envelope into the desig-
nated receptacle on her unit at GVI.  Incredibly, this complaint was only opened by the Correc-
tional Service two months after Ms. Smith died.  Despite a policy requirement that should a 
griever die following the submission of a complaint, a response will be prepared and made 
available to any person conducting a lawful investigation, there is no evidence that this griev-
ance has been either reviewed or answered.  
 I provide these details of Ms. Smith's experiences with the CSC's Offender Complaints and Griev-
ance System as concrete examples of the inability of that system to appropriately and reasonably 
resolve inmate complaints in a timely manner. The presence of a more timely, effective, fair and 
responsive internal complaints and grievance system within the Correctional Service could have 
A Flawed Compass             Rhetoric and Reality 
192 
 
significantly improved Ms. Smith's overly restrictive and dehumanizing conditions of confine-
ment.401 
12.4.1 The Panel’s Consideration of Grievances 
In the light of the Correctional Investigators recitation of CSC's record, it is telling that the only 
issue the Panel was asked to consider regarding the grievance system was that of “frivolous and 
vexatious grievances by offenders”. This is the Panel’s commentary: 
CSC is faced with a small number of offenders who file grievances continuously and in large 
numbers. These grievances must be managed more expeditiously, while protecting the offender’s 
right to raise issues of concern for review and action. 
The Panel reviewed legislative alternatives but concluded that they do not offer a fair and expe-
ditious approach to managing these types of grievances. The Panel has concluded that these 
types of grievances should be reviewed and resolved at the first level of the grievance process 
[the warden] and applying CSC policies at that level. 
The Panel is to be commended for not adopting some of the draconian responses to multiple 
grievers to be found in the American federal prison but one is left wondering whether, but for 
the tragedy of her death, would Ashley Smith’s last unanswered complaint had been designated 
“frivolous and vexatious” and following the recommendation of the Panel left to be resolved by 
the Warden of the institution in whose custody she died. 
12.5 Direct Accountability to the Deputy Commissioner for Women  
There is another question which presses for an answer from the findings of the Correctional In-
vestigator. We earlier mentioned that the one recommendation of the Glube report that the 
Panel rejected, at CSC’s urging, was the establishment of a separate stream of women's correc-
tions with the warden's of the women's institutions reporting directly to the Deputy Commis-
sioner for Women. CSC has steadfastly resisted this change.  The Correctional Investigator’s re-
port traced the history of this recommendation and CSC’s resistance:   
Following the events at the Prison for Women in 1994, Justice Arbour recommended that: 
The position of Deputy Commissioner for Women be created within the Correctional Service 
of Canada, at a rank equivalent to that of Regional Deputy Commissioner. 
The federally sentenced women facilities be grouped under a reporting structure independ-
ent of the Regions, with the Wardens reporting directly to the Deputy Commissioner for 
Women.402  
The Correctional Service appointed a Deputy Commissioner for Women (DCW); however, it did 
not afford the position line authority over the women's facilities.  Instead, the DCW was man-
dated to provide advice, guidance and support to the women's facilities (i.e., functional author-
ity), while the wardens of those facilities continued to report to their respective RDCs for opera-
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tional matters.  This was not the "separate stream" for women's corrections that was envisioned 
by Justice Arbour. 
The Expert Committee chaired by Justice Glube in 2006, closely reviewed federal women's correc-
tions in Canada, including the governance model that the CSC chose to put into place for 
women's facilities.  Justice Glube found that there were problems with the governance model 
and she subsequently recommended that:   
...the Correctional Service revisit the women's corrections governance structure in order to 
have the Wardens of the women offender institutions report directly to the Deputy Commis-
sioner for Women. 
The Correctional Service rejected Justice Glube's recommendation as they had rejected Justice 
Arbour's a decade earlier.403 
 As he did with the failure of CSC to implement independent adjudication of segregation, the 
Correctional Investigator considered the impact of CSC’s resistance to the establishment of a 
separate stream of corrections for women on the calamitous events leading to Ashley Smith’s 
death 
As evidenced by the case of Ms. Smith, the current organizational structure resulted in nobody 
taking control for the overall management of what was clearly a very challenging set of behav-
iours.  This is particularly concerning given the excessive number of times that Ms. Smith was 
transferred and given Ms. Smith's continuous placement in segregation.  
The current operational structure for women's corrections has been in place for a decade.  As 
referenced by Justice Glube, and as exemplified by the death of Ms. Smith, it is reasonable to 
state that the current governance structure for women's corrections is flawed and lacks the re-
quired accountability.404  
While we agree that the recommendation of Arbour, Glube and the Correctional Investigator 
are sound, we need to be clear that weaknesses in the governance structure cannot account for 
the treatment of Ashley Smith. Regardless of the specifics of the governance structure surely 
one of the primary roles of the Deputy Commissioner must be to oversee and ensure that 
women are treated fairly and humanely. That mandate requires her exercising responsibility for 
policies governing the operation of women’s institutions. But the mandate also requires a much 
greater commitment to and recognition by CSC that the safeguarding of human rights is the 
heartbeat of its organization. There is nothing in the Panel’s Roadmap that would encourage 
such commitment and, as we have demonstrated, much that would further undermine it. 
12.5.1  The Panel’s Response to Direct Accountability for Women 
In spite of the continuous call by virtually every major review of the circumstances of federally-
sentenced women as well as those of key community organizations and others for direct ac-
countability of institutions for federally-sentenced women to a deputy commissioner, and the 
steadfast resistance to those recommendations by CSC, the Panel simply sides with CSC.  
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The Panel believes the functional role of DCW is currently satisfactory. The Panel agrees with 
CSC’s response to the Expert Committee’s recommendation that a “strong functional and strong 
leadership role by the [DCW], rather than a line authority model, is the most effective govern-
ance structure at this time. Balancing corporate attention and visibility with efficient use of re-
sources is an important element in managing the overall model for women’s corrections.” CSC 
also promised to “enhance and strengthen the relationship of the DCW and her staff with all lev-
els of the organization in order to ensure a clear and sharpened women-centered focus in sup-
port of the women’s correctional model.” The Panel supports this direction.405 
This is the only matter that the Panel does not simply defer to the Glube Committee recom-
mendations and it does so without giving any explanation for their deviation from all previous 
recommendations. Indeed the Panel’s comments on this matter are worded in such vague ter-
minology that one is left to wonder how they were able to dismiss those recommendations so 
easily and without apparently considering the important reasons that gave rise to them. One 
cannot help but suspect that the recommendation conveniently gave CSC the recommendation 
they had been seeking since Arbour. 
12.6 Deaths in Custody 
A Preventable Death  was not the first report the Correctional Investigator had published on the 
subject of a prisoner's death in a Canadian penitentiary that resulted from CSC’s failure to take 
the required or recommended  measures to prevent such  occurrences. In 2006, he commis-
sioned The Deaths in Custody Study which was delivered to CSC In February 2007. This study 
examined 82 reported suicides, homicides, and accidental deaths of inmates while in the cus-
tody of the Correctional Service of Canada during a five year period (2001 to 2005).  The Study 
found the Correctional Service had failed to incorporate lessons learned and to implement cor-
rective action over time and across Regions, with similar errors and observations being made 
incident after incident.  As the Correctional Investigator concluded in his report on Ashley 
Smith’s death, one of the key findings of that Study was that:  
It is likely that some of the deaths in custody could have been averted through improved risk as-
sessments, more vigorous preventative measures, and more competent and timely responses by 
institutional staff.  
 In the concluding section of A Preventable Death the Correctional Investigator lists the numer-
ous ways in which at the institutional, regional and national level there was a failure of ac-
countability: 
The investigations into the death of Ms. Smith that were conducted by this Office and by the Cor-
rectional Service both found that, during her eleven-month period in federal custody, widespread 
breakdowns in many major components of federal corrections occurred, including: 
 inter-Regional transfers;  
 administrative segregation;  
 conditions of confinement;  
                                                     
405  Roadmap, p. 79 
A Flawed Compass             Rhetoric and Reality 
195 
 
 health care;  
 use of force interventions;  
 the delivery of mental health services; and  
 the grievance process.406  
It is the responsibility of the Correctional Service, as a publicly accountable organization man-
dated to provide safe and humane care to offenders, to learn from each of these deaths and to 
implement corrective measures to ensure that preventable deaths do not occur. Yet, in its 
Roadmap to Strengthening Public Safety the Panel, under the umbrella of “offender account-
ability”, recommends “transformative” changes without hardly a reference to the Correctional 
Service of Canada's mandate as set out in the CCRA to provide for safe and humane conditions.  
How then should we view the tragedy of the death of a nineteen year old in a segregation cell 
in the most modern of Canadian prisons within a framework of women centred corrections? 
Nils Christie, one of the world’s most respected criminologist and humanist has suggested this 
approach:   
Punishment can then be seen to reflect our understanding and our values, and is therefore regu-
lated by standards people apply every day for what it is possible and what it is not possible to do 
to others . . . More than a tool for social engineering, the level and kind of punishment is a mirror 
of the standards that reign in a society. So the question for each and every one of us is: would it 
be in accordance with my general set of values to live in a state which represented me in this 
particular way? 407  
What happened to Ashley Smith in 2007 offers such a mirror. In a lead editorial following the 
release of the Correctional Investigator’s report the Globe and Mail captured the images in that 
mirror: 
Ashley Smith was not a killer or a hardened criminal; she was a mentally ill 19-year-old with per-
sonality disorders. Yet when she took her life in federal prison, she had been confined for1 ½  
months to a solitary cell measuring 6 ft. by 9 ft., without a mattress, a book, or pen and paper. 
Seven staff looked on as she suffocated after tying a ligature around her neck. They did not go to 
her aid because, for bureaucratic reasons, they had been instructed to wait until she stopped 
breathing. 
Her suicide in 2007 is a black mark on Canada's mental-health and corrections systems. Canada 
is simply not equipped to handle extreme behavioural disorders in children and teenagers. The 
Dickensian response to Ms. Smith, as described in an inquiry report last week by Correctional In-
vestigator Howard Sapers, is indicative of wide failings that even now are probably being felt by 
an unknown number of inmates and mental patients. 
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This was not some backwoods jail in which Ms. Smith was kept. This was Canada's federal prison 
system, governed by laws and policies that reflect Canadians' expectations of humaneness for all 
prisoners. Yet those laws and policies were routinely violated, even subverted408 
In his elegant and evocative book A Just Measure of Pain, Michael Ignatieff has provided us 
with clear images of the nature of solitary confinement in the penitentiary in the nineteenth 
century.  
The night was the hardest time of all. Sleep was likely to be fitful and restless. A convict worked 
out the night watching the stars or the clouds scudding across the moon through the cell win-
dow, and listening to the catacomb silence. Sometimes there were screams. Men came apart in 
the loneliness and the silence ...The wardens came for the ones who cried out and took them 
down to the infirmary.409 
In Prisoners of Isolation Michael Jackson, in describing the conditions of solitary confinement in 
the 20th century, suggested that these images continue to have a terrible relevance in the con-
temporary Canadian penitentiary. The entrenchment of human rights in the Charter and their 
recognition in the CCRA was intended to ensure that the cries in the night might begin to re-
cede from our collective memory.  
12.7 Conclusion 
Ashley Smith may not have cried out aloud for her jailers to hear as she lay dying in a segrega-
tion cell. But can anyone doubt that not only that day but for a long time before she had been 
crying out? Can anyone imagine that faced with the experience of their own child crying out in 
such a disturbed and disturbing manner that they would not intervene until she was close to 
death? Would anyone accept as justification for such neglect the intention to hold her account-
able and thereby change her behaviour?   Respect for human dignity and our common human-
ity bespeaks and begs for humane intervention. Human dignity and dignity's child suffered a 
fatal blow when Ashley Smith was allowed to die.  
The Panel is not responsible for Ashley Smith's death. But the Panel has adopted the same poli-
cies adopted by the highly stressed staff at Grand Valley who subjugated the rights of Ashley 
Smith to the perceived needs of security and control. In our view the Panel was too easily cap-
tured by those who promote deprivation as a means to achieve compliance in a system where 
compliance often trumps all other considerations such as the desperate circumstance or mental 
health of the individual. The importance of vigilant and principled leadership in maintaining 
conditions that respect the rights of individuals confined by the power of the state was missed 
entirely. Indeed, the Panel demonstrated a failure of leadership to address the most vexatious 
and pernicious problem of corrections through the ages: providing safe and humane conditions 
through respect for human rights in a prison environment.    
All of this speaks to the dangers of creating major “transformative” policy virtually overnight by 
a largely unqualified group under a heavy cloud of political expediency. Surely these factors 
                                                     
408  Globe and Mail March 10, 2009 
409  Michael Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in the Industrial Revolution 1750-1850, p.9 
A Flawed Compass             Rhetoric and Reality 
197 
 
alone warrant that the report be set aside as a failed experiment in public policy. That it was 
accepted in its entirety without any apparent internal critical review or public consultation as 
the future for CSC is alarming. Surely in this case the emperor has no clothes. 
The Panel’s Roadmap seeks to move the Correctional Service of Canada away from an un-
equivocal commitment to respect and protect the human rights of prisoners as the centerpiece 
of its operations. It is a flawed moral and legal compass. It points in the wrong direction; a di-
rection that, tragically and inevitably, will bring yet more chapters in an already overburdened 
history of abuse and mismanagement of correctional authority through gross disregard of hu-
man dignity.  




So what should readers conclude from our response? We have challenged the Roadmap’s frame-
work for transforming the future of the Canadian correctional system on many grounds. The princi-
pal themes that have informed our critique of the proposed transformation are that it falls short of 
two of the fundamental criteria for a correctional system for the 21st century. The first of those 
criteria is that in law, policy and practice the system must demonstrate its overriding commitment 
to the protection of human rights. The fact that nowhere in their analysis does the Panel, even for a 
paragraph, reflect on the concept of human rights when discussing the future of the most coercive 
arm of the state is unpardonable and we would argue that for this reason alone the Roadmap to 
Strengthening Public Safety  is  discredited. We do not have to labour over the hard lessons learnt 
from Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay to understand the essential relationship between human 
rights and imprisonment. In Canada our own legacy of abuse, most recently exposed in the report 
of Justice Louise Arbour and the Correctional Investigators report on the death of Ashley Smith and 
in the continuing and increasing over-representation of Aboriginal prisoners, should make it clear 
that complacency has no place in our commitment to human rights. 
The second criterion for a “correctional system” is that it must “correct.” If a correctional system is 
to correct, then we must judge its operation in that light and asses any proposals for changes on 
the basis of likely outcomes. While the Roadmap makes very substantial recommendation for 
change, in major areas it provides a dearth of evidence for the likely effect, let alone benefit of 
them. They claim that the abolition of statutory release will result in more prisoners actively follow-
ing their correctional plans and, therefore, being released by the National Parole Board on the road 
to reintegration - without any evidence. They propose massive investment in work readiness as the 
key to post release success – without evidence. They dismiss most education beyond basic job 
training – without evidence. And so it goes time and time again thus raising the larger question of 
whether key elements of the transformation agenda have any foundation stronger than the beliefs 
of the Panel and senior CSC management.  
For years CSC has, through its own research branch and in conjunction with the research branch of 
the Ministry of Public Safety and the academic community conducted some of the most advanced 
research and analysis of what can be done within the correctional environment that serves to re-
duce recidivism. CSC often prides itself in its international reputation in this respect and yet all this 
was entirely ignored by the Panel who instead substituted their personal beliefs. How was this pos-
sible and, more importantly, why was this possible?  
In our opening chapter we trace back statements of the Prime Minister that clearly dismisses, even 
derides, evidence as the basis of public policy in criminal justice. We identified long-held positions 
of founding political parties to the current governing party that now appear in the report as major 
recommendations – political positions that were never analyzed objectively or justified with evi-
dence. 
A Flawed Compass               Conclusion 
199 
 
When we hold the Roadmap up to the record of the impressive reports of previous royal commis-
sions, commissions of inquiry and parliamentary committees that have marked the progression of 
Canadian corrections over the course of almost two centuries, it lacks the essential features of a 
landmark pointing the way to a better future, a safer future, a more just and humane future. What 
it represents is a warning sign of the dangers of forming public policy in one of the most difficult 
and challenging areas of our democracy where the most fundamental rights are at stake, in the 
crucible of narrow political ideology. That the Panel did not have the necessary strengths and inde-
pendence to carry out its broad mandate and that it was given an impossibly short timeframe have 
only contributed to what must be regarded as an abject failure in reshaping Canadian corrections.  
It is one of the great ironies, but also very telling, that a document so flawed has so quickly become 
the blueprint for operational change and opening of the public purse. Many of the recommenda-
tions of the Roadmap do not require changes to the legislative framework and are in the process of 
being implemented. We have been told that “the train has left the station” and that critical com-
mentary will not bring it back. Our response is that if the train is heading for a crash the responsible 
step is to try and stop it in its tracks before it does irreversible harm.  
There are other parts of the Roadmap that recommend legislative amendment to the legislative 
framework of corrections. In June 2009, in the final days of the session the Honourable Peter Van 
Loan, Minister of Public Safety, introduced in Parliament a package of legislative amendments to 
the CCRA identified as Bill C-43.   The direct link between the Roadmap and the proposed amend-
ments is made clear in the Minister’s statements “It sets the foundation to strengthen the federal 
correctional system as we are proposing with the tabling of this bill”.410  
We carefully considered adding as a final chapter to this response our commentary on Bill C- 43. 
We have decided however that it is better to distribute this commentary as a separate albeit com-
panion document. The Roadmap is being held up by CSC as the foundation for correctional trans-
formation displacing and eclipsing every other vision of corrections. The implications for the poli-
cies, practices and values contained in the Roadmap go far beyond that which requires legislative 
change and so we did not want readers to assume that Bill-43 is the complete response of the Gov-
ernment to the report. Indeed Bill C-43 it is likely to be only the first of several Bills, including one 
to abolish statutory release.  As a matter of historical record we have an obligation to make it as 
clear as we can that this is a vision that offers a false promise of public safety, obscuring its great 
detrimental impact on the protection of human rights and effective corrections. We also have an 
obligation to make it clear to those who will be deliberating upon the merits of Bill C. 43 that its 
amendments are not the “modernization” of the correctional system as the government would 
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